Lassen die USA Europa im Stich, Herr McMaster?

Sprecher 1: Table Today mit Michael Bröker und Helene Bubrowski.

Sprecher 2: Herzlich willkommen zu diesem Podcast-Spezial an diesem Samstag, den 11. Mai. Ich bin Helene Bubrowski und freue mich sehr, dass Sie sich Zeit nehmen für das Gespräch, das mein Kollege Markus Bickel, Redaktionsleiter des Security Table, und Jan Kallmorgan, Partner der Unternehmensberatung EY und Berater von Firmen und Investoren zu geostrategischen Fragen, zusammen mit Herbert Raymond McMaster geführt haben. McMaster ist ehemaliger Drei-Sterne-General der US-Armee und war nationaler Sicherheitsberater des Präsidenten Donald Trump. In dem rund einstündigen Gespräch gibt H.R. McMaster Einblicke darin, wie die Weltmacht USA geostrategisch in diesen Tagen der multiplen globalen Krisen tickt. Es geht um die konkreten Bedrohungen, die von strategischen Allianzen zwischen Ländern wie zum Beispiel Russland, China und dem Iran wirklich ausgehen. Ebenso um die Bedeutung des Taurus für die Ukraine und die möglichen Optionen Israels im Gaza-Krieg. Und McMaster spricht auch darüber, was eine erneute Amtszeit von Donald Trump für die europäische Sicherheitspolitik bedeuten würde.

Sprecher 3: Ich bin manchmal ein bisschen zu ehrlich, aber ganz im Ernst, ich mag es einfach klar, ohne Überraschungen. Genau deshalb bin ich bei Frank, dem einfach Mobilfunkanbieter. App runterladen, Tarif bestellen, fertig. 20 GB für 10 Euro. In bester D-Netz-Qualität. Monatlich kündbar, keine versteckten Kosten. Und das Beste ist Frank for Friends. Ich schicke einfach meinen Code an meine FreundInnen. Und jedes Mal, wenn jemand darüber startet, kriegen wir alle dauerhaft extra Datenvolumen. Kein Drama, keine Geheimnisse. Also, probier's mit Frank. Ist ehrlich einfacher.

Sprecher 4: Good evening from Berlin. Welcome to Security Table live briefing. Wie tickt die Weltmacht USA? Geostrategische Interessen in Nahost und Ukraine. Herzlich willkommen. My name is Markus Bickel. I'm head of the Security Table in Berlin, and I'm pleasured to have here with us tonight General H.R. McMaster, whom we will be discussing issues of war theaters in the Middle East. And in Ukraine tonight, my partner, Security Table's partner, is Jan Kalmorgan, our geopolitical expert, who is advising clients of Ernest& Young on geostrategic matters. Welcome to us here tonight, Jan. And welcome to you, General McMaster. Just a short introduction. You've retired from the U.S. Army a few years ago, but have been serving in the Gulf War in 1991, among other things. Operations you've been involved in. It was also Operation Iraqi Freedom after 2003. And you've been also serving in Germany in Bamberg from 1989 until 1992, when you were deployed to Operation Desert Storm in Iraq. If you will, I think we can call you an intellectual general. You have a PhD in American history, and your latest book is called Battlegrounds, The Fight to Defend the Free World. You have another book coming up later in the year, which talks about your experience as national security advisor from 2017 to 2018. And of course, the question what the elections will bring in your country in the U.S. Will be part of our discussion today. For our audience, the first half of the hour we have together, I and Jan will be addressing our questions to General McMaster. And after about half an hour, the floor is open to your questions. Please send them via chat into the Zoom talk we're in, and we'll be picking out questions when you send them in to discuss your view of things and have the time for you as well. So let's jump right into the discussion. General, you've been serving in Iraq twice during your long work for the U.S. Army. Looking at the war the U.S. Had to battle, for example, in Fallujah in Iraq, what lessons do you draw from there for the war the IDF is fighting in Israel, in Gaza right now?

Sprecher 2: Hey, Marcus. It's great to be with you.

Sprecher 5: John, guten Abend. I've missed Germany a lot. I spent six and a half years in Germany and loved every moment of it. Hey, I'll just tell you that I think there are certain lessons that you can apply, certainly, between Iraq and Gaza. But there are certain factors that are not the same. In Iraq, we had the opportunity to partner very closely with Iraqi forces, Iraqi forces who were protecting the Iraqi population, who had borne the brunt of the violence from al-Qaeda in Iraq, especially during the surge period. And that was certainly our experience in the Iraqi city of Tal Afar. I think what is immensely important in these operations is obviously to try to minimize the harm to innocent civilians. But it's very difficult when you have an organization like Hamas, which is using the population as human shields. And so I think what was extraordinarily difficult for the Israelis was to be able to separate the population from the terrorist organization. And of course, this resulted in a large number of civilian casualties and has resulted in the mounting pressure against the IDF. So what can be done now, I guess, Marcus, would be the question. I think now that large areas of Gaza are clear of Hamas, about 18 of the 24 Hamas battalions are destroyed, that there is an opportunity to encourage, exhort. the population in Rafah to move into those already cleared areas. It'll be very important to screen those who are coming through because often terrorist leadership will try to blend in to the evacuating civilian population to continue to victimize Palestinians another day. So I anticipate this is what's going to happen. There is no way that the IDF can't go in to Rafah. They must do it to continue to dismantle, destroy Hamas. They have to do that for their own population to say, we did what we said we're going to do. But I think to minimize civilian casualties could be very important to evacuate as many civilians as possible. This is about a million people, of course. In the Iraqi city of Tal Afar, we evacuated 250,000 people. It was a much smaller scale. But really, I think that's what's important. But also, you know, I think what we learned in Iraq is how important the informational domain is, you know, and on the battleground of perception. And this is what I think Israelis and the IDF could have done much better. You know, I mean, I think that I mean, I think Palestinians should be saying, hey, I do not want another frozen chicken. You know, I mean, I think they should have been bringing in more and more assistance with them as they continued the operation, medical assistance and so forth. Now, he did a good deal of this, but not enough, obviously. And then the other aspect of this from the informational domain is it's important to clarify your own intentions. To counter enemy propaganda. and disinformation, but really, most importantly, to trace the grievances and the suffering of the people back to those who caused it, which is Hamas, right? The organization that has diverted tens of billions of dollars away from the Palestinian people in Gaza and into their terrorist organization and infrastructure and capabilities. While their leadership lived, you know, in villas, you know, on the beach or in five-star hotels, you know, in gutter. So I think that there could have been a much better job internationally, and I think even among the Palestinian population, to trace the grievances back to the principal or most proximate cause of those grievances and suffering.

Sprecher 6: On that note, do you think that the current U.S. Diplomatic strategy is working, A, and B, what kind of immediate next step would you foresee going to happen? Also, with regard to the Arab allies or the key Arab players in the region, which obviously need to be strongly involved in supporting any Western strategy.

Sprecher 5: I mean, it's a noble endeavor that Secretary Tony Blinken is engaged in, but it's not going to work, you know, I don't think, for a number of reasons. One reason is I think that we have been mixed in our message when we should have been, I think, more stalwart in terms of support for the need, the need for the IDF to destroy Hamas. I think we could have had that message up front. We recognize the need for the IDF. IDF to continue the operation while still calling for a higher degree of discrimination in the use of force and a higher degree of sensitivity to minimizing civilian casualties overall. I think that should have been the message rather than now what has been, you know, the first talking point of call for a ceasefire. And I think in some ways, the horrors of October 7th and the ongoing horrors for the remaining hostages has taken kind of a second place to that. I think that's unfortunate because what that does is it emboldens Israel's opponents and Hamas'sponsors, too, in many parts of the world, sadly, including Russia. China and, you know, sadly, Turkey, you know, for example, or South Africa or Brazil, you know. So I think the missed messages from the U.S. Have encouraged, I think, more of the opposition toward Israel, even manifesting itself in this really fundamentally disappointing organization of the International Criminal Court. So, you know, I think. The message has been wrong. I think what is really disturbing me on it's we continue to act like we don't know what the return address is. The return address is Tehran. And so having failed in the effort to supplicate or have a conciliatory approach to the Iranians, now U.S. Diplomats. Are engaging with Iranian proxies in this ultimate self-delusion. forlorn effort that maybe they can peel these proxies away from Iran. I mean, so we have one of our best ambassadors is going to engage with the Houthis to do what? You know, I think he thinks that maybe we can cut a deal with them where they'll forswear their allegiance to Iran. Well, Iran is who trains them, equips them. You know, these missiles were not manufactured in Yemen, you know, and then we're doing the same thing with Assad. We're like taking the pressure off Assad again. How many times have we tried that? Assad is wholly reliant on an Iranian proxy army.

Sprecher 6: So the strategy towards Iran and from any of you.

Sprecher 5: Well, I think the strategy toward Iran should be to impose as much cost on the Iranians as possible and to take advantage of the situation where they appear to be quite strong externally through the use of their proxies. But the Iranian regime is fundamentally weak. It's fundamentally weak, I think, from an economic perspective and from a perspective of the degree to which their population supports this theocratic dictatorship. You see what they're doing to crack down internally now, you know, in terms of executing, you know, executing anybody who opposes them or protests against them, not anybody, but many. And then they're cracking down on women again, you know, for the way that they're wearing their hijabs. I mean, you know, I think that we should have a major. Informational campaign and public diplomacy campaign to provide support, you know, moral support, at least, to those who want to affect a fundamental change in the nature of the regime. I'm not saying that, you know, the United States and Germany and others should be doing regime change in Iran, but we should be supporting those who want a regime in place that ceases its permanent hostility. To the United States, its Arab neighbors, and Israel.

Sprecher 6: And by information war, that means using non-military measures, using clandestine operations, funding the opposition within Iran. Imagining this is happening since a couple of years already, what are the... What kind of specific steps would you want to take against Iran? And what would be your recommendation?

Sprecher 5: Well, Jan, based on your background, you know, there are some things I will mention and other things I won't mention. But I think we should be doing all the above, you know, anything we can. And I think what's happened is the eight years of the Obama administration, you know, I'm not a partisan person. I'm just making an observation here. They engaged in, I think, what was fundamentally a flawed approach to Iran. And they believed Iran's big lie. The Iranians have been stringing us along with this lie that, oh, you know, there are moderates just waiting in the wings. And if the United States and Germany and other countries take a conciliatory approach to Iran, what will happen is those moderates will grow stronger and the revolutionaries will fade in terms of their influence. And of course, what this gets them is sanctions relief. It gets the alleviation of pressure. And, you know, I'm kind of sympathetic to the interpretation of an Iran scholar, Ali Ansari. I think he does quite good work, you know, and he chronicles the struggle. There was a real struggle. I mean, during the Civil War period, going back to the, you know, to 79. And maybe into 80. And then again, maybe a little bit in the 90s, there was this competition between the Republicans and the revolutionaries. But hey, the revolutionaries won. They are in charge. And they have extended their grip on power internally through the basij and through the bunyads, these conglomerates. They control the economy. So we think, okay, we'll relieve sanctions. And then there'll be an alternative power base that will rise. Maybe the merchant class will come back and run. The merchant class is the theocratic dictatorship. It is the IRGC. So the relaxation of sanctions just allows them. To have more cash flow through their criminalized patronage networks and more cash flow into the IRGC and its proxy forces.

Sprecher 4: Seven months into the war in Gaza, do you see further regional escalation by the side of Iran, or do you think this is coming into a phase of more calm?

Sprecher 5: More escalation. I see more escalation. And I have seen no evidence that Iran's going to let up. And, you know, I think what's unfortunate, you know, sometimes. When I hear the Biden administration officials speaking, I think, is this Robert McNamara from the 1960s? Because they're talking and sending signals with force, you know. And, of course, you know, for the Iranians, their strategy is essentially to expend every Arab life in pursuit of their aims. They don't give a damn. About the Palestinians. They don't give a damn about Lebanese Shia or the Houthis. And so every time that we say we don't want to escalate, what we're essentially doing is giving the Iranians license to escalate with impunity through the use of their proxy forces. And so I think that's what they're going to do. You see the continued attacks out of southern Lebanon. I mean, the reality is Lebanese Hezbollah is getting crushed every time they do that. I mean, the Israelis are imposing, you know, huge costs on Lebanese Hezbollah every time they fire a rocket or an anti-tank missile or conduct an attack. But I think what you're going to see. Is an Israeli offensive in southern Lebanon, unless something changes fundamentally with Hezbollah. And before the school year, because 70,000 Israelis are displaced, want their kids back in school. They want to go back into their houses. And so there's a great deal of pressure on the Israeli government and military to conduct that operation. So I think in the next month or so, Rafa happens. Okay, there might be a temporary ceasefire. Maybe, maybe there's a long shot, you know, that there will be a small hostage release. There'll be a temporary ceasefire. But Rafah is going to happen. And then I think after that, you're going to see an operation against Lebanese Hezbollah, which will probably include an occupation of southern Lebanon, some portion of southern Lebanon, maybe 15 kilometers, 20 kilometers, maybe for a period of time until something. Other than UNIFIL, which is gutless, you know, in southern Lebanon, can be put into place. And I'm talking really about a peace enforcement organization that can build the confidence of the Israelis that that area is secure and will allow maybe peace and normality to come back into the residents of southern Lebanon, who will likely be displaced by an Israeli offensive. And so it's not going to get any better. I don't see the Houthis letting up either, by the way. And then, of course, what nobody's really talking about are the Iraqi militias, which have become more aggressive against the Kurds in northern Iraq and have really have a grip on the Iraqi government. And by the way. Are providing more and more manpower to Iran's proxy army in Syria, which it's positioning on the border for Israel. I don't think we can discount the possibility that Ayatollah Khamenei, in his 80s now, right, has this list of to-do items. And he wants to cross-destroy Israel off his list. And I think you can see that through the massive shipment of arms into the West Bank. The retrofitting of the 150,000 are trying to retrofit a portion of those rockets with precision guidance systems. In my view, Iran is not letting up at all.

Sprecher 6: Very clear and very precise. We could fill this entire podcast on the Middle East, but we need to move on to the next theater, which is obviously Ukraine, the biggest strategic challenge for both Europe and the West. Very clear, hugely problematic situation. Some relief is Ukraine with U.S. Funding now passed in the House. How do you assess the current situation and how do you assess the next couple of months evolving?

Sprecher 5: I'm very concerned right now about the Ukrainian manpower constraints, as well as the lagging and continued constraints on munitions until this assistance really kicks in. As you know, the Russians are desperate to see if Chasiv Yar, this is an area that really most people are not talking about what's really valuable about that. There is an advantage in terms of terrain and the ability to really– that would allow Russia to continue offensive operations to subsume the entire Donbass region, which is what Russia would like to do as an interim objective. But also, you know, these are areas that are of importance for Ukraine's, you know, small but important defense industrial base. You know, these are manufacturing areas. There are areas where there are underground facilities, you know, that go. back to the Soviet period. What Putin wanted is he wanted to see some of these areas before the May Day celebrations. He wasn't able to do that. But in trying to do it, the Russians have suffered about 30,000 casualties a month, about 1,000 casualties a day. The sad part is they're able to sustain that. Their replacement rate is about one to one. The Ukrainians are suffering less casualties, but their replacement rate so far is about 0.3 to 1 casualty. So there is an effort underway in Ukraine to mobilize. They are building defenses in depth now, which they had not been with an adequate sense of urgency because they were still focused on trying to get the halting offensive going previous months. I'm worried about the immediate future in terms of there could be some significant losses of important from a tactical and operational perspective, terrain, important from like an industrial base, but also important from a psychological perspective for the Ukrainian people, but even for the international supporters of Ukraine. So we have to get through that first.

Sprecher 6: Is Europe doing enough and would long-range missiles from Europe, particularly from Germany, change the situation significantly in your view?

Sprecher 5: Yes, they would change the situation significantly. What you're seeing right now in terms of these Russian gains are the effect of these glide bombs. Which carry about half a ton of explosives each. And they're targeting tactical positions with these, with multiple of them. You need more air defenses for that. But also, Ukraine needs their own longer range capabilities to really impose costs on Russia in terms of the delivery systems for these glide bombs. Airfields associated with the aircraft that deliver them, and then also to be able to go after logistics. Remember the Lundorf offensive in 1917? It was effective, but it died out because there wasn't logistics support. I think that's what these long-range capabilities can do to this Russian offensive. Maybe also this Russian offensive can be looked at as analogous to the French Nivelle offenses in 1917, which broke the French army and resulted in the mutiny of the French army. And I think there are rumors now, and Jan, you may have heard more about this. About mass defections among Russian soldiers in the southern part of Ukraine. The Ukrainian estimate is 18,000. Of course, you have to take all this with a grain of salt. But every army's got a breaking point. And it seems to me that Russia is impaling themselves on these Ukrainian defenses. And so there may be, in what seems to be a very difficult situation right now for the Ukrainians, an opportunity for a moral defeat of at least a portion of these Russian forces.

Sprecher 6: We can't leave this topic without asking the question of China's role in the Ukraine war with Antony Blinken talking very openly and actively about an axis of adversaries. NATO General Secretary Stoltenberg also picked up this line. This leads us a bit into the geopolitical great power relationship between the U.S. And China, which is a very different nature towards our relationship with China. But maybe you can allude on that a bit in particular with regards to China's role in the Ukraine.

Sprecher 5: Well, China has been supporting Russia from the beginning of this onslaught against Ukraine. Going back to 2014, they've been supporting them. You know, I think there's a direct line, Jan, between the unenforced red line in Syria in 2013 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. And guess what else? The building of islands in the South China Sea and the weaponization of those islands. And I think, you know, Putin and Xi Jinping really met when they talked about their love for each other, or at least their partnership with no limits. There are elements of this alliance that are particularly troubling. It is an alliance. And I think that is their ability to cover for each other when we act as if they're separate from one another. They're not. And so we have this nostalgic view, right, of Kissingerian and Nixonian diplomacy or triangular diplomacy, where we, in the 1970s, endeavored to have a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Union and with China than either of them had with each other in an effort to divide them. And of course, this is good geopolitics, right? I mean, this goes back to Mackinder and Spikeman, who said the greatest danger is if there is a hostile power dominating the Eurasian landmass. That's kind of the situation we're in right now. And it'd be nice to divide them. But I think we should do the opposite. We should tape them together, not only because they deserve each other, but because when we act like they're separate, they're more effective. And so what is happening now is, I mean, from the very beginning, that China is covering and aiding and abetting Russia in material ways. From the very beginning, you know, with their wolf warrior diplomats, you know, and reinforcing this ridiculous narrative of, you know, a special military operation, you know, to protect Russia from Nazis or, you know, or from NATO, you know. And then, you know, of course, the material support is quite significant, you know, buying more Russian gas and oil to feed Putin's ATM that he needs to keep the war going. But then also, you know, the equipment and the hardware that he needs to sustain his war making machine. And I think what you're going to see, I think what we're going to certainly see is pressure on Chinese entities. You've seen this with the blacklist that was released yesterday with a number of Chinese entities and individuals associated. with this kind of activity. But I think finally, you're going to see sanctions on Chinese banks, secondary sanctions on Chinese banks. And ultimately, there is going to be pressure, Jan, for a rending of economic relations with China. And I know Volkswagen doesn't want to hear that, man. I know that there are a lot of companies that don't want to hear that. But it's coming, and it's coming for a number of reasons. First of all, it's the geostrategic dynamics that we're talking about and the fact that this is a hostile regime that is acting in concert with Russia to tear down the existing order and replace it with a new order that is sympathetic to their authoritarian model. And in China's case, also sympathetic to their statist mercantilist economic model. That's going to continue. I mean, this is their objectives. You know, if you look at the five big initiatives from China, I mean, it's all about making the China dream the world dream. I mean, you know, and of course, we're familiar with One Belt, One Road. But now the two recent additions to these five initiatives are the Global Security Initiative and maybe scariest of all, the Global Civilization Initiative, right? And this sounds a lot to me like the Greater East Asia Code Prosperity Sphere of Imperial Japan, you know? We have to recognize that companies that continue to rely. On what they hope is like access to the Chinese market, cheap manufacturing in China, they're going to be profoundly disappointed because China will continue to do what They've always done, right? They're going to steal your IP. They're going to steal your sensitive technology. They're going to pick a Chinese winner, BYD, subsidize that winner, help them overproduce at artificially low cost. They lose about $30,000 per electric vehicle that they manufacture. And then dump them on our markets and try to drive us out of the global market after they shut you down on their internal market. This has happened in so many sectors, right? I mean, this has happened in engines. It's happened in wind turbines and solar panels and batteries, right? And so I'll tell you, Volkswagen, Tesla, others are going to be profoundly disappointed. But, you know. They should have known better. And there's also going to be reputational risk, Jan. I mean, I don't see how genocide is not like an ESG issue in boardrooms, for example. So, you know, I think that the way to think about this in terms of economic and financial relationships with China is take a Hippocratic oath. Do no hurt or harm in three areas. Don't help China develop the military capabilities that they can use against us. U.S. Investors funded the companies that now do all the battlefield artificial intelligence for the People's Liberation Army. Hey, congratulations. I hope you got a good return. The second element of the Hippocratic Oath would be, Don't help them perfect their technologically enabled police state or to commit genocide, for example. So if you invested in. Pick vision or sense time. Again, hey, congratulations, you know, on your returns. But ultimately, you know, this is, and maybe people didn't know it at the time, but they have enabled, you know, kind of the horrible acts of the party. And then finally, hey, don't jeopardize the long-term viability of your company in pursuit of short-term profits in China. And I think in Germany, you know, Germany benefited, German companies benefited tremendously, you know, from the model of cheap energy from Russia. And then manufacturing in China and export to China. And I think that model's over. And we could face surrendering of the economies that would, of course, be disastrous for the world economy, would probably result in a depression. But I think if we act like we know it's coming now, we make our supply chains more resilient. We come up with alternative markets for our goods that we had hoped maybe to sell in China. I think that all of that's prudent.

Sprecher 6: And from a CEO perspective, that probably takes a little bit longer than the prescription in this podcast sounds. But the market in China remains, of course, vital to a lot of companies. So just decoupling from it is also not easy. But thanks for your perspective. Very critical.

Sprecher 4: Maybe half an hour into the program, the first question from a viewer of ours, Stefan Ursul-Leatz, asks if there you see a Moscow-Tehran-Beijing axis, which does coordinated escalation in the Middle East in order to divert U.S. Capacities from Ukraine or East Asia if necessary. Is that the case?

Sprecher 5: I think that is the case. Or at least if I could maybe modify that just slightly, I think we can assume that at the very least, This axis of aggressors is what I would call them, and I would include North Korea in this, will act to accelerate the achievement of their objectives in a region if they think we're preoccupied with other crises. And I believe that what we're witnessing are cascading crises. The war in Europe, I think, has cascaded. Into the Middle East. And I think some of the ways in which those wars are connected is in the growing cooperation relationship alliance between Russia and Iran and China, and to a certain extent, North Korea. How are they connected? Of course, there are some very direct connections with Iran, for example, providing the Shahed drones and missile capabilities to Russia so they can continue their onslaught into Ukraine. But it's important to remember that Russia has been aiding and abetting Iran across the Middle East in an effort to portray itself, for Moscow to portray itself as both in a dual role of arsonist and fireman. So Russia, the arsonist, enables Iran in Syria and enables the serial episodes of mass homicide. That have resulted in the death death of 500,000 people and the displacement of 12 million people. I mean, where are the protests on college campuses for that? And so now having aided and abetted Iran and Iran's effort to establish a land bridge to the Mediterranean and Iran's effort to reinforce its proxies in the ring of fire around Israel. Then Russia offers its good offices, you know, to promise that, hey, if everybody just gets on board with Assad, what we'll promise to do is we'll promise to reduce Iranian influence in a post-Civil War Syria. That's a complete lie, of course. And it's a lie for practical reasons that... Assad is more reliant on the Iranians than they are on the Russians. So that's one way that this is all connected. Think about the way that Moscow hosted Hamas leadership right after these unconscionable, horrific attacks against Israel on October 7th, providing diplomatic cover for that organization. You know, it's not coincidental that there were large numbers of Cornette missiles uncovered in Gaza, for example. But there are many other ways that there are these connections, obviously, too. You know, China is buying cheap oil and gas from Iran. You have China in this new partnership with Iran as well. And I think Russia is providing in return to the Iranians help with their missile. And I think. likely help with their nuclear program also. So this is really a real axis of aggressors. And I'm glad that more people are kind of waking up to the degree to which these adversaries are interconnected, because the next cascade could be in the Indo-Pacific region for the reasons who, you know, who, um, The questioner, whoever asked that question, alluded to.

Sprecher 4: Maybe a follow-up question from General Kai Brinkmann. German General Kai Brinkmann asks, if we assume a further increase in escalation in the Middle East, what can and needs to be done to get to stabilization? And whom do you see as the main actors to achieve this?

Sprecher 5: Yeah. Well, you know, I think the United States could impose costs on Iran. I mean, I really think that's the way to do it. And impose costs on Iran, you know, not necessarily militarily, but maybe through a range of other means, as well as the economic and financial aspects of putting pressure on the Iranian regime. Again, I think there is a situation in which Iran is quite weak internally, but appears strong externally because they're able to escalate with impunity. This narrative of controlling escalation, this narrative of– it essentially encourages, I think, Iran to continue to use its proxies because it believes it can do so with relative impunity. I do think, though, the one thing we're not talking about because of, you know, all the immediate issues with the crisis in the region from, you know, from really Iraq, which, again, was just little talk. talked about and Yemen, Syria, southern Lebanon, which I think is the next operation for the IDF, Syria and Gaza, is we're not talking about Iran's nuclear program and missile program. And I would say there is maybe a 99% chance that in the next three to five years, Israel strikes Iran's nuclear and missile program. facilities. I believe they think they have no other alternative because the Began Doctrine, right, is still in place. And that is, of course, you know, Israel's determination to not allow a hostile, have the most destructive weapons on earth. And of course, Iran's rhetoric has been, you know, that that they will use these weapons to wipe what they call the cancerous boil off the earth. So things aren't looking good in terms of the trajectory in the Middle East, right? And I think the only way, the only way to avert these kind of really worst case scenarios as through a more resolute effort to confront and impose costs on Iran. I think that's the only thing that the Iranians understand.

Sprecher 6: So after the two big theaters, Middle East and Ukraine, we have to turn to the Indo-Pacific, where the most focus of the United States national security apparatus is. And there's a situation that might evolve around Taiwan. There are several reports that the U.S. Military assumes an aggressive move from China towards Taiwan publicly. discussed in the United States. How do you view the China issue and how are these theaters interlinked with each other, not necessarily China only, but the Chinese role in the Indo-Pacific, Ukraine, Middle East, etc.? Because, I mean, it looks like an interconnection of geopolitical theaters that we have to face.

Sprecher 5: No, it really is, Jan. And of course, you know, what you have is you have these this axis of aggressors trying to cultivate kind of their own camp. Right. You have you saw the Colombian president of all places. Right. Has just ended diplomatic relations with Israel. You know, and you have Lula da Silva in Brazil. You know, you've got I mean, you have the courting of others by this axis of aggressors. And so the dynamic really is a global one and the competition is a global one. But in the Indo-Pacific in particular, I do believe that we should take these authoritarian hostile leaders at their word. I think we're always wrong when we try to second guess and say, well, I don't think Xi Jinping really means that this is a short-term problem with Taiwan. Well, maybe he really isn't going to use force, even though the People's Liberation Army has increased 44-fold since the year 2000, or spending has increased 44-fold. They're developing capabilities, tiers of capabilities to affect an invasion. Now, that doesn't mean they're going to invade immediately, but what they're going to try to do, I think, is try everything short of a full-scale invasion to achieve what they would prefer, which is annexation by invitation. The tactics they've been employing, efforts to co-opt Taiwanese leaders, use of economic coercion, information and political subversion, and then sometimes physical coercion, as we saw with the kind of the soft blockade of Taiwan during U.S. House Speaker Pelosi's visit about two years ago, I guess now, almost two years ago. So anyway, I think we're going to see all that coming. And what's concerning to me, I'm watching some other indicators, you know, they're building a huge military hospital across the Strait of Taiwan. Now, why would they be doing that? You know, and then, of course, the landing craft, the helicopters. I mean, these are material preparations. Now go to the rhetoric. The rhetoric is. Preparing the Chinese people for war. If you read Xi Jinping's speeches, he talks about the war, a potential war to subsume Taiwan as a preemptive war against the West, against the encirclement, the pressure. It sounds a lot to me like Putin's rhetoric prior to the massive invasion of Ukraine. He'll be nostalgic about the Korean War, what he calls the War of American Aggression, right, in Korea. And he talks about that Mao making the courageous decision to deliver one blow to prevent 100 blows. And then he talks about Taiwan and frames it as kind of a preemptive war. And then he talks about the need to sacrifice. You know, I mean, all of it's there. And so. I think we have to believe it. There's a really, there's a good new book out by Hoover Press, edited by my friend Matt Pottinger called The Boiling Moat. Extraordinarily well-crafted essays. And I think on this issue, the best kind of succinct treatment of the threat toward Taiwan and what we could do now. To prevent that from happening. The bottom line is, you know, try to make Taiwan indigestible by accelerating some of the capabilities that could communicate clearly, you know, to the People's Liberation Army that they could not accomplish that mission at an acceptable cost.

Sprecher 6: This is very much a U.S. National security issue. Focus and perspective. All these issues will also be discussed in Washington at the NATO summit in July. Where do you see Europe, given that most of NATO members are European, is playing into this? Middle East and China obviously being not part of the North Atlantic territory. Will the United States take care of itself on these three theaters? Or do you expect a wider NATO effort and transatlantic convergence if you want?

Sprecher 5: Yeah, there has to be a transatlantic approach to this. I mean, there's no other way that we can be effective, you know, and not only in the kind of the threat to Taiwan, you know, but how about, you know, China's claim to the ocean and what they're doing to try to coerce the Philippines now? I was really happy to see the German Navy conducting patrols. through the South China Sea, along with the French Navy and others. I think that's super important for this to be a multinational effort, just to communicate to China a simple message, hey, nobody owns the ocean. And just to make that kind of a routine for all of our navies and to do so with a strong multinational voice. But Jan, as you know better than anybody, China's strategy is very sophisticated and includes, I didn't mention the other strategies like, you know, Made in China 2025 and the efforts to create the dual circulation economy.

Sprecher 7: Which is a legitimate strategy, right? I mean.

Sprecher 5: Yeah, I think so. I mean, I think with that, you know, when those who say, hey, decoupling is not a thing, I think it's important. That Xi Jinping has declared his intention to decouple on his own terms and to do so in a way that creates dependencies on China while insulating China from dependencies outside. So I think the economic dimension of this competition is the one in which the United States, the European Union, the UK. And Japan and Australia and others, but really Japan, U.S., if we take a stance together on the tools of economic statecraft or on trade enforcement mechanisms to counter unfair trade and economic practices of the Chinese Communist Party, we're unstoppable. Right. I mean, what China will do is take a divide and conquer approach. And so this is why I was a bit disappointed, at least in the way that the chancellor's recent visit was portrayed. Because I think we should all just try to stay aligned on this in terms of at least our communication of our resolve to counter various Chinese acts of economic aggression, including overcapacity, overproduction, state subsidies, sustained campaigns of industrial espionage, and so forth.

Sprecher 6: I think if you take a perspective from a corporate perspective or from a business perspective, I think the lessons learned is here what you call economic statecraft, much more intervention by governments, much more national security considerations going into large strategies where business has to be a part of either as a subject or an object. But I think that is a very important lesson for non-national security experts that the economic policies, national security policies will be interlinked with each other.

Sprecher 5: Yeah. And I think what we've seen on computer chips and microprocessors, that's going to carry over into other sectors, right? Batteries, for example. But I think if you're looking for like an investment bet right now, it's companies that are at the forefront of making supply chains more resilient, right? And doing so in a way that doesn't result in a huge increase in costs or technologies that can do that. Or, for example, a lot of the rare earths and other minerals and upstream components for electronics and other hardware, demand for those can be satisfied in large measure through recycling. So come. companies that get an angle on recycling. I mean, I think that we all ought to be looking for these solutions. And of course, it's important for us to act in concert as we employ the tools of economic statecraft, but it's also important just across the private sector for us to work together to find relatively low-cost solutions, improving the resilience of our supply chains across the board.

Sprecher 4: With 15 minutes to go, I think, especially here calling from Berlin, from Europe, there's the orange elephant in the room. What will happen if Mr. Trump wins the election in November for European-U.S. Relationships in military terms?

Sprecher 5: Yeah. Well, you know, who knows? It depends. It depends on what Donald Trump you get, you know, and and so he has about him. And this is no secret, a certain dissonance. Right. His skepticism at times of sustained U.S. Military commitments abroad, which stem in part from, you know, the long held concern that many American administrations have had over many years, especially in the post-Cold War years. That allies in Europe are free riding on U.S. Security, which was actually pretty accurate for a while, especially in the case of Germany, right? Where our European deterrence initiative, the rotation of U.S. Forces to Europe, cost about the equivalent of one of Germany's defense budget. So, and that's not our permanently positioned troops there. That's just the rotational forces. And so the argument was like, why are we doing this? And Germany's not stepping up. And, you know, President Trump had, you know, kind of a little bit of a strained relationship with Chancellor Merkel, but it wasn't like acrimonious or anything, at least when I was there. And he would sometimes chide Chancellor Merkel and say, hey, if you love NATO so much, why don't you pay your dues? Now, you know, I tried everything I could to help explain to him that you're not paying dues to NATO. You're investing, you know, in your own defense, consistent with the Wales pleasure of at least 2%. So I welcome, you know, the Zeitenwende. I think, you know, he will welcome that as well, maybe. So I think there's a way, I think, for us to... You know, to maybe in the Trump administration, sustain the commitment to European defense at this critical moment, and maybe even strengthen it further. I mean, who knows what will happen. But you know, the word that he loves, and he says all the time, is reciprocity. And he even said to me, that's my favorite word, reciprocal, reciprocal. So, you know, I think on trade, there is going to be even more tension than on security. And so, you know, non-tariff barriers to entry to the market, those sorts of things with the European Union are going to be important to him as well. And if he brings Bob Lighthizer in, I mean, you know what you're getting with Bob Lighthizer. He's extremely, you know, he was. U.S. Trade representative for those who are on the call, you know, he's a good person, first of all. He has views you might disagree with in terms of trade and economic policy, but he's an upfront, candid person who the EU and the Commission can work with. So it depends on who you get. Now, if you get our former ambassador to Germany in a key position, that might be a cause for concern. So I think a lot of this will depend on who comes in. The two organizations to take a look at right now are the Heritage Foundation, where they have the Project 2025 that is going on to recruit people into the new administration. And then, of course, you have the America First think tank as well. Now, what's encouraging to me is the America First think tank in particular has been very stalwart in its support for Ukraine. So certainly this neo-isolationist wing in the Republican Party, and that is a cause for concern. But I think the dominant sentiment in the Republican Party is still generally internationalist. It prioritizes the transatlantic relationship, prioritizes NATO, and understands that you get peace through strength, right, in a Reagan-esque kind of way. I would not despair, Marcus. Do not despair. But be concerned.

Sprecher 6: So the majority in the Republican Party, you would think, or you would argue, is still like on the classic Reagan-Bush national security, internationalist, strong NATO, robust America. Conform policy, but with allies and seeing NATO as an asset.

Sprecher 5: Yes, that's right. Now, the problem, though, is what you've seen manifest itself in the House is you have a very small majority, right, of Republicans in the House. And that has super empowered about six to 10 people who are really radical in terms of their kind of neo-isolationist and nativist views. Paradoxically, if there's a much larger minority of Republicans in the House, this would not be an issue at all.

Sprecher 6: But from this side of the ocean, it looked like the MAGA side of the Republican Party has more control, more influence than we were hoping. And that Trump is playing this and leveraging this to a great degree, independence from all like international security considerations, but more like looking on domestic relative parochial issues.

Sprecher 5: Yeah. Well, see, this is the issue. Okay. So these are Trump's most stalwart supporters. They represent his base. His base are people who were left behind by transitions in the global economy in the 2000s, especially after China was granted entry in the World Trade Organization. These are people who lost their manufacturing jobs in Ohio, in Indiana, in Wisconsin, in Pennsylvania, all these swing states. And so what did they experience next? They got a financial crisis. What did they get after that? Well, toss in an opioid epidemic. at the effects of social media on these people who are already disappointed in the elites in Washington who didn't give a damn about them in their view, right? This is what Donald Trump tapped into, okay? And so you get this incongruous situation where, you know, the guy from the New York real estate developer who wears too long ties, you know, and goes into these rallies. They identify with him because he's the ultimate disruptor. And, you know, Washington needs to be disrupted in their view. And so for this base, this is where Trump gets the adulation that he craves, that he wants, that he needs. And so it encourages him to stay with the politics of subtraction. Right. Stick with the message your base loves. But what we need is a leader at this stage in our history. We need a leader who gets to the politics of addition, that brings people together, that forms broader coalitions. Right. And and this is what President Trump is not very adept at doing. And this is why at times. He can be susceptible to sort of the Iago figures, if you'll permit a Shakespearean analogy in his ear. Although I don't know, President Trump may not have been as virtuous as Othello, but he has these people in his ear who are always, you know, they try to manipulate him. What he could say is they say to him like, hey. This is going to be inimical to your base. You know, your base will now accept this policy. And this is what happened on a number of occasions. This is what happened to our commitment in Afghanistan, for example.

Sprecher 6: Are there enough McMasters left in Washington that would go into the White House doing adult supervision and national security policy that is, as you describe and you recommend?

Sprecher 5: You know, I think there are some really good people who could still serve in the Trump administration. OK, if you if you take a look across the board, you actually the Financial Times had a really good investigative piece on this, you know, maybe three weeks ago or so. And I think it's quite accurate. You know, went through all the personalities, you know, I mean, if you get Senator Tom Cotton in defense, I think that's good. You know, Secretary Mike Pompeo, I think, is solid in terms of it, in my view, in terms of his worldview and his and the way degree to which he prioritizes alliances in the transatlantic relationship. You have others, you know, Bill Hagerty is an extremely talented senator with great private sector experience. He was our ambassador to Japan. He'd be great at state. He'd be great at commerce. He'd be great at treasury. There are good people, I think, competent people who could come into the administration. Now, there are others who are not in that category, you know, and I don't necessarily want to name them. But it depends if Trump wants the Congress to go along with him. Right. He's not going to pick somebody. who's barely going to get confirmed by the Senate or maybe not confirmed. You know, he could, if he wanted to go full, you know, I'm going to do whatever the hell I want. He could appoint people who he knows are not going to. to get confirmed and appoint them as acting secretaries. But that's only, they can only do that for six months. But, you know, then you can rotate them around, though, if you want. You know, so does he go full, I'm doing what the hell I want to do? Or does he recognize as, you know, that he's not the king, you know, that we have separation of powers? And if he wants, you know, to get anything done in Congress, that he's going to have to, you know, he's going to have to appoint people who are palatable, at least, to a larger number of his own party.

Sprecher 4: Sir, there's one question coming up, picking up on one of Trump's foreign policy successes, the Abraham Accords. Now you have Saudi Arabia almost on board, it seemed, a few months ago. What do you think about the alliance between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the U.S.?

Sprecher 5: Yeah. You know, I think that it's going to happen eventually. You know, of course, you know, the threat from Iran is what's galvanizing this, you know, and and and of course, the Abraham Accords, people said it was crazy, you know, to start it. But, you know, if you if you go back to the speech that Trump gave in Riyadh when he visited and people said, you know, what the hell is Donald Trump doing? Going to Saudi Arabia, you know, for his first visit, you know, abroad. And remember that trip, that trip took him from Riyadh to Jerusalem to Rome. Okay. That was deliberate. That was deliberate. And it was meant to, to transcend this sort of narrative that jihadist terrorists use, that this is a religious conflict. This is a conflict with irreligious people who use a perverted interpretation of religion to pursue their criminal and political agendas. And that was his message. And that aligned. With the reform agenda of MBS, you know, who turned out to be profoundly disappointing with the murder of a U.S. Resident and journalist, right, Jamal Khashoggi. But what happened is the Biden administration came in. Remember, President Biden said, we're going to make Saudi Arabia a prized state. I mean, not a bad move, I think. The Emiratis and others then began to hedge. They hedged with Russia, with China, you know, and it allowed this, you know, the brokering of the normalization relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran was really done by Iraq and Oman. But then MBS asked China to come in over top of that because, again, he was hedging in any way he could. Because we had given up, the United States had given up economic leverage. We weren't enforcing the sanctions on Iran. And we gave up military leverage as Iran was conducting attacks against our forces and we weren't responding. So Saudi Arabia is like, who's got our back? The United States didn't have their back in their view. So I think in a Trump administration. It could kind of actually generate additional momentum toward the normalization of relations with Israel. And then ultimately. you know, kind of a united approach to confronting not only Iran, but also, I think, vastly diminishing the influence that Russia has gained in the region after the unenforced red line in Syria 2013 and China's efforts to make inroads mainly through investments and so forth.

Sprecher 6: Well, maybe to conclude this wide-ranging discussion with very succinct perspectives from the United States. The National Intelligence Council of the United States puts out every four years a report with a 2035-2050 outlook. Let's not go that far, but maybe take a look at 2030. Two scenarios, which one would you subscribe to? One is, are we entering a period of global block building, autocracies, axis of adversaries versus a Western united front with a merger market in the middle? Or are you rather seeing a more benign global competition where still elements of globalizations prevail, economic self-interest, et cetera, prevail? If we could finish with this broader perspective, that would be great.

Sprecher 5: The best case is the first case. The worst case is World War III.

Sprecher 6: That's not very encouraging.

Sprecher 5: That's not encouraging. But, you know, the first case is actually a pretty good case relative to World War III. So I think what we are going to see is the emergence of these blocks, middle economies, other countries in the middle. And I think what will determine our future will be the degree to which we can coalesce and remain unified. in the West and recognize the nature of the competition for what it is and take the prudent but resolute measures that are necessary to discourage these conflicts that we're witnessing today from cascading further. I think we can do it. I know we can do it. But of course, you know, one of the weaknesses are the divisions that we see within our own societies. And between our countries, you know, and and of course, our adversaries are doing the best they can to foment those divisions, to increase the vitriol of our of our political discourse and to diminish our confidence in who we are and our common identity as people who value representative government and rule of law and freedom of speech and. Freedom of religion and religious tolerance. I mean, I think we really, you know, have to regain our confidence, Jan, and we should deliberately work together to do that.

Sprecher 6: Let's focus on avoiding Cold War III and get the transatlantic alliance back. We will have enough food for thoughts for the next 25 episodes of the Security Live briefings here. We will have definitely you back on the show, maybe pair you with a European counterpart, probably have different perspectives. Thank you very much, HR. I leave the last words to Marcus. This was fantastic. And looking much forward to more thought-provoking, definitely thought-provoking conversations with you.

Sprecher 4: Yes.

Sprecher 5: Hey, always a pleasure to be with both of you. Thanks.

Sprecher 4: Thanks a lot for your insights, General, from the Middle East to Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific. We learned a lot from that. Hope that unity prevails between the transatlantic partners, as you said in your final remarks.

Sprecher 1: Vielen Dank. Auf Wiedersehen.

Sprecher 8: Auf Wiedersehen. Auf Wiedersehen.

Sprecher 2: Das war das Security Table Live Briefing von Markus Bickel, dem Redaktionsleiter des Security Table, Jan Kallmorgan und H.R. McMaster. Ich hoffe, dass Sie mit vielen neuen Erkenntnissen und neuem Wissen aus diesem Gespräch gehen. Weitere Analysen zur Sicherheitslage und Sicherheitsstrategie, zu geopolitischen Trends, der Verteidigungspolitik, Militärgüterbeschaffung gibt es natürlich im Security Table. Als Briefing und online auf table.media.com. Ich bin Helene Wobrowski. Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit genommen haben. Ich freue mich darauf, dass wir uns am Montag wieder hören im Table Today Podcast. Dann wieder zusammen mit Michael Bröker. Und jetzt wünsche ich Ihnen ein schönes, ruhiges, vielleicht ja auch spannendes und aufregendes, wie auch immer, jedenfalls schönes Wochenende.

Sprecher 1: Table Today mit Michael Bröker und Helene Bubrowski.

Sprecher 3: Ich bin manchmal ein bisschen zu ehrlich, aber ganz im Ernst, ich mag es einfach klar, ohne Überraschungen. Genau deshalb bin ich bei Frank, dem einfach Mobilfunkanbieter. App runterladen, Tarif bestellen, fertig. 20 GB für 10 Euro. In bester D-Netz-Qualität. Monatlich kündbar, keine versteckten Kosten. Und das Beste ist Frank for Friends. Ich schicke einfach meinen Code an meine FreundInnen. Und jedes Mal, wenn jemand darüber startet, kriegen wir alle dauerhaft extra Datenvolumen. Kein Drama, keine Geheimnisse. Also, probier's mit Frank. Ist ehrlich einfacher.