Jan van Aken: 'Taiwan is a separate state with its own administration'

The triad of partner, competitor and systemic rival has become firmly rooted in Germany's and Europe's China policy. According to the new German coalition contract, systemic rivalry is coming more to the fore. What do you think of this shift?

My impression is that the China policy of the former German government coalition was strongly influenced by the Russian attack on Ukraine and the total turn towards the United States. Consequently, they also wanted to side with the US in the conflict with China. With Trump, that ought to be over now.

You can be both a partner and a competitor, as is often the case with the US. We should build a similar relationship with China as the second superpower, based on partnership, but also on economic competition, and not make ourselves too dependent. But seeing China as a rival means being completely against each other. I find that wrong.

Proponents of systemic rivalry argue that China deliberately competes with liberal democracies and that we must defend our system.

I consider the idea of competition between autocracies and liberal democracies a big lie. If it existed, we wouldn't be in NATO together with Turkey. Brazil is a BRICS country, which means it is on the side of Russia and China, yet it is also a relatively liberal democracy. There are many more examples. Ultimately, this is an attempt at an ideological division into camps, like during the Cold War, which is not tenable.

Your party does not share the strategic triad on China. What is the Left Party's China policy?

Do we have one?

Your parliamentary election program mentioned China six times, after all.

We maintain some contacts with China through the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, and we have an international commission whose head meets with representatives of the Chinese embassy every one or two years. But I wouldn't call that an active China policy.

We see China, for example, as a possible player in a peace process in Ukraine. Even if it is an autocratically run country and violates human rights, we need to discuss whether it should be included in a peace solution.

You have repeatedly suggested the deployment of Chinese peacekeeping troops in Ukraine and argued that these should be seen as neutral. However, China does in fact support Russia's war efforts, at least logistically, for example by sending dual-use goods.

I have to interject here. Chinese tanks run on German MTU engines. The EU has imposed an arms embargo on China. Why are these engines allowed to be supplied to or produced in China? Because they are dual-use. I am also in favour of careful consideration, but only criticizing certain Chinese dual-use exports is dishonest.

China has not condemned Russia's war, at least in UN votes, and adopts many Russian narratives to justify it. What role can China play in finding a peaceful solution for Ukraine?

A strong ally of the warring party has the influence to bring them to the negotiating table, as peace research has shown. When Xi Jinping calls, Putin must come – assuming von der Leyen and Xi Jinping can agree on a joint offer.

You will have to approach the country. That's how I understood Brazil and China's offer last May: We are ready to mediate, but this is your war, you have to come to us. With Trump, however, the window of opportunity for China and even the EU to really get actively involved has been closing. Europe has wasted three years.

You have also dealt with the Taiwan-China conflict. The word Taiwan does not appear at all in the Left's election manifesto. What is your position?

The Left Party currently has no resolution from the party leadership on this matter. I personally do not share the Chinese position that says the conflict is an unfinished civil war. I say that Taiwan is a separate state with its own administration. Ultimately, the status quo must be maintained, even if it is perhaps unsatisfactory in formal legal terms. My impression is that this has worked for a long time, but it is now beginning to slip.

What is upsetting the status quo?

I can only cite the experts I have listened to. They already see Xi Jinping as the key. He has clearly stated that Taiwan is Chinese and that he wants to resolve the issue during his term of office. That is more pressure and must be taken seriously. I fear that if someone with a position of power like Xi Jinping makes such a commitment, it will be difficult for him to get out of it.

For the time being, China remains dependent on Taiwanese semiconductors, so a war would be a disaster for the country itself. However, the question is, to what extent will China be able to become self-sufficient in the next 10 to 15 years.

China recently held another military drill around Taiwan. Some voices in the upcoming German government call for a greater military presence of the German Armed Forces in the region, for example, through the passage of frigates through the Taiwan Strait. What is your opinion on this?

Then we'll also have to get used to Chinese submarines holding drills off Heligoland soon. What's the point? It's an unnecessary provocation. I don't see any European country having any influence on the situation around Taiwan. If you try to use military deterrence and China attacks anyway, what would come next – a NATO war against China? That would be utter madness. German frigates have no business outside the Baltic Sea or the EU.

How else to protect the status quo?

At the end of the day, it is about what is non-negotiable for China, because that is what peace negotiations are all about. Is it about finally ending the so-called century of humiliation and reclaiming Taiwan at all costs, or is it about more practical issues, such as obtaining deep-sea access to secure a military balance with the US? China does not currently have this access in the desired form because it is surrounded by a chain of US allies off its coast. Such access is crucial for nuclear second-strike capability, among other things. If that's the goal, a sensible German foreign policy would be to look for formats that offer a solution that works for China.

China repeatedly stresses that Taiwan is a sovereignty issue and a purely internal Chinese matter. The leadership in Beijing reserves the right to decide whether an attack will happen.

This is where I also see a problem, because the issue is not open to a diplomatic solution in this form. However, the status quo has already lasted a long time with this contradiction – and if there is no final solution, then it should be maintained for as long as possible.

You traveled to China in 2006. What were your impressions?

During my visit, I wanted to get a better understanding of the use of Japanese biological weapons against the Chinese population during the Second World War. Japan has never really acknowledged its responsibility for that. On the other hand, I was surprised that China was still celebrating an anti-Japan Day at the time. The hatred was still deeply rooted.

A visit to a village in Zhejiang province also struck me. The family of a local activist had a genealogical table showing that one of her ancestors was among the best ten in the imperial examinations 200 years ago. You could feel the pride in their history. So I can imagine the Chinese perspective: They have been a world power for so long and want to be one again.