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The decisions on the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework are not due until 2027, but the discussion is already gathering pace. The debate, which was triggered by a leaked internal presentation, has come at an inopportune time for the EU Commission: The far-reaching reform ideas are already mobilizing resistance from many sides before the Commission leadership has even committed itself. The final proposal is not due until summer 2025.
CSU MEP Markus Ferber, for example, speaks of a “slap in the face of the European Parliament”. Parliamentary budgetary and control rights would be trampled underfoot if a large part of the EU budget was combined into one plan per member state. In addition, EU policy would be reduced to absurdity if each country could set its own priorities in agricultural policy, for example, criticized Ferber. Stakeholders such as the German Farmers’ Association are also already campaigning against the reform plans.
The debates are viewed with concern by the German government. There is a considerable need for reform: The current budget is far too inflexible and means a de facto planned economy in seven-year plans, according to one of the ministries involved. The basic idea of the commission is correct, according to another ministry.
By the end of the year, the federal government wants to draw up a joint statement on what reforms are needed in cohesion policy from the perspective of the current government. Minister Christian Lindner is not the only one to doubt the effectiveness of regional funding; moreover, the funds from the EU budget are only flowing out slowly. The federal states, as those responsible, are likely to vehemently disagree.
But in Berlin, the government is being combative: “The burden of justification lies with those who don’t want to change anything”, they say.
Only days after the EU decision to impose additional tariffs on Chinese EVs, China has imposed provisional anti-dumping measures on brandy imports from the European Union.
The highest rate applies to JAS Hennessy, a subsidiary of the French luxury goods group LVMH, with 39 percent of the import value. Rémy Martin, a brand of the spirits manufacturer Rémy Cointreau, received 38.1 percent. Most producers must expect 34.8 percent. The smaller producer, Martell, received the lowest rate at 30.6 percent.
As of October 11, importers must now provide a security deposit to Chinese customs. China justified the measures by stating that an investigation had come to the preliminary conclusion that the dumping of brandy from the EU could cause “considerable damage” to the brandy sector in the People’s Republic.
The Chinese anti-dumping measures against European cognac are hardly surprising – the investigation into European brandy has been ongoing for some time. Since the decision in Brussels on Friday last week, it was considered very likely that Beijing would take this step. It is also likely that this will fall on the first business day after the Chinese public holiday week.
The EU Commission was apparently prepared. Shortly after the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s announcement, the Brussels authority announced that it would take the matter to the World Trade Organization (WTO): “The European Commission will challenge, at the WTO, the announced imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures by China on imports of brandy from the EU,” said Commission spokesman Olof Gill. “We believe that these measures are unfounded, and we are determined to defend EU industry against the abuse of trade defense instruments.”
Bernd Lange, Chairman of the Trade Committee in the EU Parliament, called China’s move “a pinprick in the negotiations.” Lange told Table.Briefings: “This is part of the poker game. If Beijing gets serious, the EU will go to the WTO.”
France’s Trade Minister Sophie Primas agreed: “Together with the European Commission, we will, of course, challenge this decision before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,” she said. The association of French cognac producers, Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac (BNIC), called on the government on Tuesday to “put an end to the escalation.” The producers are “hostages” of the trade conflict over electric cars. “These tariffs must be suspended before it is too late,” BNIC demanded.
The Commission and the Chinese government are still negotiating ways to avert the EU tariffs on electric cars. These will otherwise come into force at the end of October. On Tuesday evening, reports emerged that the Chinese government had apparently tried to avert the additional EV tariffs by offering a minimum price of 30,000 euros. This was reported by Reuters. The amount of the proposed minimum prices had not previously been known.
Paris criticized China’s leader Xi Jinping for breaking a promise he made to the French president. It “goes against the commitment made by President Xi during his visit to France,” Primas said in a statement to POLITICO. Emmanuel Macron received Xi in May in the French capital. Among the gifts Macron presented to China’s President were two bottles of cognac, a Hennessy X.O. and a Rémy Martin Louis XIII.
Cognac is the largest single category of imported spirits in China. According to BNIC data, China accounted for 19.4 percent of all French cognac exports last year. This makes the People’s Republic one of the most profitable markets for producers. The French account for 99 percent of China’s brandy imports. French shipments were worth around 1.5 billion euros in 2023. The market leader in this category in the People’s Republic is Rémy Cointreau.
However, French cognac only accounts for a fraction of the total Chinese spirits market. The most popular drink in China is locally produced baijiu, which accounts for 95 percent of the spirits market.
Cognac will probably not be the end of the story, however. On Tuesday, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce indicated that further tariffs on other products could follow: An anti-subsidy investigation into EU pork is still ongoing. Certain EU dairy products have also already been targeted. The ministry said that “objective and fair” decisions would be made.
However, one comment should cause Berlin to prick up its ears: The Ministry added that it was considering raising tariffs on imported “large-engine vehicles.” This includes vehicles with an engine displacement of 2.5 liters or more.
Numerous cars from premium brands such as Mercedes-Benz, Audi and BMW could fall under the new regulation. Although the brands operate plants in China, most large saloons and SUVs are imported and not manufactured in the People’s Republic – for example, the Mercedes-Benz S-Class, the Audi A8 or the BMW 7 Series.
In the 14 years that Viktor Orbán has been Prime Minister, Hungary has approved 95% of legislative proposals in the Council. A journalist asks Orbán at his press conference in the European Parliament why he still says that a lot is going wrong in the EU. Orbán replies that there have been two sharp turning points. He cites the increase in illegal migration from 2015 and Brexit.
Orbán has come to Strasbourg a day early, where he is presenting the Hungarian presidency’s program in the European Parliament today. He took two hours to explain his policies to the media in advance.
When it comes to migration, Orbán sees himself vindicated by history. “There is no way around protecting the EU’s external borders.” The “frontline countries” must be supported in fending off illegal migration. It would make sense for Brussels to support their work. He describes the challenges of migration as “mud-slinging” and “lightning storms”.
He sees the only solution in “outside hotspots”, i.e. reception centers for migrants outside EU territory. Migrants should submit their “request” for asylum there. Decisions should be made locally. Because, according to Orbán: “Only the migrant we didn’t let in won’t stay.” However, Hungary is being punished by the EU for already applying the right recipe in migration policy. Orbán is alluding to the penalties Hungary is facing due to infringement proceedings in migration policy.
He was convinced that all other member states would take the same stance. However, he has long been branded an “idiot” for doing so. He points to imitators in migration policy, such as the Netherlands under Geert Wilders. Individual member states are still trying to find individual solutions. His proposal would be regular Schengen summits at which the member states agree on a common line. Nevertheless, his government wants Hungary to opt out of migration policy. The fact that the treaties first have to be amended for an opt-out does not deter him. “First we had to signal to Brussels that we want out. The next step is to discuss how we can get out.”
Brexit has changed the balance of power in the Council. With the British, the Visegrad states had always been able to fend off attempts by the “EU bubble” in Brussels to take “more and more power and influence” away from the member states and place it in Brussels. However, since the United Kingdom left the EU, a self-appointed “mainstream elite” in Brussels has been able to do as it pleases.
There is increasing resistance to the “EU elites”: “Europeans are not satisfied.” In Orbán’s worldview, the “Patriots for Europe” group, which was largely co-founded by Fidesz, is “a new player that represents criticism of the EU”. Orbán believes: “Either the EU elite will change and accept what more and more people in Europe want.” Or: “The elite is not prepared to change and then we have to push them aside.”
Orbán is looking forward to the US presidential elections. If Trump wins at the beginning of November, “we will open a few bottles of champagne”. In true Trump style, he wants to rely on “deals” in the event of differences of opinion. For example with the Erasmus and Horizon funding programs, from which students and universities from Hungary were excluded. “We can still find an understanding so that Hungary can participate again.”
If this is not possible, it is not a tragedy, as his government has set up its own programs. Quite a lot of money would flow out of Hungary’s national budget for them. “However, we are now realizing that we love the Hungarian programs. We are currently checking whether they are not better.” However, his government will not bow to pressure from Brussels under any circumstances: “We see the EU’s approach as a nasty form of blackmail that Brussels should be ashamed of.”
With his long-awaited report at the beginning of September, former Italian Prime Minister and ECB President Mario Draghi increased the pressure on EU member states to invest more in research and, above all, innovation. Among other things, Draghi criticized existing EU research programs as bureaucratic and underfunded. He is pushing for the EU research and innovation budget to be doubled to €200 billion for the next seven-year framework program from 2028 to 2034.
Draghi’s paper has triggered numerous reactions. Experts agree: if all the changes in the report were implemented, it would be tantamount to a small revolution in EU research policy. Christian Ehler, Member of the European Parliament (EPP), also welcomes many of Draghi’s substantial proposals. In fact, they can be implemented within a reasonable timeframe, he says in an interview with Table.Briefings. But: “Not all of them are good proposals”, says Ehler, who was most recently Coordinator of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). For example, extending Erasmus+ to researchers makes no sense, as there are already Marie Curie Actions and COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) as part of Horizon Europe.
In principle, the changes to build the Research and Innovation Union (ERA) are possible for the EU, but this depends to a large extent on the willingness and capacity of the member states, says Ehler. “ERA is first and foremost a coordination effort in which the member states have to bring about most of the changes on the ground. The last few years have shown that while member states are willing to talk about the big issues, progress is slow in most member states.” Whether it is therefore realistic to expect that a comprehensive plan for the ERA with national plans for each member state will really lead to change is questionable, Ehler points out.
Christian Ehler, on the other hand, can only underline Draghi’s criticism of the Horizon program. “We need a simplified program with more self-administration by scientists, researchers and innovators. Less political pressure on the program is crucial. Administrative simplification is also essential – we can’t wait several years again for the model grant agreement to be available for Research Framework Program 10″, says the EU politician.
Despite all the problems with Horizon, Ehler makes one reservation. The justified criticism of Horizon should “not lead to the research framework program being taken completely under the wing of the Directorate-General for Budget and the EU Competitiveness Fund“, says Ehler. This, in turn, goes against Draghi’s recommendation “that the research program should be made by and for experts and not by budget politicians and civil servants who want to realize their wet dreams of power”.
Christian Ehler also fundamentally supports the plans to restructure the European Innovation Council (EIC), which combines various instruments such as the EIC Pathfinder or the EIC Accelerator to promote innovation – but in a more independent EIC. “Draghi’s proposal would essentially separate the EIC Pathfinder from the Accelerator. This is the wrong step”, says Ehler. The EIC should be implemented as an integrated program managed by an independent and flexible institute.
Like Draghi, Christian Ehler also sees the urgency of rapidly expanding Europe’s innovative strength. “We are already seeing a downward spiral. Only one of the ten largest corporate investors in research and development comes from the European Union: Volkswagen.” And we can see where this weak figure comes from: In 2021, the industry in the EU invested more than two percent of GDP in research and development in only two member states. In eight member states, this figure was less than 0.5 percent and in 19 member states it was 1 percent or less. In most member states and in the EU as a whole, this percentage has not changed significantly in the last five years, criticizes Ehler and makes the comparison: the USA invests 2.4 percent, China 1.8 percent of gross domestic product.
And so, like Draghi, Ehler shares the growing concern about Europe’s competitiveness and innovative strength. Back in April, another former Italian Prime Minister, Enrico Letta, published his recommendations for the future of the EU single market, including the creation of a “fifth freedom” dedicated to the free movement of research, innovation, knowledge and education. In it, he made proposals for strengthening the EU internal market. Although the specific proposals made by politicians may differ, it clearly shows that the need for reform and investment in these areas is becoming increasingly urgent.
A competitive steel industry in the European Union is essential for prosperity, the resilience of industrial value chains, employment, economic security and the green transformation. It offers more than 300,000 employees good industrial jobs with collective bargaining protection and co-determination. Steel is systemically relevant as the foundation of industrial value creation in Europe. Numerous integrated value chains need steel as a basic material. What’s more, as a high-tech material, steel paves the way for the green transformation. Without steel, no wind turbine would turn. Not a single kilowatt hour of electricity could be transported. Without steel, no electric car would drive even one kilometer.
As a basic material for the mobility and energy transition, green steel in particular will ensure a secure and sustainable supply of basic materials in the future. European steel producers have therefore begun to invest billions in low-carbon steel production with government support and to implement innovative decarbonization concepts.
Nevertheless, the European steel industry is in a historic crisis. A creeping deindustrialization is underway. Europe is the only region in the world with a shrinking steel industry. In the last ten years, the EU has lost a fifth of its production capacity and more than 20,000 jobs. Instead of a trade surplus (16 million tons in 2012), the EU now has a large deficit (10 million tons in 2023). Capacity utilization in European steelworks is now below 65%.
There are many reasons for this development. Increasing import pressure from countries with overcapacity plays a key role. The overcapacity from China alone exceeds total European production by a factor of 5. The combination of unfair trade practices and the lack of a European response to this makes this a toxic mix for the steel industry.
Some of the instruments used to support the European steel industry are already working. One example is minimum import prices, such as for grain-oriented electrical steel. However, price adjustments are urgently needed here. A follow-up solution is also urgently needed for the Steel Safeguards, which expire in 2026.
In addition, the existing trade defense instruments (anti-dumping and anti-subsidy procedures) must be used more quickly and effectively against unfair trade practices. To this end, WTO and EU legal leeway must be used. As a first step, the new European Commission should clearly identify this scope in the first quarter of 2025.
Before the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) is launched in 2026, the EU urgently needs to correct the obvious design flaws. So far, there has been no solution to relieve the burden on steel exports to third countries. To ensure that products that are essentially made of steel cannot only be produced economically in non-European countries after the introduction of CBAM, we are calling for the scope of application to be reviewed, taking into account bureaucratic, economic and trade policy hurdles. This applies above all to downstream products for which competitiveness in Europe would deteriorate massively because they do not fall within the scope of application.
The development of energy costs is another key issue. In the short term, the EU should enable member states to establish temporary relief mechanisms such as industrial electricity prices. In the long term, however, a competitive energy supply can only be ensured through a genuine European energy market. To achieve this, the energy transport infrastructure must be consistently expanded across national borders.
In order to make green steel competitive, the EU must play its part in developing lead markets for green steel. In addition to a revision of the Public Procurement Directive, which includes issues relating to the Paris climate targets and collective agreements, an early review of the CO2 fleet limits for cars can also play an important role. We need to move away from a pure consideration of what comes out of the exhaust pipe to an overall CO2 balance of a vehicle. This would make green steel more attractive for manufacturers.
The EU Commission is now called upon to quickly bring the stakeholders to the table and agree on a binding steel action plan with companies, trade unions and works councils. Politicians must finally get into action mode. Continuing to stand idly by and watch developments would mean accepting the collapse of entire value chains and authoritarian regimes determining in the future whether retrofitting and the energy transition are still possible at all in Europe and, if so, at what price.
Dennis Radtke has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2017. He sits on the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs for the CDU/EPP. He has also recently become Chairman of the Christian Democratic Workers’ Association (CDA). Previously, Radtke was trade union secretary at IG BCE.
The decisions on the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework are not due until 2027, but the discussion is already gathering pace. The debate, which was triggered by a leaked internal presentation, has come at an inopportune time for the EU Commission: The far-reaching reform ideas are already mobilizing resistance from many sides before the Commission leadership has even committed itself. The final proposal is not due until summer 2025.
CSU MEP Markus Ferber, for example, speaks of a “slap in the face of the European Parliament”. Parliamentary budgetary and control rights would be trampled underfoot if a large part of the EU budget was combined into one plan per member state. In addition, EU policy would be reduced to absurdity if each country could set its own priorities in agricultural policy, for example, criticized Ferber. Stakeholders such as the German Farmers’ Association are also already campaigning against the reform plans.
The debates are viewed with concern by the German government. There is a considerable need for reform: The current budget is far too inflexible and means a de facto planned economy in seven-year plans, according to one of the ministries involved. The basic idea of the commission is correct, according to another ministry.
By the end of the year, the federal government wants to draw up a joint statement on what reforms are needed in cohesion policy from the perspective of the current government. Minister Christian Lindner is not the only one to doubt the effectiveness of regional funding; moreover, the funds from the EU budget are only flowing out slowly. The federal states, as those responsible, are likely to vehemently disagree.
But in Berlin, the government is being combative: “The burden of justification lies with those who don’t want to change anything”, they say.
Only days after the EU decision to impose additional tariffs on Chinese EVs, China has imposed provisional anti-dumping measures on brandy imports from the European Union.
The highest rate applies to JAS Hennessy, a subsidiary of the French luxury goods group LVMH, with 39 percent of the import value. Rémy Martin, a brand of the spirits manufacturer Rémy Cointreau, received 38.1 percent. Most producers must expect 34.8 percent. The smaller producer, Martell, received the lowest rate at 30.6 percent.
As of October 11, importers must now provide a security deposit to Chinese customs. China justified the measures by stating that an investigation had come to the preliminary conclusion that the dumping of brandy from the EU could cause “considerable damage” to the brandy sector in the People’s Republic.
The Chinese anti-dumping measures against European cognac are hardly surprising – the investigation into European brandy has been ongoing for some time. Since the decision in Brussels on Friday last week, it was considered very likely that Beijing would take this step. It is also likely that this will fall on the first business day after the Chinese public holiday week.
The EU Commission was apparently prepared. Shortly after the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s announcement, the Brussels authority announced that it would take the matter to the World Trade Organization (WTO): “The European Commission will challenge, at the WTO, the announced imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures by China on imports of brandy from the EU,” said Commission spokesman Olof Gill. “We believe that these measures are unfounded, and we are determined to defend EU industry against the abuse of trade defense instruments.”
Bernd Lange, Chairman of the Trade Committee in the EU Parliament, called China’s move “a pinprick in the negotiations.” Lange told Table.Briefings: “This is part of the poker game. If Beijing gets serious, the EU will go to the WTO.”
France’s Trade Minister Sophie Primas agreed: “Together with the European Commission, we will, of course, challenge this decision before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,” she said. The association of French cognac producers, Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac (BNIC), called on the government on Tuesday to “put an end to the escalation.” The producers are “hostages” of the trade conflict over electric cars. “These tariffs must be suspended before it is too late,” BNIC demanded.
The Commission and the Chinese government are still negotiating ways to avert the EU tariffs on electric cars. These will otherwise come into force at the end of October. On Tuesday evening, reports emerged that the Chinese government had apparently tried to avert the additional EV tariffs by offering a minimum price of 30,000 euros. This was reported by Reuters. The amount of the proposed minimum prices had not previously been known.
Paris criticized China’s leader Xi Jinping for breaking a promise he made to the French president. It “goes against the commitment made by President Xi during his visit to France,” Primas said in a statement to POLITICO. Emmanuel Macron received Xi in May in the French capital. Among the gifts Macron presented to China’s President were two bottles of cognac, a Hennessy X.O. and a Rémy Martin Louis XIII.
Cognac is the largest single category of imported spirits in China. According to BNIC data, China accounted for 19.4 percent of all French cognac exports last year. This makes the People’s Republic one of the most profitable markets for producers. The French account for 99 percent of China’s brandy imports. French shipments were worth around 1.5 billion euros in 2023. The market leader in this category in the People’s Republic is Rémy Cointreau.
However, French cognac only accounts for a fraction of the total Chinese spirits market. The most popular drink in China is locally produced baijiu, which accounts for 95 percent of the spirits market.
Cognac will probably not be the end of the story, however. On Tuesday, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce indicated that further tariffs on other products could follow: An anti-subsidy investigation into EU pork is still ongoing. Certain EU dairy products have also already been targeted. The ministry said that “objective and fair” decisions would be made.
However, one comment should cause Berlin to prick up its ears: The Ministry added that it was considering raising tariffs on imported “large-engine vehicles.” This includes vehicles with an engine displacement of 2.5 liters or more.
Numerous cars from premium brands such as Mercedes-Benz, Audi and BMW could fall under the new regulation. Although the brands operate plants in China, most large saloons and SUVs are imported and not manufactured in the People’s Republic – for example, the Mercedes-Benz S-Class, the Audi A8 or the BMW 7 Series.
In the 14 years that Viktor Orbán has been Prime Minister, Hungary has approved 95% of legislative proposals in the Council. A journalist asks Orbán at his press conference in the European Parliament why he still says that a lot is going wrong in the EU. Orbán replies that there have been two sharp turning points. He cites the increase in illegal migration from 2015 and Brexit.
Orbán has come to Strasbourg a day early, where he is presenting the Hungarian presidency’s program in the European Parliament today. He took two hours to explain his policies to the media in advance.
When it comes to migration, Orbán sees himself vindicated by history. “There is no way around protecting the EU’s external borders.” The “frontline countries” must be supported in fending off illegal migration. It would make sense for Brussels to support their work. He describes the challenges of migration as “mud-slinging” and “lightning storms”.
He sees the only solution in “outside hotspots”, i.e. reception centers for migrants outside EU territory. Migrants should submit their “request” for asylum there. Decisions should be made locally. Because, according to Orbán: “Only the migrant we didn’t let in won’t stay.” However, Hungary is being punished by the EU for already applying the right recipe in migration policy. Orbán is alluding to the penalties Hungary is facing due to infringement proceedings in migration policy.
He was convinced that all other member states would take the same stance. However, he has long been branded an “idiot” for doing so. He points to imitators in migration policy, such as the Netherlands under Geert Wilders. Individual member states are still trying to find individual solutions. His proposal would be regular Schengen summits at which the member states agree on a common line. Nevertheless, his government wants Hungary to opt out of migration policy. The fact that the treaties first have to be amended for an opt-out does not deter him. “First we had to signal to Brussels that we want out. The next step is to discuss how we can get out.”
Brexit has changed the balance of power in the Council. With the British, the Visegrad states had always been able to fend off attempts by the “EU bubble” in Brussels to take “more and more power and influence” away from the member states and place it in Brussels. However, since the United Kingdom left the EU, a self-appointed “mainstream elite” in Brussels has been able to do as it pleases.
There is increasing resistance to the “EU elites”: “Europeans are not satisfied.” In Orbán’s worldview, the “Patriots for Europe” group, which was largely co-founded by Fidesz, is “a new player that represents criticism of the EU”. Orbán believes: “Either the EU elite will change and accept what more and more people in Europe want.” Or: “The elite is not prepared to change and then we have to push them aside.”
Orbán is looking forward to the US presidential elections. If Trump wins at the beginning of November, “we will open a few bottles of champagne”. In true Trump style, he wants to rely on “deals” in the event of differences of opinion. For example with the Erasmus and Horizon funding programs, from which students and universities from Hungary were excluded. “We can still find an understanding so that Hungary can participate again.”
If this is not possible, it is not a tragedy, as his government has set up its own programs. Quite a lot of money would flow out of Hungary’s national budget for them. “However, we are now realizing that we love the Hungarian programs. We are currently checking whether they are not better.” However, his government will not bow to pressure from Brussels under any circumstances: “We see the EU’s approach as a nasty form of blackmail that Brussels should be ashamed of.”
With his long-awaited report at the beginning of September, former Italian Prime Minister and ECB President Mario Draghi increased the pressure on EU member states to invest more in research and, above all, innovation. Among other things, Draghi criticized existing EU research programs as bureaucratic and underfunded. He is pushing for the EU research and innovation budget to be doubled to €200 billion for the next seven-year framework program from 2028 to 2034.
Draghi’s paper has triggered numerous reactions. Experts agree: if all the changes in the report were implemented, it would be tantamount to a small revolution in EU research policy. Christian Ehler, Member of the European Parliament (EPP), also welcomes many of Draghi’s substantial proposals. In fact, they can be implemented within a reasonable timeframe, he says in an interview with Table.Briefings. But: “Not all of them are good proposals”, says Ehler, who was most recently Coordinator of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). For example, extending Erasmus+ to researchers makes no sense, as there are already Marie Curie Actions and COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) as part of Horizon Europe.
In principle, the changes to build the Research and Innovation Union (ERA) are possible for the EU, but this depends to a large extent on the willingness and capacity of the member states, says Ehler. “ERA is first and foremost a coordination effort in which the member states have to bring about most of the changes on the ground. The last few years have shown that while member states are willing to talk about the big issues, progress is slow in most member states.” Whether it is therefore realistic to expect that a comprehensive plan for the ERA with national plans for each member state will really lead to change is questionable, Ehler points out.
Christian Ehler, on the other hand, can only underline Draghi’s criticism of the Horizon program. “We need a simplified program with more self-administration by scientists, researchers and innovators. Less political pressure on the program is crucial. Administrative simplification is also essential – we can’t wait several years again for the model grant agreement to be available for Research Framework Program 10″, says the EU politician.
Despite all the problems with Horizon, Ehler makes one reservation. The justified criticism of Horizon should “not lead to the research framework program being taken completely under the wing of the Directorate-General for Budget and the EU Competitiveness Fund“, says Ehler. This, in turn, goes against Draghi’s recommendation “that the research program should be made by and for experts and not by budget politicians and civil servants who want to realize their wet dreams of power”.
Christian Ehler also fundamentally supports the plans to restructure the European Innovation Council (EIC), which combines various instruments such as the EIC Pathfinder or the EIC Accelerator to promote innovation – but in a more independent EIC. “Draghi’s proposal would essentially separate the EIC Pathfinder from the Accelerator. This is the wrong step”, says Ehler. The EIC should be implemented as an integrated program managed by an independent and flexible institute.
Like Draghi, Christian Ehler also sees the urgency of rapidly expanding Europe’s innovative strength. “We are already seeing a downward spiral. Only one of the ten largest corporate investors in research and development comes from the European Union: Volkswagen.” And we can see where this weak figure comes from: In 2021, the industry in the EU invested more than two percent of GDP in research and development in only two member states. In eight member states, this figure was less than 0.5 percent and in 19 member states it was 1 percent or less. In most member states and in the EU as a whole, this percentage has not changed significantly in the last five years, criticizes Ehler and makes the comparison: the USA invests 2.4 percent, China 1.8 percent of gross domestic product.
And so, like Draghi, Ehler shares the growing concern about Europe’s competitiveness and innovative strength. Back in April, another former Italian Prime Minister, Enrico Letta, published his recommendations for the future of the EU single market, including the creation of a “fifth freedom” dedicated to the free movement of research, innovation, knowledge and education. In it, he made proposals for strengthening the EU internal market. Although the specific proposals made by politicians may differ, it clearly shows that the need for reform and investment in these areas is becoming increasingly urgent.
A competitive steel industry in the European Union is essential for prosperity, the resilience of industrial value chains, employment, economic security and the green transformation. It offers more than 300,000 employees good industrial jobs with collective bargaining protection and co-determination. Steel is systemically relevant as the foundation of industrial value creation in Europe. Numerous integrated value chains need steel as a basic material. What’s more, as a high-tech material, steel paves the way for the green transformation. Without steel, no wind turbine would turn. Not a single kilowatt hour of electricity could be transported. Without steel, no electric car would drive even one kilometer.
As a basic material for the mobility and energy transition, green steel in particular will ensure a secure and sustainable supply of basic materials in the future. European steel producers have therefore begun to invest billions in low-carbon steel production with government support and to implement innovative decarbonization concepts.
Nevertheless, the European steel industry is in a historic crisis. A creeping deindustrialization is underway. Europe is the only region in the world with a shrinking steel industry. In the last ten years, the EU has lost a fifth of its production capacity and more than 20,000 jobs. Instead of a trade surplus (16 million tons in 2012), the EU now has a large deficit (10 million tons in 2023). Capacity utilization in European steelworks is now below 65%.
There are many reasons for this development. Increasing import pressure from countries with overcapacity plays a key role. The overcapacity from China alone exceeds total European production by a factor of 5. The combination of unfair trade practices and the lack of a European response to this makes this a toxic mix for the steel industry.
Some of the instruments used to support the European steel industry are already working. One example is minimum import prices, such as for grain-oriented electrical steel. However, price adjustments are urgently needed here. A follow-up solution is also urgently needed for the Steel Safeguards, which expire in 2026.
In addition, the existing trade defense instruments (anti-dumping and anti-subsidy procedures) must be used more quickly and effectively against unfair trade practices. To this end, WTO and EU legal leeway must be used. As a first step, the new European Commission should clearly identify this scope in the first quarter of 2025.
Before the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) is launched in 2026, the EU urgently needs to correct the obvious design flaws. So far, there has been no solution to relieve the burden on steel exports to third countries. To ensure that products that are essentially made of steel cannot only be produced economically in non-European countries after the introduction of CBAM, we are calling for the scope of application to be reviewed, taking into account bureaucratic, economic and trade policy hurdles. This applies above all to downstream products for which competitiveness in Europe would deteriorate massively because they do not fall within the scope of application.
The development of energy costs is another key issue. In the short term, the EU should enable member states to establish temporary relief mechanisms such as industrial electricity prices. In the long term, however, a competitive energy supply can only be ensured through a genuine European energy market. To achieve this, the energy transport infrastructure must be consistently expanded across national borders.
In order to make green steel competitive, the EU must play its part in developing lead markets for green steel. In addition to a revision of the Public Procurement Directive, which includes issues relating to the Paris climate targets and collective agreements, an early review of the CO2 fleet limits for cars can also play an important role. We need to move away from a pure consideration of what comes out of the exhaust pipe to an overall CO2 balance of a vehicle. This would make green steel more attractive for manufacturers.
The EU Commission is now called upon to quickly bring the stakeholders to the table and agree on a binding steel action plan with companies, trade unions and works councils. Politicians must finally get into action mode. Continuing to stand idly by and watch developments would mean accepting the collapse of entire value chains and authoritarian regimes determining in the future whether retrofitting and the energy transition are still possible at all in Europe and, if so, at what price.
Dennis Radtke has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2017. He sits on the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs for the CDU/EPP. He has also recently become Chairman of the Christian Democratic Workers’ Association (CDA). Previously, Radtke was trade union secretary at IG BCE.