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Reinhard Bütikofer is one of the most seasoned China experts in German politics. In our interview, Felix Lee speaks with him about Merkel’s China policy and what a Green Chancellor would do differently. Bütikofer criticizes Germany’s unilateral moves, which tend to weaken Europe’s position against Beijing. He explains why Xi’s inauguration in 2013 represents a change for the worse, and why China has long since begun to decouple itself from the West. The Green MEP argues that Germany should not become fully dependent on China, and should instead cooperate with like-minded partners to counter Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions.
Yesterday, the Olympic Games in Tokyo came to an end. The upcoming Winter Games in Beijing have been a subject of debate in the past months: should there be a boycott due to human rights violations in Xinjiang? The organizers are trying to counter a boycott debate with a positive spin. They promise the very first “Green Winter Games”: Its sports venues are to be powered exclusively by eco-electricity, and transport is to be provided by electric and fuel cell cars and buses. Christiane Kühl analyses the concept of the “Green Games” and has found some questionable elements.
Have a pleasant week!
Reinhard Bütikofer (68) has been active in the Society for German-Chinese Friendship since the 1970s. The former federal chairman of the Green Party has been a member of the EU Parliament since 2009. He helps shape European policy on China in Foreign Affairs and Trade Committees. He also chairs the Delegation for Relations with the People’s Republic of China and is a member of the German-Chinese Dialogue Forum. And from time to time, his involvement gets him into trouble: since March, he has been blacklisted and is banned from entering China. This punitive measure was part of Beijing’s response to European sanctions for human rights violations in the Xinjiang region. Bütikofer had supported the sanctions.
Mr Bütikofer, no other Western industrialized country has benefited as much from China’s rise as Germany. What is your assessment after 16 years of Angela Merkel as Chancellor?
These 16 years of China policy cannot be lumped together. Today it is hardly remembered, but at the beginning of her chancellorship, Angela Merkel dared to receive the Dalai Lama, although she knew that this would meet utmost disapproval in Beijing. Just a few years ago, a group of European China think tanks concluded in a study that Merkel was one of the few leaders in Europe who also talked publicly about human rights in China. She arranged for Liu Xiaobo, the widow of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xia, to be allowed to depart for Germany after years of house arrest. And yet today, Merkel’s China policy seems strangely outdated.
In what way?
She has recently distinguished herself as a reliable partner of Xi Jinping, as a politician who is prepared not only to downplay human rights concerns in favor of deeper cooperation with the Xi regime but also took single-handed decisions with Germany, which can only weaken Europe’s position with China. Close economic ties have led critics to accuse Germany of having no foreign policy towards China at all, but instead engaging in an “automotive foreign policy”, is not the sole reason. Aside from large corporations like VW, the German economy took a far more critical stance towards China than the Chancellor’s Office. To me, it seems that there is a considerable amount of defeatism at play with Merkel. As if the Chancellor is convinced that China’s propaganda of unstoppable rise is true and that ultimately the only choice is to submit today or tomorrow under less favorable conditions. I think this is a wrong and dangerous attitude that threatens to lead us into a position of helplessness in the face of an increasingly arrogant regime.
But Merkel is attributed with a keen sense for change in world politics.
Xi Jinping’s Inauguration in 2013 is synonymous with a fundamental roll-back in China and an equally dramatic shift to superpower assumption in terms of its foreign politics. At the beginning of his term, observers had hoped Xi might turn out to be a reformer. That was an illusion. Human rights lawyers who were still able to defend their clients courageously in court ten years ago are now imprisoned. Xi has brutally sharpened China’s policies against national minorities. Xinjiang is now home to the worst police state, at best comparable to North Korea. The Communist Party is again squeezing into every crevice of people’s daily lives and increasingly putting its economy on a leash. Xi has used his campaign against corruption to concentrate all power in a kind of party imperialism – something that had been considered an aberration to be avoided at all costs since the time of Deng Xiaoping. For many years, Mrs. Merkel’s China policy followed the basic idea that thick boards had to be drilled with patience and passion. But the Xi regime has replaced the thick planks with steel plates. Merkel’s wooden drill won’t do much good anymore.
The question is what conclusions one draws from this. Should Germany decouple itself from China?
I have never considered the idea of general decoupling propagated by President Trump to be an intelligent perspective. It is diametrically opposed to our basic European idea of multilateral cooperation. We do not want to build walls. But we have to take note of the fact that China has long since started to decouple. It is still the case that European companies make no inroads into Chinese procurement markets, while our procurement markets are wide open to Chinese state-owned enterprises. China is becoming more and more self-sufficient, decoupling in education, the media sector, the IT industry, and the field of rare minerals. Decoupling was an ideology of Trump, but it is a reality of Xi.
So, decoupling after all?
In a situation where a partner is prepared to turn economic interdependence into a political weapon, one cannot naively proclaim that our candor knows no limits. One example is the expansion of the 5G network, which will be the nerve system of our future communications, particularly in the industrial sector. I don’t want a Chinese company to be part of the infrastructure expansion that, according to current Chinese law, has to be unconditionally at the beck and call of security authorities. It is not a decoupling philosophy, but simply practical common sense not to become completely dependent on a competitor that does not play fair.
How are you going to explain that to a corporation like VW, which now makes half of its sales in China?
It goes without saying that a major corporation cannot turn on its heels and deems the Chinese market as uninteresting. But I do believe that strategists at corporate headquarters have recognized that China’s medium- and long-term economic strategy is not based on partnership with the West. This already began with the “Made in China 2025” strategy six years ago. This now continues with the 14th Five-Year Plan and the so-called dual circulation. International partners only have a place if they submit to China’s economic and political logic. Instead of continuing to run into a dead-end, we should look for new ways. And this will not be easy.
What China policy do you think is appropriate?
We in the EU have found a formula that accurately defines our relationship with China. It is one of competition, partnership and systemic rivalry. The Biden administration has adopted this triad. All three dimensions will exist in parallel for quite a while. We can’t manage the competition and systemic rivalry alone. So I think it is appropriate for us to join with like-minded partners to stop Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions.
The US is pursuing its own interests in its rivalry with China, but is calling on Germany and Europe to decide which side to take in the future.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said on several occasions that he makes no such demands of the USA’s partners. However, it would be unfortunate if we were to pretend that this systemic conflict does not concern us at all, but merely happens between the USA and China. This systemic rivalry relates to fundamental values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and multilateralism. In this respect, the EU is not a neutral party, but quite clearly a partner of countries such as the USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, India and others. With all willingness to cooperate, one thing must be clear: We do not make deals in which we trade climate protection for our commitment to human rights.
No deals? The international community sacrificed Taiwan a while ago, cutting all diplomatic ties because China wanted it that way. Now the status quo of Taiwan is more endangered than ever. Shouldn’t a future federal government position itself more clearly?
Yes, it must. Incidentally, the European Parliament is playing a leading role in formulating a new Taiwan policy. This policy is conservative in its basic concern: we do not want to see the status quo be changed by unilateral action by either of the two actors. This rules out a military conquest of Taiwan, which Xi Jinping has repeatedly threatened, as well as a possible Taiwanese declaration of independence. However, since Beijing is constantly continuing to challenge the status quo, we must more clearly take a stand in our support of Taiwan’s democracy. This means, for example, to try and involve Taiwan more in the World Health Organization or in world climate conferences; negotiating an EU investment agreement with Taiwan; promoting political and cultural exchange more.
What would a Green chancellor do differently in China policy?
When we govern, we govern in a coalition. No one dictates foreign policy. Nevertheless, I hope for changes in Germany’s China policy. Firstly, we need to act more European, instead of Germany taking the solo route. Germany has acted too egotistically in this respect. Secondly, we must stop pretending that trade and foreign policy are separate. We must place our foreign trade interests in the geopolitical context. Thirdly, we want to focus more on foreign climate policy, including towards China. Fourthly, Germany and Europe must become better partners to countries in the global South, for example through the EU connectivity strategy. The Chinese Silk Road Initiative is filling a vacuum that we have left behind. And most recently, the EU has so far given away or sold fewer than 10 million vaccine doses to countries in the Global South – a shameful state of affairs.
Annalena Baerbock, the Green Party candidate for chancellor, seems to be holding back on foreign policy in the election campaign so far.
On the contrary. She was very clear both on European policy and with regard to transatlantic relations, as well as on dealing with authoritarian regimes. “Dialogue and rigor” is her formula for relations with the latter. In this way, she draws clearer lines at China and Russia than Laschet or Scholz do – who for my taste act too much like Merkel or Schröder.
And Angela Merkel? She continues to be held in high regard in China. After her chancellorship, do you think she might become a mediator in the difficult relations with China, like Henry Kissinger or Helmut Schmidt once did?
Merkel’s reputation in China is no longer as majestic as it once was. China sees that for all her commitment, Merkel can’t deliver as Beijing would like. For example, she wanted to push through the investment agreement at all costs, but it has now been put on ice. She has been able to shape China policy less and less from the chancellery, why would she want to continue to fail at it without her office? Incidentally, I don’t think she longs to become a Christian Democratic Helmut Schmidt or European Henry Kissinger.
And your role in the future? For decades, you have visited China on a regular basis and worked towards the country. Now, Beijing has personally put you on a list of undesirables.
I will, of course, continue my involvement. As long as I can’t go to China, I may visit Taiwan more often. After all, I will be one hundred years old in 2053 and hope that there will be a change for the better in China before then and that I will be welcomed back after all.
After the Olympics is before the Olympics. Now that the Olympic flame has been extinguished in Tokyo, it is only about six months until it is due to be reignited at the 2022 Winter Games in Beijing. The Beijing Games are not expected to be any more “normal” than the one in Tokyo. It is unclear, for example, if and how China will adjust its strict Covid entry restrictions – and if so, for whom. Meanwhile, there is talk in the Western world about a diplomatic boycott of the Games to send a signal against human rights violations in Xinjiang and other places (as reported by China.Table).
Beijing does not want to know anything about all this for the time being: China’s capital currently focuses on perfect preparations for the Winter Games – and claiming them to be “Green Games”. This was proclaimed by state-news agency Xinhua back in January: “This will be the first time in the history of the Olympics that all the venues will be wholly powered by green energy.” Beijing is also relying on electric and fuel-cell powered vehicles for Olympic transportation, and specifically built a new high-speed train line from downtown to ski resorts in the surrounding area. In June, the organizing committee BOCOG reported that all 26 sports venues had been completed.
Sustainability has been one of the basic principles of the Olympic Games for some time now – at least in theory. Tokyo, for example, had foldable cardboard beds in the Olympic village, and medals were made of recycled precious metal. But environmentalists criticized the use of uncertified tropical wood at some venues. The Games have become less and less sustainable since 1992, says Sven Daniel Wolfe, who, with several other researchers, has examined every Olympic Games since the Albertville Winter Games nearly 30 years ago. For the researchers, sustainability meant not only environmental protection, but sustainability in terms of costs and social issues.“The Winter Games tend to cause more environmental damage than the Summer Games,” Wolfe tells China.Table. “That’s simply because of the nature of winter sports.” You need slopes and trails with stadiums, luge tracks and ski ramps in the mountains – which are not always pre-existing at every Olympic venue, for example, because it already hosted World Cups. “The 2014 Sochi Games were hugely destructive to the natural environment,” according to Wolfe. “All new infrastructure was built in protected natural forest.”
Beijing, too, has hardly hosted any Winter World Cups in the past and had to build all these facilities from scratch – alpine and luge/bobsleigh infrastructure in the Yanqing district beyond the Great Wall, as well as stadiums for Nordic skiing in Zhangjiakou, which already belongs to the neighboring Hebei province. At least the disciplines of snowboarding and trick skiing take place in existing ski resorts near Zhangjiakou.
But there is one problem that cannot be solved: There is now snow in Beijing. The winters are cold but extremely dry. So artificial snow is needed. It’s true that ski resorts in the Alps, for example, are increasingly resorting to artificial snow for World Cups because it’s easier to compress. But especially in arid regions like Beijing, this does not seem very sustainable. After all, the water used for the artificial snow is supposed to be recycled again and again.
With the support of architectural and environmental scientists, the Beijing Organizing Committee (BOCOG) has developed a set of environmental assessment standards that scrutinize the recycling of snow-making water, vegetation protection and mountain venues’ impact on wildlife, are the first of their kind internationally, and will play a major role in the development of eco-friendly skiing and mountain tourism in the region, the state-run newspaper China Daily quoted Liu Yumin, director of BOCOG’s planning and construction department, as saying. During the construction of the National Alpine Skiing Center in Yanqing, workers temporarily replanted sensitive alpine meadows, which they successfully moved back after completion. Crossings for small animals were also designed.
For indoor sports, Beijing relied on existing stadiums wherever possible. The Olympic Center, Capital Indoor Stadium and Beijing Wukesong Sports Center, which were among the main venues for the 2008 Summer Olympics, were converted for ice-based competitions such as speed skating or curling. Electricity for all sports venues will be generated by wind and solar power plants in Hebei, according to Xinhua, and will be directed to the various venues through a flexible DC grid that also supplies the capital.
As an example, Xinhua mentioned the arena for snowboard and freestyle ski competitions. During the Olympics, it is expected to consume 100,000 kWh of electricity. “The amount is equivalent to the consumption of 500 three-person households in a month, but all electricity will be generated through clean and renewable sources,” Xinhua quoted construction manager, Xu Yan, as saying. But only when sites are connected via their own micro-power grids, a supply through green power can be verified, Richard Brubaker, founder of sustainability consultancy Collective Responsibility in Shanghai, told China.Table. “Otherwise, it’s difficult to be completely sure of the energy source in China.” It remains to be seen how thorough the documentation will turn out.
To save electricity and prevent climate-damaging emissions from ice sports, Beijing plans to use carbon dioxide refrigerant for ice production, which is the least toxic and most eco-friendly alternative, according to Xinhua. The new technology can improve cooling efficiency by 20 percent, reducing power consumption. The technology will play a demonstration role for the construction of new venues for winter games worldwide, the agency quoted an official from the organizing committee BOCOG as saying.
Beijing has also built new subway lines, as well as charging stations for electric and fuel cell cars in the three competition zones of downtown Beijing, Yanqing and Zhangjiakou, in addition to the new high-speed rail. From official athlete transportation to shuttles from train stations to competitions, all official Olympic vehicles will run on electricity or hydrogen, according to China Daily. In Zhangjiakou, for example, 150 fuel cell buses from various Chinese manufacturers will be used.
The hydrogen used by the buses will be produced at the hydrogen industrial park in Yanqing, the second phase of which is currently under construction. “Regardless of how sustainable the event itself is, what’s interesting about hydrogen at the Olympics is that it’s a showcase for what’s possible,” Brubaker says. Back in 2008, already Beijing used fuel cell buses at the Summer Games, something completely new in China at the time. The hydrogen buses of Zhangjiakou are also a pilot project for public transport as a whole (as reported by China.Table).
Does all of this make the Games sustainable? Major events like the Olympics are often the antithesis of sustainability, Brubaker says. “But I would also argue that there are many lessons to be learned from events where sustainability is considered as part of the planning process.” Wolfe is more critical of the environmental, social and local budget costs of mega-events like the Olympics. He, therefore, advocates rotating the Games in the future between a few previous venues where the infrastructure is already in place – and could be continuously used in the future. If the idea catches on, Beijing will probably be able to use its Olympic sites even more often.
US athletes have overtaken China’s athletes in the medal table on the last day of the Olympic Games. In a total of 339 events, the U.S. won 39 gold medals, while China won 38. In the total number of medals won, the U.S. is slightly ahead of China (113 to 88).
Beijing, however, can be pleased with the haul. At the last Summer Games in Rio de Janeiro, the Chinese team won 26 gold medals and 70 medals in total.
A selection of Chinese Olympic victories:
When Erwin Gerber walked through an old street in Shaxi, a small suburb of Taicang, back in 2013, he was on the lookout for a small café and some delicious cake. But there was none. After that day in Shaxi, he searched the entire area, from Shanghai to Kunshan, looking for a café offering a “decent” Black Forest or hazelnut cake. After a year, he gave up on his search and decided he’d have to make it himself. This is how he tells the story about the start of his business. Today, his bakery “Brotecke” is known far beyond Taicang for its German baked goods.
“People here order over the Internet,” says Gerber, explaining that the bread and pretzels he makes in his bakery near Taicang are sometimes shipped all the way to Beijing, 1,200 kilometers away. Everything arrives in one day, he says. “In Germany, no one orders rolls from Hamburg to Munich.” But even without walk-in customers, the bakery has grown every year since its opening in 2015.
Erwin Gerber was in his early 50s when he decided to make everything himself. Having grown up in Koblenz, he had a carpentry business in Germany until he was headhunted and stays in Ireland, Canada and Dubai subsequently followed. When he was in the process of expanding a terminal at the airport of Dubai, he realized what the stress was doing to him. “I was afraid of having a heart attack at 55,” Gerber says. He decided to follow his wife to her home country, and Taicang drew him in. “It was a very clean and organized city, even back then,” Gerber says. Not least because of the many Germans who influenced the city’s officials, he says. The city of 800,000 is home to nearly 400 German businesses and is also known as “Little Swabia.”
The now 57-year-old found his new home because of the “German cleanliness”. He couldn’t imagine going back to Germany. “The last time I was in Germany, I noticed that the Germans hadn’t changed, but I had changed,” says Gerber. It also is related to the Chinese mentality, he says. “I used to be kind of a big-time choleric,” he says. In Taicang, he learned to look for solutions to problems instead of going ballistic. It doesn’t work any other way in China. “I’ve become much calmer,” Gerber says.
It also wouldn’t work without problems, for which solutions had to be found. Finding employees in one of China’s richest provinces who were willing to get up at 3:30 a.m. was difficult, says Gerber. And the most important thing was finding a German baker, as well. Never having learned the trade himself, he placed ads in Germany through the employment agency and websites. With success. Now he is on the lookout once more. “It would be nice to find someone who is not afraid to come to China,” says Gerber. Then, he says, he might be able to retire from the business at some point. Until then, he sits in the bakery every morning at 5:20 a.m. with coffee and a crumble. “Quality control,” as he calls it. Marita Wehlus
“This is why you should NOT learn Chinese!”, “10 things no one will tell you about Mandarin!”, “How much do you really know about Hanzi???”. Well, did we get your attention? Then you’ve just fallen into the trap of the “Headline Gang”! In our language, better known as “Click baiting”. In China, click baiters who generate online traffic through lurid or curious headlines are called 标题党 biāotídǎng (composed of 标题 biāotí = “headline” and 党 dǎng “party” or “gang, clique, coterie”).
By the way, the headline clique is not the only “gang” that has made a name for itself in Chinese. Throughout the internet jungle, for example, the so-called 剁手党 duòshǒudǎng, the “hand-chopping clique” is also on the move. Have no fear! Their aggression is not aimed at others, but is purely self-directed, and, fortunately, only figuratively. While the headline hunters mentioned at the beginning are hunting for clicks, the “duòshǒudǎng” are on a permanent online hunt for bargains. This makes them “online shopaholics”. And among them, after excessive online shopping frenzies – for example around the time of China’s Shopping Festival on November 11(双十一 shuāng-shíyī) – some people ruefully jokingly swear to “chop off” their mobile phone hand (剁 duò “to chop, to chop off”) to abstain from Taobao in the future. In the end, however, the “self-mutilation” only affects the wallet.
Other notorious “gangs” also include the “quick flashers”(快闪党 kuàishǎndǎng – flash mobbers), the “house cattle”(黄牛党 huángniúdǎng – (ticket) black marketeers), the “black hands”(黑手党 hēishǒudǎng – mafia) and the “purse party” (拎包党 līnbāodǎng – pickpockets). Not to be confused with the “reaching-out party”(伸手党 shēnshǒudǎng), which means “scroungers or freeloaders,” rather than pickpockets. This describes individuals who, out of convenience, rely on the help of others on every occasion, no matter how small, or simply brazenly claim the successes of others as their own.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Reinhard Bütikofer is one of the most seasoned China experts in German politics. In our interview, Felix Lee speaks with him about Merkel’s China policy and what a Green Chancellor would do differently. Bütikofer criticizes Germany’s unilateral moves, which tend to weaken Europe’s position against Beijing. He explains why Xi’s inauguration in 2013 represents a change for the worse, and why China has long since begun to decouple itself from the West. The Green MEP argues that Germany should not become fully dependent on China, and should instead cooperate with like-minded partners to counter Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions.
Yesterday, the Olympic Games in Tokyo came to an end. The upcoming Winter Games in Beijing have been a subject of debate in the past months: should there be a boycott due to human rights violations in Xinjiang? The organizers are trying to counter a boycott debate with a positive spin. They promise the very first “Green Winter Games”: Its sports venues are to be powered exclusively by eco-electricity, and transport is to be provided by electric and fuel cell cars and buses. Christiane Kühl analyses the concept of the “Green Games” and has found some questionable elements.
Have a pleasant week!
Reinhard Bütikofer (68) has been active in the Society for German-Chinese Friendship since the 1970s. The former federal chairman of the Green Party has been a member of the EU Parliament since 2009. He helps shape European policy on China in Foreign Affairs and Trade Committees. He also chairs the Delegation for Relations with the People’s Republic of China and is a member of the German-Chinese Dialogue Forum. And from time to time, his involvement gets him into trouble: since March, he has been blacklisted and is banned from entering China. This punitive measure was part of Beijing’s response to European sanctions for human rights violations in the Xinjiang region. Bütikofer had supported the sanctions.
Mr Bütikofer, no other Western industrialized country has benefited as much from China’s rise as Germany. What is your assessment after 16 years of Angela Merkel as Chancellor?
These 16 years of China policy cannot be lumped together. Today it is hardly remembered, but at the beginning of her chancellorship, Angela Merkel dared to receive the Dalai Lama, although she knew that this would meet utmost disapproval in Beijing. Just a few years ago, a group of European China think tanks concluded in a study that Merkel was one of the few leaders in Europe who also talked publicly about human rights in China. She arranged for Liu Xiaobo, the widow of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xia, to be allowed to depart for Germany after years of house arrest. And yet today, Merkel’s China policy seems strangely outdated.
In what way?
She has recently distinguished herself as a reliable partner of Xi Jinping, as a politician who is prepared not only to downplay human rights concerns in favor of deeper cooperation with the Xi regime but also took single-handed decisions with Germany, which can only weaken Europe’s position with China. Close economic ties have led critics to accuse Germany of having no foreign policy towards China at all, but instead engaging in an “automotive foreign policy”, is not the sole reason. Aside from large corporations like VW, the German economy took a far more critical stance towards China than the Chancellor’s Office. To me, it seems that there is a considerable amount of defeatism at play with Merkel. As if the Chancellor is convinced that China’s propaganda of unstoppable rise is true and that ultimately the only choice is to submit today or tomorrow under less favorable conditions. I think this is a wrong and dangerous attitude that threatens to lead us into a position of helplessness in the face of an increasingly arrogant regime.
But Merkel is attributed with a keen sense for change in world politics.
Xi Jinping’s Inauguration in 2013 is synonymous with a fundamental roll-back in China and an equally dramatic shift to superpower assumption in terms of its foreign politics. At the beginning of his term, observers had hoped Xi might turn out to be a reformer. That was an illusion. Human rights lawyers who were still able to defend their clients courageously in court ten years ago are now imprisoned. Xi has brutally sharpened China’s policies against national minorities. Xinjiang is now home to the worst police state, at best comparable to North Korea. The Communist Party is again squeezing into every crevice of people’s daily lives and increasingly putting its economy on a leash. Xi has used his campaign against corruption to concentrate all power in a kind of party imperialism – something that had been considered an aberration to be avoided at all costs since the time of Deng Xiaoping. For many years, Mrs. Merkel’s China policy followed the basic idea that thick boards had to be drilled with patience and passion. But the Xi regime has replaced the thick planks with steel plates. Merkel’s wooden drill won’t do much good anymore.
The question is what conclusions one draws from this. Should Germany decouple itself from China?
I have never considered the idea of general decoupling propagated by President Trump to be an intelligent perspective. It is diametrically opposed to our basic European idea of multilateral cooperation. We do not want to build walls. But we have to take note of the fact that China has long since started to decouple. It is still the case that European companies make no inroads into Chinese procurement markets, while our procurement markets are wide open to Chinese state-owned enterprises. China is becoming more and more self-sufficient, decoupling in education, the media sector, the IT industry, and the field of rare minerals. Decoupling was an ideology of Trump, but it is a reality of Xi.
So, decoupling after all?
In a situation where a partner is prepared to turn economic interdependence into a political weapon, one cannot naively proclaim that our candor knows no limits. One example is the expansion of the 5G network, which will be the nerve system of our future communications, particularly in the industrial sector. I don’t want a Chinese company to be part of the infrastructure expansion that, according to current Chinese law, has to be unconditionally at the beck and call of security authorities. It is not a decoupling philosophy, but simply practical common sense not to become completely dependent on a competitor that does not play fair.
How are you going to explain that to a corporation like VW, which now makes half of its sales in China?
It goes without saying that a major corporation cannot turn on its heels and deems the Chinese market as uninteresting. But I do believe that strategists at corporate headquarters have recognized that China’s medium- and long-term economic strategy is not based on partnership with the West. This already began with the “Made in China 2025” strategy six years ago. This now continues with the 14th Five-Year Plan and the so-called dual circulation. International partners only have a place if they submit to China’s economic and political logic. Instead of continuing to run into a dead-end, we should look for new ways. And this will not be easy.
What China policy do you think is appropriate?
We in the EU have found a formula that accurately defines our relationship with China. It is one of competition, partnership and systemic rivalry. The Biden administration has adopted this triad. All three dimensions will exist in parallel for quite a while. We can’t manage the competition and systemic rivalry alone. So I think it is appropriate for us to join with like-minded partners to stop Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions.
The US is pursuing its own interests in its rivalry with China, but is calling on Germany and Europe to decide which side to take in the future.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said on several occasions that he makes no such demands of the USA’s partners. However, it would be unfortunate if we were to pretend that this systemic conflict does not concern us at all, but merely happens between the USA and China. This systemic rivalry relates to fundamental values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and multilateralism. In this respect, the EU is not a neutral party, but quite clearly a partner of countries such as the USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, India and others. With all willingness to cooperate, one thing must be clear: We do not make deals in which we trade climate protection for our commitment to human rights.
No deals? The international community sacrificed Taiwan a while ago, cutting all diplomatic ties because China wanted it that way. Now the status quo of Taiwan is more endangered than ever. Shouldn’t a future federal government position itself more clearly?
Yes, it must. Incidentally, the European Parliament is playing a leading role in formulating a new Taiwan policy. This policy is conservative in its basic concern: we do not want to see the status quo be changed by unilateral action by either of the two actors. This rules out a military conquest of Taiwan, which Xi Jinping has repeatedly threatened, as well as a possible Taiwanese declaration of independence. However, since Beijing is constantly continuing to challenge the status quo, we must more clearly take a stand in our support of Taiwan’s democracy. This means, for example, to try and involve Taiwan more in the World Health Organization or in world climate conferences; negotiating an EU investment agreement with Taiwan; promoting political and cultural exchange more.
What would a Green chancellor do differently in China policy?
When we govern, we govern in a coalition. No one dictates foreign policy. Nevertheless, I hope for changes in Germany’s China policy. Firstly, we need to act more European, instead of Germany taking the solo route. Germany has acted too egotistically in this respect. Secondly, we must stop pretending that trade and foreign policy are separate. We must place our foreign trade interests in the geopolitical context. Thirdly, we want to focus more on foreign climate policy, including towards China. Fourthly, Germany and Europe must become better partners to countries in the global South, for example through the EU connectivity strategy. The Chinese Silk Road Initiative is filling a vacuum that we have left behind. And most recently, the EU has so far given away or sold fewer than 10 million vaccine doses to countries in the Global South – a shameful state of affairs.
Annalena Baerbock, the Green Party candidate for chancellor, seems to be holding back on foreign policy in the election campaign so far.
On the contrary. She was very clear both on European policy and with regard to transatlantic relations, as well as on dealing with authoritarian regimes. “Dialogue and rigor” is her formula for relations with the latter. In this way, she draws clearer lines at China and Russia than Laschet or Scholz do – who for my taste act too much like Merkel or Schröder.
And Angela Merkel? She continues to be held in high regard in China. After her chancellorship, do you think she might become a mediator in the difficult relations with China, like Henry Kissinger or Helmut Schmidt once did?
Merkel’s reputation in China is no longer as majestic as it once was. China sees that for all her commitment, Merkel can’t deliver as Beijing would like. For example, she wanted to push through the investment agreement at all costs, but it has now been put on ice. She has been able to shape China policy less and less from the chancellery, why would she want to continue to fail at it without her office? Incidentally, I don’t think she longs to become a Christian Democratic Helmut Schmidt or European Henry Kissinger.
And your role in the future? For decades, you have visited China on a regular basis and worked towards the country. Now, Beijing has personally put you on a list of undesirables.
I will, of course, continue my involvement. As long as I can’t go to China, I may visit Taiwan more often. After all, I will be one hundred years old in 2053 and hope that there will be a change for the better in China before then and that I will be welcomed back after all.
After the Olympics is before the Olympics. Now that the Olympic flame has been extinguished in Tokyo, it is only about six months until it is due to be reignited at the 2022 Winter Games in Beijing. The Beijing Games are not expected to be any more “normal” than the one in Tokyo. It is unclear, for example, if and how China will adjust its strict Covid entry restrictions – and if so, for whom. Meanwhile, there is talk in the Western world about a diplomatic boycott of the Games to send a signal against human rights violations in Xinjiang and other places (as reported by China.Table).
Beijing does not want to know anything about all this for the time being: China’s capital currently focuses on perfect preparations for the Winter Games – and claiming them to be “Green Games”. This was proclaimed by state-news agency Xinhua back in January: “This will be the first time in the history of the Olympics that all the venues will be wholly powered by green energy.” Beijing is also relying on electric and fuel-cell powered vehicles for Olympic transportation, and specifically built a new high-speed train line from downtown to ski resorts in the surrounding area. In June, the organizing committee BOCOG reported that all 26 sports venues had been completed.
Sustainability has been one of the basic principles of the Olympic Games for some time now – at least in theory. Tokyo, for example, had foldable cardboard beds in the Olympic village, and medals were made of recycled precious metal. But environmentalists criticized the use of uncertified tropical wood at some venues. The Games have become less and less sustainable since 1992, says Sven Daniel Wolfe, who, with several other researchers, has examined every Olympic Games since the Albertville Winter Games nearly 30 years ago. For the researchers, sustainability meant not only environmental protection, but sustainability in terms of costs and social issues.“The Winter Games tend to cause more environmental damage than the Summer Games,” Wolfe tells China.Table. “That’s simply because of the nature of winter sports.” You need slopes and trails with stadiums, luge tracks and ski ramps in the mountains – which are not always pre-existing at every Olympic venue, for example, because it already hosted World Cups. “The 2014 Sochi Games were hugely destructive to the natural environment,” according to Wolfe. “All new infrastructure was built in protected natural forest.”
Beijing, too, has hardly hosted any Winter World Cups in the past and had to build all these facilities from scratch – alpine and luge/bobsleigh infrastructure in the Yanqing district beyond the Great Wall, as well as stadiums for Nordic skiing in Zhangjiakou, which already belongs to the neighboring Hebei province. At least the disciplines of snowboarding and trick skiing take place in existing ski resorts near Zhangjiakou.
But there is one problem that cannot be solved: There is now snow in Beijing. The winters are cold but extremely dry. So artificial snow is needed. It’s true that ski resorts in the Alps, for example, are increasingly resorting to artificial snow for World Cups because it’s easier to compress. But especially in arid regions like Beijing, this does not seem very sustainable. After all, the water used for the artificial snow is supposed to be recycled again and again.
With the support of architectural and environmental scientists, the Beijing Organizing Committee (BOCOG) has developed a set of environmental assessment standards that scrutinize the recycling of snow-making water, vegetation protection and mountain venues’ impact on wildlife, are the first of their kind internationally, and will play a major role in the development of eco-friendly skiing and mountain tourism in the region, the state-run newspaper China Daily quoted Liu Yumin, director of BOCOG’s planning and construction department, as saying. During the construction of the National Alpine Skiing Center in Yanqing, workers temporarily replanted sensitive alpine meadows, which they successfully moved back after completion. Crossings for small animals were also designed.
For indoor sports, Beijing relied on existing stadiums wherever possible. The Olympic Center, Capital Indoor Stadium and Beijing Wukesong Sports Center, which were among the main venues for the 2008 Summer Olympics, were converted for ice-based competitions such as speed skating or curling. Electricity for all sports venues will be generated by wind and solar power plants in Hebei, according to Xinhua, and will be directed to the various venues through a flexible DC grid that also supplies the capital.
As an example, Xinhua mentioned the arena for snowboard and freestyle ski competitions. During the Olympics, it is expected to consume 100,000 kWh of electricity. “The amount is equivalent to the consumption of 500 three-person households in a month, but all electricity will be generated through clean and renewable sources,” Xinhua quoted construction manager, Xu Yan, as saying. But only when sites are connected via their own micro-power grids, a supply through green power can be verified, Richard Brubaker, founder of sustainability consultancy Collective Responsibility in Shanghai, told China.Table. “Otherwise, it’s difficult to be completely sure of the energy source in China.” It remains to be seen how thorough the documentation will turn out.
To save electricity and prevent climate-damaging emissions from ice sports, Beijing plans to use carbon dioxide refrigerant for ice production, which is the least toxic and most eco-friendly alternative, according to Xinhua. The new technology can improve cooling efficiency by 20 percent, reducing power consumption. The technology will play a demonstration role for the construction of new venues for winter games worldwide, the agency quoted an official from the organizing committee BOCOG as saying.
Beijing has also built new subway lines, as well as charging stations for electric and fuel cell cars in the three competition zones of downtown Beijing, Yanqing and Zhangjiakou, in addition to the new high-speed rail. From official athlete transportation to shuttles from train stations to competitions, all official Olympic vehicles will run on electricity or hydrogen, according to China Daily. In Zhangjiakou, for example, 150 fuel cell buses from various Chinese manufacturers will be used.
The hydrogen used by the buses will be produced at the hydrogen industrial park in Yanqing, the second phase of which is currently under construction. “Regardless of how sustainable the event itself is, what’s interesting about hydrogen at the Olympics is that it’s a showcase for what’s possible,” Brubaker says. Back in 2008, already Beijing used fuel cell buses at the Summer Games, something completely new in China at the time. The hydrogen buses of Zhangjiakou are also a pilot project for public transport as a whole (as reported by China.Table).
Does all of this make the Games sustainable? Major events like the Olympics are often the antithesis of sustainability, Brubaker says. “But I would also argue that there are many lessons to be learned from events where sustainability is considered as part of the planning process.” Wolfe is more critical of the environmental, social and local budget costs of mega-events like the Olympics. He, therefore, advocates rotating the Games in the future between a few previous venues where the infrastructure is already in place – and could be continuously used in the future. If the idea catches on, Beijing will probably be able to use its Olympic sites even more often.
US athletes have overtaken China’s athletes in the medal table on the last day of the Olympic Games. In a total of 339 events, the U.S. won 39 gold medals, while China won 38. In the total number of medals won, the U.S. is slightly ahead of China (113 to 88).
Beijing, however, can be pleased with the haul. At the last Summer Games in Rio de Janeiro, the Chinese team won 26 gold medals and 70 medals in total.
A selection of Chinese Olympic victories:
When Erwin Gerber walked through an old street in Shaxi, a small suburb of Taicang, back in 2013, he was on the lookout for a small café and some delicious cake. But there was none. After that day in Shaxi, he searched the entire area, from Shanghai to Kunshan, looking for a café offering a “decent” Black Forest or hazelnut cake. After a year, he gave up on his search and decided he’d have to make it himself. This is how he tells the story about the start of his business. Today, his bakery “Brotecke” is known far beyond Taicang for its German baked goods.
“People here order over the Internet,” says Gerber, explaining that the bread and pretzels he makes in his bakery near Taicang are sometimes shipped all the way to Beijing, 1,200 kilometers away. Everything arrives in one day, he says. “In Germany, no one orders rolls from Hamburg to Munich.” But even without walk-in customers, the bakery has grown every year since its opening in 2015.
Erwin Gerber was in his early 50s when he decided to make everything himself. Having grown up in Koblenz, he had a carpentry business in Germany until he was headhunted and stays in Ireland, Canada and Dubai subsequently followed. When he was in the process of expanding a terminal at the airport of Dubai, he realized what the stress was doing to him. “I was afraid of having a heart attack at 55,” Gerber says. He decided to follow his wife to her home country, and Taicang drew him in. “It was a very clean and organized city, even back then,” Gerber says. Not least because of the many Germans who influenced the city’s officials, he says. The city of 800,000 is home to nearly 400 German businesses and is also known as “Little Swabia.”
The now 57-year-old found his new home because of the “German cleanliness”. He couldn’t imagine going back to Germany. “The last time I was in Germany, I noticed that the Germans hadn’t changed, but I had changed,” says Gerber. It also is related to the Chinese mentality, he says. “I used to be kind of a big-time choleric,” he says. In Taicang, he learned to look for solutions to problems instead of going ballistic. It doesn’t work any other way in China. “I’ve become much calmer,” Gerber says.
It also wouldn’t work without problems, for which solutions had to be found. Finding employees in one of China’s richest provinces who were willing to get up at 3:30 a.m. was difficult, says Gerber. And the most important thing was finding a German baker, as well. Never having learned the trade himself, he placed ads in Germany through the employment agency and websites. With success. Now he is on the lookout once more. “It would be nice to find someone who is not afraid to come to China,” says Gerber. Then, he says, he might be able to retire from the business at some point. Until then, he sits in the bakery every morning at 5:20 a.m. with coffee and a crumble. “Quality control,” as he calls it. Marita Wehlus
“This is why you should NOT learn Chinese!”, “10 things no one will tell you about Mandarin!”, “How much do you really know about Hanzi???”. Well, did we get your attention? Then you’ve just fallen into the trap of the “Headline Gang”! In our language, better known as “Click baiting”. In China, click baiters who generate online traffic through lurid or curious headlines are called 标题党 biāotídǎng (composed of 标题 biāotí = “headline” and 党 dǎng “party” or “gang, clique, coterie”).
By the way, the headline clique is not the only “gang” that has made a name for itself in Chinese. Throughout the internet jungle, for example, the so-called 剁手党 duòshǒudǎng, the “hand-chopping clique” is also on the move. Have no fear! Their aggression is not aimed at others, but is purely self-directed, and, fortunately, only figuratively. While the headline hunters mentioned at the beginning are hunting for clicks, the “duòshǒudǎng” are on a permanent online hunt for bargains. This makes them “online shopaholics”. And among them, after excessive online shopping frenzies – for example around the time of China’s Shopping Festival on November 11(双十一 shuāng-shíyī) – some people ruefully jokingly swear to “chop off” their mobile phone hand (剁 duò “to chop, to chop off”) to abstain from Taobao in the future. In the end, however, the “self-mutilation” only affects the wallet.
Other notorious “gangs” also include the “quick flashers”(快闪党 kuàishǎndǎng – flash mobbers), the “house cattle”(黄牛党 huángniúdǎng – (ticket) black marketeers), the “black hands”(黑手党 hēishǒudǎng – mafia) and the “purse party” (拎包党 līnbāodǎng – pickpockets). Not to be confused with the “reaching-out party”(伸手党 shēnshǒudǎng), which means “scroungers or freeloaders,” rather than pickpockets. This describes individuals who, out of convenience, rely on the help of others on every occasion, no matter how small, or simply brazenly claim the successes of others as their own.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.