The EU–India Summit on Jan. 27, the day after India’s Republic Day, is a political signal in itself. In the days before, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa will attend the parade in Delhi as guests of honor – underscoring the importance of this moment for India’s hosts. But photo ops have never been in short supply in a relationship full of declarations of intent and, ultimately, often unfulfilled expectations. If, after decades of negotiations, the summit succeeds in finalizing a free trade agreement, this would indeed be a historic moment – one that could improve the lives of two billion people. It would create a free trade area that already encompasses €165 billion in trade today – €40 billion more than the EU-Mercosur agreement.
Both sides would be showing a world growing ever more fragmented that rules-based cooperation can create mutual benefit – especially between a heavyweight of the “West” and one of the most important actors of the “Global South”. But signing the agreement can only be the beginning. Success or failure will depend on whether both sides treat it as the start of a genuine partnership.
That means the agreement must be neither an “anti-Trump” nor an “anti-China” project. It needs to rest on its own strength and on shared goals – and deliver advantages in future-oriented fields such as innovation and economic resilience, education and training, digitalization and data sovereignty. That will not be possible without the courage to set priorities, because the starting points are simply too different. At first glance, history, culture and geography offer little overlap. India is growing dynamically in demographic and economic terms, while Europe is aging and economically stagnating. At the same time, OECD data show that India’s average annual income in 2024 was under €2,500, compared with €18,000 in Hungary and as much as €50,000 in Germany. Both sides profess commitment to a rules-based international order and the UN system – but differing approaches, especially toward Russia, remain a challenge.
It would be a mistake to gloss over these differences with a veneer of harmony. Instead, both sides should be able to tolerate each other’s criticism, without reflexively dismissing it as “interference” or “moralizing”. Listening to – and learning from – one another is what builds understanding trust, and shared success.
To make that happen, trust must be built on many levels – and far more Indo-European networks are needed. Mobility is essential to that – and so are reforms to visa systems. Exchanges cannot be limited to the top tiers of politics and administration; they must include industry, academia, municipalities, culture and media. India will have to move beyond its often cautious and restrained foreign policy and work more actively with the EU and its member states. Europe, in turn, must accept that India’s transformation will require time, access to technology and financing.
Some global actors are likely hoping the negotiations will fail. India’s Prime Minister Modi and his European guests von der Leyen and Costa should not grant them that wish. Instead, when signing the agreement, they should commit to bringing it to life quickly. Then it will be more than a deal: it will be a geostrategic turning point for both sides – and a strong signal in favor of a cooperative, rules-based, future-oriented globalization.
Ambika Vishwanath is Co-Founder and Director of the Kubernein Initiative (India) and Principal Research Fellow at the La Trobe Centre for Global Security (Australia).
Michael Scharfschwerdt is Senior Advisor for Geopolitics at management consultancy Kearney and served as head of the Policy Planning Staff at Germany’s Federal Foreign Office from 2022 to 2025.
Editor’s note: Discussing China and Asia today means engaging in more controversy than ever. We aim to reflect a diversity of viewpoints to give readers an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance.