It already seemed as if EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s initiative to lower the high standard of species protection for wolves had fizzled out. There was no majority on the member states’ side in the spring. Now something is happening: Luxembourg has announced its support for the initiative. This would fulfill one of two conditions for a qualified majority: At least 15 member states would be in favor.
However, as there are comparatively few Luxembourgers, this is not enough to fulfill the second condition: The states must also represent 65 percent of the EU population. It is therefore surprising to hear that the Hungarian Council Presidency intends to vote again on Wednesday at EU ambassador level on the protection of the predators.
Ultimately, a country with a large number of members would have to speak out in favor of the Commission’s proposal in order to get things moving: Germany or Spain, for example. In her former role as Environment Minister in Madrid, Teresa Ribera was just as vehemently opposed to more culls as her German counterpart Steffi Lemke.
At her hearings in parliament, future Executive Vice-President Ribera is likely to face awkward questions if she sticks to her guns. There are now rumors that the federal government could change its mind and abandon its reservation of scrutiny. If this is true, then the election result in the “wolf state” of Brandenburg probably provided the impetus.
Get through the day safely!
Some titles will change, but the responsibilities of the new Commissioners for agricultural and food issues will essentially remain the same. As before, the Agriculture Commissioner – proposed by Christophe Hansen (EPP) from Luxembourg – will be responsible for agriculture and rural development and thus for both pillars of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Health Commissioner – the Hungarian Olivér Várhelyi has been proposed – will continue to cover animal welfare and food safety, including plant protection and genetic engineering.
What is new is that the Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms, Raffaele Fitto, is to oversee the work of Agriculture Commissioner Hansen. The Italian is a confidant of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and a member of her Fratelli d’Italia party. During von der Leyen’s first term of office, the agriculture portfolio was still under the overall supervision of Green Deal Commissioner Frans Timmermans. An arrangement that harbored a lot of potential for conflict, also because Timmermans was actively involved in the agricultural sector and conducted trilogue negotiations himself.
By changing the structure, von der Leyen is reducing the risk that Teresa Ribera from Spain, who will be responsible for implementing the Green Deal targets as Vice-President in the future, will become a similarly irritating figure for farmers as Timmermans. The upgrading of the portfolio from agriculture to “Agriculture and Food” also sends the signal that Hansen will be in charge of this policy area – even if he does not actually have any new responsibilities.
Accordingly, in his letter of appointment, the Commission President instructs Hansen to draw up the paper on the vision of agriculture that von der Leyen promised – based on the recommendations of the strategy dialog – for the first 100 days of her term of office. By way of comparison, the farm-to-fork strategy, which previously provided the framework for agricultural and food policy, was presented by the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety.
Von der Leyen wants to directly oversee the creation of the vision paper herself. The letter of appointment shows which recommendations from the strategy dialog she will focus on in particular. For example, the recommendation to pay CAP direct payments “directly to small farmers”. Compared to the statement in the Strategy Dialogue report, this is a relativization. There it sounded as if only “farmers in need” could still hope to receive the area payment. According to the SME definition, “small farms” could still mean that farmers with up to 250 hectares of land would continue to receive the direct payment.
Hansen has the task of initiating the reorganization of direct payments in view of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. There is a consensus that the direct payment cannot continue as before once the huge areas have joined. The reduction, restructuring or abolition of the area payment over the course of up to two future funding periods (up to 2042) is under discussion.
In the previous funding period, direct payments were tied to farmers fulfilling organic requirements. This so-called conditionality of payments was called into question by the Strategic Dialogue on Agriculture. It is expected that a switch will be made to an incentive model in the future. According to the model, farmers receive additional financial aid if they fulfill certain eco-services.
It is expected that the Commission will take stronger action against unfair trading practices. This is indicated by the fact that the Commission President has pledged to do more for farmers in this matter. It must be ensured that they do not have to sell their products below production cost. Conflicts with the trade are to be expected here.
It is also likely to be controversial which climate change adaptation measures will be supported by the Commission. What will be supported beyond the set aside of land? Is there also money for irrigation, for converting stables to protect animals in hot weather, and for artificial shading of pastures?
It also calls on Luxembourg’s Hansen to work together with Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič towards more “reciprocity” and a level playing field in international trade. This is likely to mean that requirements for imports are aligned more closely with those that apply to domestic producers. The Strategy Dialogue has also called for this, but the scope for this under trade law is limited.
The topic of animal welfare has been symbolically upgraded and is now included in the title of the nominated Health Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi. The Commission had made proposals for new rules on animal transportation and the protection of domestic cats and dogs. Both proposals have not yet been dealt with by the Council and Parliament.
Plant protection would also fall under Várhelyi’s remit. The mission letter only mentions the competencies for biological plant protection. A more comprehensive reform would also include application regulations and authorization procedures. The Nitrates Directive is also not mentioned in the mission letter. Nevertheless, there are indications that the Commission could tackle the directive. Exemptions from which the Netherlands and Ireland benefit will soon expire. Consideration is being given to which technical measures could be used to allow regions with intensive grazing livestock farming higher fertilizer inputs.
On Oct. 20, the people of Moldova will make two decisions. They must elect their new head of state from a total of 17 candidates. And it must decide whether the planned accession to the European Union should be enshrined in the constitution in order to prevent future governments from diverting the republic from its pro-European course.
Moldova has been a candidate for EU membership since June 2022, after the government applied for membership in March of the same year. The country of 2.5 million inhabitants is one of the poorest in Europe and also has one of the smallest armed forces in the world – comprising just 7,000 people. This is surprising given its geopolitical location in eastern Europe and 1,222 kilometers of shared border with Ukraine.
That is why things should now move quickly: Moldova should join the EU as early as 2030 if Chișinău has his way. A lot still needs to happen before then. Specifically, the republic faces four challenges:
These factors influence each other. A lack of a consistent political line hinders the integrity of state powers – there is too much concern about restrictions from a new government that is potentially pursuing a different political course. Corruption in the political system in turn opens the door to Russian influence. This is also confirmed by Prime Minister Dorin Recean: “Russia cannot harm us militarily, which is why Moscow is focusing on hybrid attacks.”
Putin’s influence is particularly strong in the autonomous region of Gagauzia and in the breakaway de facto regime of Transnistria, which is exclusively supported by Russia. Both regions have their own governments and are even more exposed to disinformation campaigns than the rest of the country.
The desired narrative of both poles is the same: A peaceful and prosperous Moldova – whether as a member of the European Union or as Putin’s godchild. For the EU, the most important thing is not to lose Moldova to Russia. That is why it is overlooking the sometimes obvious obstacles for the time being. For Moldova, EU membership would not primarily mean military security, but economic and political security.
Polls, for example from the International Republican Institute, are currently pointing in the direction of the EU – up to 65 percent approval is predicted – and the re-election of pro-European President Maia Sandu. However, Sandu will probably not win the presidency in the first round, but in the second, says Eastern European scholar Anastasia Pociumban from the German Council on Foreign Relations to Table.Briefings.
The parliamentary elections in June next year will be interesting, as Sandu’s PAS party is unlikely to win a majority there. The party won the 2021 election campaign on domestic rather than foreign policy issues. However, due to many challenges – Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the resulting energy and economic crisis and over a million Ukrainians who have fled via Moldova – it has not been able to keep its promises, says Pociumban. Moreover, people are more interested in Sandu as a person than in her party, as she is regarded as one of the few major political figures in the country who is not corrupt.
It is important to the Moldovans themselves that their country is not viewed too simplistically. Moldova is not just a pawn between two major powers, but has its own decision-making power and agency and has become more and more resilient as a result of the multiple crises: Moldovans emphasize this time and again.
The research for this report was carried out as part of a journalist trip to Moldova and Romania sponsored by the European Commission.
Sept. 25, 2024; 9 a.m.-5:30 p.m., Lamot (Belgium)
CEWEP Residues Conference – Ash to Resource
The Confederation of European Waste-to-Energy Plants (CEWEP) addresses topics such as environmental contribution, residues utilization, and material recovery. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 25, 2024; 10:30-11:45 a.m., online
ECFR, Discussion Critical minerals and EU-Africa strategic partnerships: Where do we stand?
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) discusses the most pressing issues aiming to further promote the Europe-Africa dialogue, identify policy and implementation options, and set financial priorities. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 25, 2024; 2-3 p.m., online
FSR, Discussion Navigating Global Trade Dynamics and Geopolitical Challenges in 2040
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) addresses the influence of emerging markets, technological advancements, and policy responses to geopolitical tensions. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 25, 2024; 6:30-9:30 p.m., Brussels (Belgium)
HE Hydrogen Europe Autumn Market 2024
Hydrogen Europe (HE) brings together members and stakeholders of the hydrogen sector. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 26, 2024; 12:30-1:30 p.m., online
HBS, Seminar Entering the EU’s new policy cycle: The European Green Deal at risk?
The Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) discusses the future of the European Green Deal. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 26, 2024; 2:30-3:30, online
Eurogas, Seminar Road Transport Policy: What Future for Renewable & Low-Carbon Gases?
Eurogas discusses the CO2 standards Regulation and potential reviews to include renewable fuels, in line with the Renewable Energy Directive. INFO & REGISTRATION
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced her intention to financially support the issue of green government bonds in the Global South. In Europe, green bonds have proven to be an incredibly effective instrument for mobilizing private investment, said von der Leyen in New York at the summit of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. However, when a developing country issues green bonds, it often has to pay investors very high interest rates.
Von der Leyen announced a “Green Coupon Facility” with which Europe intends to subsidize part of the interest for issuers of green bonds. The aim is to enable developing countries to raise money to build up their own economies. Von der Leyen had already launched the Global Green Bond Initiative last year. The fund, endowed with €1 billion by European development banks, the EIB and the UN, is intended to reduce the investment risk for green bonds and mobilize up to €20 billion of private capital for sustainable investments.
Von der Leyen also declared that she would meet with Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and the industry in New York on Tuesday to promote global carbon pricing and discuss its possibilities. “The principle is as effective as it is simple: If you emit greenhouse gases, you have to pay for it.”
As a third step in supporting the Global South, the EU Commission President announced an expansion of the EU’s Global Gateway connectivity initiative. “We will make our partners an integrated offer.” When Europe invests in industrial capacities in the Global South, for example, it will also try to promote trade partnerships in order to integrate the industries into European supply chains. According to von der Leyen, the aim is also to support economic reforms. luk
Yesterday, Monday, the EU Commission requested consultations at the WTO on a Chinese anti-subsidy case against dairy products from the EU. On Aug. 21, the Chinese government launched an investigation into liquid milk, cream with a fat content of over ten percent and various types of cheese. According to Beijing’s argument, these products are excessively subsidized by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and by measures at national level.
In Brussels, it is assumed that the Chinese action is a reaction to the possible EU anti-subsidy duties against Chinese electric vehicles, similar to the Chinese anti-dumping investigations against European pork and brandy.
The Commission emphasizes that this is the first time it has acted so quickly against investigations by third countries. “We are seeing a pattern of China launching trade defense measures based on questionable allegations and insufficient evidence”, says a Commission spokesperson. The Commission is of the opinion that the Chinese investigation against dairy products is not compatible with WTO rules. It also wanted to protect the interests of European dairy farmers and the CAP from “abusive procedures”.
The requested consultations are the first step in the WTO dispute settlement procedure. If this does not lead to the desired result, the EU can request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel after 60 days. jaa
Despite billions in subsidies every year, organic products remain a niche market in Europe. The EU is likely to fall well short of its target of 25% organic farming by 2030. In order to reach the target, the area would have to grow twice as fast as before. This is the conclusion drawn by the EU Court of Auditors in a report published on Monday. The auditors argue that increasing the organic production area with the help of CAP subsidies alone would not be effective.
More needs to be done to promote demand for organic products and increase productivity in the sector. “Otherwise, we run the risk of creating a system that is completely dependent on EU funding instead of a thriving industry that is supported by well-informed consumers”, warns the responsible auditor Keit Pentus-Rosimannus. The report therefore recommends defining targets for the production and consumption of organic products in addition to the area target.
The Court of Auditors also points out shortcomings in implementation. Member states had not always ensured compliance with the rules for organic farming, for example with regard to crop rotation. In some cases, farms therefore had to use more purchased fertilizers and pesticides, the auditors report. This reduces the environmental benefits of the support. They recommend that the EU should do more to support the member states with effective implementation and better integrate the requirements of the EU Organic Farming Regulation into the CAP support programs.
Finally, the report recommends setting targets and strategies for the organic sector beyond 2030 and collecting more data on the effectiveness of funding programs in the future.
In her appointment letter, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also instructed the nominated Commissioners for Agriculture and Animal Welfare, Christophe Hansen and Olivér Várhelyi, to promote the organic sector. Like the Court of Auditors, the Strategic Dialogue on Agriculture recommends striking a balance between the promotion of production and demand for organic products. jd
German Minister for Agriculture Cem Özdemir (Greens) has once again called for the start of application of the EU regulation on deforestation-free supply chains (EUDR) to be postponed. The fact that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen apparently announced internally at an EPP group meeting last week that she wanted to review the timetable once again was a “glimmer of hope on the firmament“, said Özdemir on the sidelines of the EU Agriculture Council on Monday.
“Above all, of course, I also hope for a public statement“, he emphasized. Özdemir, like many other critics of the EUDR, has been pushing for a postponement of the implementation deadline for months. A few weeks ago, the German government also sent a letter to the European Commission calling for a postponement of six months. jd
Surprising turnaround: At the so-called car summit (Autogipfel), a video conference with representatives of the automotive industry, Robert Habeck agreed with their demand on Monday afternoon to review the EU fleet limits as early as 2025 – one year earlier than currently planned. However, this does not mean “that we will automatically lower the targets as a result”, said the Minister for Economic Affairs. The goal of only allowing zero-emission new cars from 2035 must be maintained, as this is the prerequisite for the transport sector to be climate-neutral in 2050. However, the path to 2035 could be looked at again in order to react to the “changed reality”, said Habeck.
The automotive industry has been pushing for an earlier revision of the limit values for some time. Individual manufacturers such as Volkswagen are also calling for the fleet limits to be lowered in the short term. This is because some companies will fail to meet the maximum CO2 values, which will apply from next year; they will then face high fines. The CDU and CSU supported this demand, but there was no majority for it in the umbrella organization of European car manufacturers ACEA. The Federal Ministry for the Environment has also recently emphasized that manufacturers can achieve the targets.
There are to be no new purchase premiums. There was agreement among the participants that “quick fixes” and “flash in the pan” were not helpful, explained Habeck. Even without financial support, EVs are already economical, he said. However, a recent calculation by the Agora Verkehrswende think tank partially contradicts this assessment: According to this, calculated over a holding period of five years, only vehicles from the upper mid-range and luxury class EVs are cheaper than comparable combustion engines. For small cars and fuel-efficient vehicles, on the other hand, EVs are not yet economical; a purchase premium of €6000 would change this.
A new EV premium of €6,000 had been called for in advance in an SPD paper. CDU leader Friedrich Merz rejected a new purchase premium, while CSU leader Markus Söder called for an “intelligent premium” that would primarily benefit German manufacturers – which is likely to run counter to EU and WTO requirements. mkr
In the dispute over the possible division of the German electricity bidding zone, a report commissioned by the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of the Environment argues for alternative solutions. For example, different regional remuneration for renewable energies, electrolyzers for hydrogen production and controllable power plants as part of capacity mechanisms are possible. “Before a bidding zone separation in Germany, these alternative instruments should first be examined and weighed up against the option of a bidding zone split”, the report presented in Berlin on Monday states.
The green-black state government thus sees itself in line with the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. The report confirms Stuttgart’s rejection of a bidding zone division: “In the medium to long term, only the planned grid expansion can effectively reduce the additional costs of suboptimal power plant and storage deployment in the electricity market caused by grid bottlenecks.”
A report and a recommendation from the European regulatory agency ACER on a possible redistribution of electricity price zones in the EU are expected in December. If the German bidding zone were to be split, the experts expect “that average electricity prices in the northern zone could be around ten euros per megawatt-hour (MWh) lower in 2025 and six euros lower in 2030 than in the southern zone”.
For industry in Baden-Württemberg, “the effects of a bidding zone separation in its current structure are relatively moderate on the whole”. However, the electricity intensity of industry will change significantly with increasing electrification.
The experts see greater advantages in splitting the bidding zones if grid expansion continues to stall. “The negative distribution effects of a separation of the bidding zones could then be mitigated by the introduction of compensation measures, particularly for the south.” However, some experts see positive distribution effects for the industrial centers in the south and west of Germany in the current situation. ber

He probably has to address most of the animosities in the European Parliament: Raffaele Fitto from the right-wing nationalist Fratelli d’Italia. The fact that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given the Italian a key position in the new Commission is causing resentment, particularly on the left of the EPP. However, this is probably due less to his personality than to the rejection of the party he represents.
Fitto was appointed Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms. This also includes responsibility for the distribution of billions from the Corona Reconstruction Fund and the promotion of poor, structurally weak regions. Funds that make up around a third of the EU budget will pass through Fitto’s desk in the future. According to von der Leyen’s mission letter to Fitto, his work should achieve nothing less than “making European economies and societies more sustainable and resilient and better prepared for future challenges”.
With the weighty post for Fitto, von der Leyen is also securing the recently crumbled solidarity of Italy’s head of government Giorgia Meloni. In protest against previous exclusion in the distribution of key positions in the European Council, Meloni abstained from voting for von der Leyen as Commission President. With Fitto as Vice-President, Meloni will now receive the recognition she had hoped for in Italy. Fitto’s appointment will also appease the ECR group – which could be helpful in the future in close votes in Parliament.
Because as EPP leader Manfred Weber once aptly called him: Fitto serves as a link. From June 2019 to October 2022, he himself was Co-Chair of the ECR Group. He then moved to Meloni’s cabinet – where he is currently Minister for European Affairs and the Regions of Southern Italy. Unlike other new commissioners, Fitto is therefore no stranger to his assigned area of responsibility.
For the past two years, he has been responsible for the money from the reconstruction fund in Italy, which amounts to around €200 billion. A task that has little to do with party affiliation, which Fitto is said to have good contacts with the Italian Social Democrats.
Fitto is one of the few Fratelli d’Italia who can look back on many years of experience in politics at regional, national and European level. Born in 1969 in Maglie, a small town in the province of Lecce, he began his political career at the age of 20 in the regional politics of Apulia – at that time still as a member of the Democrazia Cristiana. After its collapse, Fitto moved through several successor parties until he joined Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 2001.
Fitto entered the European Parliament for the first time in 1999, but resigned from office just one year later because he had been elected President of his home region of Apulia. In 2006, he became a member of the national parliament, where he rose to become Minister for Regional Affairs in Berlusconi’s government in 2008. In 2014, Fitto returned to Brussels as an MEP, where he initially became part of the EPP.
However, he fell out with Berlusconi, left Forza Italia in 2015, founded his own party and also switched camps in the EU Parliament – joining the ECR group. After forming an electoral alliance with Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia in 2019 and being re-elected to the European Parliament for them, his small party Direzione Italia merged with the Fratelli.
Fitto has a trusting relationship with Meloni. He had already been in government with her for some time from 2008. It is therefore hardly surprising that she brought him into her cabinet as head of government. The three coalition parties in Rome were quickly able to agree on Fitto as a candidate for the EU Commission. The 55-year-old has excellent connections in Brussels and is also respected beyond party boundaries as reliable and fact-oriented. He is said to be sociable and a convinced European. He now only has to convince the skeptics on the left of the EPP of this. Almut Siefert
It already seemed as if EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s initiative to lower the high standard of species protection for wolves had fizzled out. There was no majority on the member states’ side in the spring. Now something is happening: Luxembourg has announced its support for the initiative. This would fulfill one of two conditions for a qualified majority: At least 15 member states would be in favor.
However, as there are comparatively few Luxembourgers, this is not enough to fulfill the second condition: The states must also represent 65 percent of the EU population. It is therefore surprising to hear that the Hungarian Council Presidency intends to vote again on Wednesday at EU ambassador level on the protection of the predators.
Ultimately, a country with a large number of members would have to speak out in favor of the Commission’s proposal in order to get things moving: Germany or Spain, for example. In her former role as Environment Minister in Madrid, Teresa Ribera was just as vehemently opposed to more culls as her German counterpart Steffi Lemke.
At her hearings in parliament, future Executive Vice-President Ribera is likely to face awkward questions if she sticks to her guns. There are now rumors that the federal government could change its mind and abandon its reservation of scrutiny. If this is true, then the election result in the “wolf state” of Brandenburg probably provided the impetus.
Get through the day safely!
Some titles will change, but the responsibilities of the new Commissioners for agricultural and food issues will essentially remain the same. As before, the Agriculture Commissioner – proposed by Christophe Hansen (EPP) from Luxembourg – will be responsible for agriculture and rural development and thus for both pillars of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Health Commissioner – the Hungarian Olivér Várhelyi has been proposed – will continue to cover animal welfare and food safety, including plant protection and genetic engineering.
What is new is that the Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms, Raffaele Fitto, is to oversee the work of Agriculture Commissioner Hansen. The Italian is a confidant of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and a member of her Fratelli d’Italia party. During von der Leyen’s first term of office, the agriculture portfolio was still under the overall supervision of Green Deal Commissioner Frans Timmermans. An arrangement that harbored a lot of potential for conflict, also because Timmermans was actively involved in the agricultural sector and conducted trilogue negotiations himself.
By changing the structure, von der Leyen is reducing the risk that Teresa Ribera from Spain, who will be responsible for implementing the Green Deal targets as Vice-President in the future, will become a similarly irritating figure for farmers as Timmermans. The upgrading of the portfolio from agriculture to “Agriculture and Food” also sends the signal that Hansen will be in charge of this policy area – even if he does not actually have any new responsibilities.
Accordingly, in his letter of appointment, the Commission President instructs Hansen to draw up the paper on the vision of agriculture that von der Leyen promised – based on the recommendations of the strategy dialog – for the first 100 days of her term of office. By way of comparison, the farm-to-fork strategy, which previously provided the framework for agricultural and food policy, was presented by the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety.
Von der Leyen wants to directly oversee the creation of the vision paper herself. The letter of appointment shows which recommendations from the strategy dialog she will focus on in particular. For example, the recommendation to pay CAP direct payments “directly to small farmers”. Compared to the statement in the Strategy Dialogue report, this is a relativization. There it sounded as if only “farmers in need” could still hope to receive the area payment. According to the SME definition, “small farms” could still mean that farmers with up to 250 hectares of land would continue to receive the direct payment.
Hansen has the task of initiating the reorganization of direct payments in view of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. There is a consensus that the direct payment cannot continue as before once the huge areas have joined. The reduction, restructuring or abolition of the area payment over the course of up to two future funding periods (up to 2042) is under discussion.
In the previous funding period, direct payments were tied to farmers fulfilling organic requirements. This so-called conditionality of payments was called into question by the Strategic Dialogue on Agriculture. It is expected that a switch will be made to an incentive model in the future. According to the model, farmers receive additional financial aid if they fulfill certain eco-services.
It is expected that the Commission will take stronger action against unfair trading practices. This is indicated by the fact that the Commission President has pledged to do more for farmers in this matter. It must be ensured that they do not have to sell their products below production cost. Conflicts with the trade are to be expected here.
It is also likely to be controversial which climate change adaptation measures will be supported by the Commission. What will be supported beyond the set aside of land? Is there also money for irrigation, for converting stables to protect animals in hot weather, and for artificial shading of pastures?
It also calls on Luxembourg’s Hansen to work together with Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič towards more “reciprocity” and a level playing field in international trade. This is likely to mean that requirements for imports are aligned more closely with those that apply to domestic producers. The Strategy Dialogue has also called for this, but the scope for this under trade law is limited.
The topic of animal welfare has been symbolically upgraded and is now included in the title of the nominated Health Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi. The Commission had made proposals for new rules on animal transportation and the protection of domestic cats and dogs. Both proposals have not yet been dealt with by the Council and Parliament.
Plant protection would also fall under Várhelyi’s remit. The mission letter only mentions the competencies for biological plant protection. A more comprehensive reform would also include application regulations and authorization procedures. The Nitrates Directive is also not mentioned in the mission letter. Nevertheless, there are indications that the Commission could tackle the directive. Exemptions from which the Netherlands and Ireland benefit will soon expire. Consideration is being given to which technical measures could be used to allow regions with intensive grazing livestock farming higher fertilizer inputs.
On Oct. 20, the people of Moldova will make two decisions. They must elect their new head of state from a total of 17 candidates. And it must decide whether the planned accession to the European Union should be enshrined in the constitution in order to prevent future governments from diverting the republic from its pro-European course.
Moldova has been a candidate for EU membership since June 2022, after the government applied for membership in March of the same year. The country of 2.5 million inhabitants is one of the poorest in Europe and also has one of the smallest armed forces in the world – comprising just 7,000 people. This is surprising given its geopolitical location in eastern Europe and 1,222 kilometers of shared border with Ukraine.
That is why things should now move quickly: Moldova should join the EU as early as 2030 if Chișinău has his way. A lot still needs to happen before then. Specifically, the republic faces four challenges:
These factors influence each other. A lack of a consistent political line hinders the integrity of state powers – there is too much concern about restrictions from a new government that is potentially pursuing a different political course. Corruption in the political system in turn opens the door to Russian influence. This is also confirmed by Prime Minister Dorin Recean: “Russia cannot harm us militarily, which is why Moscow is focusing on hybrid attacks.”
Putin’s influence is particularly strong in the autonomous region of Gagauzia and in the breakaway de facto regime of Transnistria, which is exclusively supported by Russia. Both regions have their own governments and are even more exposed to disinformation campaigns than the rest of the country.
The desired narrative of both poles is the same: A peaceful and prosperous Moldova – whether as a member of the European Union or as Putin’s godchild. For the EU, the most important thing is not to lose Moldova to Russia. That is why it is overlooking the sometimes obvious obstacles for the time being. For Moldova, EU membership would not primarily mean military security, but economic and political security.
Polls, for example from the International Republican Institute, are currently pointing in the direction of the EU – up to 65 percent approval is predicted – and the re-election of pro-European President Maia Sandu. However, Sandu will probably not win the presidency in the first round, but in the second, says Eastern European scholar Anastasia Pociumban from the German Council on Foreign Relations to Table.Briefings.
The parliamentary elections in June next year will be interesting, as Sandu’s PAS party is unlikely to win a majority there. The party won the 2021 election campaign on domestic rather than foreign policy issues. However, due to many challenges – Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the resulting energy and economic crisis and over a million Ukrainians who have fled via Moldova – it has not been able to keep its promises, says Pociumban. Moreover, people are more interested in Sandu as a person than in her party, as she is regarded as one of the few major political figures in the country who is not corrupt.
It is important to the Moldovans themselves that their country is not viewed too simplistically. Moldova is not just a pawn between two major powers, but has its own decision-making power and agency and has become more and more resilient as a result of the multiple crises: Moldovans emphasize this time and again.
The research for this report was carried out as part of a journalist trip to Moldova and Romania sponsored by the European Commission.
Sept. 25, 2024; 9 a.m.-5:30 p.m., Lamot (Belgium)
CEWEP Residues Conference – Ash to Resource
The Confederation of European Waste-to-Energy Plants (CEWEP) addresses topics such as environmental contribution, residues utilization, and material recovery. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 25, 2024; 10:30-11:45 a.m., online
ECFR, Discussion Critical minerals and EU-Africa strategic partnerships: Where do we stand?
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) discusses the most pressing issues aiming to further promote the Europe-Africa dialogue, identify policy and implementation options, and set financial priorities. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 25, 2024; 2-3 p.m., online
FSR, Discussion Navigating Global Trade Dynamics and Geopolitical Challenges in 2040
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) addresses the influence of emerging markets, technological advancements, and policy responses to geopolitical tensions. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 25, 2024; 6:30-9:30 p.m., Brussels (Belgium)
HE Hydrogen Europe Autumn Market 2024
Hydrogen Europe (HE) brings together members and stakeholders of the hydrogen sector. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 26, 2024; 12:30-1:30 p.m., online
HBS, Seminar Entering the EU’s new policy cycle: The European Green Deal at risk?
The Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) discusses the future of the European Green Deal. INFO & REGISTRATION
Sept. 26, 2024; 2:30-3:30, online
Eurogas, Seminar Road Transport Policy: What Future for Renewable & Low-Carbon Gases?
Eurogas discusses the CO2 standards Regulation and potential reviews to include renewable fuels, in line with the Renewable Energy Directive. INFO & REGISTRATION
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced her intention to financially support the issue of green government bonds in the Global South. In Europe, green bonds have proven to be an incredibly effective instrument for mobilizing private investment, said von der Leyen in New York at the summit of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. However, when a developing country issues green bonds, it often has to pay investors very high interest rates.
Von der Leyen announced a “Green Coupon Facility” with which Europe intends to subsidize part of the interest for issuers of green bonds. The aim is to enable developing countries to raise money to build up their own economies. Von der Leyen had already launched the Global Green Bond Initiative last year. The fund, endowed with €1 billion by European development banks, the EIB and the UN, is intended to reduce the investment risk for green bonds and mobilize up to €20 billion of private capital for sustainable investments.
Von der Leyen also declared that she would meet with Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and the industry in New York on Tuesday to promote global carbon pricing and discuss its possibilities. “The principle is as effective as it is simple: If you emit greenhouse gases, you have to pay for it.”
As a third step in supporting the Global South, the EU Commission President announced an expansion of the EU’s Global Gateway connectivity initiative. “We will make our partners an integrated offer.” When Europe invests in industrial capacities in the Global South, for example, it will also try to promote trade partnerships in order to integrate the industries into European supply chains. According to von der Leyen, the aim is also to support economic reforms. luk
Yesterday, Monday, the EU Commission requested consultations at the WTO on a Chinese anti-subsidy case against dairy products from the EU. On Aug. 21, the Chinese government launched an investigation into liquid milk, cream with a fat content of over ten percent and various types of cheese. According to Beijing’s argument, these products are excessively subsidized by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and by measures at national level.
In Brussels, it is assumed that the Chinese action is a reaction to the possible EU anti-subsidy duties against Chinese electric vehicles, similar to the Chinese anti-dumping investigations against European pork and brandy.
The Commission emphasizes that this is the first time it has acted so quickly against investigations by third countries. “We are seeing a pattern of China launching trade defense measures based on questionable allegations and insufficient evidence”, says a Commission spokesperson. The Commission is of the opinion that the Chinese investigation against dairy products is not compatible with WTO rules. It also wanted to protect the interests of European dairy farmers and the CAP from “abusive procedures”.
The requested consultations are the first step in the WTO dispute settlement procedure. If this does not lead to the desired result, the EU can request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel after 60 days. jaa
Despite billions in subsidies every year, organic products remain a niche market in Europe. The EU is likely to fall well short of its target of 25% organic farming by 2030. In order to reach the target, the area would have to grow twice as fast as before. This is the conclusion drawn by the EU Court of Auditors in a report published on Monday. The auditors argue that increasing the organic production area with the help of CAP subsidies alone would not be effective.
More needs to be done to promote demand for organic products and increase productivity in the sector. “Otherwise, we run the risk of creating a system that is completely dependent on EU funding instead of a thriving industry that is supported by well-informed consumers”, warns the responsible auditor Keit Pentus-Rosimannus. The report therefore recommends defining targets for the production and consumption of organic products in addition to the area target.
The Court of Auditors also points out shortcomings in implementation. Member states had not always ensured compliance with the rules for organic farming, for example with regard to crop rotation. In some cases, farms therefore had to use more purchased fertilizers and pesticides, the auditors report. This reduces the environmental benefits of the support. They recommend that the EU should do more to support the member states with effective implementation and better integrate the requirements of the EU Organic Farming Regulation into the CAP support programs.
Finally, the report recommends setting targets and strategies for the organic sector beyond 2030 and collecting more data on the effectiveness of funding programs in the future.
In her appointment letter, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also instructed the nominated Commissioners for Agriculture and Animal Welfare, Christophe Hansen and Olivér Várhelyi, to promote the organic sector. Like the Court of Auditors, the Strategic Dialogue on Agriculture recommends striking a balance between the promotion of production and demand for organic products. jd
German Minister for Agriculture Cem Özdemir (Greens) has once again called for the start of application of the EU regulation on deforestation-free supply chains (EUDR) to be postponed. The fact that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen apparently announced internally at an EPP group meeting last week that she wanted to review the timetable once again was a “glimmer of hope on the firmament“, said Özdemir on the sidelines of the EU Agriculture Council on Monday.
“Above all, of course, I also hope for a public statement“, he emphasized. Özdemir, like many other critics of the EUDR, has been pushing for a postponement of the implementation deadline for months. A few weeks ago, the German government also sent a letter to the European Commission calling for a postponement of six months. jd
Surprising turnaround: At the so-called car summit (Autogipfel), a video conference with representatives of the automotive industry, Robert Habeck agreed with their demand on Monday afternoon to review the EU fleet limits as early as 2025 – one year earlier than currently planned. However, this does not mean “that we will automatically lower the targets as a result”, said the Minister for Economic Affairs. The goal of only allowing zero-emission new cars from 2035 must be maintained, as this is the prerequisite for the transport sector to be climate-neutral in 2050. However, the path to 2035 could be looked at again in order to react to the “changed reality”, said Habeck.
The automotive industry has been pushing for an earlier revision of the limit values for some time. Individual manufacturers such as Volkswagen are also calling for the fleet limits to be lowered in the short term. This is because some companies will fail to meet the maximum CO2 values, which will apply from next year; they will then face high fines. The CDU and CSU supported this demand, but there was no majority for it in the umbrella organization of European car manufacturers ACEA. The Federal Ministry for the Environment has also recently emphasized that manufacturers can achieve the targets.
There are to be no new purchase premiums. There was agreement among the participants that “quick fixes” and “flash in the pan” were not helpful, explained Habeck. Even without financial support, EVs are already economical, he said. However, a recent calculation by the Agora Verkehrswende think tank partially contradicts this assessment: According to this, calculated over a holding period of five years, only vehicles from the upper mid-range and luxury class EVs are cheaper than comparable combustion engines. For small cars and fuel-efficient vehicles, on the other hand, EVs are not yet economical; a purchase premium of €6000 would change this.
A new EV premium of €6,000 had been called for in advance in an SPD paper. CDU leader Friedrich Merz rejected a new purchase premium, while CSU leader Markus Söder called for an “intelligent premium” that would primarily benefit German manufacturers – which is likely to run counter to EU and WTO requirements. mkr
In the dispute over the possible division of the German electricity bidding zone, a report commissioned by the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of the Environment argues for alternative solutions. For example, different regional remuneration for renewable energies, electrolyzers for hydrogen production and controllable power plants as part of capacity mechanisms are possible. “Before a bidding zone separation in Germany, these alternative instruments should first be examined and weighed up against the option of a bidding zone split”, the report presented in Berlin on Monday states.
The green-black state government thus sees itself in line with the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. The report confirms Stuttgart’s rejection of a bidding zone division: “In the medium to long term, only the planned grid expansion can effectively reduce the additional costs of suboptimal power plant and storage deployment in the electricity market caused by grid bottlenecks.”
A report and a recommendation from the European regulatory agency ACER on a possible redistribution of electricity price zones in the EU are expected in December. If the German bidding zone were to be split, the experts expect “that average electricity prices in the northern zone could be around ten euros per megawatt-hour (MWh) lower in 2025 and six euros lower in 2030 than in the southern zone”.
For industry in Baden-Württemberg, “the effects of a bidding zone separation in its current structure are relatively moderate on the whole”. However, the electricity intensity of industry will change significantly with increasing electrification.
The experts see greater advantages in splitting the bidding zones if grid expansion continues to stall. “The negative distribution effects of a separation of the bidding zones could then be mitigated by the introduction of compensation measures, particularly for the south.” However, some experts see positive distribution effects for the industrial centers in the south and west of Germany in the current situation. ber

He probably has to address most of the animosities in the European Parliament: Raffaele Fitto from the right-wing nationalist Fratelli d’Italia. The fact that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given the Italian a key position in the new Commission is causing resentment, particularly on the left of the EPP. However, this is probably due less to his personality than to the rejection of the party he represents.
Fitto was appointed Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms. This also includes responsibility for the distribution of billions from the Corona Reconstruction Fund and the promotion of poor, structurally weak regions. Funds that make up around a third of the EU budget will pass through Fitto’s desk in the future. According to von der Leyen’s mission letter to Fitto, his work should achieve nothing less than “making European economies and societies more sustainable and resilient and better prepared for future challenges”.
With the weighty post for Fitto, von der Leyen is also securing the recently crumbled solidarity of Italy’s head of government Giorgia Meloni. In protest against previous exclusion in the distribution of key positions in the European Council, Meloni abstained from voting for von der Leyen as Commission President. With Fitto as Vice-President, Meloni will now receive the recognition she had hoped for in Italy. Fitto’s appointment will also appease the ECR group – which could be helpful in the future in close votes in Parliament.
Because as EPP leader Manfred Weber once aptly called him: Fitto serves as a link. From June 2019 to October 2022, he himself was Co-Chair of the ECR Group. He then moved to Meloni’s cabinet – where he is currently Minister for European Affairs and the Regions of Southern Italy. Unlike other new commissioners, Fitto is therefore no stranger to his assigned area of responsibility.
For the past two years, he has been responsible for the money from the reconstruction fund in Italy, which amounts to around €200 billion. A task that has little to do with party affiliation, which Fitto is said to have good contacts with the Italian Social Democrats.
Fitto is one of the few Fratelli d’Italia who can look back on many years of experience in politics at regional, national and European level. Born in 1969 in Maglie, a small town in the province of Lecce, he began his political career at the age of 20 in the regional politics of Apulia – at that time still as a member of the Democrazia Cristiana. After its collapse, Fitto moved through several successor parties until he joined Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 2001.
Fitto entered the European Parliament for the first time in 1999, but resigned from office just one year later because he had been elected President of his home region of Apulia. In 2006, he became a member of the national parliament, where he rose to become Minister for Regional Affairs in Berlusconi’s government in 2008. In 2014, Fitto returned to Brussels as an MEP, where he initially became part of the EPP.
However, he fell out with Berlusconi, left Forza Italia in 2015, founded his own party and also switched camps in the EU Parliament – joining the ECR group. After forming an electoral alliance with Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia in 2019 and being re-elected to the European Parliament for them, his small party Direzione Italia merged with the Fratelli.
Fitto has a trusting relationship with Meloni. He had already been in government with her for some time from 2008. It is therefore hardly surprising that she brought him into her cabinet as head of government. The three coalition parties in Rome were quickly able to agree on Fitto as a candidate for the EU Commission. The 55-year-old has excellent connections in Brussels and is also respected beyond party boundaries as reliable and fact-oriented. He is said to be sociable and a convinced European. He now only has to convince the skeptics on the left of the EPP of this. Almut Siefert