We at China.Table have spent a lot of time discussing China with German politicians over the past few weeks. We have already published six interviews as a result of this dialogue. Today, two days before the federal election, we present two additional conversations.
Hans-Peter Friedrich of the CSU reaffirms the CDU/CSU‘s commitment to clear values but is clearly in favor of open and unbiased dialogue with China. “Wherever we invest, German value standards will apply” – but he thinks nothing of sanctions and lectures. Friedrich is Vice-President of the German Bundestag and co-founder of the China-Brücke association.
As Minister of the Interior from 2011 to 2013, he has government experience under Angela Merkel – and defends the way the chancellor dealt with China. Friedrich sees China’s economic rise as an advantage: “We should be grateful for any competition” – because only through competition, companies remain healthy. When it comes to the Union’s China competence, Friedrich cannot resist making a reference to former Minister-President of Bavaria, Franz-Josef Strauß. The Bavarian was the first German politician to meet with Mao.
Johannes Vogel is the deputy federal chairman of the FDP and, as a member of the German-Chinese parliamentary group, takes a keen interest in developments in the Far East. He explains why stepping in for unhindered trade with China is not at odds with his party’s particular commitment to freedom and human rights. Vogel also believes that the demands for a supply chain law on the one hand and for cutting red tape on the other are perfectly compatible. It just has to be done well – and that is something German policy has failed at in recent years. The methods of the current Minister of Economics in industrial policy are not very effective, says Vogel.
Although at first glance the representatives of potential alliance partners, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, use similar terms, striking differences are separating Friedrich’s and Vogel’s statements. For example, they interpret the mood among German businesses differently. Vogel sees an increasingly China-critical attitude among companies. For Friedrich, these are mainly just statements by associations and DAX CEOs; according to him, medium-sized companies and businesses operating locally would prefer less criticism of China.
At China.Table, we presented the positions of the SPD, the CDU/CSU, the Greens, the FDP, and the Left on China; we also requested an interview with an AfD politician with China experience, but she did not agree to an interview.
Looking forward to an exciting election Sunday
Hans-Peter Friedrich is Deputy President of Parliament and Chairman of the Dialogue Forum China-Brücke
Disclaimer: This interview has been translated into English and is not considered an official translation by any party involved in the interview.
How do we find common ground for our values and our economic interests in China?
Our values are non-negotiable under any circumstances. And if a trade or economic partner demands that we give our values, or at least put them into perspective, then we must deny that.
The reality is quite different for a company in China. For example, in dealing with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. It is better to keep quiet.
However, you can’t expect a company that sells computer parts in Shanghai, for example, to take a position on how to deal with the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. That is the task of politics. But one can expect this company to uphold German values in environmental protection or workers’ rights. My impression is that this is why German companies in China are valued by Chinese employees. German values apply wherever we invest. These companies have even helped to spread these values quickly beyond companies.
But, in turn, did the German Government not fail when it came to taking a clear stand on Beijing’s treatment of political activists in Hong Kong by declaring: this is not the way to go about it? That is not in line with our values.
The question is what scope there is for action at all. Under the given terms of the treaty, which the British and the Chinese negotiated back in 1984, there is very little room for maneuvering: it was clear that Hong Kong would be handed back to China in 1997. It was also clear that both sides would interpret the “one country, two systems” principle, which applies until 2047, very differently. It was also clear that the Chinese would try to annex Hong Kong piece by piece, politically as well. Anything else would have been naive. And they compared Hong Kong with the neighboring city of Shenzhen with their idea of a modern city. They succeeded.
The EU has also imposed sanctions on China over Hong Kong. And China has responded with sanctions in return. That was, after all, a concrete measure.
Yes, action has been taken. The only question is what good it will do. Sanctions are above all political symbolism. If no other measure seems practical, then you impose economic sanctions. This policy dates back to a time when attempts were made to bring dictatorships in Africa into line. Today, at a time when companies are much more closely intertwined around the globe, this is no longer a sensible approach, especially as this intertwinement is also positive. It creates stability and peace. Sanctions lead to a dead end: they have no political impact and harm the economy.
But isn’t it important to make a statement?
Quite, but whether sanctions are the appropriate means is questionable. Because you have to know how to get out of it. Dropping sanctions without having achieved anything is not a credible policy.
Does the EU’s new Indo-Pacific strategy against China at least make sense?
This strategy is important, even if it only forces Europeans to abandon their navel-gazing and ask themselves: what do we actually want to reach in the world? In this respect, any strategy that thinks outside the box makes sense. Particularly as this is about multilateralism and retaining open trade routes. Beijing should also have an interest in this.
Now a German warship is cruising off the coast of China.
This is a symbol of solidarity with our NATO partner, the USA. We want to show our colors together. But the ships and the Indo-Pacific strategy are not directed against anything, as you put it – not even against China. They stand for something: for free seas and free trade routes in the best interest of all.
Freedom was also what the Americans had in mind for Afghanistan until they withdrew. Will the Chinese now finish where NATO has failed?
The Chinese have been in Afghanistan for many years. Not with soldiers, but with businessmen who secured raw material deposits and created investment opportunities. However, it is not a question of finishing or not finishing. What is at stake now, and this is again in everyone’s interest, is to stabilize Afghanistan, to pacify an unpredictable hotbed of conflict. In this respect, everything that contributes to stabilization is now desirable. Whether it comes from Germany or China. And the best course of action is for all countries to work together as closely as possible on this matter. A militaristic approach didn’t work. Now we all have to see whether it can work economically.
Nevertheless, we also have different interests. How do we remain economically competitive in the face of a China that is becoming ever more innovative and therefore also more powerful?
By returning to our strengths, the market economy, for example. That is something that has made us strong. And we should not forget that even the Chinese did not become strong because of their successful planned economy, but because they dared to allow free-market competition. In our country, this has led to a strong middle class. We are ahead of the Chinese in this respect. We are envied by China for our basic research. So we have every reason to continue to be confident and to accept the challenge. The executive who sold the Augsburg-based robotics manufacturer Kuka to China put it this way: The Chinese economy is like a gym for the German economy. A nice image. If you are not exposed to a competitor, you become sluggish. In this respect, we should be grateful for any competition.
The Green Party accuses the Merkel administration of the fact that German companies are now more critical of China than the Chancellor’s Office.
The vocal part of German businesses are either association officials or CEOs of large corporations. And both can safely be labeled under the category of politics. Among the German middle class and at the working level of corporations, the picture is much more differentiated. The Greens simply say what China critics want to hear.
Are you seriously claiming that there is no resentment towards China in the German economy?
There is discontent, and politicians must take it seriously. If this discontent is about copyright, for example, or about equal access to markets, then it must be discussed openly with the proper authorities. But that is what Mrs. Merkel and the CDU/CSU are known for in China and this is even what Beijing values about them.
Merkel has indeed pursued a policy of drilling thick boards with patience and passion for many years. But in the meantime, one has the impression that Beijing has replaced the thick boards with steel plates. What do we do now?
Your comparison sounds like nothing has been accomplished. That is not my impression. The shift towards a market economy is much stronger and more sustainable than counter-movements, which we must, however, also acknowledge. Germany is holding a human rights dialogue. A dialogue on the rule of law. Our Hanns-Seidel-Foundation does an excellent job of convincingly representing our constitutional values while retaining great trust in China.
This is all happening in the background. Don’t we also need to talk more publicly with China?
I do not believe that a post-colonialist attitude of lecturing weaker countries about what they should and should not do is still appropriate. Especially now, as we make the shocking discovery that China is no longer a weak country. In this respect, one could say that it is true that the Chinese have already pulled in steel plates as far as interference in internal affairs is concerned. And the German condescending attitude does not help here. I am not trying to relativize anything that is going wrong in China, but I want to make it clear that the Chinese have grown more confident and have every reason to be. We cannot ignore that.
Does this mean that there is ultimately only room for international partners in China if they submit to China’s economic and political conditions?
No. With Huawei and 5G, it somehow worked out in the end. First, we mixed politics and business interests. Then we sat together and found a working solution: Huawei’s world-class technology gladly, because it makes our economy more competitive, but on our terms and values. We don’t need the lecture overkill of the Greens, we need solutions that are suitable for everyday use.
In this respect, does it make sense for like-minded partners, i.e. the Americans, the Europeans, and the democracies in Asia, to join forces as an alliance of values against China and thus try to assert their interests?
It is right for countries that share common values to unite. What bothers me is your phrase ‘against China’. Once again, it is not about being against anything, but being for something. For example, for climate protection, human rights, or open markets. On these issues, it makes perfect sense to work together as a community of values, without ignoring cultural differences. But it is not something that is directed against China. Rather, it’s about working together on solutions based on our values.
But China is not only a partner, it is also a competitor. Some also consider China a systemic rival.
China is all of the three. But I don’t like the word rival. I would say China is a systemic competitor. We must now prove, and we can do so convincingly, that our system of democracy and the rule of law is more successful than any other system in social, humanitarian, and economic terms. Here, too, competition stimulates business.
A competition, however, in which the West is becoming weaker and weaker.
Which must become a challenge for us to become even more convincing. If you look at the United Nations today, you can see that there is still a long way to go for the democratic age. Nevertheless, we must develop common standards for the new world order. This is difficult and may not get any easier. And yet there is no alternative. One thing must finally become clear to notorious China critics: We cannot force anyone, no matter how loudly we shout stop and feel we are in the right. We must be convincing. We are only a part of the world. Not even a big part. But we can develop great powers of persuasion.
In this dispute, do we possibly have to back down on political human rights in order to make progress on climate protection, as far as China is concerned?
I am against connecting such matters in the first place. The Chinese have a vital interest in reducing their environmental impact. They want to be ‘carbon-neutral’ by 2060 and have recently announced that they will no longer export coal-fired power plants. We have an interest in that too. But that doesn’t mean we have to accept conditions. Our task is to work together with the global community to solve these major challenges.
In China, the new Silk Road is considered a development project. In the West, it is a power instrument to expand China’s influence. Do we need to do something to counter the Chinese advance?
So first of all, of course, it’s both: Of course, the Chinese are securing raw materials worldwide and building up sales markets. That makes sense for any economy. And at the same time, the countries involved benefit from it. So we should not point the finger at the Chinese, instead, we should do the same. But on our terms and in the light of our interests. And if there are opportunities for cooperation, we should take advantage of them. But that does not mean that we should not try and compete and stay ahead of the Chinese. What we cannot do is sit back and watch the Chinese occupy key strategic locations in the world and then complain bitterly about it afterward.
That means Joe Biden is better than Donald Trump for global development. Unlike Trump, he is more interested in self-strengthening than in isolation.
My impression is that more and more US politicians are sensing that the strategy of creating an image of the enemy to relativize domestic political difficulties cannot be the last word on the subject. US President Joe Biden has made it quite clear that he is not interested in a new Cold War. That is a positive development. But the Americans have different interests than the Chinese. And these differences are likely to expand. That must not be forgotten either. For Europe, this means only one thing: We must find an independent European position on China.
Merkel played a central role in this. She is now no longer available. Wouldn’t CSU politician Soeder of the CDU/CSU have been better suited for the job than the CDU man Armin Laschet?
Armin Laschet is also a politician with a great deal of international experience; he was a Member of the European Parliament and is the Minister-President of a federal state that, like Bavaria, has very close economic ties with China. He knows what a trade volume of more than 200 billion euros between China and Germany means, and last week he warned against a Cold War between the West and China. And Soeder stands shoulder to shoulder on these issues and at the same time in a historical continuity of CSU party leaders. It was the anti-communist Franz-Josef Strauß who was the first German politician to visit Mao and tell him: We have to talk to each other. I will never forget the photo of him playing table tennis with Mao. That was the end of the exclusion and the beginning of a fruitful competition that continues to this day. Even then, Strauss wanted one thing above all: to be better than the Chinese. And that’s still what it’s all about today.
Hans-Peter Friedrich, 64, has been a member of the German Bundestag for the CSU since 1998. He was Minister of the Interior in Merkel’s 3rd government from 2011 to 2013. He has been Vice President of the German Bundestag since 2017 and has been a member of the CSU party presidium since 2011. Friedrich is also chairman of the China-Brücke – an independent dialogue forum that is proving itself as a multifaceted platform for exchange with China.
Disclaimer: This interview has been translated into English and is not considered an official translation by any party involved in the interview.
The FDP presents itself as the party of choice for entrepreneurs and business leaders. At the same time, it takes a particularly hard line on China, our most important trading partner. How does that fit?
First of all, the FDP is not exclusively the party of business. We are, of course, the party that sees entrepreneurship as something positive, is in favor of entrepreneurship, counters anti-capitalist resentment, and defends the social market economy. But we are in favor of economic and social freedom. The indivisibility of these two aspects is what makes our position in the party system specifically liberal and independent. And that’s why it matches with our positions of seeing economic prosperity and free trade as something positive and at the same time standing up for freedom and human rights around the globe. Incidentally, the BDI was also one of the first institutions to point out how profound the new systemic competition with China under Xi Jinping is. It has since taken a critical stance on the CCP and developments in China. The German economy also has to consider the consequences of this development – and in my opinion, it is doing so.
The planned European supply chain law is causing headaches for German companies operating in China. Companies fear chaos and supply problems if human rights organizations can file lawsuits against procurement in China on a wide scale.
We need to address all these issues on a pan-European basis. That makes sense in foreign policy. It makes sense in security policy. And that is why a European solution makes more sense here too rather than going it alone at a national level. But supply chain laws must above all be realistic. Liability obligations must not be extended to the third level of suppliers in the country of origin, i.e. the suppliers’ suppliers. That is in fact impossible for a private actor, and in reality, is a hollow bureaucracy for companies. We must be careful not to pass any governmental tasks and challenges in development policy onto private actors.
The German state or the European Union alone also have little influence on working conditions in other countries.
It is unfortunate that we as Europeans are not big enough on an international scale with independent positions and on an equal footing, and that we do not play enough of a role in the global West. Above all, there should be more cooperation and coordination with the free-market democracies in Asia. Together, we have more power than alone. I consider this to be the biggest strategic gap in China policy.
So there is a need for more coordination with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India?
And with Australia and New Zealand. Singapore, of course, does not quite fit into this specific list, but Malaysia, for example, should be included.
Australia, however, has just hacked our French allies in the shins badly.
These events only prove that we in the West as a whole have not yet seized the opportunity that the Biden administration offers us. Instead, we should come to a common strategy and closer coordination. For we must face up security issues of this kind together; that would be the right approach. And we cannot allow ourselves to just limit ourselves to transatlantic thinking alone; there should be a forum, an organization, in which market-economy democracies at a global level face these issues together, or at any rate exchange viewpoints. I can understand the military demands that Australia is now putting forward. However, we in the EU cannot settle for no role at all. We must be able to expect our allies not to present other partners with faits accomplis.
But that is exactly what Australia, the UK, and the US have now done.
If this has indeed happened how our French friends have put it, then that is indeed a no-go among allies, naturally. I know that the Americans were also annoyed about the timing of the European-Chinese investment agreement. After Joe Biden’s election, however, many opportunities have been missed so far to finally agree on a joint China strategy developed by the West, and I think we should finally see this as a wake-up call. This is a challenge to all concerned – to ourselves, but also to our allies on the other side of the Atlantic, whom I hold in very high regard.
What could a reaction look like in actual terms?
By keeping a cool head, but clearly stating disapproval. As the West, we should now take the opportunity to look each other in the eye and ask ourselves whether this is actually the best kind of cooperation. Perhaps seeing it as an opportunity to finally get to another level and then to think beyond the transatlantic dimension. A phrase that Winston Churchill is said to have used is rather fitting here: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.”
How do you look back on the China policy of the Merkel years? How did you manage to deal with the rivalry, i.e. to balance European values with trade interests?
The first thing to acknowledge here is that the Merkel governments were dealing with two different Chinas. China was never a democracy in the last decades, but the regime has changed in nature once again with the change of leadership generation from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Previously, there were definitely different factions in the CCP and the future development of the CP was open; the party had a variety of ideas for the country. Under Xi Jinping, on the other hand, a completely new systemic challenge has emerged. And that happened during the Merkel era. Since then, we have had a strategy deficit: the West is stuck with a China strategy from the time before Xi.
What should we do? Europe can hardly afford to isolate itself from China.
We do indeed have an economically interconnected world, and we do not want to, and cannot, reverse that – that would hardly be advisable for the Federal Republic of Germany either, and as a liberal, I would strictly object to it. Please understand what I’m saying: we do not have a Cold War. But we do have a new systemic competition, which requires a new strategy, and in my opinion, the German government has not made enough progress in this respect over the recent years. I am very reluctant to make analogies with the Cold War, because the current systemic competition, while similarly profound, is of a completely different nature. But to use a comparison at least on the timeline: we are at a point close to the “Long Telegram”, i.e. where the Americans were at the end of the 1940s when they only slowly realized that they were in a new form of competition with the Soviet Union. So we are at the beginning of a development that will keep us enormously busy.
What happens after the election?
The German Federal Government, as the strongest nation within the European Union, is providing too little impetus. Systemic competition with China must therefore be a central issue for the next Federal Government. The EU should drop the unanimity principle in foreign policy and create a stronger capacity to act. There is a security policy dimension to this: we cannot be satisfied with our capabilities. We have just witnessed this again by how the withdrawal from Afghanistan was organized. When the Chancellor says that the withdrawal shows what we are capable and not capable of in terms of foreign policy, it clearly shows that we are not capable enough. Another dimension is the question: who is “we”? Who is the global West? There is also a dimension of economic policy and technological balance.
The balance is increasingly shifting to the Far East.
The question is, where do the dependencies really lie? As an economy, we are not too dependent on the People’s Republic of China overall, as a recent Merics study has shown. However, if you look at individual sectors and individual companies, there is in some cases a very strong weighting on the Chinese market. As the FDP, we say that this cannot be balanced out by doing less business in China, but all the more business with other regions of the world. For this, further free trade and investment agreements are essential right now. Partners for this would be, for example, the free-market democracies in Asia. That would be a good way to balance things out. But the last economics minister to visit Malaysia was Michael Glos of the CSU. That was in 2006, which alone shows how much needs to be done given the historic dimension of this task.
However, China repeatedly appears in the FDP’s party program as a kind of role model. It claims to have found a faster way out of the crisis and to have more digital schools. The FDP wants to learn from China?
No, not at all. No.
Two noes? A double no?
Apart from the dramatic lack of freedom in society: I am firmly convinced that the German economy would also not function as a state economy controlled from the top. Our strength is innovation through the creativity of the many in a free society. Nevertheless, the long-term planning and strategic long-sightedness of the Chinese naturally challenge us. But that does not mean to become more “Chinese.” Quite the opposite. But we should take the challenge seriously. All in all, in recent years we in the Federal Republic have taken a far too short-sighted approach to megatrends such as demographic change, digitalization, and decarbonization. For example, it is long overdue to finally make our pension system demographically stable.
Many politicians are increasingly following China’s industrial policy approach. The Minister of Economic Affairs Peter Altmaier provides funding for the domestic production of protective masks, battery cells, or semiconductors.
I don’t think much of this approach at its core. Of course, we need successful battery cell production here in Germany, too, and temporary funding can make sense for transformation breakthroughs such as the land infrastructure for electric cars. But we shouldn’t start seeing the world based on the division of labor as a problem. Instead, we need to take a much broader view of supply structures by investing more in other regions of the world. Just because we don’t want to be dependent on one economic bloc doesn’t mean we have to move everything back home. Politicians have to deliver strategies and the private sector has to act on its own responsibility. But I’m not convinced by Peter Altmaier’s pseudo-industrial policy.
Pseudo-industrial policy?
I do not believe that our capacity for innovation is owed to government guidance. It is a combination of creativity, immigration, and the promise of upward mobility, diversity, and a good framework for entrepreneurship and our market economy. That’s where innovation comes from. But it wasn’t just Altmaier’s idea, its implementation left a lot to be desired. What followed was a list of supposedly necessary national champions – which even included Deutsche Bank – that is important, but actually has nothing to do with digitalization or AI. This came across as old-fashioned, classic industrial policy, which we have rightly never pursued in Germany. It lacked any added value. Peter Altmaier even left supporters of an industrial strategy disappointed. Maybe this tells you something about the usefulness of this approach of state control over the economy. What we ultimately need when it comes to decarbonization is a coherent and tough regulatory policy.
Yet there was a shortage of masks for nurses or chips for car manufacturers just when they were desperately needed. Didn’t that come as something of a surprise to someone with firm faith in the market?
We had an absolutely exceptional situation with the Corona Crisis. It brought about the most severe intrusion in our way of life since World War II. We can admit and acknowledge that this is a gigantic stress test. We have indeed seen once again that diversification makes sense for supply chains, for example. But we have also seen proof that the market economy, entrepreneurship, and international cooperation have done most to solve the problems. After all, in the end, it is the vaccine that will get us out of the crisis. If it had been up to the political right, the success story of Özlem Türeci and Ugur Şahin would never have happened in Germany. In the opinion of the political left, however, there is no greater bogeyman than an entrepreneurial couple who have become multi-billionaires in just a few years by founding a company. Even worse for the left: Biontech developed the vaccine in free-trade-globalized cooperation with an American pharmaceutical multinational. So all these forces would be throwing away what makes us strong.
Johannes Vogel (39) is Deputy Chairman of the FDP and Secretary-General of the FDP in NRW. As Vice-Chairman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Group, he has a strong connection with China. He is one of the few German MPs who speak (some) Chinese.
China’s panda, since 1961 the heraldic animal of the world’s largest nature conservation organization “World Wide Fund for Nature” (WWF), is no longer threatened with extinction. According to Beijing figures, the black and white bears are multiplying at an ever-faster rate. There are currently almost 2,500 specimens living in the wild and as offspring, enough to preserve the species. The People’s Republic is now scoring points for its survival just before the start of the UN Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species COP 15 in Kunming. In any case, the panda is China’s perfect image carrier.
This is why panda haters are annoyed. Countless people, on the other hand, profess to be panda lovers. And those who support everything Beijing is doing are called panda huggers. Once there were panda hunters. But they are, in fact, extinct. Even the sons of a US president were among them.
Pat Nixon visited the panda enclosure at Beijing Zoo on the second day of her husband and US President Richard Nixon’s historic trip to China. It was February 22, 1972, and she fell completely under the charm of the giant black and white bears and bought lots of panda toys as souvenirs. Premier Zhou Enlai was informed of this. Beijing had long secretly planned to give the Nixons two real bears as a state gift. Now, Zhou let the First Lady know specially. During the farewell banquet, he offered her a pack of “Panda” cigarettes, Mao’s favorite brand. Since she didn’t smoke, she declined bewildered, as US department head at the Foreign Ministry, Ding Yanhong, later described the scene. Undeterred, Zhou pointed to the advertising logo on the pack with the image of two pandas. “But you like these bears, don’t you?” Mrs. Nixon understood. After the banquet, she told her husband. “Imagine this: They want to give us two pandas.”
Seven weeks later, on April 16, 1972, the pair of bears, Lingling and Xingxing arrived at the Washington Zoo. They were the first pandas gifted by the People’s Republic to a Western country. To greet them, 8,000 U.S. citizens cheered the arrivals alongside the presidential couple. From then on, the US was in love with the panda. Today, 61 pandas live on loan outside China in 18 countries. Eleven of them are housed in four zoos across the US.
Long before the Nixons, a US presidential family had made a very different panda story. Safari hunters Theodore and Kermit Roosevelt, sons of U.S. President Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt, who governed from 1901 to 1908, boasted of being the first foreigners to kill a giant panda in Mianning, Sichuan, on April 13, 1929. On behalf of the Chicago Field Museum of Natural History, they ambushed a full-grown panda. They allegedly shot the giant bear at the same time to share what was then undoubted glory. In their book, Trailing the Giant Panda, published in late 1929, they pose over their trophy in a full-page photo. When I asked animal researchers at the Chengdu panda station about it, they said, “We don’t like to talk about it. It wasn’t until 1939 that China placed the panda under protection. But the incident back then may be part of the reason why so many U.S. citizens are helping us save the panda from extinction today.”
The efforts have paid off. The all-clear for the survival of the species is given by the magazine “National Geographic” in its September issue. It is based on information from the nature conservation official Cui Shuhong from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. Last July, he publicly confirmed for the first time that Beijing had officially downgraded the “status of the wild giant panda” from “endangered” to “vulnerable”.
It is based on figures by China’s national panda censuses, which are organized every ten years. The first census in the 1980s caused worldwide alarm, with only 1,114 bears counted. But Beijing was able to breathe easier after the fourth panda census in 2013. 200 gamekeepers and ecologists had spent three years combing 66 nature reserves and mountain forests in the panda provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, and Shaanxi. They rediscovered 1,864 pandas in the wild. In addition, there are 633 bears re-bred in zoos and panda stations by early 2021. The current panda population is sufficient to guarantee the bears’ genetic diversity and survival. Beijing hopes that the fifth panda census, now planned for 2022, will result in further record numbers. To this end, it has expanded the area of its nature reserves. Bamboo, which makes up 90 percent of the pandas’ diet, has also proved resistant to climate and environmental influences.
Approved conservation groups such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature had already downgraded the panda on its “Red List” in 2016 as no longer in danger of survival, but China’s authorities called it “hasty conclusions that would only jeopardize efforts to protect the panda.”
Five years later, the all-clear is more fitting for Beijing’s calculations. In the run-up to the upcoming UN UN Biodiversity Conference (COP 15), Xinhua proudly announced in English on July 9 that, thanks to China’s efforts, pandas are no longer endangered: “finally some good news!” It is hosting the UN meeting, which starts on October 11th in Kunming – but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only with online welcoming speeches.
Panda bears have always turned out to be image ambassadors for China’s “soft power” policies, found an Oxford University study that examined the intentions behind China’s panda exports to international zoos.
For only ten years did Beijing’s leadership give away pandas as a state gift, with the US being the first recipient in 1972. Although Mao sent pandas to zoos in the Soviet Union as early as 1957 and to North Korea in 1965, it was not until the Nixon trip that the concept of panda diplomacy emerged. By 1982, heads of state from nine countries, including Germany, received pairs of pandas as state presents.
The People’s Republic only revived an ancient tradition. According to imperial records, Tang Empress Wu Zetian had a pair of pandas along with 70 skins presented as a gift to the then Japanese Emperor Tenmu on October 22, 685. Even the time was noted. At ten o’clock in the morning, the animals left the then capital Changan (Xi’an) in two cages and were transported to Japan by ship via Yangzhou. From 685 to 1982, a total of 40 pandas were given away by China.
Since 1982, foreign zoos have only been allowed to obtain pandas based on long-term loan agreements. Beijing has committed itself to the earmarked use of the loan fees. 60 percent are used for the protection of nature reserves, 40 percent are spent on panda research.
The ecological debate is leaving its mark. In front of the panda enclosure in Chengdu, a poster warns against mankind’s destructive treatment of nature. It was written by Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx’s comrade-in-arms. In his treatise on “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,” Engels writes: “Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory, nature takes its revenge on us.” It is well known that the Chinese listen to Marx and Engels.
We at China.Table have spent a lot of time discussing China with German politicians over the past few weeks. We have already published six interviews as a result of this dialogue. Today, two days before the federal election, we present two additional conversations.
Hans-Peter Friedrich of the CSU reaffirms the CDU/CSU‘s commitment to clear values but is clearly in favor of open and unbiased dialogue with China. “Wherever we invest, German value standards will apply” – but he thinks nothing of sanctions and lectures. Friedrich is Vice-President of the German Bundestag and co-founder of the China-Brücke association.
As Minister of the Interior from 2011 to 2013, he has government experience under Angela Merkel – and defends the way the chancellor dealt with China. Friedrich sees China’s economic rise as an advantage: “We should be grateful for any competition” – because only through competition, companies remain healthy. When it comes to the Union’s China competence, Friedrich cannot resist making a reference to former Minister-President of Bavaria, Franz-Josef Strauß. The Bavarian was the first German politician to meet with Mao.
Johannes Vogel is the deputy federal chairman of the FDP and, as a member of the German-Chinese parliamentary group, takes a keen interest in developments in the Far East. He explains why stepping in for unhindered trade with China is not at odds with his party’s particular commitment to freedom and human rights. Vogel also believes that the demands for a supply chain law on the one hand and for cutting red tape on the other are perfectly compatible. It just has to be done well – and that is something German policy has failed at in recent years. The methods of the current Minister of Economics in industrial policy are not very effective, says Vogel.
Although at first glance the representatives of potential alliance partners, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, use similar terms, striking differences are separating Friedrich’s and Vogel’s statements. For example, they interpret the mood among German businesses differently. Vogel sees an increasingly China-critical attitude among companies. For Friedrich, these are mainly just statements by associations and DAX CEOs; according to him, medium-sized companies and businesses operating locally would prefer less criticism of China.
At China.Table, we presented the positions of the SPD, the CDU/CSU, the Greens, the FDP, and the Left on China; we also requested an interview with an AfD politician with China experience, but she did not agree to an interview.
Looking forward to an exciting election Sunday
Hans-Peter Friedrich is Deputy President of Parliament and Chairman of the Dialogue Forum China-Brücke
Disclaimer: This interview has been translated into English and is not considered an official translation by any party involved in the interview.
How do we find common ground for our values and our economic interests in China?
Our values are non-negotiable under any circumstances. And if a trade or economic partner demands that we give our values, or at least put them into perspective, then we must deny that.
The reality is quite different for a company in China. For example, in dealing with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. It is better to keep quiet.
However, you can’t expect a company that sells computer parts in Shanghai, for example, to take a position on how to deal with the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. That is the task of politics. But one can expect this company to uphold German values in environmental protection or workers’ rights. My impression is that this is why German companies in China are valued by Chinese employees. German values apply wherever we invest. These companies have even helped to spread these values quickly beyond companies.
But, in turn, did the German Government not fail when it came to taking a clear stand on Beijing’s treatment of political activists in Hong Kong by declaring: this is not the way to go about it? That is not in line with our values.
The question is what scope there is for action at all. Under the given terms of the treaty, which the British and the Chinese negotiated back in 1984, there is very little room for maneuvering: it was clear that Hong Kong would be handed back to China in 1997. It was also clear that both sides would interpret the “one country, two systems” principle, which applies until 2047, very differently. It was also clear that the Chinese would try to annex Hong Kong piece by piece, politically as well. Anything else would have been naive. And they compared Hong Kong with the neighboring city of Shenzhen with their idea of a modern city. They succeeded.
The EU has also imposed sanctions on China over Hong Kong. And China has responded with sanctions in return. That was, after all, a concrete measure.
Yes, action has been taken. The only question is what good it will do. Sanctions are above all political symbolism. If no other measure seems practical, then you impose economic sanctions. This policy dates back to a time when attempts were made to bring dictatorships in Africa into line. Today, at a time when companies are much more closely intertwined around the globe, this is no longer a sensible approach, especially as this intertwinement is also positive. It creates stability and peace. Sanctions lead to a dead end: they have no political impact and harm the economy.
But isn’t it important to make a statement?
Quite, but whether sanctions are the appropriate means is questionable. Because you have to know how to get out of it. Dropping sanctions without having achieved anything is not a credible policy.
Does the EU’s new Indo-Pacific strategy against China at least make sense?
This strategy is important, even if it only forces Europeans to abandon their navel-gazing and ask themselves: what do we actually want to reach in the world? In this respect, any strategy that thinks outside the box makes sense. Particularly as this is about multilateralism and retaining open trade routes. Beijing should also have an interest in this.
Now a German warship is cruising off the coast of China.
This is a symbol of solidarity with our NATO partner, the USA. We want to show our colors together. But the ships and the Indo-Pacific strategy are not directed against anything, as you put it – not even against China. They stand for something: for free seas and free trade routes in the best interest of all.
Freedom was also what the Americans had in mind for Afghanistan until they withdrew. Will the Chinese now finish where NATO has failed?
The Chinese have been in Afghanistan for many years. Not with soldiers, but with businessmen who secured raw material deposits and created investment opportunities. However, it is not a question of finishing or not finishing. What is at stake now, and this is again in everyone’s interest, is to stabilize Afghanistan, to pacify an unpredictable hotbed of conflict. In this respect, everything that contributes to stabilization is now desirable. Whether it comes from Germany or China. And the best course of action is for all countries to work together as closely as possible on this matter. A militaristic approach didn’t work. Now we all have to see whether it can work economically.
Nevertheless, we also have different interests. How do we remain economically competitive in the face of a China that is becoming ever more innovative and therefore also more powerful?
By returning to our strengths, the market economy, for example. That is something that has made us strong. And we should not forget that even the Chinese did not become strong because of their successful planned economy, but because they dared to allow free-market competition. In our country, this has led to a strong middle class. We are ahead of the Chinese in this respect. We are envied by China for our basic research. So we have every reason to continue to be confident and to accept the challenge. The executive who sold the Augsburg-based robotics manufacturer Kuka to China put it this way: The Chinese economy is like a gym for the German economy. A nice image. If you are not exposed to a competitor, you become sluggish. In this respect, we should be grateful for any competition.
The Green Party accuses the Merkel administration of the fact that German companies are now more critical of China than the Chancellor’s Office.
The vocal part of German businesses are either association officials or CEOs of large corporations. And both can safely be labeled under the category of politics. Among the German middle class and at the working level of corporations, the picture is much more differentiated. The Greens simply say what China critics want to hear.
Are you seriously claiming that there is no resentment towards China in the German economy?
There is discontent, and politicians must take it seriously. If this discontent is about copyright, for example, or about equal access to markets, then it must be discussed openly with the proper authorities. But that is what Mrs. Merkel and the CDU/CSU are known for in China and this is even what Beijing values about them.
Merkel has indeed pursued a policy of drilling thick boards with patience and passion for many years. But in the meantime, one has the impression that Beijing has replaced the thick boards with steel plates. What do we do now?
Your comparison sounds like nothing has been accomplished. That is not my impression. The shift towards a market economy is much stronger and more sustainable than counter-movements, which we must, however, also acknowledge. Germany is holding a human rights dialogue. A dialogue on the rule of law. Our Hanns-Seidel-Foundation does an excellent job of convincingly representing our constitutional values while retaining great trust in China.
This is all happening in the background. Don’t we also need to talk more publicly with China?
I do not believe that a post-colonialist attitude of lecturing weaker countries about what they should and should not do is still appropriate. Especially now, as we make the shocking discovery that China is no longer a weak country. In this respect, one could say that it is true that the Chinese have already pulled in steel plates as far as interference in internal affairs is concerned. And the German condescending attitude does not help here. I am not trying to relativize anything that is going wrong in China, but I want to make it clear that the Chinese have grown more confident and have every reason to be. We cannot ignore that.
Does this mean that there is ultimately only room for international partners in China if they submit to China’s economic and political conditions?
No. With Huawei and 5G, it somehow worked out in the end. First, we mixed politics and business interests. Then we sat together and found a working solution: Huawei’s world-class technology gladly, because it makes our economy more competitive, but on our terms and values. We don’t need the lecture overkill of the Greens, we need solutions that are suitable for everyday use.
In this respect, does it make sense for like-minded partners, i.e. the Americans, the Europeans, and the democracies in Asia, to join forces as an alliance of values against China and thus try to assert their interests?
It is right for countries that share common values to unite. What bothers me is your phrase ‘against China’. Once again, it is not about being against anything, but being for something. For example, for climate protection, human rights, or open markets. On these issues, it makes perfect sense to work together as a community of values, without ignoring cultural differences. But it is not something that is directed against China. Rather, it’s about working together on solutions based on our values.
But China is not only a partner, it is also a competitor. Some also consider China a systemic rival.
China is all of the three. But I don’t like the word rival. I would say China is a systemic competitor. We must now prove, and we can do so convincingly, that our system of democracy and the rule of law is more successful than any other system in social, humanitarian, and economic terms. Here, too, competition stimulates business.
A competition, however, in which the West is becoming weaker and weaker.
Which must become a challenge for us to become even more convincing. If you look at the United Nations today, you can see that there is still a long way to go for the democratic age. Nevertheless, we must develop common standards for the new world order. This is difficult and may not get any easier. And yet there is no alternative. One thing must finally become clear to notorious China critics: We cannot force anyone, no matter how loudly we shout stop and feel we are in the right. We must be convincing. We are only a part of the world. Not even a big part. But we can develop great powers of persuasion.
In this dispute, do we possibly have to back down on political human rights in order to make progress on climate protection, as far as China is concerned?
I am against connecting such matters in the first place. The Chinese have a vital interest in reducing their environmental impact. They want to be ‘carbon-neutral’ by 2060 and have recently announced that they will no longer export coal-fired power plants. We have an interest in that too. But that doesn’t mean we have to accept conditions. Our task is to work together with the global community to solve these major challenges.
In China, the new Silk Road is considered a development project. In the West, it is a power instrument to expand China’s influence. Do we need to do something to counter the Chinese advance?
So first of all, of course, it’s both: Of course, the Chinese are securing raw materials worldwide and building up sales markets. That makes sense for any economy. And at the same time, the countries involved benefit from it. So we should not point the finger at the Chinese, instead, we should do the same. But on our terms and in the light of our interests. And if there are opportunities for cooperation, we should take advantage of them. But that does not mean that we should not try and compete and stay ahead of the Chinese. What we cannot do is sit back and watch the Chinese occupy key strategic locations in the world and then complain bitterly about it afterward.
That means Joe Biden is better than Donald Trump for global development. Unlike Trump, he is more interested in self-strengthening than in isolation.
My impression is that more and more US politicians are sensing that the strategy of creating an image of the enemy to relativize domestic political difficulties cannot be the last word on the subject. US President Joe Biden has made it quite clear that he is not interested in a new Cold War. That is a positive development. But the Americans have different interests than the Chinese. And these differences are likely to expand. That must not be forgotten either. For Europe, this means only one thing: We must find an independent European position on China.
Merkel played a central role in this. She is now no longer available. Wouldn’t CSU politician Soeder of the CDU/CSU have been better suited for the job than the CDU man Armin Laschet?
Armin Laschet is also a politician with a great deal of international experience; he was a Member of the European Parliament and is the Minister-President of a federal state that, like Bavaria, has very close economic ties with China. He knows what a trade volume of more than 200 billion euros between China and Germany means, and last week he warned against a Cold War between the West and China. And Soeder stands shoulder to shoulder on these issues and at the same time in a historical continuity of CSU party leaders. It was the anti-communist Franz-Josef Strauß who was the first German politician to visit Mao and tell him: We have to talk to each other. I will never forget the photo of him playing table tennis with Mao. That was the end of the exclusion and the beginning of a fruitful competition that continues to this day. Even then, Strauss wanted one thing above all: to be better than the Chinese. And that’s still what it’s all about today.
Hans-Peter Friedrich, 64, has been a member of the German Bundestag for the CSU since 1998. He was Minister of the Interior in Merkel’s 3rd government from 2011 to 2013. He has been Vice President of the German Bundestag since 2017 and has been a member of the CSU party presidium since 2011. Friedrich is also chairman of the China-Brücke – an independent dialogue forum that is proving itself as a multifaceted platform for exchange with China.
Disclaimer: This interview has been translated into English and is not considered an official translation by any party involved in the interview.
The FDP presents itself as the party of choice for entrepreneurs and business leaders. At the same time, it takes a particularly hard line on China, our most important trading partner. How does that fit?
First of all, the FDP is not exclusively the party of business. We are, of course, the party that sees entrepreneurship as something positive, is in favor of entrepreneurship, counters anti-capitalist resentment, and defends the social market economy. But we are in favor of economic and social freedom. The indivisibility of these two aspects is what makes our position in the party system specifically liberal and independent. And that’s why it matches with our positions of seeing economic prosperity and free trade as something positive and at the same time standing up for freedom and human rights around the globe. Incidentally, the BDI was also one of the first institutions to point out how profound the new systemic competition with China under Xi Jinping is. It has since taken a critical stance on the CCP and developments in China. The German economy also has to consider the consequences of this development – and in my opinion, it is doing so.
The planned European supply chain law is causing headaches for German companies operating in China. Companies fear chaos and supply problems if human rights organizations can file lawsuits against procurement in China on a wide scale.
We need to address all these issues on a pan-European basis. That makes sense in foreign policy. It makes sense in security policy. And that is why a European solution makes more sense here too rather than going it alone at a national level. But supply chain laws must above all be realistic. Liability obligations must not be extended to the third level of suppliers in the country of origin, i.e. the suppliers’ suppliers. That is in fact impossible for a private actor, and in reality, is a hollow bureaucracy for companies. We must be careful not to pass any governmental tasks and challenges in development policy onto private actors.
The German state or the European Union alone also have little influence on working conditions in other countries.
It is unfortunate that we as Europeans are not big enough on an international scale with independent positions and on an equal footing, and that we do not play enough of a role in the global West. Above all, there should be more cooperation and coordination with the free-market democracies in Asia. Together, we have more power than alone. I consider this to be the biggest strategic gap in China policy.
So there is a need for more coordination with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India?
And with Australia and New Zealand. Singapore, of course, does not quite fit into this specific list, but Malaysia, for example, should be included.
Australia, however, has just hacked our French allies in the shins badly.
These events only prove that we in the West as a whole have not yet seized the opportunity that the Biden administration offers us. Instead, we should come to a common strategy and closer coordination. For we must face up security issues of this kind together; that would be the right approach. And we cannot allow ourselves to just limit ourselves to transatlantic thinking alone; there should be a forum, an organization, in which market-economy democracies at a global level face these issues together, or at any rate exchange viewpoints. I can understand the military demands that Australia is now putting forward. However, we in the EU cannot settle for no role at all. We must be able to expect our allies not to present other partners with faits accomplis.
But that is exactly what Australia, the UK, and the US have now done.
If this has indeed happened how our French friends have put it, then that is indeed a no-go among allies, naturally. I know that the Americans were also annoyed about the timing of the European-Chinese investment agreement. After Joe Biden’s election, however, many opportunities have been missed so far to finally agree on a joint China strategy developed by the West, and I think we should finally see this as a wake-up call. This is a challenge to all concerned – to ourselves, but also to our allies on the other side of the Atlantic, whom I hold in very high regard.
What could a reaction look like in actual terms?
By keeping a cool head, but clearly stating disapproval. As the West, we should now take the opportunity to look each other in the eye and ask ourselves whether this is actually the best kind of cooperation. Perhaps seeing it as an opportunity to finally get to another level and then to think beyond the transatlantic dimension. A phrase that Winston Churchill is said to have used is rather fitting here: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.”
How do you look back on the China policy of the Merkel years? How did you manage to deal with the rivalry, i.e. to balance European values with trade interests?
The first thing to acknowledge here is that the Merkel governments were dealing with two different Chinas. China was never a democracy in the last decades, but the regime has changed in nature once again with the change of leadership generation from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Previously, there were definitely different factions in the CCP and the future development of the CP was open; the party had a variety of ideas for the country. Under Xi Jinping, on the other hand, a completely new systemic challenge has emerged. And that happened during the Merkel era. Since then, we have had a strategy deficit: the West is stuck with a China strategy from the time before Xi.
What should we do? Europe can hardly afford to isolate itself from China.
We do indeed have an economically interconnected world, and we do not want to, and cannot, reverse that – that would hardly be advisable for the Federal Republic of Germany either, and as a liberal, I would strictly object to it. Please understand what I’m saying: we do not have a Cold War. But we do have a new systemic competition, which requires a new strategy, and in my opinion, the German government has not made enough progress in this respect over the recent years. I am very reluctant to make analogies with the Cold War, because the current systemic competition, while similarly profound, is of a completely different nature. But to use a comparison at least on the timeline: we are at a point close to the “Long Telegram”, i.e. where the Americans were at the end of the 1940s when they only slowly realized that they were in a new form of competition with the Soviet Union. So we are at the beginning of a development that will keep us enormously busy.
What happens after the election?
The German Federal Government, as the strongest nation within the European Union, is providing too little impetus. Systemic competition with China must therefore be a central issue for the next Federal Government. The EU should drop the unanimity principle in foreign policy and create a stronger capacity to act. There is a security policy dimension to this: we cannot be satisfied with our capabilities. We have just witnessed this again by how the withdrawal from Afghanistan was organized. When the Chancellor says that the withdrawal shows what we are capable and not capable of in terms of foreign policy, it clearly shows that we are not capable enough. Another dimension is the question: who is “we”? Who is the global West? There is also a dimension of economic policy and technological balance.
The balance is increasingly shifting to the Far East.
The question is, where do the dependencies really lie? As an economy, we are not too dependent on the People’s Republic of China overall, as a recent Merics study has shown. However, if you look at individual sectors and individual companies, there is in some cases a very strong weighting on the Chinese market. As the FDP, we say that this cannot be balanced out by doing less business in China, but all the more business with other regions of the world. For this, further free trade and investment agreements are essential right now. Partners for this would be, for example, the free-market democracies in Asia. That would be a good way to balance things out. But the last economics minister to visit Malaysia was Michael Glos of the CSU. That was in 2006, which alone shows how much needs to be done given the historic dimension of this task.
However, China repeatedly appears in the FDP’s party program as a kind of role model. It claims to have found a faster way out of the crisis and to have more digital schools. The FDP wants to learn from China?
No, not at all. No.
Two noes? A double no?
Apart from the dramatic lack of freedom in society: I am firmly convinced that the German economy would also not function as a state economy controlled from the top. Our strength is innovation through the creativity of the many in a free society. Nevertheless, the long-term planning and strategic long-sightedness of the Chinese naturally challenge us. But that does not mean to become more “Chinese.” Quite the opposite. But we should take the challenge seriously. All in all, in recent years we in the Federal Republic have taken a far too short-sighted approach to megatrends such as demographic change, digitalization, and decarbonization. For example, it is long overdue to finally make our pension system demographically stable.
Many politicians are increasingly following China’s industrial policy approach. The Minister of Economic Affairs Peter Altmaier provides funding for the domestic production of protective masks, battery cells, or semiconductors.
I don’t think much of this approach at its core. Of course, we need successful battery cell production here in Germany, too, and temporary funding can make sense for transformation breakthroughs such as the land infrastructure for electric cars. But we shouldn’t start seeing the world based on the division of labor as a problem. Instead, we need to take a much broader view of supply structures by investing more in other regions of the world. Just because we don’t want to be dependent on one economic bloc doesn’t mean we have to move everything back home. Politicians have to deliver strategies and the private sector has to act on its own responsibility. But I’m not convinced by Peter Altmaier’s pseudo-industrial policy.
Pseudo-industrial policy?
I do not believe that our capacity for innovation is owed to government guidance. It is a combination of creativity, immigration, and the promise of upward mobility, diversity, and a good framework for entrepreneurship and our market economy. That’s where innovation comes from. But it wasn’t just Altmaier’s idea, its implementation left a lot to be desired. What followed was a list of supposedly necessary national champions – which even included Deutsche Bank – that is important, but actually has nothing to do with digitalization or AI. This came across as old-fashioned, classic industrial policy, which we have rightly never pursued in Germany. It lacked any added value. Peter Altmaier even left supporters of an industrial strategy disappointed. Maybe this tells you something about the usefulness of this approach of state control over the economy. What we ultimately need when it comes to decarbonization is a coherent and tough regulatory policy.
Yet there was a shortage of masks for nurses or chips for car manufacturers just when they were desperately needed. Didn’t that come as something of a surprise to someone with firm faith in the market?
We had an absolutely exceptional situation with the Corona Crisis. It brought about the most severe intrusion in our way of life since World War II. We can admit and acknowledge that this is a gigantic stress test. We have indeed seen once again that diversification makes sense for supply chains, for example. But we have also seen proof that the market economy, entrepreneurship, and international cooperation have done most to solve the problems. After all, in the end, it is the vaccine that will get us out of the crisis. If it had been up to the political right, the success story of Özlem Türeci and Ugur Şahin would never have happened in Germany. In the opinion of the political left, however, there is no greater bogeyman than an entrepreneurial couple who have become multi-billionaires in just a few years by founding a company. Even worse for the left: Biontech developed the vaccine in free-trade-globalized cooperation with an American pharmaceutical multinational. So all these forces would be throwing away what makes us strong.
Johannes Vogel (39) is Deputy Chairman of the FDP and Secretary-General of the FDP in NRW. As Vice-Chairman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Group, he has a strong connection with China. He is one of the few German MPs who speak (some) Chinese.
China’s panda, since 1961 the heraldic animal of the world’s largest nature conservation organization “World Wide Fund for Nature” (WWF), is no longer threatened with extinction. According to Beijing figures, the black and white bears are multiplying at an ever-faster rate. There are currently almost 2,500 specimens living in the wild and as offspring, enough to preserve the species. The People’s Republic is now scoring points for its survival just before the start of the UN Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species COP 15 in Kunming. In any case, the panda is China’s perfect image carrier.
This is why panda haters are annoyed. Countless people, on the other hand, profess to be panda lovers. And those who support everything Beijing is doing are called panda huggers. Once there were panda hunters. But they are, in fact, extinct. Even the sons of a US president were among them.
Pat Nixon visited the panda enclosure at Beijing Zoo on the second day of her husband and US President Richard Nixon’s historic trip to China. It was February 22, 1972, and she fell completely under the charm of the giant black and white bears and bought lots of panda toys as souvenirs. Premier Zhou Enlai was informed of this. Beijing had long secretly planned to give the Nixons two real bears as a state gift. Now, Zhou let the First Lady know specially. During the farewell banquet, he offered her a pack of “Panda” cigarettes, Mao’s favorite brand. Since she didn’t smoke, she declined bewildered, as US department head at the Foreign Ministry, Ding Yanhong, later described the scene. Undeterred, Zhou pointed to the advertising logo on the pack with the image of two pandas. “But you like these bears, don’t you?” Mrs. Nixon understood. After the banquet, she told her husband. “Imagine this: They want to give us two pandas.”
Seven weeks later, on April 16, 1972, the pair of bears, Lingling and Xingxing arrived at the Washington Zoo. They were the first pandas gifted by the People’s Republic to a Western country. To greet them, 8,000 U.S. citizens cheered the arrivals alongside the presidential couple. From then on, the US was in love with the panda. Today, 61 pandas live on loan outside China in 18 countries. Eleven of them are housed in four zoos across the US.
Long before the Nixons, a US presidential family had made a very different panda story. Safari hunters Theodore and Kermit Roosevelt, sons of U.S. President Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt, who governed from 1901 to 1908, boasted of being the first foreigners to kill a giant panda in Mianning, Sichuan, on April 13, 1929. On behalf of the Chicago Field Museum of Natural History, they ambushed a full-grown panda. They allegedly shot the giant bear at the same time to share what was then undoubted glory. In their book, Trailing the Giant Panda, published in late 1929, they pose over their trophy in a full-page photo. When I asked animal researchers at the Chengdu panda station about it, they said, “We don’t like to talk about it. It wasn’t until 1939 that China placed the panda under protection. But the incident back then may be part of the reason why so many U.S. citizens are helping us save the panda from extinction today.”
The efforts have paid off. The all-clear for the survival of the species is given by the magazine “National Geographic” in its September issue. It is based on information from the nature conservation official Cui Shuhong from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. Last July, he publicly confirmed for the first time that Beijing had officially downgraded the “status of the wild giant panda” from “endangered” to “vulnerable”.
It is based on figures by China’s national panda censuses, which are organized every ten years. The first census in the 1980s caused worldwide alarm, with only 1,114 bears counted. But Beijing was able to breathe easier after the fourth panda census in 2013. 200 gamekeepers and ecologists had spent three years combing 66 nature reserves and mountain forests in the panda provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, and Shaanxi. They rediscovered 1,864 pandas in the wild. In addition, there are 633 bears re-bred in zoos and panda stations by early 2021. The current panda population is sufficient to guarantee the bears’ genetic diversity and survival. Beijing hopes that the fifth panda census, now planned for 2022, will result in further record numbers. To this end, it has expanded the area of its nature reserves. Bamboo, which makes up 90 percent of the pandas’ diet, has also proved resistant to climate and environmental influences.
Approved conservation groups such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature had already downgraded the panda on its “Red List” in 2016 as no longer in danger of survival, but China’s authorities called it “hasty conclusions that would only jeopardize efforts to protect the panda.”
Five years later, the all-clear is more fitting for Beijing’s calculations. In the run-up to the upcoming UN UN Biodiversity Conference (COP 15), Xinhua proudly announced in English on July 9 that, thanks to China’s efforts, pandas are no longer endangered: “finally some good news!” It is hosting the UN meeting, which starts on October 11th in Kunming – but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only with online welcoming speeches.
Panda bears have always turned out to be image ambassadors for China’s “soft power” policies, found an Oxford University study that examined the intentions behind China’s panda exports to international zoos.
For only ten years did Beijing’s leadership give away pandas as a state gift, with the US being the first recipient in 1972. Although Mao sent pandas to zoos in the Soviet Union as early as 1957 and to North Korea in 1965, it was not until the Nixon trip that the concept of panda diplomacy emerged. By 1982, heads of state from nine countries, including Germany, received pairs of pandas as state presents.
The People’s Republic only revived an ancient tradition. According to imperial records, Tang Empress Wu Zetian had a pair of pandas along with 70 skins presented as a gift to the then Japanese Emperor Tenmu on October 22, 685. Even the time was noted. At ten o’clock in the morning, the animals left the then capital Changan (Xi’an) in two cages and were transported to Japan by ship via Yangzhou. From 685 to 1982, a total of 40 pandas were given away by China.
Since 1982, foreign zoos have only been allowed to obtain pandas based on long-term loan agreements. Beijing has committed itself to the earmarked use of the loan fees. 60 percent are used for the protection of nature reserves, 40 percent are spent on panda research.
The ecological debate is leaving its mark. In front of the panda enclosure in Chengdu, a poster warns against mankind’s destructive treatment of nature. It was written by Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx’s comrade-in-arms. In his treatise on “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,” Engels writes: “Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory, nature takes its revenge on us.” It is well known that the Chinese listen to Marx and Engels.
