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Is Germany facing the forced decommissioning of more than eight million old diesel cars? An upcoming ECJ ruling could lead to this, claims Minister for Transport Volker Wissing. To prevent this from happening, the car industry has now submitted a proposal on how this could be legally avoided. Markus Grabitz analyzes what it contains.
The Critical Raw Materials Act stipulates that no more than 65% of a critical raw material may be sourced from a single country by 2030. In Germany, several partnerships have also been agreed upon in recent years. Nevertheless, raw material partnerships in the industry are not taking off. In her Analysis, Leonie Düngefeld reports on the causes – and explains how this could change.
Lobbyists have always been part of Brussels, but a new Analysis by Table.Briefings shows that the number of registered lobby groups has once again increased significantly since the beginning of the year. Read the exact figures and background information in today’s issue.
I wish you a good start to the day!
A draft has been submitted with which the EU Commission could provide legal “clarification” of the conditions for measuring pollutant emissions for older diesel vehicles. The proposal comes from the automotive industry. Minister for Transport Volker Wissing (FDP) had called for such clarification in a letter to the EU Commission at the end of last week.
Otherwise, Wissing fears that 8.2 million older diesel vehicles could be taken out of service in Germany alone as a result of ECJ proceedings against the manufacturer Mercedes-Benz. Many more vehicles would be affected throughout the EU. In 2017, around 250 million cars of the affected emission classes were registered across the EU.
According to information obtained by Table.Briefings, the legal clarification is to be made in Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007. It is to be stated there that manufacturers must comply with the pollutant limit values exclusively within the framework of the test procedures defined at the time. To this end, the following addition should be inserted into the legal text: “…in the test procedures laid down in these implementing measures.” This is intended to prevent a possible ECJ ruling from subsequently introducing new, stricter measurement procedures that cannot be met by the cars.
The background to this is that a procedural representative of the EU Commission’s legal service argued in an ECJ hearing on July 10 that older vehicles in emission classes Euro IV, V, and in some cases VI must also comply with the emission limits in all driving situations. Until now, these vehicles have only had to comply with the limit values on the chassis dynamometer. Experts assume that the limit values for nitrogen dioxide, for example, cannot be complied with under any circumstances in Real Driving Emissions (RDE).
The reply that Thierry Breton, the Commissioner for Industry, sent to Wissing at the weekend did nothing to dispel the concerns of the manufacturers and Wissing. Breton had described Wissing’s warning that millions of Euro V and Euro VI vehicles in Germany alone could be at risk of being taken out of service as “misleading”.
According to Breton in the letter, the Commission has no intention of “making retroactive changes, imposing additional administrative burdens or requirements on car manufacturers, or taking or promoting measures that would in any way disadvantage citizens who have bought cars in good faith”.
Time is pressing for the legal clarification requested by Wissing. On Nov. 21, the Advocate General of the ECJ, Athanasios Rantos, intends to issue an opinion on the matter. The ruling is expected at the beginning of 2025. It is said in the industry that Rantos is critical of the manufacturers.
According to reports in Brussels, the Commission does not want to initiate the legal “clarification” demanded by Wissing. Reference is made to the pending ECJ ruling. In addition, Breton’s predecessor, Industry Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska, had already provided clarification in 2016 in response to a written question from an MEP: “It should be noted that according to this definition, compliance with the emission limit values under ‘normal operating conditions’ does not mean that they are complied with at all times and under all circumstances (this would not be technically possible). It means that the limit values are complied with on average, covering the widest possible range of driving conditions that may occur in reality.”
The consequences of a possible ruling that could retroactively allow new test procedures for cars built a long time ago are controversial among legal experts. In German law, there is the principle of non-retroactivity, according to legal experts from industry representatives. This gives consumers and companies legal certainty. They could not be placed in a worse position retrospectively by government action. However, it is not clear whether this prohibition of retroactivity applies in all EU states.
It is also unclear who would have to bear the consequences of an ECJ ruling. Would it be the owners of the vehicles, for which there would then possibly no longer be any type approval, or the manufacturers, who would be liable for ensuring that their vehicles comply with emissions regulations? One fear is that environmental organizations will initiate new lawsuits following a corresponding ECJ ruling.
In this specific case, a measuring device manufacturer filed a lawsuit against the Mercedes-Benz Group at Duisburg Regional Court. The allegation is that the manufacturer installed illegal defeat devices in its vehicles. The Duisburg court has referred the case to the ECJ for clarification.
So far, German companies have invested less in raw materials projects in partner countries than the German government had hoped from the strategic cooperation. The urgency to diversify raw material imports has decreased enormously over the past two years, insiders told Table.Briefings.
Germany and the EU need to secure critical raw materials such as lithium, cobalt and nickel to transform their economies. Domestic mining and processing is also to be strengthened in Germany. However, they will still have to import the majority of raw materials and intermediate products. Through partnerships and other forms of cooperation with like-minded countries, the German government and the EU Commission are trying to reduce dependency on China in particular, which has an almost monopolistic position in important parts of the value chain. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act stipulates that no more than 65% of a critical raw material may be sourced from a single country by 2030.
Based on its first raw materials strategy in 2010, the German government decided to cooperate with Mongolia in 2011, Kazakhstan in 2012 and Peru in 2014. In 2013, it also signed a declaration of intent with Chile that is not binding under international law. However, the success of these partnerships fell short of expectations even then, according to various stakeholders.
An analysis conducted by the Adelphi think tank on behalf of the German Federal Environment Agency in 2016 stated: “It became apparent that a uniform instrument with the same or very similar objectives poses a major challenge for all partner countries when it comes to implementation.” The initially high level of interest shown by German companies had continued to decline over the years, partly due to falling commodity prices. “This meant that politicians could only provide support, but not demand cooperation from German and partner country companies.”
Today, more than ten years later, Franziska Brantner, Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWK), describes a very similar experience: since the coronavirus crisis and the attack on Ukraine, there has been a renewed awareness of the need to invest in the resilience of supply chains. “This willingness is threatening to decline again, partly due to a drop in prices clearly driven by China.” The problem is the cyclical development of commodity prices. “Ten or 15 years ago, we had a similar situation: raw materials were expensive and everyone got together in the German raw materials alliance”, explained Brantner in an interview with Table.Briefings. “Then prices went down again and de facto people continued to buy from China.” And so it went on – until the next crisis.
Under Brantner’s aegis, the instrument of raw materials partnerships should receive fresh impetus in this legislative period. In the key issues paper on the amendment of the raw materials strategy, the BMWK formulated the goal of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements to secure raw materials at the beginning of 2023, particularly with countries that are considered “value partners” for the German government.
There is now close cooperation with Australia, Brazil, Chile, Ghana and Canada. The Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, which is subordinate to the BMWK, works with geological services such as the Japanese raw materials agency JOGMEC. The EU Commission has also concluded various new raw materials partnerships, most recently with Uzbekistan, Argentina, Namibia and the DR Congo in addition to Serbia. There are also multilateral partnerships, such as the Minerals Security Partnership.
Brantner describes the cooperation between the German copper group Aurubis and the state-owned mining company Codelco in Chile as a successful project: The governments there have succeeded in flanking the cooperation with more environmentally friendly copper processing and at the same time with the purchase of intermediate products. “This is one of the projects where I would say that something is happening in our mutual interest.“
In most partner countries, however, investments by German companies are barely getting off the ground. “The doors are definitely open to us Germans in the partner countries“, says Brantner, describing her experience. Canadian ministries, for example, send detailed information on individual projects via a working group on critical raw materials; the BMWK passes this on to German companies via the associations. “But of course it is then a question of the company’s decision whether to invest and conclude off-take agreements and enter into joint ventures.”
Has the pressure to diversify eased in the meantime? “Yes and no”, says Matthias Wachter, Head of Department for International Cooperation and Raw Materials at the BDI. “Sensitivity remains high. Implementation is proving more difficult and protracted than many companies had hoped.” Numerous companies have seen how critical such dependencies can be in a worst-case scenario and are working to reduce them. In practice, diversification is not quite so simple.
“In order to secure raw materials, companies need to cooperate closely with mines in the long term“, explains Wachter. However, such capital-intensive projects often fail due to financing. Many companies could finance and hedge the risks entirely privately. This is why it is important that the German government’s planned raw materials fund finally comes, says Wachter. The political context also plays a role: Many raw materials are mined in politically difficult countries, such as cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo. “Framework conditions such as the German Supply Chain Duties Act also make it more difficult to increase involvement in resource-rich developing and emerging countries.”
There is a good political intention behind the raw materials partnerships, says Wachter, but so far they have not brought the hoped-for success. At first glance, the partnerships seemed like a “pretty good match”: Resource-rich countries want to sell their raw materials and we can contribute technology and infrastructure. “However, it remains to be seen what this will look like in detail“, explains Wachter. Moreover, in practice, the German companies that need the raw materials are often not the same companies that can supply the technology and infrastructure.
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s analysis is similar: The partnerships between the EU or individual member states and third countries to date are largely based on declarations of intent. “A context-specific analysis does not appear to have been carried out sufficiently“, the paper from May 2024 states. It is also unclear “whether and to what extent expertise from representatives of civil society, trade unions and business has been incorporated”. A strategy tailored to the respective country is required, which is developed in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including the business community.
In their recommendations, the authors mention two aspects, among others:
The US vice president has chosen her preferred vice president. Kamala Harris, the US Democratic presidential candidate, wants to campaign against Donald Trump with Tim Walz by her side. The governor of the state of Minnesota could appeal to white working-class voters in key swing states who have supported Trump in recent years.
The 60-year-old Walz has a history of success in traditionally conservative areas. In 2006, the former high school teacher and military veteran flipped a Republican congressional district in Minnesota before becoming governor in 2018. His rapid rise to the national stage also shows the power of social media, CNN wrote: Walz’s recent attacks on the Republicans – he called the party “weird” – went viral. And because of his jovial attitude, supporters also call him “Midwestern Dad”. But Walz has faced attacks from Trump and other Republicans who accused him of being too liberal; Trump called him a “wannabe West Coast politician.”
When it comes to foreign policy, Walz is likely to align with Harris and President Joe Biden. He was stationed a soldier in Italy after 9/11, and recently said that the rest of the world needs the US, and that Republicans are on an isolationist course: “These guys are throwing our NATO allies under the bus.”
He is a staunch supporter of Ukraine; shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Walz signed a law banning Minnesota’s state investments in Russia. He also has a deep personal history with China, though it’s unclear how that might influence Washington’s policy if he and Harris win. He taught English at a school in China for a year, went on his honeymoon there, and coordinated summer trips there for American high school students.
Harris has revived the Democrats’ chances of entering the White House. Recent polls show that Harris has caught up in the polls and is now neck and neck with Trump. But the choice of Walz as her running mate may not be a decisive factor in the election. Traditionally, vice presidential candidates fill gaps in the ticket’s appeal and portfolio, but typically haven’t had major impacts on the outcome.
The US media praise Harris for nominating Walz. The Washington Post speaks of a great decision and sees Walz as a bright candidate who can bring a breath of fresh air into the Democratic ranks, which are actually so homogeneous. The Wall Street Journal sees Walz as an ally who could prove useful in the particularly contested states of Michigan and Wisconsin, and the New York Times reports on a clever choice, as Walz also appeals to voters in rural areas due to his non-elitist life story.
The Republican-affiliated Fox News also considers the former teacher a smart choice because he is popular within the influential teachers’ unions. He is also one of the most decorated veterans in Congress and is respected as a football coach. And then, according to Fox, the man from Minnesota is also free of scandal and, with his approachable and moderating manner, is something of a safe bet for Harris. By J.D. Capelouto and Arthur Fiedler
J.D. Capelouto is a reporter for the US website Semafor in New York. As part of the Arthur F. Burns exchange program for journalists, he will be working at Table.Briefings until the end of September.
On July 17, Table.Briefings reported on a position paper calling for the EU combustion compromise for 2035 to be overturned. Unfortunately, the findings of the authors, led by combustion engine expert Thomas Koch, do not stand up to critical scrutiny.
Koch and his colleagues argue that the emissions of battery electric vehicles are actually much higher than assumed by science and the EU. To reach this conclusion, Koch’s team makes two inadmissible simplifications. Firstly, Koch’s group suggests that the additional demand for electricity for the production and operation of electric vehicles will be met with fossil fuels. Secondly, the authors of the position paper reveal a lack of understanding of how the various parts of EU climate regulation work and interact.
The position paper uses a so-called marginal approach to calculate the CO2 emissions of the electricity used. This approach assumes that for every electric vehicle that is built or charged, a coal or gas-fired power plant generates additional electricity. This assumption is misleading because it ignores the energy transition that is already taking place and the plans of the electricity industry.
In fact, grid operators and energy providers are already planning for the expected demand for electricity from EVs (see ENTSOE energy demand forecast, for example). As a result, the expansion of renewable energies is dimensioned in such a way that the power plant capacities can supply the electricity required by the EV fleet. In addition, EVs often charge at times when there is a lot of renewable electricity in the grid (e.g. at night or at lunchtime at work). This grid-friendly charging will be further improved in the future through innovative charging and grid management.
Instead of the marginal approach used by Koch’s group, the average electricity mix of a country or region should be used to calculate the emissions intensity of the production and operation of an EV.
Using this method, T&E’s modeling shows that a mid-size electric vehicle produced and charged with the average EU electricity mix would emit 75 gCO2/km over its lifetime if purchased in 2022 and 46 gCO2/km if purchased in 2030. Studies by the ICCT and the IEA come to similar conclusions. The values of 157 gCO2/km calculated in the position paper are therefore many times off the mark.
In addition to these incorrect calculation bases, the position paper makes a serious mistake in its understanding of the regulatory logic of EU climate legislation. The paper suggests that the “real” emissions of EVs are significantly higher because only the emissions at the vehicle’s tailpipe are included in the calculation. As EVs do not cause any emissions when driving, but the electricity produced does, depending on the source of electricity, this is an unacceptable advantage for e-mobility. What appears plausible at first glance fails to take into account how climate action works in Europe.
There is a good reason why the methodology of the fleet limit values adopted by the EU only takes into account direct tailpipe emissions: Because the manufacturers of the vehicles are the subject of regulation, only what the car manufacturers themselves can directly influence can be regulated. Emissions from upstream sectors such as electricity generation are explicitly addressed by other regulations (e.g. EU emissions trading). It is precisely the interplay of different regulations within the Green Deal that should ensure that Europe achieves the goal of CO2 neutrality.
The EU combustion compromise for 2035 is the most important measure for reducing traffic emissions. If Europe wants to defend its leading position in the automotive industry, we need proposals on how to promote e-mobility made in Europe and not methodically questionable sham debates about the combustion engine technology of the past.
Sebastian Bock is Managing Director of the environmental umbrella organization Transport & Environment Germany.
Is Germany facing the forced decommissioning of more than eight million old diesel cars? An upcoming ECJ ruling could lead to this, claims Minister for Transport Volker Wissing. To prevent this from happening, the car industry has now submitted a proposal on how this could be legally avoided. Markus Grabitz analyzes what it contains.
The Critical Raw Materials Act stipulates that no more than 65% of a critical raw material may be sourced from a single country by 2030. In Germany, several partnerships have also been agreed upon in recent years. Nevertheless, raw material partnerships in the industry are not taking off. In her Analysis, Leonie Düngefeld reports on the causes – and explains how this could change.
Lobbyists have always been part of Brussels, but a new Analysis by Table.Briefings shows that the number of registered lobby groups has once again increased significantly since the beginning of the year. Read the exact figures and background information in today’s issue.
I wish you a good start to the day!
A draft has been submitted with which the EU Commission could provide legal “clarification” of the conditions for measuring pollutant emissions for older diesel vehicles. The proposal comes from the automotive industry. Minister for Transport Volker Wissing (FDP) had called for such clarification in a letter to the EU Commission at the end of last week.
Otherwise, Wissing fears that 8.2 million older diesel vehicles could be taken out of service in Germany alone as a result of ECJ proceedings against the manufacturer Mercedes-Benz. Many more vehicles would be affected throughout the EU. In 2017, around 250 million cars of the affected emission classes were registered across the EU.
According to information obtained by Table.Briefings, the legal clarification is to be made in Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007. It is to be stated there that manufacturers must comply with the pollutant limit values exclusively within the framework of the test procedures defined at the time. To this end, the following addition should be inserted into the legal text: “…in the test procedures laid down in these implementing measures.” This is intended to prevent a possible ECJ ruling from subsequently introducing new, stricter measurement procedures that cannot be met by the cars.
The background to this is that a procedural representative of the EU Commission’s legal service argued in an ECJ hearing on July 10 that older vehicles in emission classes Euro IV, V, and in some cases VI must also comply with the emission limits in all driving situations. Until now, these vehicles have only had to comply with the limit values on the chassis dynamometer. Experts assume that the limit values for nitrogen dioxide, for example, cannot be complied with under any circumstances in Real Driving Emissions (RDE).
The reply that Thierry Breton, the Commissioner for Industry, sent to Wissing at the weekend did nothing to dispel the concerns of the manufacturers and Wissing. Breton had described Wissing’s warning that millions of Euro V and Euro VI vehicles in Germany alone could be at risk of being taken out of service as “misleading”.
According to Breton in the letter, the Commission has no intention of “making retroactive changes, imposing additional administrative burdens or requirements on car manufacturers, or taking or promoting measures that would in any way disadvantage citizens who have bought cars in good faith”.
Time is pressing for the legal clarification requested by Wissing. On Nov. 21, the Advocate General of the ECJ, Athanasios Rantos, intends to issue an opinion on the matter. The ruling is expected at the beginning of 2025. It is said in the industry that Rantos is critical of the manufacturers.
According to reports in Brussels, the Commission does not want to initiate the legal “clarification” demanded by Wissing. Reference is made to the pending ECJ ruling. In addition, Breton’s predecessor, Industry Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska, had already provided clarification in 2016 in response to a written question from an MEP: “It should be noted that according to this definition, compliance with the emission limit values under ‘normal operating conditions’ does not mean that they are complied with at all times and under all circumstances (this would not be technically possible). It means that the limit values are complied with on average, covering the widest possible range of driving conditions that may occur in reality.”
The consequences of a possible ruling that could retroactively allow new test procedures for cars built a long time ago are controversial among legal experts. In German law, there is the principle of non-retroactivity, according to legal experts from industry representatives. This gives consumers and companies legal certainty. They could not be placed in a worse position retrospectively by government action. However, it is not clear whether this prohibition of retroactivity applies in all EU states.
It is also unclear who would have to bear the consequences of an ECJ ruling. Would it be the owners of the vehicles, for which there would then possibly no longer be any type approval, or the manufacturers, who would be liable for ensuring that their vehicles comply with emissions regulations? One fear is that environmental organizations will initiate new lawsuits following a corresponding ECJ ruling.
In this specific case, a measuring device manufacturer filed a lawsuit against the Mercedes-Benz Group at Duisburg Regional Court. The allegation is that the manufacturer installed illegal defeat devices in its vehicles. The Duisburg court has referred the case to the ECJ for clarification.
So far, German companies have invested less in raw materials projects in partner countries than the German government had hoped from the strategic cooperation. The urgency to diversify raw material imports has decreased enormously over the past two years, insiders told Table.Briefings.
Germany and the EU need to secure critical raw materials such as lithium, cobalt and nickel to transform their economies. Domestic mining and processing is also to be strengthened in Germany. However, they will still have to import the majority of raw materials and intermediate products. Through partnerships and other forms of cooperation with like-minded countries, the German government and the EU Commission are trying to reduce dependency on China in particular, which has an almost monopolistic position in important parts of the value chain. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act stipulates that no more than 65% of a critical raw material may be sourced from a single country by 2030.
Based on its first raw materials strategy in 2010, the German government decided to cooperate with Mongolia in 2011, Kazakhstan in 2012 and Peru in 2014. In 2013, it also signed a declaration of intent with Chile that is not binding under international law. However, the success of these partnerships fell short of expectations even then, according to various stakeholders.
An analysis conducted by the Adelphi think tank on behalf of the German Federal Environment Agency in 2016 stated: “It became apparent that a uniform instrument with the same or very similar objectives poses a major challenge for all partner countries when it comes to implementation.” The initially high level of interest shown by German companies had continued to decline over the years, partly due to falling commodity prices. “This meant that politicians could only provide support, but not demand cooperation from German and partner country companies.”
Today, more than ten years later, Franziska Brantner, Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWK), describes a very similar experience: since the coronavirus crisis and the attack on Ukraine, there has been a renewed awareness of the need to invest in the resilience of supply chains. “This willingness is threatening to decline again, partly due to a drop in prices clearly driven by China.” The problem is the cyclical development of commodity prices. “Ten or 15 years ago, we had a similar situation: raw materials were expensive and everyone got together in the German raw materials alliance”, explained Brantner in an interview with Table.Briefings. “Then prices went down again and de facto people continued to buy from China.” And so it went on – until the next crisis.
Under Brantner’s aegis, the instrument of raw materials partnerships should receive fresh impetus in this legislative period. In the key issues paper on the amendment of the raw materials strategy, the BMWK formulated the goal of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements to secure raw materials at the beginning of 2023, particularly with countries that are considered “value partners” for the German government.
There is now close cooperation with Australia, Brazil, Chile, Ghana and Canada. The Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, which is subordinate to the BMWK, works with geological services such as the Japanese raw materials agency JOGMEC. The EU Commission has also concluded various new raw materials partnerships, most recently with Uzbekistan, Argentina, Namibia and the DR Congo in addition to Serbia. There are also multilateral partnerships, such as the Minerals Security Partnership.
Brantner describes the cooperation between the German copper group Aurubis and the state-owned mining company Codelco in Chile as a successful project: The governments there have succeeded in flanking the cooperation with more environmentally friendly copper processing and at the same time with the purchase of intermediate products. “This is one of the projects where I would say that something is happening in our mutual interest.“
In most partner countries, however, investments by German companies are barely getting off the ground. “The doors are definitely open to us Germans in the partner countries“, says Brantner, describing her experience. Canadian ministries, for example, send detailed information on individual projects via a working group on critical raw materials; the BMWK passes this on to German companies via the associations. “But of course it is then a question of the company’s decision whether to invest and conclude off-take agreements and enter into joint ventures.”
Has the pressure to diversify eased in the meantime? “Yes and no”, says Matthias Wachter, Head of Department for International Cooperation and Raw Materials at the BDI. “Sensitivity remains high. Implementation is proving more difficult and protracted than many companies had hoped.” Numerous companies have seen how critical such dependencies can be in a worst-case scenario and are working to reduce them. In practice, diversification is not quite so simple.
“In order to secure raw materials, companies need to cooperate closely with mines in the long term“, explains Wachter. However, such capital-intensive projects often fail due to financing. Many companies could finance and hedge the risks entirely privately. This is why it is important that the German government’s planned raw materials fund finally comes, says Wachter. The political context also plays a role: Many raw materials are mined in politically difficult countries, such as cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo. “Framework conditions such as the German Supply Chain Duties Act also make it more difficult to increase involvement in resource-rich developing and emerging countries.”
There is a good political intention behind the raw materials partnerships, says Wachter, but so far they have not brought the hoped-for success. At first glance, the partnerships seemed like a “pretty good match”: Resource-rich countries want to sell their raw materials and we can contribute technology and infrastructure. “However, it remains to be seen what this will look like in detail“, explains Wachter. Moreover, in practice, the German companies that need the raw materials are often not the same companies that can supply the technology and infrastructure.
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s analysis is similar: The partnerships between the EU or individual member states and third countries to date are largely based on declarations of intent. “A context-specific analysis does not appear to have been carried out sufficiently“, the paper from May 2024 states. It is also unclear “whether and to what extent expertise from representatives of civil society, trade unions and business has been incorporated”. A strategy tailored to the respective country is required, which is developed in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including the business community.
In their recommendations, the authors mention two aspects, among others:
The US vice president has chosen her preferred vice president. Kamala Harris, the US Democratic presidential candidate, wants to campaign against Donald Trump with Tim Walz by her side. The governor of the state of Minnesota could appeal to white working-class voters in key swing states who have supported Trump in recent years.
The 60-year-old Walz has a history of success in traditionally conservative areas. In 2006, the former high school teacher and military veteran flipped a Republican congressional district in Minnesota before becoming governor in 2018. His rapid rise to the national stage also shows the power of social media, CNN wrote: Walz’s recent attacks on the Republicans – he called the party “weird” – went viral. And because of his jovial attitude, supporters also call him “Midwestern Dad”. But Walz has faced attacks from Trump and other Republicans who accused him of being too liberal; Trump called him a “wannabe West Coast politician.”
When it comes to foreign policy, Walz is likely to align with Harris and President Joe Biden. He was stationed a soldier in Italy after 9/11, and recently said that the rest of the world needs the US, and that Republicans are on an isolationist course: “These guys are throwing our NATO allies under the bus.”
He is a staunch supporter of Ukraine; shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Walz signed a law banning Minnesota’s state investments in Russia. He also has a deep personal history with China, though it’s unclear how that might influence Washington’s policy if he and Harris win. He taught English at a school in China for a year, went on his honeymoon there, and coordinated summer trips there for American high school students.
Harris has revived the Democrats’ chances of entering the White House. Recent polls show that Harris has caught up in the polls and is now neck and neck with Trump. But the choice of Walz as her running mate may not be a decisive factor in the election. Traditionally, vice presidential candidates fill gaps in the ticket’s appeal and portfolio, but typically haven’t had major impacts on the outcome.
The US media praise Harris for nominating Walz. The Washington Post speaks of a great decision and sees Walz as a bright candidate who can bring a breath of fresh air into the Democratic ranks, which are actually so homogeneous. The Wall Street Journal sees Walz as an ally who could prove useful in the particularly contested states of Michigan and Wisconsin, and the New York Times reports on a clever choice, as Walz also appeals to voters in rural areas due to his non-elitist life story.
The Republican-affiliated Fox News also considers the former teacher a smart choice because he is popular within the influential teachers’ unions. He is also one of the most decorated veterans in Congress and is respected as a football coach. And then, according to Fox, the man from Minnesota is also free of scandal and, with his approachable and moderating manner, is something of a safe bet for Harris. By J.D. Capelouto and Arthur Fiedler
J.D. Capelouto is a reporter for the US website Semafor in New York. As part of the Arthur F. Burns exchange program for journalists, he will be working at Table.Briefings until the end of September.
On July 17, Table.Briefings reported on a position paper calling for the EU combustion compromise for 2035 to be overturned. Unfortunately, the findings of the authors, led by combustion engine expert Thomas Koch, do not stand up to critical scrutiny.
Koch and his colleagues argue that the emissions of battery electric vehicles are actually much higher than assumed by science and the EU. To reach this conclusion, Koch’s team makes two inadmissible simplifications. Firstly, Koch’s group suggests that the additional demand for electricity for the production and operation of electric vehicles will be met with fossil fuels. Secondly, the authors of the position paper reveal a lack of understanding of how the various parts of EU climate regulation work and interact.
The position paper uses a so-called marginal approach to calculate the CO2 emissions of the electricity used. This approach assumes that for every electric vehicle that is built or charged, a coal or gas-fired power plant generates additional electricity. This assumption is misleading because it ignores the energy transition that is already taking place and the plans of the electricity industry.
In fact, grid operators and energy providers are already planning for the expected demand for electricity from EVs (see ENTSOE energy demand forecast, for example). As a result, the expansion of renewable energies is dimensioned in such a way that the power plant capacities can supply the electricity required by the EV fleet. In addition, EVs often charge at times when there is a lot of renewable electricity in the grid (e.g. at night or at lunchtime at work). This grid-friendly charging will be further improved in the future through innovative charging and grid management.
Instead of the marginal approach used by Koch’s group, the average electricity mix of a country or region should be used to calculate the emissions intensity of the production and operation of an EV.
Using this method, T&E’s modeling shows that a mid-size electric vehicle produced and charged with the average EU electricity mix would emit 75 gCO2/km over its lifetime if purchased in 2022 and 46 gCO2/km if purchased in 2030. Studies by the ICCT and the IEA come to similar conclusions. The values of 157 gCO2/km calculated in the position paper are therefore many times off the mark.
In addition to these incorrect calculation bases, the position paper makes a serious mistake in its understanding of the regulatory logic of EU climate legislation. The paper suggests that the “real” emissions of EVs are significantly higher because only the emissions at the vehicle’s tailpipe are included in the calculation. As EVs do not cause any emissions when driving, but the electricity produced does, depending on the source of electricity, this is an unacceptable advantage for e-mobility. What appears plausible at first glance fails to take into account how climate action works in Europe.
There is a good reason why the methodology of the fleet limit values adopted by the EU only takes into account direct tailpipe emissions: Because the manufacturers of the vehicles are the subject of regulation, only what the car manufacturers themselves can directly influence can be regulated. Emissions from upstream sectors such as electricity generation are explicitly addressed by other regulations (e.g. EU emissions trading). It is precisely the interplay of different regulations within the Green Deal that should ensure that Europe achieves the goal of CO2 neutrality.
The EU combustion compromise for 2035 is the most important measure for reducing traffic emissions. If Europe wants to defend its leading position in the automotive industry, we need proposals on how to promote e-mobility made in Europe and not methodically questionable sham debates about the combustion engine technology of the past.
Sebastian Bock is Managing Director of the environmental umbrella organization Transport & Environment Germany.