Table.Media: Mr. Lindner, you were German ambassador to India until the middle of last year. Why does the Modi government find it so difficult to distance itself from Russia?
Walter Lindner : It's not sympathy for Vladimir Putin or his war of aggression – but both countries have a long history. Even Gandhi had a good relationship with Moscow. In the 1970s, when Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan with India's help, the Soviet Union was India's only supporter. The West was united behind Pakistan. This is something that has never been forgotten in India. The Soviet Union supplied weapons that no one else was supplying. Add to that the geographical proximity to Pakistan and especially China, which always forces India to do a balancing act. Maneuvering between China, Russia and the West is not easy.
And that explains the reluctance?
India is a complex, unique country: 1.4 billion inhabitants, ten world religions, all federally organized, hundreds of languages, spirituality everywhere, a 7000-year history – the country is incredibly complex, and it takes time to recognize and penetrate that.
Are you saying we don't really perceive the country?
Definitely yes! India, apart from its size, is a democracy, unlike, say, China, with freedom of expression, trade unions, freedom of the press, and a lively culture of debate. The Indians get elections organized, have managed vaccination well – these alone are great achievements. Angela Merkel has always been fascinated by this country. On top of that, the population is growing – 20 million people are added every year. With the corresponding need for schools, social services, infrastructure, this is an enormous challenge. We in Europe are not aware of this.
One might expect clear language from a democracy: The aggressor in this war is clearly defined.
India does not fit into the usual categories. First, we are dealing with a self-confident society. Secondly, they don't want to get on the wrong side of the Russians. In addition, when people from the West come with their index finger raised, people immediately remember the colonial times, and the old aversions are back. This results in permanently cautious tactics. Western know-it-alls are not popular anywhere in the Global South – not even in India.
That the war could also have something to do with India cannot be conveyed?
Our Western argument is always: The principle of the inviolability of borders, which Putin has brutally violated, has consequences for the whole world. It could be the blueprint for the actions of other major powers that are much closer to India. The Indians listen to this approvingly but then say that the Americans were also in Iraq, Vietnam and Libya, so where was the insistence on international law? India is an immensely fascinating country, but also a self-confident, sometimes unyielding partner. But it is always worth the effort to deal with that.
Does geographic distance matter?
Absolutely. For us, Ukraine is very close, and the threat to neighboring states is a threat to all of Europe. But for India and many others, it is far away and not an immediate threat. Although, of course, you feel the impact of the sanctions on grain and energy prices and the impact on supply chains. But people see this as a European conflict rather than a global one. And they say, “Solve this! It's your conflict!”.
You just mentioned it – the price increases affect India a lot.
What India always brings up: Border violations by China or attacks by Islamist terrorists in India do not make headlines in the West either. There's a certain inequality from India's point of view. Everything that happens in Europe should be taken very seriously by the Indians. Conversely, what happens in the Indo-Pacific region is of less interest in Europe. This is felt on the subcontinent, and that's why they don't want to be patronized.
Is India trying to maintain a kind of equidistance from Russia and the United States?
I don't see it that way. The Indians say they have their own way, which is always for non-violence and peace negotiations and against any bloc formation. India is a protagonist of multilateralism with many power factors and centers in the world. Nobody wants to go back to the old bipolarity. That's why Prime Minister Narendra Modi just tried to salvage a consensus at the G20 foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi and not let the war issue overshadow everything and divide the world into two camps again – albeit with limited success.
Do the Indians see a role for themselves in the conflict – possibly as mediators?
India's role is to advocate peaceful solutions in the spirit of Gandhi. Of course, behind closed doors, they are not happy about what Putin has instigated. But at the same time, they suspect that there will only be a solution if Putin, the aggressor, stops the war or if all sides agree to a peaceful solution. Apart from appeals for a ceasefire and talks, there is not much left. People would certainly be willing to help, but they don't see that as realistic at the moment.
How do we convince countries like India, Brazil or South Africa of our social model and our values?
What is always striking, especially to me as a diplomat, is how Eurocentrically we look at the world from the perspective of Germany and Europe. We believe that everyone thinks like us. But that's not how it is. It is wishful thinking to believe that our values are shared everywhere. We have to keep promoting and arguing – but not with the internalized Eurocentrism that clings to us. We need to pay more attention to individual countries, their history and their regional characteristics. There simply remains a lot of work, sometimes painstaking work, to convince other world regions of our value model.
Dealing with Covid has not made us more sympathetic in the global South either.
That's true, though. There were really bumpy moments. For example, the approval procedures for Indian vaccines took a very long time, while European vaccines were approved quickly in India. That doesn't go down well. Today, both sides are smarter. Europe has realized that the goods produced in India are good, and India has realized that good quality and global control of vaccines are also in its own interest.
Would we be more persuasive if we didn't get caught up in our own contradictions? We like to rail against autocrats, but when it suits us, we court them ...
... in India and elsewhere in the Global South, they see that many countries in the North have a colonial past, and Germany, in addition, the pitch black chapter of the Holocaust. So they know that our European values have not always been groundbreaking either. The fact that we, of all people, are now coming up with moral yardsticks does not sit well with everyone.
What does that mean for Germany?
We can't always apply our own point of view. The perception of Europe beyond Europe is not free of conflict. All the more reason for us to explain again and again – and not postcolonially or with a moralistic index finger – what we stand for and why we act as we do. That we have learned lessons from our own history and that we, therefore, now want to do things better. But that's a mammoth task.
We are one of the largest exporting nations in the world. Why is our view so narrowed?
Politicians often have other priorities: Domestic politics, or, for example, cohesion in Europe, the German-American relationship, Brexit until recently, or the relationship with Russia. We have a tendency to indulge in navel-gazing. It is the job of the Foreign Office and also of the embassies to promote the views of over 190 countries around the globe to us in order to get a comprehensive picture.
