Zippelius: German transit of the Taiwan Strait should be normalized

If you look at the working papers on the government talks, it is striking that the language used to describe China has become much harsher. "China has become a systemic rival," it says. "Our desire for elements of partnership and fair competition is less and less reciprocated."

I don't want to comment on ongoing processes. I'm very sorry about that, but I really have to hold back on this.

To put it another way, to what extent do you think the previous government's China strategy should be amended?

It is a breathing paper. An update would be appropriate because just as China and the world are changing, so is the paper. It provides a good description of the current situation. The question is: how can it be filled with life? If you look at exports of German dual-use products to China, for example, the figures for 2022 and 2024 were more or less the same, whereas there was a drop in 2023. This raises the question: How did this come about? What are we talking about here? Another question is: Will we install a new national security council?

Why do you think such a council is needed?

For example, the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr from Kabul has shown this. How can we address key foreign and security policy issues faster and in line with the times? How can we take action more quickly? I think it would make sense for the relevant stakeholders to discuss this in a national security council. What I would find important here: We have a national security strategy, a China strategy, Indo-Pacific guidelines, we have twelve interconnected strategies. I think we should write fewer strategies. Instead, we should combine them and implement them coherently. More action, less theory.

The problem with the last German government was that it rarely agreed on anything that concerned China, despite having a joint China strategy. Will that change now?

Yes, because the necessity is there. The only way to approach China is through unity. We must communicate unity to the outside world and also be united in our actions. What challenges China is the unity of an entire German government and unity at the European level. If you can convey this unity, you can also act more confidently. However, if a government is not united, it opens up certain flanks.

The Trump administration has increased the need for unity within the EU, but at the same time, centrifugal forces could also increase. Some, such as Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, are already calling for greater rapprochement with China.

I think it is likely that these centrifugal forces will increase. You have to be realistic. The fact that the transatlantic paths have become bumpier means that some could turn to the other direction. Whether that is a good thing is another question. A unified approach is also key at the European level. That's why I also hope we will return to a strong Franco-German partnership. We haven't quite achieved that in the past. Scholz and Macron could have gone to China together.

Many call for the EU to turn more towards its value partners in the Indo-Pacific as an alternative.

Firstly, the question is how to raise the economic figures with other partners from the region to a level comparable to what various companies have built up in China. No one has yet shown me a way to do this. But we should take advantage of every opportunity that comes our way, which has often not been done in the past. So many things would be easy to implement or are already in place to expand our portfolio. An investment protection agreement with Singapore, for example. Or a free trade agreement between the EU and the ASEAN countries. I see this independently of China. As an export nation, it should be in our interest to position ourselves as broadly as possible.

Merz has called for a permanent EU military presence in the Indo-Pacific. What should this look like?

(Defense Minister) Boris Pistorius has signed a military cooperation agreement with the Philippines. This could be continued and expanded.

Will German warships sail the Taiwan Strait again?

I don't see why this presence shouldn't happen in the future. It wasn't meant as a provocation. It's an existing sea route, why shouldn't it be used? It should be normalized.

And what is your outlook on Taiwan?

It is obvious that steps are being taken in China. And I believe this is being neglected in the overall discussion here. Two years ago, Xi Jinping visited the Southern Theater Command. Afterward, for the very first time, the word "war readiness" appeared in an editorial in the People's Daily. We see that the tone is getting harsher and that air and maritime movements around coastal areas are increasing.

Which topics do you believe will become particularly important concerning China?

What particularly concerns me is that China wants to enforce its norms and standards more and more globally, for example, in telecommunications or autonomous driving. They occupy more and more seats on global standardization committees. However, this means that the answers to questions crucial to our lives increasingly come from China. These questions are also very important for our economy. Are we at the forefront when it comes to setting global framework conditions and thus being able to manifest our interests?

This mainly concerns the competitiveness of Germany's industry.

Where do we still lead in future technologies and have an intrinsic interest in expanding this further? In ultrasonic technology, for example, we are still leading. It is in our interest to maintain our innovation leadership and set standards. In China, industrial policy is associated with large subsidies. But industrial policy does not have to be a subsidy policy. For me, structural reform is a top issue. This involves electricity prices, migration policy, taxes and levies. We also need to ask ourselves: In which economic sectors do we have relevant security interests, such as telecommunications? We must be able to deal with these through our own means.

Do we need a de-risking expert commission?

We don't need new committees and parallel structures for everything. I think a China competence center would be important. A contact point that pools China expertise. We have various departments in our ministries that deal with China. This leads to friction and information often does not converge. We also see this in economic policy, academia, civil society and local authorities. It would be good if we could bring all this together in one place and create a database.

Let's talk about the Huawei corruption scandal in Brussels. How can something like this be better regulated in Germany?

We have already imposed stricter rules on ourselves. However, there are MPs who may not notice certain signs. We have to ensure that people can contact centralized offices if they have any questions or receive appropriate training. How is contact made? Have I noticed any anomalies? With this in mind, I believe that members of the German parliament should receive mandatory briefings on security-related issues.

Nicolas Zippelius (CDU) is a political scientist and has been a member of the German Bundestag for the Karlsruhe-Land constituency since 2021. He studied Mandarin on a scholarship in Taipei.