Special Edition: EU fitness check

“The fossil-fuel economy has reached its limits.” With these words, Ursula von der Leyen unveiled her Fit for 55 package on July 14, 2021 – a sweeping set of measures aimed at putting Europe on the path to climate neutrality and ushering in a new economic miracle. We covered her plans in the very first edition of Europe.Table.

Today, you’re reading our 1,000th Professional Briefing. Over the past four years, we have closely tracked the Fit for 55 legislation and many other major initiatives as they made their way through the EU’s legislative process. In this special edition, we want to take a step back and look at the bigger picture: How much progress has the European Union made in these four years? Is the bloc – often accused of being slow and cumbersome – ready for a rapidly changing world?

To answer that, we’ve revisited the big topics from our early days: the Green Deal, efforts to rein in digital giants, the debate over e-fuels, and the phase-out of combustion engines. And of course, the constant internal wrangling within the German government, which all too often ended with the infamous “German vote.” One thing is clear: Europe is making progress, but the road has been anything but straight.

At least on one question, Europeans are united: Döner kebab belongs to everyone. That message from Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen reached us just in time for lunch on Wednesday – as you’ll see at the end of this edition in Manuel Berkel’s report. Enjoy the read!

Yours,
Till Hoppe

It’s an issue that has been with us since the early days of Europe.Table – the German vote. Germany fails to bring its full weight to bear in Brussels, as coalition governments are often unable to reach consensus, with ministries getting bogged down in endless rounds of coordination. Back in 2021, CDU European policy expert Elmar Brok observed, “The federal government is too often unable to speak in Brussels.”

The traffic light coalition did acknowledge the problem and pledged to do better. Yet the increasingly fractious relationship between the SPD, Greens, and FDP was reflected in voting behavior in the EU Council: while the federal government abstained just once in the Council in 2022 for lack of consensus, according to the EU Council Monitor of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, that number rose to eight times in the coalition’s final year, 2024.

Sometimes, coalition partners argued their disagreements in public – whether over the combustion engine ban, supply chain legislation, or platform work. The low point came when Chancellor Olaf Scholz used his directive authority to force a “no” on tariffs for Chinese electric vehicles – only to realize afterward that the federal government was largely isolated among EU member states.

His successor, Friedrich Merz, is determined to do things differently. The new chancellor has made European policy a top priority, declaring that German votes must become the rare exception. In coalition talks with the SPD, he pushed for a centralization of EU coordination in the chancellery.

In the end, they agreed to strengthen the chancellery’s role on key EU dossiers. Merz brought in Michael Clauß, a close confidant and seasoned expert on the Brussels machine, to serve as his adviser and power center for European coordination. As a longtime EU ambassador, Clauß can draw on an excellent network. During sensitive tariff negotiations between the European Commission and the US government, for example, Clauß maintained close contact with Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of staff, Björn Seibert.

As ambassador, Clauß had himself pointed out the problem – in an internal cable, he criticized the federal government’s frequent inability to act in Brussels. To handle the workload, the chancellery’s Europe division will be expanded by one or two additional units.

The problems are obvious: under the traffic light coalition, ministries often got stuck on the working level, with political leaders failing to address conflicts early on. In other cases, (FDP) ministers stepped on the brakes late in the legislative process – prompting head-shaking in Brussels.

The CDU-SPD government wants to identify and resolve conflicts earlier. This includes more intensive cabinet deliberations, where EU dossiers were previously handled mostly pro forma. For example, ministers held in-depth discussions in advance over Germany’s position on EU financial planning.

Merz confidant Thorsten Frei plays a key role. As chancellery minister, he leads the circle of senior civil servants who prepare Wednesday’s cabinet meetings on Mondays – and who are now also tasked with resolving contentious EU issues. Frei is said by government sources to take the role seriously, relying on thorough preparation from Clauß and making decisions himself.

That’s what happened with passenger rights: the Polish Council presidency wanted to revive an old European Commission proposal that would have significantly weakened protections for airline passengers facing delays. The CDU-led transport ministry supported the move, while the SPD-led justice and consumer affairs ministry opposed it. Frei ultimately sided with Justice Minister Stefanie Hubig.

CDU and SPD also want to make improvements at the working level. The four main EU coordination offices – the chancellery, foreign office, economics ministry, and finance ministry – now monitor in real time which critical EU dossiers are likely to spark conflict. Department heads use these findings to prepare the circle of state secretaries.

Still, the new structure has yet to prove itself. The traffic light coalition, after all, was initially harmonious. And the CDU now controls three of the four coordinating ministries. That carries “the risk that the SPD will only realize late that it disagrees on certain issues, leading to public disputes once again,” warns SWP expert Nicolai von Ondarza.

First conflicts are already simmering. Merz wants to abolish the EU supply chain directive (CSDDD) altogether – which the SPD firmly rejects. The only thing that saved the coalition from its first German vote was the Polish Council presidency: in the ongoing omnibus process, it waived a formal vote in the Council, instead simply asking for member state opinions. Germany’s representative remained silent.

Some observers called the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act nothing less than Europe’s digital constitution when Europe.Table began its reporting in summer 2021. The digital laws were meant to safeguard human-centered, democracy-promoting, and rule-of-law principles in the online world, ensure fair competition – and, ideally, serve as a model for regulations worldwide.

Now, however, reality has set in. Key allies have not followed the EU’s lead – in the US, the opposite has happened. Nor have the laws produced breakthrough results. “It’s still too early to say what the DMA and DSA can actually deliver,” says Marc Liesching, professor of media theory and media law at HTWK Leipzig.

Others are less patient. There were two main goals, says Alexandra Geese, Green MEP and shadow rapporteur for the DSA: to end surveillance through profiling and targeting, and to make algorithms transparent and subject to change. The prevailing algorithms, with their interaction-based ranking, have led to disinformation spreading more quickly than information. Under the DSA, the Commission has the power to require such algorithms to be replaced. The aim, she says, must be to let users once again choose for themselves how content is curated.

Tiemo Wölken is among those who describe the DSA as a digital basic law. “In practice, though, this is not yet the case,” says the SPD MEP and rapporteur on digital services for the European Parliament’s initiative report. He notes that enforcement does not fall to an independent authority but to the Commission – making it political as well.

For Wölken, personalized advertising remains the core problem in the attention-driven platform business model. He wants to see “a continued phase-out of personalized advertising.” That ban didn’t make it into the law. Wölken sees the DMA as far faster and more effective in practice than the DSA. The DSA case against X, for example, has been ongoing since December 2023.

But even under the DMA, proceedings are progressing only slowly. Of 47 investigations launched, just two ended in April this year with multimillion-euro fines against Apple and Meta. One was closed, the rest are ongoing. “It was clear from the outset that the Commission’s limited resources as a supervisory authority would make rapid, comprehensive enforcement of the DSA a challenge,” says Liesching.

Geopolitics is another hurdle. Geese and Wölken warn against making concessions on digital law enforcement. Geese calls it “incredibly frustrating” that the EU is letting itself be intimidated by US tariff threats.

There’s also the issue of evolving technology. For Albrecht von Sonntag, co-founder of price comparison portal Idealo, there’s no question that the DMA should also cover new AI products such as Google’s AI Overviews. The new service provides AI-generated answers – and the DMA requires gatekeepers not to favor their own services over similar offerings from other providers. “Google’s AI answer is a separate service, embedded in search and positioned at the top,” von Sonntag says. That clearly violates the DMA’s rules.

The DMA needs to be expanded, von Sonntag argues, to ensure that citizens and consumers are protected when using AI applications. “To do that, the Commission must subject large language models to the DMA as potential core platform services,” he says.

Others are critical of quick changes to the digital laws. Geese warns against rolling the DMA and DSA into the planned digital policy omnibus: “We should focus on enforcement before we start thinking about revising them.” Liesching of HTWK Leipzig adds, “If you reform a law every year or two, neither companies nor authorities have any legal certainty.” That certainty, he stresses, is essential for effective and sustainable implementation.

It seems like a distant memory – a time when the European Commission could put a landmark climate package on the table without provoking an outcry. There was criticism of the Fit for 55 package on July 14, 2021, but it was nowhere near as fundamental as it is today. Back then, the debate mostly centered on details that member states, lawmakers, business leaders, and NGOs wanted to sharpen or soften.

The goal itself was largely undisputed: to cut the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions by more than half by the end of the decade – and to become the first climate-neutral continent by mid-century. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called it Europe’s “man on the moon moment.”

That consensus held for quite some time. Even as negotiations between the Council and Parliament were tough and contentious – giving politicians and us journalists many a long night – the argument was mostly over more climate protection, not less. With the energy price crisis and REPowerEU, there was even fresh momentum for decarbonization a few months later: renewables were widely seen as the path to greater independence and competitiveness.

A lot was achieved. The targets for effort sharing and emissions trading were raised, a new ETS for buildings and transport was created – including a fund for social compensation. The CO₂ border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) was introduced, along with stricter targets for renewables and energy efficiency, and a regulatory framework for hydrogen. The only area where member states have yet to agree is on greener energy taxation.

But the winds have since shifted. The economic climate has worsened, and conservative and populist parties made gains in the European elections. Under pressure from the EPP, von der Leyen has rebranded her Green Deal as the Clean Industrial Deal. Framing her project in terms of competitiveness is now her central defense – but she’s also prepared to give up much that no longer seems essential. Some of the omnibus bills reflect this; laws that were only recently passed are now seen as too bureaucratic and are being watered down.

Clear rollbacks remain rare. In the CBAM omnibus, the Commission managed to exempt 91% of affected companies from reporting obligations, while still covering 99% of emissions. In other areas, lawmakers had already agreed during negotiations to exempt small and medium-sized enterprises – for example, from energy efficiency audits.

The next climate target is already up for debate. This time, the goal is a 90% reduction in emissions by 2040. But unlike four years ago, there is major doubt as to whether such a target could even win majority support. The built-in flexibilities are telling. Europe no longer wants to achieve all of the savings on its own, but also to finance climate protection measures on other continents. That marks a paradigm shift – it’s no longer about more climate action at all costs.

Deepen, reform, or even slow down – where should the Green Deal go from here? For now, simply implementing what has already been agreed will take years. Governments are also pressuring the Commission to deepen ongoing reforms. In December, the Council plans to discuss a white paper on a fundamental reform of the electricity market – aiming to curb the seemingly relentless rise in prices.

The Greens warn against abandoning the Green Deal halfway through. “The Green Deal is not a nice-to-have – it’s the backbone of a sustainable union,” says MEP Michael Bloss. Anyone who loses their nerve now, he argues, risks not just the climate, but also Europe’s economic strength and strategic sovereignty. By contrast, the EPP has already called for more flexibility in setting the 2040 climate target. “Anyone who fights flexibility is helping ensure there will be no climate target for 2040 at all,” said CDU MEP Peter Liese. Resistance from other member states to the 90% target is intense.

Others are dangling the dubious promise of lowering Green Deal costs by “stretching out” implementation over time. In Germany, for example, the narrative goes that electricity demand is not rising as quickly as expected, so fewer transmission lines and renewables are needed.

But policymakers could stretch out the costs in time, not the decarbonization itself. There are already financing ideas for this, such as amortization accounts for grid expansion. What’s needed is real cost transparency: grids, for example, are the cheapest form of energy storage.

Real savings could come from tough regulation and siphoning off high profits. Also, by foregoing extras like underground cables and confronting uncomfortable debates – such as demand-side flexibility. Google’s recent commitment to power down data centers at times of high demand shows that forward-looking companies can find ways to support decarbonization.

Few issues have sparked such fierce and ideological debate over the years as the phase-out of combustion engines – and with it, the question of what role e-fuels can play in decarbonizing transport. Hydrogen-based, low-carbon fuels could offer combustion technology a bridge to the future, even though the phase-out is already written into EU law for 2035.

Environmental groups such as T+E oppose e-fuels in road transport. Like Green and Social Democratic policymakers, they argue that production requires large amounts of energy. Low-carbon fuels, they say, are scarce and needed for aviation and shipping. Battery-electric solutions are more efficient, and EVs are further along in the market than combustion engines running on e-fuels. That’s why they are staunchly defending the 2035 combustion engine ban – even though, from a climate perspective, they could support the use of low-carbon fuels.

The European Commission, under Frans Timmermans, went all in on EVs. As early as July 2021, when the Fit for 55 draft legislation was unveiled, Ralf Diemer of the eFuel Alliance was already lamenting that EU regulations put e-fuels at a disadvantage.

Since then, the Commission has passed two laws advancing e-fuels. The Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) sets a binding sub-quota of 1% for renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBO). Member states have the option to set higher quotas in their implementation – and some have, including Finland (4.1%) and Germany (2% by 2032). In industry, RFNBOs must replace 42% of hydrogen consumption by 2030.

There are also quotas for e-fuels in shipping and aviation. The FuelEU Maritime and ReFuelEU Aviation regulations set binding sub-quotas of 1% and 1.2%, respectively, for e-fuels by 2030, with higher targets in later years. These changes, says Diemer, are “giving real momentum to e-fuels production.”

Diemer, however, criticizes the EU’s strict requirements. He remains dissatisfied with two delegated acts setting criteria for the recognition of e-fuels, concerning the sources of electricity and CO₂ used in their production. “These strict rules mean investors see no business case for e-fuels in the EU.”

When it comes to e-fuels for cars, regulatory silence prevails. Under pressure from the German government, the Commission agreed during CO₂ fleet emissions trilogue talks to create a regulatory “e-fuels only” category for cars and light commercial vehicles. The Commission then wanted to require that e-fuels used in cars be 100% CO₂-free. Diemer counters, “100% is technically impossible.” The Commission’s proposal was not pursued further in the relevant Technical Committee on Motor Vehicles (TCMV).

After the summer recess, clarity is expected. The next high-level Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry – chaired by Ursula von der Leyen – is scheduled to take place. Manufacturers and the EPP are calling for a technology-neutral approach in the upcoming review of CO₂ fleet regulations. Introducing a carbon correction factor would make the use of e-fuels more attractive to manufacturers.

In exchange, they would receive relief in meeting CO₂ fleet targets. The eFuel Alliance and the EPP are also pushing for amendments to the delegated acts that are slowing the ramp-up, as part of a planned automotive omnibus bill.

Industrial scale-up of e-fuels production is falling behind schedule. In 2022, Porsche invested in e-fuels project company HIF Global. At the time, the pilot plant Haru Oni, located in Chile’s windy south, was supposed to produce 150,000 tons of e-methanol by 2025, with a commercial plant expected to ramp up to 1.3 million tons by 2027. Porsche now reports that “less than 100,000 tons were produced” in 2024. Further scaling at additional HIF sites is proving complicated, with “generally difficult conditions (local permits, the political and regulatory environment, geopolitical tensions, and international investor appetite).”

The EU Commission intends to continue exploring ways to support investments in US liquefied natural gas export terminals. So far, the authority has not settled on a specific option, an EU official told Table.Briefings on Wednesday. “But the EU is determined to work with the US to identify possible investments – including in US LNG export infrastructure – and to facilitate them where it makes sense and is relevant.”

The Commission first announced such plans in February. In the action plan for affordable energy, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen wrote that the EU or member states could support European importers making direct investments in foreign export infrastructure by offering private investors preferential loans.

Another EU initiative could launch as early as September. Following the energy deal with the US, the Commission published a statement outlining its understanding of the arrangement. In it, the Commission said it would use the AggregateEU mechanism for joint demand aggregation and gas procurement to match demand from European companies with offers of US LNG for the period 2025 to 2050. Demand aggregation could start as soon as September, an EU official said this week. “We’re ready to move forward, provided there is interest and demand,” the official added.

According to the Commission, AggregateEU differs from the new and permanent gas procurement mechanism, which the Commission plans to develop as part of the recently launched EU Energy and Raw Materials Platform. The new mechanism is expected to be operational in 2026. Manuel Berkel

The associations VDMA, ZVEI, VCI, and the German Pharmaceutical Industry Association are calling for European regulation to be made fit for industrial use through the upcoming digital omnibus package. In a letter to German Digital Minister Karsten Wildberger, the associations warn that, without appropriate adjustments, industry will be unable to unlock its existing data assets. This concern applies especially to the AI Act, the Data Act, and the Cyber Resilience Act.

Among other demands, they call for industrial AI to be excluded from the scope of the AI Regulation. A one-size-fits-all approach, they argue, leads to duplicate regulations and legal uncertainty in industry. The use of machinery and components is already comprehensively regulated under the New Legislative Framework.

They also criticize the Data Act, insisting that data sharing in the business sector must continue to be based on voluntary and contractual agreements. On the other hand, they support enabling data space initiatives such as Manufacturing-X and sphin-X.

The associations are also calling for longer implementation periods. The effective dates for the regulations, they say, must take into account the availability of harmonized standards and drafts, as well as allow sufficient time for adoption. Corinna Visser

Gaza war: Several political group leaders in the EU Parliament accuse Israel of genocide in the Gaza Strip in a letter to Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and António Costa and urge an immediate response from EU leaders. To the letter.

Tobacco tax: Impact analysis on excise regulations for tobacco products. To the document.

How many times have we reported on divisions among EU member states over issues like nuclear energy or joint debt? It’s a relief, then, that Europeans can agree on at least one thing: döner kebab belongs to everyone. This message from Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen reached us on Wednesday, just in time for lunch, right in the middle of our anniversary issue’s production.

You may recall: the International Doner Federation from Turkey had applied to register döner as a guaranteed traditional specialty in the EU. That would put the meat-filled flatbread alongside Dutch herring, Neapolitan pizza, and Belgian cherry beer. Colleagues in other media were already speculating about rising prices and the future of kebab shops.

A look at the application teaches you a lot about what defines a true döner. Not only does it reveal the official spice blend, but you’ll also learn that the meat block must be cut egg-, pendulum-, or cone-shaped, and that Bavaria offers formal training for “döner kebab butchers” or “döner kebab specialists.” Markus #söderisst would approve.

Turkey’s bold application set off alarm bells with Poland’s PiS party. “The German style of döner kebab preparation has become hugely popular across Europe, especially in Poland,” MEP Kosma Złotowski wrote to the Commission. According to studies, people in Poland reportedly consume up to five million kebabs per day. The PiS politician worriedly asked whether, in the future, all döner in the EU would have to follow a single recipe—and whether regional variations would be recognized as their own specialties.

Poland was not alone in its concerns. Many member states have spoken out against registering döner as a guaranteed traditional specialty, Commissioner Hansen replied on Wednesday. The Commission must now make a decision – “taking into account all the elements submitted by both the applicant and the opponents.” The weight of the döner spit now rests squarely on Hansen’s shoulders.