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There is also an EU dimension to the traffic light coalition’s battle over public finances. The Commission is currently holding technical talks with the Federal Ministry of Finance about Germany’s budget, which are quite piquant. The issue is that Germany is in breach of the new euro stability rules. Germany, of all countries, whose Finance Minister Christian Linder (FDP) was a hardliner in the debate on the new stability rules. He wanted to enforce that member states violating the rules must return to the path of virtue within four years.
He was unable to get his way with this. It was decided that member states could be given not just four, but seven years to comply with the criteria again. However, they will then be subject to even stricter supervision by the EU Commission. This is exactly what could now happen to Germany. It has not yet been decided, but is quite possible that Germany, a deficit offender, will slip into the seven-year program due to its critical budget situation.
What is also embarrassing is that in its exchange with the EU Commission, the German government had argued on the basis of 2023 economic figures. This was a bitter pill to swallow for the Commission. The Brussels officials requested up-to-date data on the budget situation. However, Germany’s economic situation has deteriorated compared to 2023.
This is not good news for Berlin either: the Federal Ministry of Finance will have even more trouble convincing the Commission that it is on the right track in terms of budgetary policy. I hope you get through the day with fewer complaints than Christian Lindner.
It would not have worked without the votes from abroad: Maia Sandu was able to announce a wafer-thin victory on Monday for the referendum with which Moldova’s president wants to irrevocably enshrine the goal of EU integration in the constitution. In the end, 50.5 percent voted in favor of the pro-European orientation, with around 13,000 votes making the difference. For a long time, the count was a nail-biter and looked like a negative result, until the votes of a good 200,000 expatriates were added, 70 percent of whom voted for the pro-European anchoring of their home country.
This suggests that the voters abroad are less exposed to Russian disinformation campaigns and therefore voted much more pro-European. For Maia Sandu, the massive influence of Moscow was a big issue the following day: she spoke of criminal groups buying votes on a grand scale and denounced the unprecedented attack by anti-democratic forces.
According to the authorities in Chişinău, Moscow is said to have used more than €100 million to influence the referendum and the parallel presidential elections. With around 42 percent, Maia Sandu is well ahead of her pro-Russian challenger Alexandr Stoianoglo with around 26 percent. However, in view of the close referendum, the incumbent does not have an easy starting position ahead of the run-off election on 3 November.
The results in Moldova are a warning in various respects: Maia Sandu warned that if the practices of influencing voters pay off in her home country, they could set a precedent in other countries. For the EU, the result is a warning that Moldova’s pro-Western orientation is not guaranteed and that greater efforts may be necessary. If Moldova does fall, this will also have repercussions for Ukraine and Georgia.
In any case, Moscow is unlikely to let up in its efforts to bring the country completely back into the Russian sphere of influence or at least destabilize it. A week ago, the EU imposed further sanctions against five individuals and one organization held responsible for acts aimed at destabilizing the Republic of Moldova. New additions to the list include Evghenia Gutul, Governor of Moldova’s autonomous region of Gagauzia. According to the responsible EU task force, the Russian disinformation campaigns include reports that Maia Sandu wants to support Ukraine in attacking the separatist region of Transnistria or offer Moldova as a location for asylum centers.
“We strongly condemn the malign activities, interference and hybrid operations of the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-backed local actors,” said Michael Gahler, head of an EU Parliament election observer delegation in Chişinău. Russia’s goal is still to undermine the electoral process, the security, sovereignty and democratic foundations of the Republic of Moldova and the free will of its citizens. Despite the unprecedented massive, malicious and illegal Russian interference, in particular through vote-buying, hybrid attacks and disinformation, the people of Moldova have opted for a future in the EU.
For Green MEP Sergey Lagodinsky, member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the result shows “how much work still lies ahead of us and, above all, of the democratic pro-European forces in Moldova.” Persuasion and work against interference from Moscow are needed. “Despite massive Russian intimidation, disinformation and attempted vote-buying, Moldovans refused to be intimidated and voted for closer ties with the EU,” said Social Democrat Tobias Cremer, also part of the election observation mission.
In Moscow, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected the accusation of voter interference and called on Maia Sandu to provide evidence for her accusations.
The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy wants to redistribute the costs for the expansion of the European electricity grid between the member states. The expansion of the grid in the EU raises “the question of how investment costs should be distributed among several member states and between grid users,” writes the BMWK in the invitation to tender for external consulting on the “Further development of the EU framework for electricity grid planning.“
The EU Commission estimates the costs for the expansion of the transmission and distribution grids at €582 billion by 2030 alone. “It should be reconsidered which part of the investment costs should be passed on to national grid customers via the transmission system operators and to what extent the costs of cross-border investments in particular should be distributed more broadly and supraregionally,” writes the ministry.
The tender does not yet answer the question of whether the reorganization would burden or relieve Germany. However, as a strong industrial nation, Germany is and will remain one of the largest electricity consumers in the EU, it could be advantageous for Germany to participate more in its neighbors’ grid projects.
In June, for example, the Swedish government stopped approval for the Hansa PowerBridge transmission line project, intended to connect the south of the country with Germany. “This would lead to higher prices and a more unstable electricity market in Sweden,” said Sweden’s Energy Minister Ebba Busch. Sweden, on the other hand, would have had to bear the costs of the project. It is possible that the BMWK is hoping to facilitate the flow of cheap green energy to Germany by sharing the costs of such projects.
However, the reallocation of costs would probably only affect cross-border lines. For the vast majority of projects, the BMWK wants to take part in the discussion about new sources of funding. The experts are to examine several options:
However, the Directorate-General for Energy (DG Energy) is already trying to dampen hopes for more funding from Brussels in advance. “EU funding will serve as a last resort for investments with high European priority, for example for certain infrastructure projects with cross-border significance,” write the officials in an internal briefing to prepare Commissioner-designate Dan Jørgensen for the upcoming hearing in the EU Parliament.
The BMWK also wants to have reform proposals for European grid planning drawn up. For example, the ministry is considering allowing actors other than the transmission system operators to propose line projects for the European network development plans (TYNDP). The BMWK also wants to examine whether the regulatory agency ACER and the grid operator organization ENTSO-E should continue to be entrusted with grid planning.
In order to accelerate grid expansion, the BMWK is looking into greater standardization of grid components in Europe as well as EU training programs and improvements in public procurement law. Suppliers could be supported in expanding their production capacities through more guarantees and a stronger role for the EIB.
The countervailing duties on Chinese EVs could enter into force in November. It is up to the EU Commission to decide whether this actually happens. Brussels is still giving Beijing the opportunity to campaign for a solution at the negotiating table. This cannot be ruled out. China enjoys high-profile support. The German automotive industry in particular favors a negotiated solution, as it fears retaliatory measures that could affect them.
From a tactical perspective, the EU is in a better position than before the provisional tariffs were imposed on October 4. The Commission rejected the Chinese proposal for a minimum price of 30,000 euros per vehicle. According to media reports, however, a minimum price of 35,000 to 40,000 euros could be successful. It is clear that the EU would make a negotiated solution very costly for China.
The countervailing duties can be easily revoked as they are not obligatory. Minimum vehicle prices are also compatible with WTO law, says Professor Christoph Herrmann from the University of Passau, who holds a chair in constitutional and administrative law, European law, European and international economic law. Instead of tariffs, a countervailing measure could also mean minimum import prices or a price commitment for manufacturers.
However, Herrmann warns: “A minimum import price is a common instrument that was also used for solar panels in 2017, for example. However, from the EU’s point of view, the risk of circumvention is quite high. Many legal proceedings are ongoing for solar panels.” An abstract minimum price on the other hand, such as the 30.000 Euros, makes little sense. Countervailing duties are more accurate because they are tailored to the transaction value of each individual vehicle, said Herrmann.
“With its approach, the EU demonstrates that it deals with its trading partner China in a fundamentally different way to the US,” says Max Zenglein, Chief Economist at Merics. He considers the approach sensible, even if there are different arguments in the debate about a negotiated solution. “The EU is signaling to China: We understand your economic system, but we are in a situation where we are under increasing economic pressure. This does not mean we want to cut all ties and damage economic relations.”
In late September, the United States introduced tariffs of 100 percent on EVs from China. The reason: Extensive subsidies and non-market-compliant practices by China lead to considerable risks of overcapacity and therefore harm the American industry. The Biden administration thus quadrupled the existing tariffs of 25 percent previously imposed by Donald Trump in 2018 based on Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. The instrument enables the USA to take unilateral and indefinite measures against another state. China protested that the measure was not WTO-compliant, which is true.
Nevertheless, Beijing made no threats towards the United States – in stark contrast to the current tariff debate with the EU. Max Zenglein concludes from the different reactions that this reflects China’s view of the USA and Europe. “The debate about EV tariffs shows that China sees Europe as a weak player that can easily be spooked and threatened. The process has been debated in Europe for months, in public, and China has tried in every way to exert its influence – quite successfully.” In contrast, China has taken note of the US’s actions, albeit in protest.
For Europe, however, the WTO rules are relevant. “Regarding the countervailing duties on Chinese electric cars, the EU also ensures that the measures are WTO-compliant in the broadest sense. China has also utilized the mechanisms in this case and filed a complaint via the WTO,” says Zenglein. A look at the list of current WTO complaints shows that the mechanism is being actively used between the parties China, the EU, and the USA. China currently has six complaints against the EU and 18 against the USA. And vice versa, the EU has twelve cases against China, and the US has 23 cases.
However, upholding WTO principles has become selective and the WTO’s steering power has declined. This is not only due to the Appellate Body crisis, says Herrmann. The USA in particular wanted to regulate its trade relations with China outside the rules-based system, and so did China. In addition, the USA is also violating WTO principles with the Inflation Reduction Act, for example, as it favors the domestic economy.
While China was a cheap workbench for many American and European companies at the turn of the millennium, it now manufactures its own high-quality industrial goods and sells them on the global market. But this is not the only reason why the situation has changed. The political landscape has also changed significantly since 2001, when China was admitted to the WTO. China was admitted to the WTO at that time because it was believed the Chinese system was developing towards a liberal market economy. In reality, however, it now shows planned economy tendencies under an increasingly authoritarian regime.
However, China’s admission to the WTO was not a purely political decision, argues Julian Hinz, Professor of International Economics at Bielefeld University and Head of the Trade Policy Research Center at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. After all, other authoritarian regimes have also become part of the WTO. “The WTO wants to put trade on a rule-based foundation. It is clear that China is intervening massively in the economy, so from an economic perspective the countervailing duties are justified, because it is about balancing out unfair competition.”
However, there are no rules in WTO law for the kind of state capitalism that China practices. “The question of what industrial policy is permitted is not sufficiently regulated. This is why countries invoke national security, such as imposing tariffs,” says Herrmann. The consequence of coercive trade policy measures, as can currently be observed in the dispute over EV tariffs, is correspondingly problematic. “You have to expect that more tariffs will be imposed and countermeasures will also affect innocent industries, such as the spirits industry.”
One way out could be reforming the system to account for the changed circumstances. However, Max Zenglein from Merics does not consider this to be realistic at present. “In order to discuss a new system, the big economic blocs would have to come together and agree on certain points. Now is not the right time for that.”
Julian Hinz points to the possibility of multilateral agreements that are not binding for everyone. “Countries or blocs of countries, such as the EU, could agree on certain topics and further liberalize them or impose certain rules on themselves. There could be groups or clubs that open up further within this framework.”
Paula Pickert has been in charge of the German Raiffeisen Association (DRV) in the European capital since September 2024. She succeeds long-standing DRV official Thomas Memmert, who has retired after 27 years as Brussels office manager. Pickert previously worked for the cooperative association in Berlin, not only in commodities management but also in public affairs. However, the EU bubble in Brussels is nothing new to the agricultural economist.
Since a six-month internship at the Council of the EU, she has been fascinated by European politics with its multitude of players from different fields and countries, she says: “Everyone has different ideas about agriculture, sustainability and cooperatives, but they all have to find a common denominator.”
Paula Pickert sees her new task primarily in two-way communication: on the one hand, bringing processes and upcoming challenges in Brussels closer to the association members throughout Germany. On the other hand, to represent the concerns of the DRV in Brussels. “It’s often about bringing the right people together at the right time – it helps that I know the team in Berlin well,” she says.
For Pickert, a special feature of the work in Brussels is the exchange with cooperative associations from other EU countries that, like the DRV, are organized in the umbrella association Cogeca. “For example, when it comes to implementing an EU directive at a national level, I check: how does France do it, what approaches are there in Portugal, what can we learn from them?” she says. “This exchange is particularly valuable for us, especially because there are often specific regulations for cooperatives due to their special form of business.”
Paula Pickert explains that the DRV wants to take a particularly close look at how the recommendations of the Strategic Dialogue will influence the future of European agricultural policy. The recommendations of the association’s committee are exciting, for example on the subject of finance and lending. “Cooperatives form an important interface between farmers and the banking sector,” she explains. “The topic is thus central for us, and it is good that the Strategic Dialogue emphasizes that different financing systems must be coherent with each other.”
Coherence is also important to the association in the European single market, Pickert emphasizes: “We needfair competitive conditions: If not globally, at least the same requirements must apply to all market participants in the EU.” For example, with regard to the use of pesticides, requirements in animal husbandry, but also competitive operating costs in a European comparison.
Also important for cooperatives: The possible revision of the EU Unfair Trading Practices Directive (UTP). The European Commission has announced an evaluation report for the coming year, followed by a reform of the directive “if necessary”. “But the UTP Directive does not just need to be revised,” says Pickert. “In addition to an expansion of the scope of application, a significant tightening of the prohibitions would be desirable.”
In addition, the DRV wants to campaign in Brussels for a “streamlining of bureaucracy,” she explains. “I believe that everyone involved agrees on the goal of reducing bureaucracy, but it also needs to be implemented,” Pickert warns. To achieve this, it is not enough to implement the “one in, one out” principle, according to which new burdens are offset by reductions elsewhere. Because that would mean a standstill. “A real reduction can only be achieved with ‘one in, two out’ – we have to get there,” she demands. Julia Dahm
There is also an EU dimension to the traffic light coalition’s battle over public finances. The Commission is currently holding technical talks with the Federal Ministry of Finance about Germany’s budget, which are quite piquant. The issue is that Germany is in breach of the new euro stability rules. Germany, of all countries, whose Finance Minister Christian Linder (FDP) was a hardliner in the debate on the new stability rules. He wanted to enforce that member states violating the rules must return to the path of virtue within four years.
He was unable to get his way with this. It was decided that member states could be given not just four, but seven years to comply with the criteria again. However, they will then be subject to even stricter supervision by the EU Commission. This is exactly what could now happen to Germany. It has not yet been decided, but is quite possible that Germany, a deficit offender, will slip into the seven-year program due to its critical budget situation.
What is also embarrassing is that in its exchange with the EU Commission, the German government had argued on the basis of 2023 economic figures. This was a bitter pill to swallow for the Commission. The Brussels officials requested up-to-date data on the budget situation. However, Germany’s economic situation has deteriorated compared to 2023.
This is not good news for Berlin either: the Federal Ministry of Finance will have even more trouble convincing the Commission that it is on the right track in terms of budgetary policy. I hope you get through the day with fewer complaints than Christian Lindner.
It would not have worked without the votes from abroad: Maia Sandu was able to announce a wafer-thin victory on Monday for the referendum with which Moldova’s president wants to irrevocably enshrine the goal of EU integration in the constitution. In the end, 50.5 percent voted in favor of the pro-European orientation, with around 13,000 votes making the difference. For a long time, the count was a nail-biter and looked like a negative result, until the votes of a good 200,000 expatriates were added, 70 percent of whom voted for the pro-European anchoring of their home country.
This suggests that the voters abroad are less exposed to Russian disinformation campaigns and therefore voted much more pro-European. For Maia Sandu, the massive influence of Moscow was a big issue the following day: she spoke of criminal groups buying votes on a grand scale and denounced the unprecedented attack by anti-democratic forces.
According to the authorities in Chişinău, Moscow is said to have used more than €100 million to influence the referendum and the parallel presidential elections. With around 42 percent, Maia Sandu is well ahead of her pro-Russian challenger Alexandr Stoianoglo with around 26 percent. However, in view of the close referendum, the incumbent does not have an easy starting position ahead of the run-off election on 3 November.
The results in Moldova are a warning in various respects: Maia Sandu warned that if the practices of influencing voters pay off in her home country, they could set a precedent in other countries. For the EU, the result is a warning that Moldova’s pro-Western orientation is not guaranteed and that greater efforts may be necessary. If Moldova does fall, this will also have repercussions for Ukraine and Georgia.
In any case, Moscow is unlikely to let up in its efforts to bring the country completely back into the Russian sphere of influence or at least destabilize it. A week ago, the EU imposed further sanctions against five individuals and one organization held responsible for acts aimed at destabilizing the Republic of Moldova. New additions to the list include Evghenia Gutul, Governor of Moldova’s autonomous region of Gagauzia. According to the responsible EU task force, the Russian disinformation campaigns include reports that Maia Sandu wants to support Ukraine in attacking the separatist region of Transnistria or offer Moldova as a location for asylum centers.
“We strongly condemn the malign activities, interference and hybrid operations of the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-backed local actors,” said Michael Gahler, head of an EU Parliament election observer delegation in Chişinău. Russia’s goal is still to undermine the electoral process, the security, sovereignty and democratic foundations of the Republic of Moldova and the free will of its citizens. Despite the unprecedented massive, malicious and illegal Russian interference, in particular through vote-buying, hybrid attacks and disinformation, the people of Moldova have opted for a future in the EU.
For Green MEP Sergey Lagodinsky, member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the result shows “how much work still lies ahead of us and, above all, of the democratic pro-European forces in Moldova.” Persuasion and work against interference from Moscow are needed. “Despite massive Russian intimidation, disinformation and attempted vote-buying, Moldovans refused to be intimidated and voted for closer ties with the EU,” said Social Democrat Tobias Cremer, also part of the election observation mission.
In Moscow, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected the accusation of voter interference and called on Maia Sandu to provide evidence for her accusations.
The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy wants to redistribute the costs for the expansion of the European electricity grid between the member states. The expansion of the grid in the EU raises “the question of how investment costs should be distributed among several member states and between grid users,” writes the BMWK in the invitation to tender for external consulting on the “Further development of the EU framework for electricity grid planning.“
The EU Commission estimates the costs for the expansion of the transmission and distribution grids at €582 billion by 2030 alone. “It should be reconsidered which part of the investment costs should be passed on to national grid customers via the transmission system operators and to what extent the costs of cross-border investments in particular should be distributed more broadly and supraregionally,” writes the ministry.
The tender does not yet answer the question of whether the reorganization would burden or relieve Germany. However, as a strong industrial nation, Germany is and will remain one of the largest electricity consumers in the EU, it could be advantageous for Germany to participate more in its neighbors’ grid projects.
In June, for example, the Swedish government stopped approval for the Hansa PowerBridge transmission line project, intended to connect the south of the country with Germany. “This would lead to higher prices and a more unstable electricity market in Sweden,” said Sweden’s Energy Minister Ebba Busch. Sweden, on the other hand, would have had to bear the costs of the project. It is possible that the BMWK is hoping to facilitate the flow of cheap green energy to Germany by sharing the costs of such projects.
However, the reallocation of costs would probably only affect cross-border lines. For the vast majority of projects, the BMWK wants to take part in the discussion about new sources of funding. The experts are to examine several options:
However, the Directorate-General for Energy (DG Energy) is already trying to dampen hopes for more funding from Brussels in advance. “EU funding will serve as a last resort for investments with high European priority, for example for certain infrastructure projects with cross-border significance,” write the officials in an internal briefing to prepare Commissioner-designate Dan Jørgensen for the upcoming hearing in the EU Parliament.
The BMWK also wants to have reform proposals for European grid planning drawn up. For example, the ministry is considering allowing actors other than the transmission system operators to propose line projects for the European network development plans (TYNDP). The BMWK also wants to examine whether the regulatory agency ACER and the grid operator organization ENTSO-E should continue to be entrusted with grid planning.
In order to accelerate grid expansion, the BMWK is looking into greater standardization of grid components in Europe as well as EU training programs and improvements in public procurement law. Suppliers could be supported in expanding their production capacities through more guarantees and a stronger role for the EIB.
The countervailing duties on Chinese EVs could enter into force in November. It is up to the EU Commission to decide whether this actually happens. Brussels is still giving Beijing the opportunity to campaign for a solution at the negotiating table. This cannot be ruled out. China enjoys high-profile support. The German automotive industry in particular favors a negotiated solution, as it fears retaliatory measures that could affect them.
From a tactical perspective, the EU is in a better position than before the provisional tariffs were imposed on October 4. The Commission rejected the Chinese proposal for a minimum price of 30,000 euros per vehicle. According to media reports, however, a minimum price of 35,000 to 40,000 euros could be successful. It is clear that the EU would make a negotiated solution very costly for China.
The countervailing duties can be easily revoked as they are not obligatory. Minimum vehicle prices are also compatible with WTO law, says Professor Christoph Herrmann from the University of Passau, who holds a chair in constitutional and administrative law, European law, European and international economic law. Instead of tariffs, a countervailing measure could also mean minimum import prices or a price commitment for manufacturers.
However, Herrmann warns: “A minimum import price is a common instrument that was also used for solar panels in 2017, for example. However, from the EU’s point of view, the risk of circumvention is quite high. Many legal proceedings are ongoing for solar panels.” An abstract minimum price on the other hand, such as the 30.000 Euros, makes little sense. Countervailing duties are more accurate because they are tailored to the transaction value of each individual vehicle, said Herrmann.
“With its approach, the EU demonstrates that it deals with its trading partner China in a fundamentally different way to the US,” says Max Zenglein, Chief Economist at Merics. He considers the approach sensible, even if there are different arguments in the debate about a negotiated solution. “The EU is signaling to China: We understand your economic system, but we are in a situation where we are under increasing economic pressure. This does not mean we want to cut all ties and damage economic relations.”
In late September, the United States introduced tariffs of 100 percent on EVs from China. The reason: Extensive subsidies and non-market-compliant practices by China lead to considerable risks of overcapacity and therefore harm the American industry. The Biden administration thus quadrupled the existing tariffs of 25 percent previously imposed by Donald Trump in 2018 based on Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. The instrument enables the USA to take unilateral and indefinite measures against another state. China protested that the measure was not WTO-compliant, which is true.
Nevertheless, Beijing made no threats towards the United States – in stark contrast to the current tariff debate with the EU. Max Zenglein concludes from the different reactions that this reflects China’s view of the USA and Europe. “The debate about EV tariffs shows that China sees Europe as a weak player that can easily be spooked and threatened. The process has been debated in Europe for months, in public, and China has tried in every way to exert its influence – quite successfully.” In contrast, China has taken note of the US’s actions, albeit in protest.
For Europe, however, the WTO rules are relevant. “Regarding the countervailing duties on Chinese electric cars, the EU also ensures that the measures are WTO-compliant in the broadest sense. China has also utilized the mechanisms in this case and filed a complaint via the WTO,” says Zenglein. A look at the list of current WTO complaints shows that the mechanism is being actively used between the parties China, the EU, and the USA. China currently has six complaints against the EU and 18 against the USA. And vice versa, the EU has twelve cases against China, and the US has 23 cases.
However, upholding WTO principles has become selective and the WTO’s steering power has declined. This is not only due to the Appellate Body crisis, says Herrmann. The USA in particular wanted to regulate its trade relations with China outside the rules-based system, and so did China. In addition, the USA is also violating WTO principles with the Inflation Reduction Act, for example, as it favors the domestic economy.
While China was a cheap workbench for many American and European companies at the turn of the millennium, it now manufactures its own high-quality industrial goods and sells them on the global market. But this is not the only reason why the situation has changed. The political landscape has also changed significantly since 2001, when China was admitted to the WTO. China was admitted to the WTO at that time because it was believed the Chinese system was developing towards a liberal market economy. In reality, however, it now shows planned economy tendencies under an increasingly authoritarian regime.
However, China’s admission to the WTO was not a purely political decision, argues Julian Hinz, Professor of International Economics at Bielefeld University and Head of the Trade Policy Research Center at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. After all, other authoritarian regimes have also become part of the WTO. “The WTO wants to put trade on a rule-based foundation. It is clear that China is intervening massively in the economy, so from an economic perspective the countervailing duties are justified, because it is about balancing out unfair competition.”
However, there are no rules in WTO law for the kind of state capitalism that China practices. “The question of what industrial policy is permitted is not sufficiently regulated. This is why countries invoke national security, such as imposing tariffs,” says Herrmann. The consequence of coercive trade policy measures, as can currently be observed in the dispute over EV tariffs, is correspondingly problematic. “You have to expect that more tariffs will be imposed and countermeasures will also affect innocent industries, such as the spirits industry.”
One way out could be reforming the system to account for the changed circumstances. However, Max Zenglein from Merics does not consider this to be realistic at present. “In order to discuss a new system, the big economic blocs would have to come together and agree on certain points. Now is not the right time for that.”
Julian Hinz points to the possibility of multilateral agreements that are not binding for everyone. “Countries or blocs of countries, such as the EU, could agree on certain topics and further liberalize them or impose certain rules on themselves. There could be groups or clubs that open up further within this framework.”
Paula Pickert has been in charge of the German Raiffeisen Association (DRV) in the European capital since September 2024. She succeeds long-standing DRV official Thomas Memmert, who has retired after 27 years as Brussels office manager. Pickert previously worked for the cooperative association in Berlin, not only in commodities management but also in public affairs. However, the EU bubble in Brussels is nothing new to the agricultural economist.
Since a six-month internship at the Council of the EU, she has been fascinated by European politics with its multitude of players from different fields and countries, she says: “Everyone has different ideas about agriculture, sustainability and cooperatives, but they all have to find a common denominator.”
Paula Pickert sees her new task primarily in two-way communication: on the one hand, bringing processes and upcoming challenges in Brussels closer to the association members throughout Germany. On the other hand, to represent the concerns of the DRV in Brussels. “It’s often about bringing the right people together at the right time – it helps that I know the team in Berlin well,” she says.
For Pickert, a special feature of the work in Brussels is the exchange with cooperative associations from other EU countries that, like the DRV, are organized in the umbrella association Cogeca. “For example, when it comes to implementing an EU directive at a national level, I check: how does France do it, what approaches are there in Portugal, what can we learn from them?” she says. “This exchange is particularly valuable for us, especially because there are often specific regulations for cooperatives due to their special form of business.”
Paula Pickert explains that the DRV wants to take a particularly close look at how the recommendations of the Strategic Dialogue will influence the future of European agricultural policy. The recommendations of the association’s committee are exciting, for example on the subject of finance and lending. “Cooperatives form an important interface between farmers and the banking sector,” she explains. “The topic is thus central for us, and it is good that the Strategic Dialogue emphasizes that different financing systems must be coherent with each other.”
Coherence is also important to the association in the European single market, Pickert emphasizes: “We needfair competitive conditions: If not globally, at least the same requirements must apply to all market participants in the EU.” For example, with regard to the use of pesticides, requirements in animal husbandry, but also competitive operating costs in a European comparison.
Also important for cooperatives: The possible revision of the EU Unfair Trading Practices Directive (UTP). The European Commission has announced an evaluation report for the coming year, followed by a reform of the directive “if necessary”. “But the UTP Directive does not just need to be revised,” says Pickert. “In addition to an expansion of the scope of application, a significant tightening of the prohibitions would be desirable.”
In addition, the DRV wants to campaign in Brussels for a “streamlining of bureaucracy,” she explains. “I believe that everyone involved agrees on the goal of reducing bureaucracy, but it also needs to be implemented,” Pickert warns. To achieve this, it is not enough to implement the “one in, one out” principle, according to which new burdens are offset by reductions elsewhere. Because that would mean a standstill. “A real reduction can only be achieved with ‘one in, two out’ – we have to get there,” she demands. Julia Dahm