The largest government investment package in decades has been decided: EUR 500 billion is to modernize Germany's infrastructure, strengthen resilience and increase crisis resistance. But one key resource is in danger of being overlooked: research at our universities – where knowledge for security is created.
A central resource is being overlooked. After all, what use are digital networks, energy systems or transport routes if they are not protected against attacks, technologically sovereign and socially resilient? This is precisely where the potential of security-related research lies – from cybersecurity and crisis technologies to social benefits that were previously unrecognizable. What they need is not symbolic politics, but structural recognition in the investment plan. Anyone who invests in security must also invest in the knowledge that makes it possible.
Universities in a changing security environment. The geopolitical situation has changed the role of universities. Research, teaching and transfer are increasingly caught between the poles of technological sovereignty, international cooperation and social resilience.
Security-related research as an opportunity for innovation. A survey conducted by the Stifterverband as part of the current University Barometer shows: University leaders see security-related research as an opportunity, not a risk, especially for the development of new technologies, additional financial resources and social security. Topics such as cyber security, critical infrastructures and supply technologies are also key strategic fields for the future, and yet potential remains untapped.
Security research is a responsibility. Security-related research is often hastily equated with armaments research and underestimated in the process. It is not about military armament in the laboratory, but about innovations that contribute to a resilient society. Universities conduct research into protection mechanisms, early warning systems or digital defense strategies – not as a military actor, but as a social entity. For this to succeed, clear guidelines, reliable structures and trust in science are needed.
Barriers instead of participation. But this is precisely where the problem lies: according to the University Barometer, two-thirds of universities do not have the necessary infrastructure for security-related research. Seven out of ten cite increased bureaucracy as a key challenge. This not only slows down international cooperation. Bureaucratic processes such as extensive export controls, complex third-party funding procedures and strict data protection regulations paralyze more than they protect.
Good intentions meet poor framework conditions. In order for universities to actually carry out security-relevant research, targeted structural empowerment is required. Three levers are crucial:
Bureaucracy slows things down. Processes are out of touch with reality and incompatible with innovation.
What’s needed: legally sound but swift procedures – for example, a fast-track funding pathway for security-relevant third-party funding. Clear responsibilities and nationwide uniform standards would help to break down barriers.
Research needs infrastructure. Two-thirds of universities report that they cannot meet essential security standards: secure IT systems, certified laboratories, and protected environments for sensitive data.
What’s needed: a cross-ministerial fund for security and resilience research, for example as a public-private partnership. After all, no hardware means no high tech.
Innovation emerges through networks. Many solutions arise at the interfaces, where science, SMEs, startups, and administration meet. Yet there is a lack of platforms for this collaboration.
What’s needed: real-world laboratories for security-related technologies that combine interdisciplinary research with practical application. And universities should be systematically involved as partners – not treated as supplicants.
Open up special funds for science. The solution is obvious: if billions are to be invested in a special fund for infrastructure, part of it must be invested specifically in science, innovation and talent. Research laboratories, IT security centers, ethical governance structures – all of these are just as much a part of the security architecture as new defense systems.
Instead of closing ourselves off, we need to open up responsibly. This is achieved through transparent decision-making processes, faster funding procedures and interdepartmental programs. The Stifterverband's proposal for a "Defense Science Infrastructure Fund" (Policy Paper "Mit Sicherheit zu mehr Innovationen") demonstrates that there are concrete approaches – they must be politically desirable.
Andrea Frank is Deputy Secretary General and a member of the Executive Board of the Stifterverband.
