The human rights violations in Xinjiang are real. In fact, they even meet some criteria for genocide. This is what the renowned sinologist Kristin Shi-Kupfer from the University of Trier is telling us. Her voice carries weight. As a German professor, she works independently and compiles verified knowledge. She has checked the relevant publications for their credibility and supplemented them with her own research. In an interview with Felix Lee, she now accuses German corporations of naivety by feigning ignorance about the treatment of Uighurs. The interview is of particular interest for managers due to two other intriguing statements: Trade is still useful – and Germany’s behavior still has considerable influence on the country’s conduct.
A certain amount of hypocrisy – this time on climate policy – also surrounds emissions trading. Later this month, Chinese power companies will also be included in trading. However, as Nico Beckert analyses, the emerging economy finds itself in the same dilemma as Europe does. It has long been a consensus that the burden can be distributed fairly and efficiently through a market mechanism but both economic areas are reluctant to effectively reduce permitted emissions. After all, they wish to avoid burdening precious economic growth. That is a pity, because in China, as in Europe for that matter, this instrument is an important weapon in the battle against global warming.
Disclaimer: This interview has been translated by China.Table and is not considered an official translation of the original interview.
Mrs. Shi-Kupfer, July the 5th marks the eleventh anniversary of the violent clashes between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi. For the Muslim minority of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the situation has been deteriorating for years. Yet the G7 countries only agreed to condemn the human rights violations at their last meeting. Why do Western governments struggle with this topic?
For one, there are varying degrees of the economic interdependence of individual countries and China, above all Germany. Then there are different assessments of the extent to which sanctions will improve the situation in Xinjiang at all. And will such an offense have a negative impact on negotiations in fields such as global health policy or climate policy? Areas with an explicit desire to cooperate with China? Finally, the recent focus on whether China’s actions in Xinjiang constitute genocide may also have hampered an earlier resolution.
So, is it genocide?
Some national parliaments and also renowned experts have described China’s actions as such. When you look at the relevant UN Convention, there are some criteria there that are met, such as measures to prevent births or even inflict serious physical and psychological harm. From my point of view, the repression of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities does not seem to be aimed at their physical elimination and killing, but at destroying and breaking their identity.
What is known about the situation in Xinjiang from a scientific point of view?
From satellite images to documents leaked by Chinese authorities, to a host of testimonies from victims who report mental and physical torture, there are several reliable sources. Meanwhile, Chinese supervisors and teachers have also testified that people disappeared to internment camps and never reappeared. And we have the studies conducted by scientist Adrian Zenz.
Zenz has been heavily criticized for his studies, not only by the Chinese but also by a number of Western experts on China.
And quite unjustly. His studies are absolutely solid. He has meticulously evaluated many of his findings based on Chinese documents which local authorities have published on the Internet. The credibility of his sources clearly shows in the behavior of the Chinese government. It has gradually adjusted its statements and acknowledges more and more of these accusations. As for the leaked documents, Beijing mainly states the situation is being distorted. The Chinese leadership denies torture and forced sterilizations. But state-operated internment camps are basically no longer being denied. Its representatives justify such measures, among other things, as combating extremism and terrorism. In the meantime, Beijing has also claimed that these camps are for vocational training. As for the facts, the Chinese government has admitted more and more whenever something went public. But the interpretation differs.
The central question remains: to what extent? The numbers of imprisoned Uyghurs vary between 100,000 and one million.
Various studies have independently confirmed the estimate of around one million first formulated by the UN in August 2018, as a percentage (10 percent) of the Uighur population in Xinjiang (around 11 million) based on local data. Later, members of other minorities have also been detained in these camps. It is probably impossible to determine the exact number. However, the extent cannot and should not be measured only quantitatively. What is shocking is the systematic way in which the Chinese leadership plans and pushes ahead with the oppression of the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities: The size of the camps can be seen on satellite images. The amount spent on surveillance technologies at a local level. Everyday life has been successively restricted and monitored for years now. The freedom of practice of recognized religions, which is actually guaranteed in the Chinese constitution, as it is with the Islam, is massively impaired. Checkpoints have been set up and surveillance cameras are in place everywhere along the roads. Xinjiang is a digital laboratory in which a whole system of security and surveillance technologies interlocks.
Electronic surveillance is taking place all over China.
Surveillance cameras with facial recognition, large-scale data storage, and also measures of human observation – yes, all this is taking place throughout China. But in Xinjiang, the measures are more systematic and also more invasive. Individual databases are much more integrated and people across the country are forced to install surveillance apps on mobile phones. The measures of control in residential areas or even supermarkets are something that even goes too far for some Han Chinese in Xinjiang.
How should countries respond to China, which is committed to uphold human rights?
A focused approach is always most effective. I also believe that the new EU sanction mechanisms are appropriate. The EU is sanctioning individuals responsible for the offenses in Xinjiang and is thus sending a clear signal without immediately pillorying an entire country and its population. Also, a useful course of action in the public criticism of Chinato would be to more specifically refer to the existing and tangible evidence and especially on released Chinese documents as well as to international legal standards such as the various UN conventions, for example, against torture, racial discrimination, and also economic, social and cultural rights. China’s leadership has ratified these and thus is in violation. These binding conventions apply to China just as they do to other countries. I believe that this information is also important to the Chinese population. Otherwise, many people will get the impression that these measures are directed against the entirety of the country. If that is the case, the Chinese government is easily able to fan the flames of nationalism by claiming: “The Western countries want things to remain restless in Xinjiang, wish for terrorist attacks to continue so that they can keep quelling China’s growth.” However, for an effective policy towards the Chinese government, businesses, backed by governments, must also critically reflect on their role in the region and draw consequences.
Now, with a focus on good economic relations, the German government, in particular, has a hard time in criticizing China too harshly.
It is out of the question that Germany and China are closely economically intertwined. However, I would warn against the conclusion that Germany is too dependent on China and therefore is not able to afford to pursue a policy based on clear principles. As various studies, including one by the Mercator Institute for China Studies, have shown, this view falls short of the mark. Mainly individual sectors and companies benefit to a large extent from trade with China. Chancellor Merkel’s approach of not snubbing the Chinese leadership too much so as not to impair other cooperation opportunities is neither convincing Beijing, nor is it in the interest of her own country.
How is a future German government supposed to explain this to German companies earning a fortune in making business in China?
This supposed contradiction – trade, on the one hand, principles and values on the other – is actually false. On the contrary: it is about the rule of law, as the cornerstone of transparent interaction. Reliable structures and planning reliability are also important for economic actors. However, with a series of laws, the most recent examples being the law against foreign sanctions and the data security law, the Chinese government has expanded its access to companies and institutions abroad in a way that can have increasingly unpredictable consequences for economic actors. Companies should urgently pay close attention to this matter. My impression, however, is that more and more entrepreneurs are rethinking their commitment to China and are looking for alternatives in other regions, such as the Indo-Pacific region.
So Volkswagen’s decision to build a plant in Urumqi at the insistence of the leadership in return for permits for two more plants in booming eastern China was a bad one?
It’s more than questionable of VW or even other companies to either say, “We don’t know what’s happening there exactly.” Or to argue: “We check everything comprehensively and, if necessary, speak to the Chinese authorities if one of our Uyghur employees doesn’t show up.” In my opinion, such independent monitoring cannot be guaranteed in Xinjiang.
Doesn’t China have the economic strenght that it couldn’t care less what the US or the Europeans think?
The way the West thinks about China still has a great deal of influence in Beijing. The counter-sanctions that China has imposed on EU politicians and scientists, which have included entire research institutions, are not exactly a display of strength, but a defensive gesture – especially since obvious cracks are showing within China’s political elites concerning politics in Xinjiang. Judging from the leaked documents, we were able to see that some cadres have also been arrested in Xinjiang, allegedly for corruption, but some for lack of loyalty. This indicates that there are voices within the wider political elite who also disagreed with the actions in Xinjiang. The Chinese government also fears for its image and the opportunity to display itself during the Winter Olympics next year. Calls for a boycott are already being heard in the West.
But does that still strike a chord with the leadership? After all, Beijing 2022 is no longer the Beijing of the 2008 Summer Olympics, when China was still trying to woo the rest of the world.
I think it continues to strike them. There are also voices within the country that would like to see a more liberal, candid and therefore more cosmopolitan China. Some voices also speak out against creating too much friction by liberal democracies, because this causes problems for China to access technologies and markets. Representatives of companies such as Huawei or Alibaba that wish to expand globally have admitted that being a Chinese company is not always an advantage. Xi Jinping is relied upon to take all these interests into account. In my opinion, he is not the omnipotent leader that many make him out to be.
Kristin Shi-Kupfer, 46, is Professor of Sinology at the University of Trier. Her research focuses on digital society, religious politics and social change. She is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics).
China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The People’s Republic’s climate goals are ambitious. It wants to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Like the EU, Beijing is increasingly relying on market-based instruments to achieve its goals. For a decade, Beijing has been preparing for the trading of emissions. However, the compromise agreed on by policymakers, industry associations and large companies disappoints, an analysis by Carbon Brief shows. Emissions trading is expected to begin in late July.
The idea behind emissions trading systems is to put a price on CO2 emissions and trade CO2 certificates at a kind of stock exchange. Companies that reduce their CO2 emissions can sell their “pollution rights” on the market. Less sustainable companies have to buy additional CO2 certificates, which affects their competitiveness. The more economic sectors have to participate in emissions trading, the better for the climate.
The Chinese system is disappointing in this regard: only one economic sector has to participate in trading. Moreover, there is no cap on CO2 allowances, nor are there any current plans to remove CO2 allowances from the market over the next few years. However, this is a vital aspect of the emissions trading system to keep up the pressure for climate innovations in companies and to achieve national CO2 reduction targets.
The nationwide emissions trading scheme now only covers the electricity and heat sectors, as well as power plants that directly supply factories with electricity. 98 percent of power plants participating in the first cycle of emissions trading in 2021 burn coal. The remaining participants operate gas-fired power plants. According to Carbon Brief, the trading includes only “a small number of gas-fired power plants.” However, the share of gas in China’s electricity mix is also relatively low, at just under nine percent.
The current focus differs greatly from the original plans. These covered a far greater amount of sectors. As recently as the beginning of 2016, it was planned to also include chemical and refinery, cement production, steel and pulp and paper production sectors, and even air traffic.
The result: emissions trading in its current form covers only 40 percent of Chinese emissions. The reason for this low figure is due to the high share of emissions from Chinese industry. It is responsible for almost 30 percent of all CO2 emissions of the People’s Republic.
The Chinese system also sets rather dubious incentives. It was designed to target “the dirtiest and least efficient” coal-fired power plants, according to Carbon Brief. Power plants that emit 50 percent more CO2 than the system has actually allocated to them will only have to buy allowances for 20 percent of those emissions on the market. According to economic experts, this will lead to an oversupply of allowances. Accordingly, a price per ton of CO2 of only USD 7.60 is expected at the launch of trading. This is twice as much as in Chinese pilot projects for emissions trading. But the Chinese CO2 price would be far below that of the EU. After a slow start, the price in Europe rose to over 57 euros at the beginning of July.
Moreover, China’s emissions trading system has hardly any strong sanctioning options. It covers only fines of up to USD 4,600 should companies not comply with the rules or provide the authorities with false information about their emissions.
In its current form, China’s emissions trading scheme is “unlikely to have any impact” on China’s CO2 emissions, according to a statement by Liu Hongqiao of Carbon Brief. However, as in the past, there are currently reports that emissions trading will soon be extended to more sectors. “The cement-producing industry will definitely be included next year, as well as electrolytic aluminum,” announced Zhang Xiliang, head of the technical committee on the overall design of the national emissions trading system, as reported by business portal Caixin. Accordingly, the steel and chemical industries will also be integrated during the 14th five-year plan (2021-2025).
According to Yan Qin, a climate analyst at Refiniv, a provider of financial market data, companies producing
have been urged by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, to prepare for inclusion in emissions trading.
The way emissions trading is structured and enforced in China could also shape the European market in the near future. On July 14, the EU Commission will present its “Fit for 55” climate package, which contains a series of environmental regulatory proposals as part of the Green Deal. The package also includes a draft for the so-called CO2 border adjustment. Known in Brussels as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), this regulation is designed to increase prices for imported products that are more harmful to the climate in third countries than those produced in Europe. However, the calculation of the levy at EU borders is to take into account whether trading partners have CO2 pricing in their own countries, for example through allowance trading. Details on how exactly this mechanism will work in practice with China remain unclear. Collaboration: Amelie Richter
Caspar Welbergen was initially put off by his first trip to Beijing. As a schoolboy, he was so overwhelmed by the foreignness of this new culture that he chose to ignore China for the time being. At the time, the 38-year-old had already been taking Chinese lessons for three years. “I drove across Frankfurt to another school once a week for that, because that was the first opportunity I had to learn Chinese.”
In the meantime, Welbergen has not only overcome the culture shock, since February 2020 he has been working as the managing director of the newly founded China Education Network to ensure that students in Germany have the opportunity to experience Chinese culture. There are still far too few opportunities to make China a formative part of one’s educational biography. Welbergen believes that this does not fit in with China’s growing global importance: “There is a big discrepancy between the intensity of political and economic connection between China and Germany and the knowledge we have about China.
China does not play a role in the curricula and voluntary work in afternoon study groups or language courses is still rare at German schools. Welbergen blames German Federalism for the situation and refers to France with its greater offer of language courses.
According to Welbergen, the aesthetics of the language is often the entry point for young people into Chinese culture. At the beginning of his studies, he also remembered his interest in Mandarin and first took Sinology lectures as a guest. “I just stayed there” Welbergen recounts. His original major, economics, was then left with only a supporting role.
After the initial “China-shock” as a high school student, a year-long stay in Shanghai during his time at University ignited his enthusiasm for Chinese culture and especially the Chinese drive to build a future for themselves and the country. “One of the best books I’ve read about China in the past is ‘Age of Ambition’ by Evan Osnos, former China correspondent for The New Yorker,” Welbergen says. “It describes this mentality perfectly.”
Before founding the education network, Welbergen was head of the Beijing office of Mercator Foundation for six years. During this time, he built up the office, established contacts between Europe and China, and even then organized student exchanges between Germany and China. Today, the education network, which is an initiative of Mercator Foundation and the Goethe-Institut, benefits from this. Nevertheless, Covid continues to severely limit their work. “A school exchange with a trip to China will probably not be possible until next year,” says Welbergen.
To give German and Chinese students the ability to get in touch, however, the education network offers virtual encounters. Here, students record their surroundings with 360-degree cameras and guide their exchange guests digitally through their own living environment. Incidentally, this could continue to be a component in the run-up to student exchanges after Covid – this reduces the danger of being hit by a culture shock. David Renke
“I just gotta have that!” Anyone who has ever had experienced this thought probably had a bee in their bonnet, or rather, a “grape” in their bonnet (种草 zhòngcǎo). This is “New Chinese” for when products are made so palatable to someone by recommendation that a desire to purchase sprouts. By satisfying this need, one speaks analogously of “plucking out grasses” (拔草 bácǎo). If, on the other hand, one’s budget does not allow it, the herbs “grow” and flourish in the back of the mind (长草 zhǎngcǎo) until the purchase is made.
The Middle Kingdom has no shortage of these “grass and weed gardeners” who cheerfully plant seeds in your mental backyard gardens. In everyday life, the boundaries between advertising and reality become blurred on the way to the office. During morning rush-hour crowds on the Beijing subway, while you’re holding on to a grip advertising a used-car dealership, you’re gazing into the tunnel outside your window, where projectors are flickering the latest online sales promotions onto the wall. This inevitably draws your gaze back to the smartphone screen, where the advertising drum continues to hammer away merrily: WeChat Moments (微信朋友圈 Wēixìn péngyouquān), Weibo (微博 Wēibó), Douyin (抖音 Dǒuyīn), Toutiao (今日头条 Jīnrì Tóutiáo). In all of these applications, product references – more or less well-marked – weave through the content mesh. So it’s only logical that Xiǎohóngshū 小红书 (literally “Little Red Book”), an app that blatantly specializes in product recommendations, has now taken off. Here, users share videos and posts, in which they test, compare and rate products.
However, China’s celebrities are without a doubt the real major gardeners. Their likenesses smile not only from advertising grips and WeChat ads but also from numerous product packages in the supermarket – from the Tarochips bag to the herbal tea can. Unlike the West, where companies often secure exclusive contracts with individual celebrities as brand ambassadors and advertising platforms (代言人 dàiyánrén), Chinese stars and starlets (明星 míngxīng) make the most of their 15 minutes of fame by allowing themselves to be harnessed as brand faces for several companies and products at the same time.
Meanwhile, viewers of Chinese reality shows (真人秀 zhēnrénxiù) also have a lot of weeding to do. It’s not just that logos of main sponsors flash virtually incessantly through every shot of major TV formats, rooting them deep in the audience’s subconscious, (mostly celebrity) contestants are also seeding vigorously, for example, by consuming the sponsor products during the show. As seen in previous seasons of the hit music show “The Big Band” (乐队的夏天 yuèduì de xiàtiān), where the participating band members repeatedly drank from sponsors drink packets containing milk and fruit drinks between gigs, with the camera on hand. The creators of the streaming hit “Sisters Who Makes Waves” (乘风破浪的姐姐 chéngfēngpòlàng de jiějie) had an even smarter idea: why spend a lot of money on elaborately produced commercials? Instead, they simply enlisted the show’s famous female protagonists as “soft” advertising sponsors. In the end, the show repeatedly featured interludes in which the participating singers and actresses incidentally recommended products to each other. In this way, the grass-planting culture blossomed in a whole new way.
The human rights violations in Xinjiang are real. In fact, they even meet some criteria for genocide. This is what the renowned sinologist Kristin Shi-Kupfer from the University of Trier is telling us. Her voice carries weight. As a German professor, she works independently and compiles verified knowledge. She has checked the relevant publications for their credibility and supplemented them with her own research. In an interview with Felix Lee, she now accuses German corporations of naivety by feigning ignorance about the treatment of Uighurs. The interview is of particular interest for managers due to two other intriguing statements: Trade is still useful – and Germany’s behavior still has considerable influence on the country’s conduct.
A certain amount of hypocrisy – this time on climate policy – also surrounds emissions trading. Later this month, Chinese power companies will also be included in trading. However, as Nico Beckert analyses, the emerging economy finds itself in the same dilemma as Europe does. It has long been a consensus that the burden can be distributed fairly and efficiently through a market mechanism but both economic areas are reluctant to effectively reduce permitted emissions. After all, they wish to avoid burdening precious economic growth. That is a pity, because in China, as in Europe for that matter, this instrument is an important weapon in the battle against global warming.
Disclaimer: This interview has been translated by China.Table and is not considered an official translation of the original interview.
Mrs. Shi-Kupfer, July the 5th marks the eleventh anniversary of the violent clashes between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi. For the Muslim minority of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the situation has been deteriorating for years. Yet the G7 countries only agreed to condemn the human rights violations at their last meeting. Why do Western governments struggle with this topic?
For one, there are varying degrees of the economic interdependence of individual countries and China, above all Germany. Then there are different assessments of the extent to which sanctions will improve the situation in Xinjiang at all. And will such an offense have a negative impact on negotiations in fields such as global health policy or climate policy? Areas with an explicit desire to cooperate with China? Finally, the recent focus on whether China’s actions in Xinjiang constitute genocide may also have hampered an earlier resolution.
So, is it genocide?
Some national parliaments and also renowned experts have described China’s actions as such. When you look at the relevant UN Convention, there are some criteria there that are met, such as measures to prevent births or even inflict serious physical and psychological harm. From my point of view, the repression of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities does not seem to be aimed at their physical elimination and killing, but at destroying and breaking their identity.
What is known about the situation in Xinjiang from a scientific point of view?
From satellite images to documents leaked by Chinese authorities, to a host of testimonies from victims who report mental and physical torture, there are several reliable sources. Meanwhile, Chinese supervisors and teachers have also testified that people disappeared to internment camps and never reappeared. And we have the studies conducted by scientist Adrian Zenz.
Zenz has been heavily criticized for his studies, not only by the Chinese but also by a number of Western experts on China.
And quite unjustly. His studies are absolutely solid. He has meticulously evaluated many of his findings based on Chinese documents which local authorities have published on the Internet. The credibility of his sources clearly shows in the behavior of the Chinese government. It has gradually adjusted its statements and acknowledges more and more of these accusations. As for the leaked documents, Beijing mainly states the situation is being distorted. The Chinese leadership denies torture and forced sterilizations. But state-operated internment camps are basically no longer being denied. Its representatives justify such measures, among other things, as combating extremism and terrorism. In the meantime, Beijing has also claimed that these camps are for vocational training. As for the facts, the Chinese government has admitted more and more whenever something went public. But the interpretation differs.
The central question remains: to what extent? The numbers of imprisoned Uyghurs vary between 100,000 and one million.
Various studies have independently confirmed the estimate of around one million first formulated by the UN in August 2018, as a percentage (10 percent) of the Uighur population in Xinjiang (around 11 million) based on local data. Later, members of other minorities have also been detained in these camps. It is probably impossible to determine the exact number. However, the extent cannot and should not be measured only quantitatively. What is shocking is the systematic way in which the Chinese leadership plans and pushes ahead with the oppression of the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities: The size of the camps can be seen on satellite images. The amount spent on surveillance technologies at a local level. Everyday life has been successively restricted and monitored for years now. The freedom of practice of recognized religions, which is actually guaranteed in the Chinese constitution, as it is with the Islam, is massively impaired. Checkpoints have been set up and surveillance cameras are in place everywhere along the roads. Xinjiang is a digital laboratory in which a whole system of security and surveillance technologies interlocks.
Electronic surveillance is taking place all over China.
Surveillance cameras with facial recognition, large-scale data storage, and also measures of human observation – yes, all this is taking place throughout China. But in Xinjiang, the measures are more systematic and also more invasive. Individual databases are much more integrated and people across the country are forced to install surveillance apps on mobile phones. The measures of control in residential areas or even supermarkets are something that even goes too far for some Han Chinese in Xinjiang.
How should countries respond to China, which is committed to uphold human rights?
A focused approach is always most effective. I also believe that the new EU sanction mechanisms are appropriate. The EU is sanctioning individuals responsible for the offenses in Xinjiang and is thus sending a clear signal without immediately pillorying an entire country and its population. Also, a useful course of action in the public criticism of Chinato would be to more specifically refer to the existing and tangible evidence and especially on released Chinese documents as well as to international legal standards such as the various UN conventions, for example, against torture, racial discrimination, and also economic, social and cultural rights. China’s leadership has ratified these and thus is in violation. These binding conventions apply to China just as they do to other countries. I believe that this information is also important to the Chinese population. Otherwise, many people will get the impression that these measures are directed against the entirety of the country. If that is the case, the Chinese government is easily able to fan the flames of nationalism by claiming: “The Western countries want things to remain restless in Xinjiang, wish for terrorist attacks to continue so that they can keep quelling China’s growth.” However, for an effective policy towards the Chinese government, businesses, backed by governments, must also critically reflect on their role in the region and draw consequences.
Now, with a focus on good economic relations, the German government, in particular, has a hard time in criticizing China too harshly.
It is out of the question that Germany and China are closely economically intertwined. However, I would warn against the conclusion that Germany is too dependent on China and therefore is not able to afford to pursue a policy based on clear principles. As various studies, including one by the Mercator Institute for China Studies, have shown, this view falls short of the mark. Mainly individual sectors and companies benefit to a large extent from trade with China. Chancellor Merkel’s approach of not snubbing the Chinese leadership too much so as not to impair other cooperation opportunities is neither convincing Beijing, nor is it in the interest of her own country.
How is a future German government supposed to explain this to German companies earning a fortune in making business in China?
This supposed contradiction – trade, on the one hand, principles and values on the other – is actually false. On the contrary: it is about the rule of law, as the cornerstone of transparent interaction. Reliable structures and planning reliability are also important for economic actors. However, with a series of laws, the most recent examples being the law against foreign sanctions and the data security law, the Chinese government has expanded its access to companies and institutions abroad in a way that can have increasingly unpredictable consequences for economic actors. Companies should urgently pay close attention to this matter. My impression, however, is that more and more entrepreneurs are rethinking their commitment to China and are looking for alternatives in other regions, such as the Indo-Pacific region.
So Volkswagen’s decision to build a plant in Urumqi at the insistence of the leadership in return for permits for two more plants in booming eastern China was a bad one?
It’s more than questionable of VW or even other companies to either say, “We don’t know what’s happening there exactly.” Or to argue: “We check everything comprehensively and, if necessary, speak to the Chinese authorities if one of our Uyghur employees doesn’t show up.” In my opinion, such independent monitoring cannot be guaranteed in Xinjiang.
Doesn’t China have the economic strenght that it couldn’t care less what the US or the Europeans think?
The way the West thinks about China still has a great deal of influence in Beijing. The counter-sanctions that China has imposed on EU politicians and scientists, which have included entire research institutions, are not exactly a display of strength, but a defensive gesture – especially since obvious cracks are showing within China’s political elites concerning politics in Xinjiang. Judging from the leaked documents, we were able to see that some cadres have also been arrested in Xinjiang, allegedly for corruption, but some for lack of loyalty. This indicates that there are voices within the wider political elite who also disagreed with the actions in Xinjiang. The Chinese government also fears for its image and the opportunity to display itself during the Winter Olympics next year. Calls for a boycott are already being heard in the West.
But does that still strike a chord with the leadership? After all, Beijing 2022 is no longer the Beijing of the 2008 Summer Olympics, when China was still trying to woo the rest of the world.
I think it continues to strike them. There are also voices within the country that would like to see a more liberal, candid and therefore more cosmopolitan China. Some voices also speak out against creating too much friction by liberal democracies, because this causes problems for China to access technologies and markets. Representatives of companies such as Huawei or Alibaba that wish to expand globally have admitted that being a Chinese company is not always an advantage. Xi Jinping is relied upon to take all these interests into account. In my opinion, he is not the omnipotent leader that many make him out to be.
Kristin Shi-Kupfer, 46, is Professor of Sinology at the University of Trier. Her research focuses on digital society, religious politics and social change. She is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics).
China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The People’s Republic’s climate goals are ambitious. It wants to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Like the EU, Beijing is increasingly relying on market-based instruments to achieve its goals. For a decade, Beijing has been preparing for the trading of emissions. However, the compromise agreed on by policymakers, industry associations and large companies disappoints, an analysis by Carbon Brief shows. Emissions trading is expected to begin in late July.
The idea behind emissions trading systems is to put a price on CO2 emissions and trade CO2 certificates at a kind of stock exchange. Companies that reduce their CO2 emissions can sell their “pollution rights” on the market. Less sustainable companies have to buy additional CO2 certificates, which affects their competitiveness. The more economic sectors have to participate in emissions trading, the better for the climate.
The Chinese system is disappointing in this regard: only one economic sector has to participate in trading. Moreover, there is no cap on CO2 allowances, nor are there any current plans to remove CO2 allowances from the market over the next few years. However, this is a vital aspect of the emissions trading system to keep up the pressure for climate innovations in companies and to achieve national CO2 reduction targets.
The nationwide emissions trading scheme now only covers the electricity and heat sectors, as well as power plants that directly supply factories with electricity. 98 percent of power plants participating in the first cycle of emissions trading in 2021 burn coal. The remaining participants operate gas-fired power plants. According to Carbon Brief, the trading includes only “a small number of gas-fired power plants.” However, the share of gas in China’s electricity mix is also relatively low, at just under nine percent.
The current focus differs greatly from the original plans. These covered a far greater amount of sectors. As recently as the beginning of 2016, it was planned to also include chemical and refinery, cement production, steel and pulp and paper production sectors, and even air traffic.
The result: emissions trading in its current form covers only 40 percent of Chinese emissions. The reason for this low figure is due to the high share of emissions from Chinese industry. It is responsible for almost 30 percent of all CO2 emissions of the People’s Republic.
The Chinese system also sets rather dubious incentives. It was designed to target “the dirtiest and least efficient” coal-fired power plants, according to Carbon Brief. Power plants that emit 50 percent more CO2 than the system has actually allocated to them will only have to buy allowances for 20 percent of those emissions on the market. According to economic experts, this will lead to an oversupply of allowances. Accordingly, a price per ton of CO2 of only USD 7.60 is expected at the launch of trading. This is twice as much as in Chinese pilot projects for emissions trading. But the Chinese CO2 price would be far below that of the EU. After a slow start, the price in Europe rose to over 57 euros at the beginning of July.
Moreover, China’s emissions trading system has hardly any strong sanctioning options. It covers only fines of up to USD 4,600 should companies not comply with the rules or provide the authorities with false information about their emissions.
In its current form, China’s emissions trading scheme is “unlikely to have any impact” on China’s CO2 emissions, according to a statement by Liu Hongqiao of Carbon Brief. However, as in the past, there are currently reports that emissions trading will soon be extended to more sectors. “The cement-producing industry will definitely be included next year, as well as electrolytic aluminum,” announced Zhang Xiliang, head of the technical committee on the overall design of the national emissions trading system, as reported by business portal Caixin. Accordingly, the steel and chemical industries will also be integrated during the 14th five-year plan (2021-2025).
According to Yan Qin, a climate analyst at Refiniv, a provider of financial market data, companies producing
have been urged by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, to prepare for inclusion in emissions trading.
The way emissions trading is structured and enforced in China could also shape the European market in the near future. On July 14, the EU Commission will present its “Fit for 55” climate package, which contains a series of environmental regulatory proposals as part of the Green Deal. The package also includes a draft for the so-called CO2 border adjustment. Known in Brussels as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), this regulation is designed to increase prices for imported products that are more harmful to the climate in third countries than those produced in Europe. However, the calculation of the levy at EU borders is to take into account whether trading partners have CO2 pricing in their own countries, for example through allowance trading. Details on how exactly this mechanism will work in practice with China remain unclear. Collaboration: Amelie Richter
Caspar Welbergen was initially put off by his first trip to Beijing. As a schoolboy, he was so overwhelmed by the foreignness of this new culture that he chose to ignore China for the time being. At the time, the 38-year-old had already been taking Chinese lessons for three years. “I drove across Frankfurt to another school once a week for that, because that was the first opportunity I had to learn Chinese.”
In the meantime, Welbergen has not only overcome the culture shock, since February 2020 he has been working as the managing director of the newly founded China Education Network to ensure that students in Germany have the opportunity to experience Chinese culture. There are still far too few opportunities to make China a formative part of one’s educational biography. Welbergen believes that this does not fit in with China’s growing global importance: “There is a big discrepancy between the intensity of political and economic connection between China and Germany and the knowledge we have about China.
China does not play a role in the curricula and voluntary work in afternoon study groups or language courses is still rare at German schools. Welbergen blames German Federalism for the situation and refers to France with its greater offer of language courses.
According to Welbergen, the aesthetics of the language is often the entry point for young people into Chinese culture. At the beginning of his studies, he also remembered his interest in Mandarin and first took Sinology lectures as a guest. “I just stayed there” Welbergen recounts. His original major, economics, was then left with only a supporting role.
After the initial “China-shock” as a high school student, a year-long stay in Shanghai during his time at University ignited his enthusiasm for Chinese culture and especially the Chinese drive to build a future for themselves and the country. “One of the best books I’ve read about China in the past is ‘Age of Ambition’ by Evan Osnos, former China correspondent for The New Yorker,” Welbergen says. “It describes this mentality perfectly.”
Before founding the education network, Welbergen was head of the Beijing office of Mercator Foundation for six years. During this time, he built up the office, established contacts between Europe and China, and even then organized student exchanges between Germany and China. Today, the education network, which is an initiative of Mercator Foundation and the Goethe-Institut, benefits from this. Nevertheless, Covid continues to severely limit their work. “A school exchange with a trip to China will probably not be possible until next year,” says Welbergen.
To give German and Chinese students the ability to get in touch, however, the education network offers virtual encounters. Here, students record their surroundings with 360-degree cameras and guide their exchange guests digitally through their own living environment. Incidentally, this could continue to be a component in the run-up to student exchanges after Covid – this reduces the danger of being hit by a culture shock. David Renke
“I just gotta have that!” Anyone who has ever had experienced this thought probably had a bee in their bonnet, or rather, a “grape” in their bonnet (种草 zhòngcǎo). This is “New Chinese” for when products are made so palatable to someone by recommendation that a desire to purchase sprouts. By satisfying this need, one speaks analogously of “plucking out grasses” (拔草 bácǎo). If, on the other hand, one’s budget does not allow it, the herbs “grow” and flourish in the back of the mind (长草 zhǎngcǎo) until the purchase is made.
The Middle Kingdom has no shortage of these “grass and weed gardeners” who cheerfully plant seeds in your mental backyard gardens. In everyday life, the boundaries between advertising and reality become blurred on the way to the office. During morning rush-hour crowds on the Beijing subway, while you’re holding on to a grip advertising a used-car dealership, you’re gazing into the tunnel outside your window, where projectors are flickering the latest online sales promotions onto the wall. This inevitably draws your gaze back to the smartphone screen, where the advertising drum continues to hammer away merrily: WeChat Moments (微信朋友圈 Wēixìn péngyouquān), Weibo (微博 Wēibó), Douyin (抖音 Dǒuyīn), Toutiao (今日头条 Jīnrì Tóutiáo). In all of these applications, product references – more or less well-marked – weave through the content mesh. So it’s only logical that Xiǎohóngshū 小红书 (literally “Little Red Book”), an app that blatantly specializes in product recommendations, has now taken off. Here, users share videos and posts, in which they test, compare and rate products.
However, China’s celebrities are without a doubt the real major gardeners. Their likenesses smile not only from advertising grips and WeChat ads but also from numerous product packages in the supermarket – from the Tarochips bag to the herbal tea can. Unlike the West, where companies often secure exclusive contracts with individual celebrities as brand ambassadors and advertising platforms (代言人 dàiyánrén), Chinese stars and starlets (明星 míngxīng) make the most of their 15 minutes of fame by allowing themselves to be harnessed as brand faces for several companies and products at the same time.
Meanwhile, viewers of Chinese reality shows (真人秀 zhēnrénxiù) also have a lot of weeding to do. It’s not just that logos of main sponsors flash virtually incessantly through every shot of major TV formats, rooting them deep in the audience’s subconscious, (mostly celebrity) contestants are also seeding vigorously, for example, by consuming the sponsor products during the show. As seen in previous seasons of the hit music show “The Big Band” (乐队的夏天 yuèduì de xiàtiān), where the participating band members repeatedly drank from sponsors drink packets containing milk and fruit drinks between gigs, with the camera on hand. The creators of the streaming hit “Sisters Who Makes Waves” (乘风破浪的姐姐 chéngfēngpòlàng de jiějie) had an even smarter idea: why spend a lot of money on elaborately produced commercials? Instead, they simply enlisted the show’s famous female protagonists as “soft” advertising sponsors. In the end, the show repeatedly featured interludes in which the participating singers and actresses incidentally recommended products to each other. In this way, the grass-planting culture blossomed in a whole new way.
