Regionally anchored, nationally networked: China competence centers as the key to secure scientific cooperation

International scientific cooperation not only provides considerable added value for German universities, it is also a prerequisite and condition for scientific progress. However, in view of growing geopolitical tensions, greater attention must also be paid to risks: “Resilience” and “export control” are terms that not only characterize economic debates, but increasingly also discussions about science and research. The debate on “knowledge security” has gained momentum; new advisory centers, guidelines and instruments are emerging worldwide – or their creation is being called for.

For example, the DAAD Competence Centre for International Academic Cooperation (KIWi) published the KIWi Knowledge Security Checklist an instrument for structured risk assessment. The German Science and Humanities Council has also dealt intensively with the topic and published a position paper entitled “Science and security in times of global political upheaval” in May 2025. The risks mentioned there include the “undesirable outflow of knowledge,” particularly when it comes to security or economically relevant information, or an “undesirable influence on the scientific system.” The Science and Humanities Council therefore recommends a “lean, manageable and, at the same time, clear risk assessment,” based on a three-stage process: individual analysis, collegial exchange and the involvement of suitable committees (for example, on ethical and/or security-related issues).

This is precisely where the regional China competence centers come into play, which the German Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR) has been funding since 2023 and will continue to do so until 2026 under the title “Promotion of the regional expansion of China competence in science.” The aim is to build up knowledge not just selectively, but on a regional basis: Universities, institutes and transfer offices are to pool expertise, form networks and utilize synergies. Eleven regional projects and one accompanying project were selected. For many actors in this field, the challenge lies in not demonizing Chinese researchers and institutions or placing them under general suspicion, on the one hand, and acknowledging the need for regionally specific expertise for corresponding review processes, on the other.

For this reason, when the project period for the regional competence centers expires, the federal government, together with the federal states, should once again provide funding for regional China competence centers. However, this funding should not follow a three-year project logic, but rather establish sustainable structures and institutions that are closely interlinked. To this end, the federal government must secure and coordinate regional structures on a permanent basis. Corresponding projects find political backing in the coalition agreement, which explicitly formulates the expansion of China expertise and the promotion of independent research as a goal.

In order for the political objectives to become effective in practice, concrete support is needed for universities and research institutions. This is the only way they can recognize risks – but also opportunities – at an early stage and deal with them responsibly. In recent years, the promotion of regional China competence centers has shown that German universities need more than general advice or legal information for their international cooperation.

In addition to a national platform for knowledge security and a discussed national contact point for China-specific questions, regional competence centers are indispensable for this. Although universities can and must generally support international cooperation themselves, there is generally a lack of human resources to adequately support the complex and rapidly changing cooperation with Chinese partners. At the same time, previous debates on cooperation with China have often been limited to export control issues. However, the real challenge lies in questions such as:

• Which partners are worth cooperating with?

• What risks or pitfalls exist in day-to-day research?

• How can opportunities be used sensibly without becoming dependent?

This is precisely where regional China competence centers come in – and do indispensable work. They offer low-threshold and trust-based advice. They help universities to strategically establish collaborations, provide critical support – and, if necessary, find ways to cancel a project responsibly.

The strength of the centers lies in providing China-specific knowledge that goes far beyond legal issues. The regional anchoring of China competence centers is an advantage here compared to a purely national office: They can take up the immediate needs of universities, research institutions and clinics in their region, connect existing networks with China know-how in a targeted manner and thus offer more precise, practical support.

Another strength lies in local matchmaking. Regional centers know the players, the issues, and the political and economic priorities in their area: In northern Germany, for example, there are dozens of local institutions with links to China – from universities to chambers of commerce. A regional center has an overview and can network the right players with each other and deal with topics in a tailored manner. This knowledge cannot be “outsourced” to external bodies without China expertise or to a federal agency.

Nevertheless, knowledge security is a task for the federal government that requires regional centers to be established and coordinated beyond project periods. In order for Germany to remain capable of dealing with China, it needs a national platform that networks regional centers, avoids duplicate structures and clearly defines profiles. There must be no competition between centers, but rather coordinated cooperation.

In order to develop their full potential, regional centers should work in a nationwide network. Each center contributes special focal points that can be brought together through a national platform. This creates a coordinated system based on the division of labor. The continued funding and long-term safeguarding of regional China competence centers is a strategic investment in the future of Germany as a science location – and therefore the responsibility of the federal government.

Jana Brokate is a research associate at Kiel University and coordinator of the BMFTR project China Competence in the North. Merle Groneweg is a member of staff at the Department of East Asian Studies at Humboldt University of Berlin (HU Berlin). Isabelle Harbrecht is project coordinator of the China Competence Training Center at HU Berlin. Daniel Höft works at the University of Marburg in the field of internationalization and academic cooperation. Linus Schlüter works at the University of Jena and is project coordinator of the China Competence Platform for universities and research institutions in Thuringia.

Editor’s note: Today more than ever, discussing China means debating controversially. We would like to reflect the diversity of viewpoints so that you can gain an insight into the breadth of the debate. Points of view do not reflect the opinion of the editorial team.