China may have pinned some hopes on Afghanistan in recent years. The country on the Hindu Kush is geopolitically favorably situated and could have served as a potential hub for Beijing’s ambitious Silk Road project. In addition, China had hoped for large deposits of raw materials, not the least rare earths. But this never came to pass. Under the protection of NATO troops, China wanted to invest a lot in Afghanistan. But almost none of the major projects have come to fruition, as Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has analyzed. The most important Afghan export goods to the People’s Republic were not high-tech metals, but nuts and animal hair.
As sneering as the comments in Chinese state newspapers directed at the West were after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban victory doesn’t quite suit the CCP leadership in Beijing either. Because China despises any kind of unpredictability, even more than a dispute with the US and its European allies.
But a different move by Beijing was thoroughly calculated. Largely unnoticed by the international public, back in April, the Chinese government invited itself into TikTok group ByteDance and now sits right at the table at the board of directors. What was once only claimed by Trump now could become reality: The video app, particularly popular among kids in the US and Europe, poses a security risk.
Not a good prospect. Nevertheless, I hope you have an insightful read!
China would like to integrate Afghanistan into its own foreign trade system, the new Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For China, the conditions for Afghanistan are ideal. The soil is said to contain rich deposits of highly coveted rare earth metals as well as copper, gold and iron. Even lithium can be mined here, the basic material for batteries in electric cars and mobile phones. Deposits of natural gas and oil have also been identified. If properly mined, these raw materials could make both countries very rich.
To top it all off, there is its geographical location. Afghanistan connects South and Central Asia, as well as West and East Asia. It could become a hub for the Silk Road trade if it had the necessary ports, roads, and train lines. Their construction, in turn, would create growth and jobs for years to come, both for China and for Afghanistan. An oft-repeated assessment from the early days of the BRI was the economic integration of Afghanistan in ways previously thought impossible.
This high potential is now also the reason for China to put up a good front and court the Taliban (as reported by China.Table). But experts doubt that a beneficial economic partnership can really be formed with its regime. “Chinese leaders stress the geographic importance of Afghanistan to China,” says Francesca Ghiretti, a Silk Road expert at the China Research Institute Merics. “But if deep cooperation is to happen, the Taliban would have to change their style of governance.”
China requires the following framework for meaningful cooperation under the BRI – and almost none of them are given:
As China’s involvement in Africa and elsewhere shows, the requirements for the target countries’ form of governance are admittedly low in theory. But even if there are no moral objections to cooperation with the Taliban, there are numerous practical hurdles to investment in Afghanistan. Some of these are not even owed to the Islamist holy warriors but are of structural nature. This becomes apparent when looking at existing Chinese projects in the country:
This is why the most important Afghan exports to China were not actually high-tech metals, but nuts, cotton yarn, dried fruit and animal hair. In practice, the actual economic interests in Afghanistan were “minimal,” says Andrew Small of the European Council on Foreign Relations. That is why China – quite uncharacteristically – has not even begun to hammer out a massive transport connection through the mountains.
But at the same time, these projects prove that China had established constructive relations with the Afghan state even during the period of Western intervention. “They got along with the existing government and signaled their cooperation,” Ghiretti said. China just had good relations with both sides, the Taliban and the official government, until this weekend. The biggest investments in the country also came from China at the time of the Western military presence. The initial idea was to have a foot in the door no matter what. Regional experts like Raffaello Pantucci of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, therefore, reject the claim, often made in recent days, that China wants to step into the void left by the US withdrawal.
And the government in Beijing has another problem with the Taliban. Images of savage men wielding rifles, who are now supposed to be China’s new partners. This could hardly be sold internally as a great success of the BRI. And while the government believes it must re-educate the already tolerant Uighurs on a massive scale in Xinjiang, does it want to cooperate with radical holy warriors in a neighboring country? There is an all too obvious contradiction here that cannot be easily explained away, according to regional expert Ghiretti. This is why, at their legendary meeting, Foreign Minister Wang Yi apparently insisted for the Taliban to adopt a more acceptable image. It is highly questionable whether such a wish will have any effect.
So China is probably most unhappy with the Taliban as its new neighbors. “Their victory was certainly not the desired outcome,” Ghiretti says. They are comparatively unsuitable as constructive – or even compliant – partners in the BRI. So they probably benefit Xi Jinping’s grand prestige project less than a secular government would have. “In the big picture, China is unlikely to make any significant investment in the foreseeable future.”
China is also likely to view developments in Afghanistan with suspicion overall. In almost every respect, a holy nation makes for a worse neighbor than a secular state would be. A hotbed of terror with a land bridge into its own territory would be a veritable nightmare. Lastly, China’s restrictive policies against Muslims in Xinjiang have created a significant potential for unrest. The leadership already believes it will have to resort to police-state methods to keep a grip on the situation. The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations already fears that the chaos in Afghanistan could spread to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or even Pakistan.
The obstacles to Chinese investment are a shame for a largely poor nation that remains in a pre-modern economy. Especially in such an environment, development strategies promoted by China could make a huge difference in a short time. This would then promise a corresponding return of Chinese investors as well. Other infrastructure providers, such as Germany, would also benefit from a growing economy and thriving large-scale projects. Siemens Energy, for example, has already signed contracts for the electrification of the country. Under the Taliban, however, the chances for such a course are poor for the time being.
According to Donald Trump, the hugely popular video app TikTok was by no means a mere online platform for a self-presenting youth, but rather a potential threat to US national security. His successor Joe Biden, on the other hand, canceled the planned ban of the app: Parent company ByteDance was finally able to make convincing arguments that the Chinese government did not exert any influence on its international operations. But just a few months later, the debate is about to flare up again, with the Chinese unicorn now in dire need of explanation. That’s because, as technology publication The Information reported, the Chinese party-state has bought itself directly into the ByteDance group. Since the end of April, It owns a stake of one percent in the Beijing-based company ByteDance Technology.
What sounds harmless is above all a Trojan horse for a much more decisive power move: The government is now able to appoint a third member of the board, in addition to the existing ones – and thus has presumed veto power over corporate decisions. Weibo, the company operating China’s most popular microblog, is also affected by the new rules. Here, the government already secured a one percent stake and the appointment of a board chairman a year ago.
Victor Shih, a professor at the University of California who focuses on China’s financial policy, says in The Information’s report, “Companies can’t afford to go against the will of a powerful regulator.” By far the most important voice, he says, has the government-appointed chairman. Moreover, the fear is, the government’s infiltration could seek to influence discussions from the outset: that is, when they are first debated internally.
ByteDance is one of China’s most valuable tech companies. TikTok is the Beijing startup’s most important product. The video app is formally owned by a shell company in the Cayman Islands – a typical offshore construct to attract the capital of foreign investors. As TikTok’s communications department repeatedly proclaims, ByteDance Beijing has “no ownership, insight or influence over TikTok’s operation.” So the Chinese state is not directly involved in TikTok but has leverage through its shareholding.
The Chinese version of TikTok is called Douyin on the domestic market and is tailored to Chinese consumer preferences and content censorship regulations. Douyin has more than 600 million daily users. In addition, ByteDance operates the popular news app Toutiao, which is also used by several hundred million Chinese as their daily news source. The question, of course, is how the influence will impact state censorship.
ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming witnessed censorship firsthand: His former app Neihan Duanzi had to be pulled from the market in 2018 due to vulgar content. In May, Zhang finally stepped down as ByteDance CEO – presumably to get out of the public spotlight. Given the ongoing tech crackdown (as reported by China.Table), maintaining a low public profile can only be beneficial. Fabian Kretschmer
How does a principal explain to her high school graduates that exams have to be postponed? How are young students able to learn when everyone has to stay at home? These are the kinds of questions many principals have asked themselves over the past year and a half – including Susanne Christine Heß, who had just started her new job at the beginning of the first Covid-related lockdown. Being the head of a private German educational campus in the Chinese metropolis of Shanghai brought special challenges.
In addition to secondary school students, the 55-year-old principal has to keep an eye on primary school students as well as on pre-school children, whose parents pay school fees and expect high standards of educational institutions. “It’s not easy to replace a kindergarten in lockdown times. And of course, we all wanted the children to be taught well even in this time of crisis,” recalls the German and History teacher, who previously worked at a Stuttgart grammar school for ten years.
It is precisely under these special conditions that the German School Shanghai Hongqiao, the hub of the local German-speaking community, has benefited from the close communication with parents – and from excellent equipment. “Here, it’s not teachers who take care of the network infrastructure, but actual IT professionals who do this with great passion and commitment. Together, we were able to quickly set up an e-learning system and ensured that everyone had the necessary programs at their disposal,” says Susanne Christine Heß.
Of course, the crisis manager was no better equipped for the Covid challenge than anyone else. But at least she had prepared herself well for her Shanghai adventure: She and her husband had gotten their first taste of China during travels, and she had learned about the country and its people from articles, books, and documentaries. She decided on an apartment in downtown Shanghai, goes shopping in Chinese stores and tries to learn Mandarin alongside her job so as not to live in a “German bubble”. By now, she understands, for example, how important collecting points for a good spot at universities are in the eyes of many Chinese parents and how difficult it is for them to regard stacking building blocks in kindergarten as learning.
The life outside the school campus impresses the childless teacher every day anew. Even after a year and a half in Shanghai, she still hasn’t gotten used to the fact that new glittering skyscrapers shoot up into the sky every day, while old city districts seem to close down overnight and two people sit in front of their shop playing mah-jongg two corners down the street.” Anyone who doesn’t get involved with the Asian culture”, of this is the principal convinced, “is missing out.” Janna Degener-Storr
While this annoyed Hong Kong visitor presents himself in a less than polite manner after his 13th day in hotel quarantine, his anger is understandable. On Tuesday, the Hong Kong government extended the already strict quarantine period (only hotel quarantine is accepted) for inbound visitors from 7 to 14 days. The reason: one person had been tested positive two days into their seven-day hotel quarantine. Hong Kong, like most East Asian countries, follows a zero-covid strategy. However, this is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain due to the particularly contagious delta variant.
China may have pinned some hopes on Afghanistan in recent years. The country on the Hindu Kush is geopolitically favorably situated and could have served as a potential hub for Beijing’s ambitious Silk Road project. In addition, China had hoped for large deposits of raw materials, not the least rare earths. But this never came to pass. Under the protection of NATO troops, China wanted to invest a lot in Afghanistan. But almost none of the major projects have come to fruition, as Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has analyzed. The most important Afghan export goods to the People’s Republic were not high-tech metals, but nuts and animal hair.
As sneering as the comments in Chinese state newspapers directed at the West were after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban victory doesn’t quite suit the CCP leadership in Beijing either. Because China despises any kind of unpredictability, even more than a dispute with the US and its European allies.
But a different move by Beijing was thoroughly calculated. Largely unnoticed by the international public, back in April, the Chinese government invited itself into TikTok group ByteDance and now sits right at the table at the board of directors. What was once only claimed by Trump now could become reality: The video app, particularly popular among kids in the US and Europe, poses a security risk.
Not a good prospect. Nevertheless, I hope you have an insightful read!
China would like to integrate Afghanistan into its own foreign trade system, the new Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For China, the conditions for Afghanistan are ideal. The soil is said to contain rich deposits of highly coveted rare earth metals as well as copper, gold and iron. Even lithium can be mined here, the basic material for batteries in electric cars and mobile phones. Deposits of natural gas and oil have also been identified. If properly mined, these raw materials could make both countries very rich.
To top it all off, there is its geographical location. Afghanistan connects South and Central Asia, as well as West and East Asia. It could become a hub for the Silk Road trade if it had the necessary ports, roads, and train lines. Their construction, in turn, would create growth and jobs for years to come, both for China and for Afghanistan. An oft-repeated assessment from the early days of the BRI was the economic integration of Afghanistan in ways previously thought impossible.
This high potential is now also the reason for China to put up a good front and court the Taliban (as reported by China.Table). But experts doubt that a beneficial economic partnership can really be formed with its regime. “Chinese leaders stress the geographic importance of Afghanistan to China,” says Francesca Ghiretti, a Silk Road expert at the China Research Institute Merics. “But if deep cooperation is to happen, the Taliban would have to change their style of governance.”
China requires the following framework for meaningful cooperation under the BRI – and almost none of them are given:
As China’s involvement in Africa and elsewhere shows, the requirements for the target countries’ form of governance are admittedly low in theory. But even if there are no moral objections to cooperation with the Taliban, there are numerous practical hurdles to investment in Afghanistan. Some of these are not even owed to the Islamist holy warriors but are of structural nature. This becomes apparent when looking at existing Chinese projects in the country:
This is why the most important Afghan exports to China were not actually high-tech metals, but nuts, cotton yarn, dried fruit and animal hair. In practice, the actual economic interests in Afghanistan were “minimal,” says Andrew Small of the European Council on Foreign Relations. That is why China – quite uncharacteristically – has not even begun to hammer out a massive transport connection through the mountains.
But at the same time, these projects prove that China had established constructive relations with the Afghan state even during the period of Western intervention. “They got along with the existing government and signaled their cooperation,” Ghiretti said. China just had good relations with both sides, the Taliban and the official government, until this weekend. The biggest investments in the country also came from China at the time of the Western military presence. The initial idea was to have a foot in the door no matter what. Regional experts like Raffaello Pantucci of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, therefore, reject the claim, often made in recent days, that China wants to step into the void left by the US withdrawal.
And the government in Beijing has another problem with the Taliban. Images of savage men wielding rifles, who are now supposed to be China’s new partners. This could hardly be sold internally as a great success of the BRI. And while the government believes it must re-educate the already tolerant Uighurs on a massive scale in Xinjiang, does it want to cooperate with radical holy warriors in a neighboring country? There is an all too obvious contradiction here that cannot be easily explained away, according to regional expert Ghiretti. This is why, at their legendary meeting, Foreign Minister Wang Yi apparently insisted for the Taliban to adopt a more acceptable image. It is highly questionable whether such a wish will have any effect.
So China is probably most unhappy with the Taliban as its new neighbors. “Their victory was certainly not the desired outcome,” Ghiretti says. They are comparatively unsuitable as constructive – or even compliant – partners in the BRI. So they probably benefit Xi Jinping’s grand prestige project less than a secular government would have. “In the big picture, China is unlikely to make any significant investment in the foreseeable future.”
China is also likely to view developments in Afghanistan with suspicion overall. In almost every respect, a holy nation makes for a worse neighbor than a secular state would be. A hotbed of terror with a land bridge into its own territory would be a veritable nightmare. Lastly, China’s restrictive policies against Muslims in Xinjiang have created a significant potential for unrest. The leadership already believes it will have to resort to police-state methods to keep a grip on the situation. The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations already fears that the chaos in Afghanistan could spread to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or even Pakistan.
The obstacles to Chinese investment are a shame for a largely poor nation that remains in a pre-modern economy. Especially in such an environment, development strategies promoted by China could make a huge difference in a short time. This would then promise a corresponding return of Chinese investors as well. Other infrastructure providers, such as Germany, would also benefit from a growing economy and thriving large-scale projects. Siemens Energy, for example, has already signed contracts for the electrification of the country. Under the Taliban, however, the chances for such a course are poor for the time being.
According to Donald Trump, the hugely popular video app TikTok was by no means a mere online platform for a self-presenting youth, but rather a potential threat to US national security. His successor Joe Biden, on the other hand, canceled the planned ban of the app: Parent company ByteDance was finally able to make convincing arguments that the Chinese government did not exert any influence on its international operations. But just a few months later, the debate is about to flare up again, with the Chinese unicorn now in dire need of explanation. That’s because, as technology publication The Information reported, the Chinese party-state has bought itself directly into the ByteDance group. Since the end of April, It owns a stake of one percent in the Beijing-based company ByteDance Technology.
What sounds harmless is above all a Trojan horse for a much more decisive power move: The government is now able to appoint a third member of the board, in addition to the existing ones – and thus has presumed veto power over corporate decisions. Weibo, the company operating China’s most popular microblog, is also affected by the new rules. Here, the government already secured a one percent stake and the appointment of a board chairman a year ago.
Victor Shih, a professor at the University of California who focuses on China’s financial policy, says in The Information’s report, “Companies can’t afford to go against the will of a powerful regulator.” By far the most important voice, he says, has the government-appointed chairman. Moreover, the fear is, the government’s infiltration could seek to influence discussions from the outset: that is, when they are first debated internally.
ByteDance is one of China’s most valuable tech companies. TikTok is the Beijing startup’s most important product. The video app is formally owned by a shell company in the Cayman Islands – a typical offshore construct to attract the capital of foreign investors. As TikTok’s communications department repeatedly proclaims, ByteDance Beijing has “no ownership, insight or influence over TikTok’s operation.” So the Chinese state is not directly involved in TikTok but has leverage through its shareholding.
The Chinese version of TikTok is called Douyin on the domestic market and is tailored to Chinese consumer preferences and content censorship regulations. Douyin has more than 600 million daily users. In addition, ByteDance operates the popular news app Toutiao, which is also used by several hundred million Chinese as their daily news source. The question, of course, is how the influence will impact state censorship.
ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming witnessed censorship firsthand: His former app Neihan Duanzi had to be pulled from the market in 2018 due to vulgar content. In May, Zhang finally stepped down as ByteDance CEO – presumably to get out of the public spotlight. Given the ongoing tech crackdown (as reported by China.Table), maintaining a low public profile can only be beneficial. Fabian Kretschmer
How does a principal explain to her high school graduates that exams have to be postponed? How are young students able to learn when everyone has to stay at home? These are the kinds of questions many principals have asked themselves over the past year and a half – including Susanne Christine Heß, who had just started her new job at the beginning of the first Covid-related lockdown. Being the head of a private German educational campus in the Chinese metropolis of Shanghai brought special challenges.
In addition to secondary school students, the 55-year-old principal has to keep an eye on primary school students as well as on pre-school children, whose parents pay school fees and expect high standards of educational institutions. “It’s not easy to replace a kindergarten in lockdown times. And of course, we all wanted the children to be taught well even in this time of crisis,” recalls the German and History teacher, who previously worked at a Stuttgart grammar school for ten years.
It is precisely under these special conditions that the German School Shanghai Hongqiao, the hub of the local German-speaking community, has benefited from the close communication with parents – and from excellent equipment. “Here, it’s not teachers who take care of the network infrastructure, but actual IT professionals who do this with great passion and commitment. Together, we were able to quickly set up an e-learning system and ensured that everyone had the necessary programs at their disposal,” says Susanne Christine Heß.
Of course, the crisis manager was no better equipped for the Covid challenge than anyone else. But at least she had prepared herself well for her Shanghai adventure: She and her husband had gotten their first taste of China during travels, and she had learned about the country and its people from articles, books, and documentaries. She decided on an apartment in downtown Shanghai, goes shopping in Chinese stores and tries to learn Mandarin alongside her job so as not to live in a “German bubble”. By now, she understands, for example, how important collecting points for a good spot at universities are in the eyes of many Chinese parents and how difficult it is for them to regard stacking building blocks in kindergarten as learning.
The life outside the school campus impresses the childless teacher every day anew. Even after a year and a half in Shanghai, she still hasn’t gotten used to the fact that new glittering skyscrapers shoot up into the sky every day, while old city districts seem to close down overnight and two people sit in front of their shop playing mah-jongg two corners down the street.” Anyone who doesn’t get involved with the Asian culture”, of this is the principal convinced, “is missing out.” Janna Degener-Storr
While this annoyed Hong Kong visitor presents himself in a less than polite manner after his 13th day in hotel quarantine, his anger is understandable. On Tuesday, the Hong Kong government extended the already strict quarantine period (only hotel quarantine is accepted) for inbound visitors from 7 to 14 days. The reason: one person had been tested positive two days into their seven-day hotel quarantine. Hong Kong, like most East Asian countries, follows a zero-covid strategy. However, this is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain due to the particularly contagious delta variant.
