The human and foreign policy disaster in Afghanistan has once again changed our look at the United States. While everything that had happened under Donald Trump could be considered an exceptional case, we have to see events under Joe Biden as normal operations. In an interview with China.Table, renowned Singaporean political scientist Li Mingjian lays out how the U.S.-China relationship might evolve. Originally, the U.S. wanted to strengthen its credibility with its troop withdrawal, but for the moment, the opposite has happened, says Li.
The experienced political observer advises the expression of criticism of China in such a way that it actually will be heard in the country. Accusations of genocide do not fit their self-image and lead to a complete denial of everything said. However, China is also overly sensitive at the moment. “Chinese state media, however, react to every little thing and want to ensure that the rest of the world fully agrees with the Chinese position,” Li complains. It obviously can’t work. Official China needs a thicker skin if it wants to play internationally. Meanwhile, traditional US allies like Germany face tough decisions. China wants to set standards and is forcing its economic partners to follow suit.
China is also currently setting new standards for data protection. On Friday, the People’s Congress passed the PIPL, a new law regulating the handling of personal data. Ning Wang gives you a rundown on what is known about the impacts of the law as things stand.
Have a pleasant week!
Li Mingjiang, you’ve been dealing with US-China relations for a decade and a half. Fifteen years ago, would you have dared to predict such tensions between the two states as we are currently experiencing?
No, fifteen Years ago relations were quite stable and cooperative. Very few analysts had predicted such a rise of tensions that quick. Neither had few analysts predicted China’s rise so rapid and robust. And many Americans did not expect at the time that China would become as great a challenge or even a threat to the United States as it is today
What contributed to the rise of tensions?
We have several sets of factors. Struggle for power, influence and status are one set. A second one consists of political differences, ideological gaps and differences in domestic governance. Then there are security conflicts and divergent economic interests and policy practices as a third set. And you can furthermore identify a fourth set of factors like misperception, miscalculation and domestic political considerations
Talking of security, what are you referring to?
Well, in American definition, you would refer to the Indo-Pacific. Particularly here you have structurally different interests and objectives in all major issues. On major East Asian security matters, at the risk of oversimplification, we can say that almost all of what the US wants is opposed by China, and almost all of what China wants is opposed by the US. For instance, look at the South China Sea where both powers are contending over military predominance, suspicions of the other party’s possible control of trade routes and different interpretations of maritime laws. There is no consensus on any of these points.
And Taiwan is the mother of all conflicts
Taiwan is most dangerous for sure and combines so many aspects. It’s about security hegemony in the region, about possible US military intervention in the Taiwan strait, about US alliances and the credibility of US security commitments. China has different views and objectives on all these things. For China, it’s perhaps its last major milestone in the process of achieving a grand national rejuvenation. The Taiwan issue signifies a powder keg of the region, with the biggest threat of a military conflict.
Chinese state media pointing to Afghanistan now claiming the US would let down its ally Taiwan as they let down Afghanistan. Is it plausible to draw this conclusion?
At least the chaos in Afghanistan sends some negative messages to a certain segment of the social-political elites in East Asia, including those in Taiwan. It’s not a mainstream view, but a few start to raise the issue of the US’ credibility. That’s the opposite of what the US is aiming for. Washington has been trying to beef up its credibility of security commitments in East Asia.
Given all these points of conflict, how can the urgently needed cooperation between the USA and China come about, which is inevitable in many respects? For example, in the fight against climate change?
Right now the atmosphere is so negative, so competitive, that close cooperation and coordination between the two major powers in global issues seems just unrealistic. A so-called G2 consisting of both powers guiding the world through the challenges of the 21st century is even completely out of the question in the foreseeable future. For at least a decade, maybe two, I expect an atmosphere of cold peace and even more strategic competition.
What does that mean for the rest of the world?
Geostrategic tensions in certain regions naturally have a negative effect on the countries around, which are coming under greater pressure due to the intensifying security competition between Washington and Beijing. But that’s not the only minefield. The struggle for technological supremacy can put allies and partners of both states in a mess when they have to decide between a US- or a Chinese standard. US-allies will also have to grapple with the question of whether or not Chinese firms can be allowed to gain access to their market.
Are there no profiteers?
Yes. If the USA and Europe develop a counteroffer to the Belt and Road Initiative, as announced, then there will be states that will benefit from it. Education programs are also part of the competition and could create opportunities for some countries. But the benefits of this constellation are significantly less than harms and risks.
That all sounds very pessimistic. Is there no way out of this dilemma?
There are very few reasons to be optimistic. The only thing that both sides can perhaps do is to relax some of their competitive policies. Each side in its own way.
Okay, what do you recommend the Americans should do?
Politically, China will unlikely develop just the way the Americans would like it to develop. That is one of the misconceptions we probably need to highlight. All the major sociopolitical changes in China since the Opium Wars have been initiated by forces within the country itself. The Americans should accept and consider this. The legitimation of Communist Party rule today is greater than they suspect. Many Chinese support the political status quo in the country because they believe they are on the upward way to a more prosperous society. Instead, the US is trying to drive a wedge between the common people and the Communist Party and hoping for some dramatic political transformation in China. This does not seem to be working.
Why not?
Fundamentally, Chinese people appreciate the economic benefits and the significant improvement of living standards that have resulted from China’s economic development in the past decades. Despite their grievances about corruption, social inequality, local government’s abuse of power on certain issues, they, by and large, recognize that the ruling political party has done a good job in steering China. You can always find some liberal-minded elites who may be supportive of Western criticisms of China, but they are a small minority group in China. There’s certainly another reason: the information that circulates in China is, to a large extent, controlled by the state. By criticizing China, you don’t start a debate in the country. Instead, there is a risk that the criticism will turn against you, especially if it is not based on sound facts. Then it doesn’t matter what is criticized, the propaganda and many Chinese people will conclude that it’s all Western hypocrisy and bad intentions in it.
Does that mean the U.S. should rather not criticize China?
No. But they should try to express their criticisms more sensitively.
Do you expect more understanding in the West that Uyghurs in Xinjiang are tortured?
Human rights violations must be criticized in any country if they do happen. In China, most people also envy the affirmative action privileges that minority groups enjoy. We know that there are different priorities on human rights in different societies and for societies at different development stages. China’s development success in the past few decades has been built on the practice that some group’s interests and rights had been sacrificed or under-protected. In the socio-economic arenas, for instance, the policy has always prioritized efficiency at the expense of equity. Politically, harsh policies have been pursued to make sure that you have an authoritarian and strong government to keep China on the track of socio-economic development instead of the sort of polarizing politics and instabilities that we can see in many other developing countries. On this particular issue, the question is whether the US government really needs to speak of genocide
Why?
This rhetoric doesn’t help anyone. People in China have a certain sense of pride, and using the genocide terminology completely destroys the credibility of such criticism in Chinese society. They perceive such harsh criticism of their country as harsh criticism against themselves. This increases mutual animosity in societies.
Is there a form of criticism of China that is not branded as demonization?
Admittedly, that’s not easy. But it would help if the US tried to recognize that the Chinese government also has legitimate intentions with its minority policy. Beijing wants to ensure that a national identity is created and enhanced and that the ethnic minorities can share in the prosperity. Basically, that’s not a bad thing. Of course, at the hands of local government officials, the implementation of certain policies is too coercive and too brutal. Still, this form of American empathy for Chinese domestic politics would increase the opportunity for dialogue.
And what can Beijing do to relax relations with the US?
Quite a lot. It starts with the Chinese government having to show more tolerance when it comes to criticism of its policies. The party needs to understand that every country in the world is coming under fire in one way or another. It is completely normal. The US and its political leaders are constantly being loudly criticized for all sorts of things. Chinese state media, however, react to every little thing and want to ensure that the rest of the world fully agrees with the Chinese position. That can’t work. A little tolerance and serenity wouldn’t hurt here, either.
You say China should be less sensitive. Should the country also change its actions?
The government needs to be more sensitive to its own policies. The social design of a society including the minorities takes a lot of time. The party believes, however, that profound change can be achieved overnight. The approach is correspondingly harsh, which in turn provokes justified criticism. Beijing can take a different approach that is accompanied by greater patience and more sensitivity to possible external backlashes
But China’s assertive demeanor also irritates large parts of the world. Do you see a potential for improvement there?
Perhaps a more serious review of the guidelines is needed. In the South China Sea, for example, Beijing would do well to be less opinionated and to seriously seek common solutions. In this regard, it would be helpful if China were more mindful of international law, particularly the law of the sea, and aligned its own positions somewhat more closely with the expectations of littoral states. But I fear that there are some forces in China that will never allow such a reassessment of their own policy. So there are attempts to relax US-Chinese relations, but they are apparently hardly feasible.
What can the European Union do?
What applies to the Americans also applies to the EU: Despite all the justified criticism of China, the Europeans should try to develop a realistic understanding of how Chinese domestic politics and policy come about. The EU could also discuss security issues in East Asia more independently with Beijing and not give the impression that the American position is being fully represented. Here the EU could create some leeway to exert greater influence.
Professor Li Mingjiang of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore has been studying US-China relations for 15 years. Li received his doctorate from Boston University. He is the author and editor of 15 books.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress gave the green light for a new data protection law on Friday. It is due to come into force on November 1st. These new rules for the handling of user data will hit Tencent, Alibaba, ByteDance and other online companies hard. This is because the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法) provides for significant changes:
The scope of the new data law does not end at the borders of the People’s Republic, but goes beyond. From November on, the personal data of Chinese citizens will no longer flow to countries with lower data security standards. Companies failing to comply will face hefty fines of up to 50 million yuan (6.6 million euros), or five percent of their previous annual revenue.
The full text of the law’s final draft has not yet been published. But the news agency Xinhua is already reporting the first details. Experts do not expect main features to have changed significantly since the second draft.
With this data protection law, China has reached a level of protection similar to Japan and the EU, while the US is still far off (as reported by China.Table). Some foreign companies are ahead of the pace, as the PIPL is closely oriented to the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). If companies are compliant with Europe’s GDPR, “they are going to be fine complying with the Chinese privacy law,” Alexa Lee, senior manager of policy at the Information Technology Industry Council, a Washington-based trade association of high-tech companies, told Wall Street Journal.
The costs for all companies will increase in order to comply with the new regulations. This is because the PIPL stipulates that critical information infrastructure operators (CIIs) and processors of personal data must undergo a security assessment by the State Council Information Office when transferring information across borders. They must also store all personal data within China.
In other cases, the cross-border transfer of personal data is subject to certification by professional organizations or the processors must sign a contract with the recipient abroad.
The fear of the consequences of the PIPL data protection law announced by Beijing on Friday was clearly felt on the stock exchanges in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Shares of Alibaba lost over two percent on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Over the week, shares of Alibaba were down 14 percent. Overseas investors had also not yet priced in the impact the new law would have on their investments in Chinese tech stocks, according to experts.
While the final details surrounding the stricter PIPL privacy law have not yet been revealed, Internet companies have nonetheless been caught off guard by the flood of new regulations. The announcement comes at a time of declining economic growth (as reported by China.Table). The importance of China’s internet companies to its economic growth has grown rapidly in recent years, even without strict legal requirements by the government. Beijing can no longer leave the field of data sovereignty, even for the sake of securing its economy, to tech companies. This will be all the more important in the continued tech dispute with the US.
The Data Security Law will come into force on September 1st, 2021 (as reported by China.Table). Together with the Data Security Law, taking effect in November, Beijing’s power to access data will surge – be it domestic or foreign. While the initial intention was to end the proliferation of domestic tech companies and get to the heart of the problem. But the law also means that Beijing is cleaning house when it comes to global standards for data security. Overall, it’s a sign that the CCP wants to strengthen legal certainty for China’s internet users. But only time will tell whether it will also lead to a stronger consumer protection. Because it is ultimately up to the party to decide on how to deal with citizens’ data.
He is a career diplomat, not a political appointee. Nicholas Burns has worked his way up as a professional in the U.S. State Department and brings ample diplomatic experience to the table. He has been ambassador to NATO and Greece. In Washington, he was appointed deputy secretary. Under George H.W. Bush, he was already involved in all negotiations with the Soviet Union during its final days. Now, the 65-year-old is to become the new U.S. ambassador to China.
The difference between political appointments and career experts is profound. During his office, Donald Trump had appointed many ambassadorships to individuals close to him or to whom he owed a favor. Burns is firmly located in the Joe Biden camp, but he is first and foremost an expert on international relations. He speaks French, Arabic, and Greek.
His views on China so far sound promising. Burns has long observed the nation’s rise and growing geo strategic rivalry. “I want to remind America of one thing: Global peace and security still depends on us more than any other country.” he wrote in a 2014 guest editorial for the Boston Globe newspaper.
While the rise of a new power has often led to war in the past and such a scenario is also possible between China and the US, Burns assessed the situation in the article, the responsibility of the government in Washington is to prevent an open conflict. To do so, he says, China must be accommodated.
In light of such views, it hardly comes as a surprise that the Chinese have a positive attitude towards him. Five years ago, state media had already praised him as a U.S. diplomat with a “vision” for foreign policy and as a “voice of reason.” Even the Global Times had positive things to say after his appointment on Friday. The state newspaper associates him with the possibility of resolving “differences and misunderstandings” between both superpowers. They acknowledge this as a difficult undertaking. But from a propaganda mouthpiece like the Global Times, it was already a warm welcome for the new U.S. representative in China.
Indeed, the current situation between the two superpowers is a complicated one. The trade conflict is deadlocked and can hardly be resolved easily. Xi Jinping is likely to assert his country’s territorial claims ever more forcefully. At the same time, China is accepting fewer and fewer voices from outside. Burns himself said over the weekend that he looks forward to addressing “the strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC and other challenges at this important crossroads.”
Burns studied in France in the 1970s and earned his first degree in European history in Boston. He went on to earn a master’s degree in international relations at Johns Hopkins University in Maryland. Right out of college, he started as an intern at the U.S. Mission in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. Since then, it’s been onward and upward to a post as deputy secretary under George W. Bush. Burns served in high positions under Republican and Democratic presidents alike.
In fact, Burns has so far focused on Europe, Eastern Europe and Middle East policy. But he also has experience in East Asia. In 2006, for example, he negotiated the disarmament of North Korea with Beijing in his role as Secretary of State. In 2008, at the age of 52, he retired from active duty, for the time being, limiting himself to a role as an academic and adviser. Now Biden reactivated him.
His appointment came after the ambassadorial post in Beijing had been vacant for months. This proves that Biden cares about the position and needs a hard-working expert there who makes few mistakes and keeps a level head. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk
“Those are Chinese cabbage prices!” you might shout for a change the next time you flip through the advertising leaflet of your local discount store. The term 白菜价 báicàijià (白菜 báicài “Chinese cabbage” and 价 jià from 价格 jiàgé “price”) is the friendly Chinese version of “underprice” or “knockdown price”.
The word has its roots in China’s north, which is usually less involved in vegetable farming. Due to a lack of alternatives, Chinese cabbage was once the preferred choice in dishes during the cold season. Although these elongated cabbages are easy to grow and high-yielding from a cultivation perspective, they, unfortunately, take up a lot of storage space from a retailer’s point of view. Therefore, when they flooded the market in large quantities after their harvest at the beginning of winter and began to pile up stores, they were hawked at rock-bottom prices. However, this only shifted the storage problem to private households. Heaps of Chinese cabbage as a winter reserve were for a long time part of the annual city scenery in Beijing and greened balconies and backyards.
By now, the “Chinese cabbage price” has become a common synonym for rock-bottom prices throughout China. There is even a well-known online discount portal bearing the name. It can be found at the web address “ibaicaijia.com”.
Those who go bargain hunting in the Middle Kingdom should also have some other discount vocabulary in their repertoire. For example, the popular bait-and-switch formula 买一送一 (mǎi yī sòng yī), which means “buy one, get one free”. This screeches out at visitors to Chinese malls and markets in exactly the same way or in any number of variations-for example, 买三送一 (mǎi sān sòng yī) or, even better, 买一送二 (mǎi yī sòng èr)-from the numerous advertising posters and price tags. On the other hand, psyched up foreign shopaholics should show restraint when promises of discounts are garnished with the sign 折 zhé (from 打折 dǎzhé “to give a discount”). This is because, unlike what we are used to in the West, these indications do not refer to the amount of the discount, but to the percentage of the final price. For example, if a Chinese store offers a 9折-discount (jiǔzhé), one should not fall into a premature rapture. This does not mean an unbelievable discount of 90 percent, but simply that the product is offered at 90 percent of the original price.
One should not be too stingy in China anyway, otherwise, linguistic ridicule might follow. In China, those with a tight grip on their wallet are often called “miserly spirits” 小气鬼 xiǎoqìguǐ (from 小气 xiǎoqì “miserly” and 鬼 guǐ “spirit“, literally “spirits with little life-energy qi”), or even worse “Tin Rooster” (铁公鸡 tiěgōngjī). This chicken metaphor is derived from the two-part proverb 铁公鸡，一 毛不拔 (tiěgōngjī, yī máo bù bá) – “not a single feather can be plucked from a tin rooster”. So if in doubt, it is better to leave a few feathers behind and save face.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
The human and foreign policy disaster in Afghanistan has once again changed our look at the United States. While everything that had happened under Donald Trump could be considered an exceptional case, we have to see events under Joe Biden as normal operations. In an interview with China.Table, renowned Singaporean political scientist Li Mingjian lays out how the U.S.-China relationship might evolve. Originally, the U.S. wanted to strengthen its credibility with its troop withdrawal, but for the moment, the opposite has happened, says Li.
The experienced political observer advises the expression of criticism of China in such a way that it actually will be heard in the country. Accusations of genocide do not fit their self-image and lead to a complete denial of everything said. However, China is also overly sensitive at the moment. “Chinese state media, however, react to every little thing and want to ensure that the rest of the world fully agrees with the Chinese position,” Li complains. It obviously can’t work. Official China needs a thicker skin if it wants to play internationally. Meanwhile, traditional US allies like Germany face tough decisions. China wants to set standards and is forcing its economic partners to follow suit.
China is also currently setting new standards for data protection. On Friday, the People’s Congress passed the PIPL, a new law regulating the handling of personal data. Ning Wang gives you a rundown on what is known about the impacts of the law as things stand.
Have a pleasant week!
Li Mingjiang, you’ve been dealing with US-China relations for a decade and a half. Fifteen years ago, would you have dared to predict such tensions between the two states as we are currently experiencing?
No, fifteen Years ago relations were quite stable and cooperative. Very few analysts had predicted such a rise of tensions that quick. Neither had few analysts predicted China’s rise so rapid and robust. And many Americans did not expect at the time that China would become as great a challenge or even a threat to the United States as it is today
What contributed to the rise of tensions?
We have several sets of factors. Struggle for power, influence and status are one set. A second one consists of political differences, ideological gaps and differences in domestic governance. Then there are security conflicts and divergent economic interests and policy practices as a third set. And you can furthermore identify a fourth set of factors like misperception, miscalculation and domestic political considerations
Talking of security, what are you referring to?
Well, in American definition, you would refer to the Indo-Pacific. Particularly here you have structurally different interests and objectives in all major issues. On major East Asian security matters, at the risk of oversimplification, we can say that almost all of what the US wants is opposed by China, and almost all of what China wants is opposed by the US. For instance, look at the South China Sea where both powers are contending over military predominance, suspicions of the other party’s possible control of trade routes and different interpretations of maritime laws. There is no consensus on any of these points.
And Taiwan is the mother of all conflicts
Taiwan is most dangerous for sure and combines so many aspects. It’s about security hegemony in the region, about possible US military intervention in the Taiwan strait, about US alliances and the credibility of US security commitments. China has different views and objectives on all these things. For China, it’s perhaps its last major milestone in the process of achieving a grand national rejuvenation. The Taiwan issue signifies a powder keg of the region, with the biggest threat of a military conflict.
Chinese state media pointing to Afghanistan now claiming the US would let down its ally Taiwan as they let down Afghanistan. Is it plausible to draw this conclusion?
At least the chaos in Afghanistan sends some negative messages to a certain segment of the social-political elites in East Asia, including those in Taiwan. It’s not a mainstream view, but a few start to raise the issue of the US’ credibility. That’s the opposite of what the US is aiming for. Washington has been trying to beef up its credibility of security commitments in East Asia.
Given all these points of conflict, how can the urgently needed cooperation between the USA and China come about, which is inevitable in many respects? For example, in the fight against climate change?
Right now the atmosphere is so negative, so competitive, that close cooperation and coordination between the two major powers in global issues seems just unrealistic. A so-called G2 consisting of both powers guiding the world through the challenges of the 21st century is even completely out of the question in the foreseeable future. For at least a decade, maybe two, I expect an atmosphere of cold peace and even more strategic competition.
What does that mean for the rest of the world?
Geostrategic tensions in certain regions naturally have a negative effect on the countries around, which are coming under greater pressure due to the intensifying security competition between Washington and Beijing. But that’s not the only minefield. The struggle for technological supremacy can put allies and partners of both states in a mess when they have to decide between a US- or a Chinese standard. US-allies will also have to grapple with the question of whether or not Chinese firms can be allowed to gain access to their market.
Are there no profiteers?
Yes. If the USA and Europe develop a counteroffer to the Belt and Road Initiative, as announced, then there will be states that will benefit from it. Education programs are also part of the competition and could create opportunities for some countries. But the benefits of this constellation are significantly less than harms and risks.
That all sounds very pessimistic. Is there no way out of this dilemma?
There are very few reasons to be optimistic. The only thing that both sides can perhaps do is to relax some of their competitive policies. Each side in its own way.
Okay, what do you recommend the Americans should do?
Politically, China will unlikely develop just the way the Americans would like it to develop. That is one of the misconceptions we probably need to highlight. All the major sociopolitical changes in China since the Opium Wars have been initiated by forces within the country itself. The Americans should accept and consider this. The legitimation of Communist Party rule today is greater than they suspect. Many Chinese support the political status quo in the country because they believe they are on the upward way to a more prosperous society. Instead, the US is trying to drive a wedge between the common people and the Communist Party and hoping for some dramatic political transformation in China. This does not seem to be working.
Why not?
Fundamentally, Chinese people appreciate the economic benefits and the significant improvement of living standards that have resulted from China’s economic development in the past decades. Despite their grievances about corruption, social inequality, local government’s abuse of power on certain issues, they, by and large, recognize that the ruling political party has done a good job in steering China. You can always find some liberal-minded elites who may be supportive of Western criticisms of China, but they are a small minority group in China. There’s certainly another reason: the information that circulates in China is, to a large extent, controlled by the state. By criticizing China, you don’t start a debate in the country. Instead, there is a risk that the criticism will turn against you, especially if it is not based on sound facts. Then it doesn’t matter what is criticized, the propaganda and many Chinese people will conclude that it’s all Western hypocrisy and bad intentions in it.
Does that mean the U.S. should rather not criticize China?
No. But they should try to express their criticisms more sensitively.
Do you expect more understanding in the West that Uyghurs in Xinjiang are tortured?
Human rights violations must be criticized in any country if they do happen. In China, most people also envy the affirmative action privileges that minority groups enjoy. We know that there are different priorities on human rights in different societies and for societies at different development stages. China’s development success in the past few decades has been built on the practice that some group’s interests and rights had been sacrificed or under-protected. In the socio-economic arenas, for instance, the policy has always prioritized efficiency at the expense of equity. Politically, harsh policies have been pursued to make sure that you have an authoritarian and strong government to keep China on the track of socio-economic development instead of the sort of polarizing politics and instabilities that we can see in many other developing countries. On this particular issue, the question is whether the US government really needs to speak of genocide
Why?
This rhetoric doesn’t help anyone. People in China have a certain sense of pride, and using the genocide terminology completely destroys the credibility of such criticism in Chinese society. They perceive such harsh criticism of their country as harsh criticism against themselves. This increases mutual animosity in societies.
Is there a form of criticism of China that is not branded as demonization?
Admittedly, that’s not easy. But it would help if the US tried to recognize that the Chinese government also has legitimate intentions with its minority policy. Beijing wants to ensure that a national identity is created and enhanced and that the ethnic minorities can share in the prosperity. Basically, that’s not a bad thing. Of course, at the hands of local government officials, the implementation of certain policies is too coercive and too brutal. Still, this form of American empathy for Chinese domestic politics would increase the opportunity for dialogue.
And what can Beijing do to relax relations with the US?
Quite a lot. It starts with the Chinese government having to show more tolerance when it comes to criticism of its policies. The party needs to understand that every country in the world is coming under fire in one way or another. It is completely normal. The US and its political leaders are constantly being loudly criticized for all sorts of things. Chinese state media, however, react to every little thing and want to ensure that the rest of the world fully agrees with the Chinese position. That can’t work. A little tolerance and serenity wouldn’t hurt here, either.
You say China should be less sensitive. Should the country also change its actions?
The government needs to be more sensitive to its own policies. The social design of a society including the minorities takes a lot of time. The party believes, however, that profound change can be achieved overnight. The approach is correspondingly harsh, which in turn provokes justified criticism. Beijing can take a different approach that is accompanied by greater patience and more sensitivity to possible external backlashes
But China’s assertive demeanor also irritates large parts of the world. Do you see a potential for improvement there?
Perhaps a more serious review of the guidelines is needed. In the South China Sea, for example, Beijing would do well to be less opinionated and to seriously seek common solutions. In this regard, it would be helpful if China were more mindful of international law, particularly the law of the sea, and aligned its own positions somewhat more closely with the expectations of littoral states. But I fear that there are some forces in China that will never allow such a reassessment of their own policy. So there are attempts to relax US-Chinese relations, but they are apparently hardly feasible.
What can the European Union do?
What applies to the Americans also applies to the EU: Despite all the justified criticism of China, the Europeans should try to develop a realistic understanding of how Chinese domestic politics and policy come about. The EU could also discuss security issues in East Asia more independently with Beijing and not give the impression that the American position is being fully represented. Here the EU could create some leeway to exert greater influence.
Professor Li Mingjiang of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore has been studying US-China relations for 15 years. Li received his doctorate from Boston University. He is the author and editor of 15 books.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress gave the green light for a new data protection law on Friday. It is due to come into force on November 1st. These new rules for the handling of user data will hit Tencent, Alibaba, ByteDance and other online companies hard. This is because the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法) provides for significant changes:
The scope of the new data law does not end at the borders of the People’s Republic, but goes beyond. From November on, the personal data of Chinese citizens will no longer flow to countries with lower data security standards. Companies failing to comply will face hefty fines of up to 50 million yuan (6.6 million euros), or five percent of their previous annual revenue.
The full text of the law’s final draft has not yet been published. But the news agency Xinhua is already reporting the first details. Experts do not expect main features to have changed significantly since the second draft.
With this data protection law, China has reached a level of protection similar to Japan and the EU, while the US is still far off (as reported by China.Table). Some foreign companies are ahead of the pace, as the PIPL is closely oriented to the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). If companies are compliant with Europe’s GDPR, “they are going to be fine complying with the Chinese privacy law,” Alexa Lee, senior manager of policy at the Information Technology Industry Council, a Washington-based trade association of high-tech companies, told Wall Street Journal.
The costs for all companies will increase in order to comply with the new regulations. This is because the PIPL stipulates that critical information infrastructure operators (CIIs) and processors of personal data must undergo a security assessment by the State Council Information Office when transferring information across borders. They must also store all personal data within China.
In other cases, the cross-border transfer of personal data is subject to certification by professional organizations or the processors must sign a contract with the recipient abroad.
The fear of the consequences of the PIPL data protection law announced by Beijing on Friday was clearly felt on the stock exchanges in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Shares of Alibaba lost over two percent on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Over the week, shares of Alibaba were down 14 percent. Overseas investors had also not yet priced in the impact the new law would have on their investments in Chinese tech stocks, according to experts.
While the final details surrounding the stricter PIPL privacy law have not yet been revealed, Internet companies have nonetheless been caught off guard by the flood of new regulations. The announcement comes at a time of declining economic growth (as reported by China.Table). The importance of China’s internet companies to its economic growth has grown rapidly in recent years, even without strict legal requirements by the government. Beijing can no longer leave the field of data sovereignty, even for the sake of securing its economy, to tech companies. This will be all the more important in the continued tech dispute with the US.
The Data Security Law will come into force on September 1st, 2021 (as reported by China.Table). Together with the Data Security Law, taking effect in November, Beijing’s power to access data will surge – be it domestic or foreign. While the initial intention was to end the proliferation of domestic tech companies and get to the heart of the problem. But the law also means that Beijing is cleaning house when it comes to global standards for data security. Overall, it’s a sign that the CCP wants to strengthen legal certainty for China’s internet users. But only time will tell whether it will also lead to a stronger consumer protection. Because it is ultimately up to the party to decide on how to deal with citizens’ data.
He is a career diplomat, not a political appointee. Nicholas Burns has worked his way up as a professional in the U.S. State Department and brings ample diplomatic experience to the table. He has been ambassador to NATO and Greece. In Washington, he was appointed deputy secretary. Under George H.W. Bush, he was already involved in all negotiations with the Soviet Union during its final days. Now, the 65-year-old is to become the new U.S. ambassador to China.
The difference between political appointments and career experts is profound. During his office, Donald Trump had appointed many ambassadorships to individuals close to him or to whom he owed a favor. Burns is firmly located in the Joe Biden camp, but he is first and foremost an expert on international relations. He speaks French, Arabic, and Greek.
His views on China so far sound promising. Burns has long observed the nation’s rise and growing geo strategic rivalry. “I want to remind America of one thing: Global peace and security still depends on us more than any other country.” he wrote in a 2014 guest editorial for the Boston Globe newspaper.
While the rise of a new power has often led to war in the past and such a scenario is also possible between China and the US, Burns assessed the situation in the article, the responsibility of the government in Washington is to prevent an open conflict. To do so, he says, China must be accommodated.
In light of such views, it hardly comes as a surprise that the Chinese have a positive attitude towards him. Five years ago, state media had already praised him as a U.S. diplomat with a “vision” for foreign policy and as a “voice of reason.” Even the Global Times had positive things to say after his appointment on Friday. The state newspaper associates him with the possibility of resolving “differences and misunderstandings” between both superpowers. They acknowledge this as a difficult undertaking. But from a propaganda mouthpiece like the Global Times, it was already a warm welcome for the new U.S. representative in China.
Indeed, the current situation between the two superpowers is a complicated one. The trade conflict is deadlocked and can hardly be resolved easily. Xi Jinping is likely to assert his country’s territorial claims ever more forcefully. At the same time, China is accepting fewer and fewer voices from outside. Burns himself said over the weekend that he looks forward to addressing “the strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC and other challenges at this important crossroads.”
Burns studied in France in the 1970s and earned his first degree in European history in Boston. He went on to earn a master’s degree in international relations at Johns Hopkins University in Maryland. Right out of college, he started as an intern at the U.S. Mission in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. Since then, it’s been onward and upward to a post as deputy secretary under George W. Bush. Burns served in high positions under Republican and Democratic presidents alike.
In fact, Burns has so far focused on Europe, Eastern Europe and Middle East policy. But he also has experience in East Asia. In 2006, for example, he negotiated the disarmament of North Korea with Beijing in his role as Secretary of State. In 2008, at the age of 52, he retired from active duty, for the time being, limiting himself to a role as an academic and adviser. Now Biden reactivated him.
His appointment came after the ambassadorial post in Beijing had been vacant for months. This proves that Biden cares about the position and needs a hard-working expert there who makes few mistakes and keeps a level head. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk
“Those are Chinese cabbage prices!” you might shout for a change the next time you flip through the advertising leaflet of your local discount store. The term 白菜价 báicàijià (白菜 báicài “Chinese cabbage” and 价 jià from 价格 jiàgé “price”) is the friendly Chinese version of “underprice” or “knockdown price”.
The word has its roots in China’s north, which is usually less involved in vegetable farming. Due to a lack of alternatives, Chinese cabbage was once the preferred choice in dishes during the cold season. Although these elongated cabbages are easy to grow and high-yielding from a cultivation perspective, they, unfortunately, take up a lot of storage space from a retailer’s point of view. Therefore, when they flooded the market in large quantities after their harvest at the beginning of winter and began to pile up stores, they were hawked at rock-bottom prices. However, this only shifted the storage problem to private households. Heaps of Chinese cabbage as a winter reserve were for a long time part of the annual city scenery in Beijing and greened balconies and backyards.
By now, the “Chinese cabbage price” has become a common synonym for rock-bottom prices throughout China. There is even a well-known online discount portal bearing the name. It can be found at the web address “ibaicaijia.com”.
Those who go bargain hunting in the Middle Kingdom should also have some other discount vocabulary in their repertoire. For example, the popular bait-and-switch formula 买一送一 (mǎi yī sòng yī), which means “buy one, get one free”. This screeches out at visitors to Chinese malls and markets in exactly the same way or in any number of variations-for example, 买三送一 (mǎi sān sòng yī) or, even better, 买一送二 (mǎi yī sòng èr)-from the numerous advertising posters and price tags. On the other hand, psyched up foreign shopaholics should show restraint when promises of discounts are garnished with the sign 折 zhé (from 打折 dǎzhé “to give a discount”). This is because, unlike what we are used to in the West, these indications do not refer to the amount of the discount, but to the percentage of the final price. For example, if a Chinese store offers a 9折-discount (jiǔzhé), one should not fall into a premature rapture. This does not mean an unbelievable discount of 90 percent, but simply that the product is offered at 90 percent of the original price.
One should not be too stingy in China anyway, otherwise, linguistic ridicule might follow. In China, those with a tight grip on their wallet are often called “miserly spirits” 小气鬼 xiǎoqìguǐ (from 小气 xiǎoqì “miserly” and 鬼 guǐ “spirit“, literally “spirits with little life-energy qi”), or even worse “Tin Rooster” (铁公鸡 tiěgōngjī). This chicken metaphor is derived from the two-part proverb 铁公鸡，一 毛不拔 (tiěgōngjī, yī máo bù bá) – “not a single feather can be plucked from a tin rooster”. So if in doubt, it is better to leave a few feathers behind and save face.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
