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It is all but certain that the Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) will be upgraded to a fully-fledged committee in these critical times. However, the exact responsibilities of the committee are likely to be the subject of fierce debate in the coming weeks. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP), who was elected chair of the (still) subcommittee of the European Parliament on Tuesday, wants the subcommittee to be given more responsibility over industrial defense issues.
The former Chair of the Defense Committee in the German Bundestag told Table.Briefings that “Defense Policy and Defense Industry must not be considered separately”, and Strack-Zimmermann added that the new competences will be negotiated primarily with the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Industry (ITRE) over the summer and in September.
It can be assumed that none of the committees would like to cede powers. However, AFET circles say that the responsibilities here are already clearly separated and that the chairman of the committee, David McAllister, has himself called for the subcommittee to be upgraded. The disputes with ITRE and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) are therefore likely to be far more serious.
These are also linked to developments in the EU Commission. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has promised to create the post of EU Commissioner for Defense, who will be responsible for coordinating the strengthening of the industrial base and innovation in the defense sector.
The committee in Parliament should reflect the competencies of the new Commissioner. Defense issues are currently being handled primarily by Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton, who is certainly not going to hand over responsibility without resistance. After the summer break, these power struggles will really pick up speed.
Wishing you a relaxing weekend!
In May, Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber were still openly toying with the idea of cooperating with parties from the national-conservative camp such as the Fratelli d’Italia. After the European elections on June 9, there was soon no more talk of this. The simple reason: a center-right alliance of Liberals, EPP and ECR would not have had a majority. And the two leading Christian Democrats had to fear that open cooperation with the ECR would alienate the Social Democrats and parts of the Liberals.
Instead, they concentrated on forging an alliance with S&D and Renew. Von der Leyen also sought the support of the Greens. The four centrist groups therefore probably accounted for the vast majority of the 401 votes that elected von der Leyen for a second term as Commission President.
However, this does not mean that this alliance will also endure in the votes on individual legislative proposals. The European Parliament does not have fixed coalitions like in the Bundestag anyway, and conservative forces in the EPP do not want to give up the option of pushing through their agenda with the help of right-wing MEPs. This could happen in negotiations on the phase-out of combustion engines or the inclusion of agriculture in the Green Deal.
Leading S&D MEPs are already warning the EPP against “making dirty deals with the far right”. Political scientist Manuel Müller warns: “The more openly the EPP cooperates with the far right, the more trust in the centrist alliance will be destroyed“.
The EPP (188 seats) and the ECR (78) have a combined total of 266 seats. Together with Renew (77), this right-wing liberal majority would have a mathematical total of 343 seats, giving it a size that would enable it to win votes with a few votes from the far right.
The political groups will never vote uniformly in the European Parliament. Group discipline is not that pronounced. Nevertheless, the figures show that there could be alliances between the EPP, ECR and Liberals when it comes to legislation. There are also forces on the right wing of Renew, such as the Dutch VVD, “which would certainly vote with the ECR in individual cases”, says Müller. The party is in coalition in The Hague with the right-wing extremist Geert Wilders.
In addition, an absolute majority of 360 seats is rarely required for votes on individual reports on legislative proposals. The political groups expect that even in the European Parliament, which now has 719 seats, 340 votes are usually enough to win a vote.
ECR Co-President Nicola Procaccini is banking on this: “There is a conservative majority in this European Parliament. That will become apparent in the legislation”, he said in plenary. The balance in the new Parliament has indeed shifted to the right. The EPP, ECR and the Patriots for Europe of Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen have a total of 350 seats. To the right of the Patriots, there is also the radical right-wing group ESN around the AfD with a further 25 seats. For comparison: in the last European Parliament, the EPP, ECR and ID only had 304 seats.
So far, there have been no agreements between the EPP and the radical right. EPP MEPs also did not support any motions put forward by the far right. It has happened that ID MEPs have voted in favor of the EPP, and their votes have even tipped the scales. But they did not talk to each other. EPP leader Manfred Weber affirms that the firewall to the right remains in place.
However, this does not exclude the ECR per se. In the EPP, however, it is expected that ECR leader Giorgia Meloni will urge the 24 Fratelli MEPs to coordinate closely with the EPP line. In addition, three members of the Czech ODS and three members of the Flemish NVA, who are likely to have already voted for von der Leyen, are possible supporters of the ECR.
Bernd Lange (SPD), one of the most experienced MEPs and already in his sixth parliamentary term, trusts that the EPP will maintain the “cordon sanitaire” with the two radical right-wing groups. He also acknowledges: “Without the EPP, there are no majorities in the new Parliament, you have to accept that.”
This puts the Christian Democrats in a new position of power. An experienced EPP MEP expects that the platform of the EPP, S&D and Renew will “almost always ensure majorities ” in legislation, possibly supplemented by votes from the ECR. However, if the Commission were to introduce very far-reaching proposals on environmental policy in the manner of Frans Timmermans, former Vice-President of the Green Deal, for example, the EPP could block them. Possible candidates for this are the new proposals on pesticide reduction or the inclusion of agriculture in emissions trading.
The EPP is watching very closely to see whether Teresa Ribera will be given a role in the Commission like Frans Timmermans used to be. The socialist and former Spanish environment minister is seen as a hardliner.
The Christian Democrats’ blockade options in turn put pressure on the center-left groups. “This gives the EPP leverage to force concessions from the Social Democrats”, says Nicolai von Ondarza, research group leader at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). The latter would then have to show a willingness to compromise.
This is precisely what the S&D Group fears. It therefore pushed for a written agreement between the groups that support von der Leyen. EPP leader Weber, however, did not want to be bound. A high-ranking S&D MEP is therefore calling for a “regular dialog” with the EPP group. Preventing the EPP from making deals with the far right will be a “tightrope act”.
Ms. Del Re,why did Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, of all countries, not send government representatives to the General Assembly of the Sahel Alliance in Berlin?
I don’t think it’s a strong political message. Niger doesn’t always take part in international events, but Mali and Burkina Faso do. I recently met both the Foreign Minister of Mali and the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso in Brussels. We will look into the circumstances in the future, but they have been present on many occasions. Germany has ongoing projects in all the countries of the Sahel, and as I always say, Germany is a giant in the region, both in terms of commitment and in terms of resources.
So do you know why they didn’t come?
I don’t know.
How seriously do you take Russia’s influence in the region?
I take this very seriously. Russia has been present in Africa for decades, so it’s not a newcomer. But obviously everything has changed with the war in Ukraine. They are continuing their normal relations that have always existed. But they are trying to refine, intensify and expand their disinformation capability. This is a real instrument of war. I fear this very much because it is very easy to spread malicious messages. This is becoming a real concern for the EU. The EU has set up a special task force to counter this kind of communication. It penetrates the mentality of the population and can be very damaging because it creates an image of the EU that is unacceptable.
Where do the EU countries’ perspectives on the situation in the Sahel differ?
There are different perspectives. Because, although we have reached a consensus – and I fought really hard to make sure that the 27 countries reached a consensus on the need for engagement – there is this idea that has been prominent recently: it’s about a transactional kind of development cooperation, where you assess the level of cooperation and the willingness to cooperate of the countries that you have partnered with. Based on their behavior, whether they behave well and perform well or not, you decide whether you should continue to invest.
There is talk from German government circles that France’s failure in the Sahel must be worked around.
Well, at the moment I think France is going through a self-reflection. They obviously want to remain engaged in the region, but they need to find a new dimension and also, of course, a way to have a dialog with these countries when, unfortunately, in their current narrative, especially at the political level, the countries are always demonstrating that they are against France.
You say that the EU must cooperate with the junta countries, from your point of view, even with countries like Burkina where people are disappearing. Journalists too. How does that work, and who can you talk to openly?
I also talk to civil society, but the fact that you talk to the authorities is fundamental. Because if we don’t get our messages across, we don’t tell them how dangerous it is to behave in a certain way. It’s a process that needs to be set in motion. Of course, it is very difficult to talk to the military juntas at the moment because they are very aggressive. I myself have met the President of Mali several times.
So do you have access to the President of Mali, General Assimi Goïta?
Yes, I had access to the President. Lately, however, I’ve been talking more with the ministers. And of course there have been things that have affected our relations. In particular, the arrival of the Wagner Group has affected our relations. That was an absolute red line for us. Of course I know that other Russians are also coming, but Iranians are also coming. The region is very crowded. People think it’s a desert, but I think it’s very crowded and also very dynamic. The risk for the EU is to remain excluded from these historic movements.
I always emphasize the resilience of the EU, even though I don’t like the term. We always talk about the resilience of societies. What about the resilience of the EU in the face of these changes? Most of the time we are disoriented. In some cases, we are shocked, as if we were paralyzed. And I think it’s time that we as the EU are prepared to deal with the shocks.
What role do the coastal countries in West Africa play?
Of course, we must defend them and help them because they are suffering from the effects of the security threats from the Sahel. But I think focusing on the coastal countries and not on the Sahel, especially the central Sahel, and especially Burkina Faso, which is the epicenter of all these phenomena, would be a strategic mistake. Now is the time for proper planning for the future in order to increase the EU’s resilience and, in particular, to maintain it as the political partner we need for the Sahel. Because otherwise, if we continue to advocate democracy, we have to support it with very strong arguments, because democracy is not a magic formula. It is a process. And that’s why we have to be political. That’s what I find most difficult in the EU at the moment.
The Italian Emanuela Claudia Del Re was appointed EU Special Representative for the Sahel by the EU Council in 2021. Her term of office runs until November 2024. The sociologist had a long career in research before becoming a member of the Italian parliament in 2018 (Movimento 5 Stelle). Del Re was Italy’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation under Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte.
He has the phone number of Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in his phone. He has worked for EU Commissioners Günther Verheugen and Peter Mandelson. Andreas Schwarz, Deputy Director-General at the EU anti-fraud agency OLAF since March 2023, is one of the really well-wired Germans in the EU Commission.
Schwarz did not initially set his sights on a career in the EU. At the end of the 1990s, he wrote a doctoral thesis in economics at the University of Potsdam on the upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the planned economy. He came to Brussels to do research. “At the end of the week, I had two job offers”, he recalls. He accepted one of them and worked for two years in the Directorate-General for Competition on state aid cases such as that of the Leuna refinery. His interest in the EU was awakened.
After completing his doctorate, Andreas Schwarz initially joined the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit in Germany. In 2003, he returned to the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Development and dealt with microfinance. His career has often been about money. Hardly anyone in Brussels knows as much about the EU budget as the 54-year-old.
In 2005, he initially took on a very political role and coordinated the protection instruments against unfair trade practices such as anti-dumping duties in the Directorate-General for Trade. The then Commissioner Peter Mandelson, a British Social Democrat, wanted to reform the instruments, which met with resistance in member states with a stronger industrial base, such as Germany. And so Schwarz had to fight against precisely this reform of trade instruments when he joined the cabinet of then Industry Commissioner Günter Verheugen (SPD) in 2007.
This post was followed by other cabinet positions, first with Polish Budget Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski as Deputy Head of Cabinet and then in the same position with his Bulgarian successor Georgieva. Budget was to become Schwarz’s major topic. He was involved twice in the difficult negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). From 2016 to 2019, he headed the MFF unit in the Directorate-General for Budget, and from 2018 to 2022 he was Director of Revenue and MFF.
The switch to the EU anti-fraud authority OLAF last year had its logic. After all, the aim here is to ensure that EU funds do not seep away into dark channels. Schwarz would like to bring the investigative authority, which has a somewhat niche existence due to its remit, more into the mainstream of Commission policy.
He benefits from the fact that he has a network within the EU Commission and knows the Directors-General and their deputies: “I can build bridges.” The head of OLAF, Ville Itälä from Finland, has a background in politics, was a minister in his home country and later an MEP, and does not know the EU Commission from the inside.
The anti-fraud authority OLAF with its 400 employees rarely makes it into the headlines. The annual report is regularly only worth a relatively small news item. OLAF’s technical expertise is not really known, even within the Commission. OLAF employs digital forensic experts who can analyze computers and cell phones. “Many people don’t even know what they have with OLAF“, says Schwarz.
Some cases are quite spectacular. For example, after Brexit, the UK had to transfer a total of three billion euros to the EU Commission because fraudsters had deliberately understated the value of shoes and textiles in previous years and therefore paid too little duty. The criminal ring had deliberately chosen a country with weak customs controls. “For me, it is a question of credibility that the EU prevents such fraud,” says Schwarz.
The Mannheim native, who is married to a Danish woman and speaks Danish, cannot imagine working on anything other than European integration. Although the EU’s role in the world is declining in terms of both its economic power and population, Andreas Schwarz is optimistic about the future: “The EU has already overcome many difficulties.” Silke Wettach
It is all but certain that the Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) will be upgraded to a fully-fledged committee in these critical times. However, the exact responsibilities of the committee are likely to be the subject of fierce debate in the coming weeks. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP), who was elected chair of the (still) subcommittee of the European Parliament on Tuesday, wants the subcommittee to be given more responsibility over industrial defense issues.
The former Chair of the Defense Committee in the German Bundestag told Table.Briefings that “Defense Policy and Defense Industry must not be considered separately”, and Strack-Zimmermann added that the new competences will be negotiated primarily with the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Industry (ITRE) over the summer and in September.
It can be assumed that none of the committees would like to cede powers. However, AFET circles say that the responsibilities here are already clearly separated and that the chairman of the committee, David McAllister, has himself called for the subcommittee to be upgraded. The disputes with ITRE and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) are therefore likely to be far more serious.
These are also linked to developments in the EU Commission. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has promised to create the post of EU Commissioner for Defense, who will be responsible for coordinating the strengthening of the industrial base and innovation in the defense sector.
The committee in Parliament should reflect the competencies of the new Commissioner. Defense issues are currently being handled primarily by Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton, who is certainly not going to hand over responsibility without resistance. After the summer break, these power struggles will really pick up speed.
Wishing you a relaxing weekend!
In May, Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber were still openly toying with the idea of cooperating with parties from the national-conservative camp such as the Fratelli d’Italia. After the European elections on June 9, there was soon no more talk of this. The simple reason: a center-right alliance of Liberals, EPP and ECR would not have had a majority. And the two leading Christian Democrats had to fear that open cooperation with the ECR would alienate the Social Democrats and parts of the Liberals.
Instead, they concentrated on forging an alliance with S&D and Renew. Von der Leyen also sought the support of the Greens. The four centrist groups therefore probably accounted for the vast majority of the 401 votes that elected von der Leyen for a second term as Commission President.
However, this does not mean that this alliance will also endure in the votes on individual legislative proposals. The European Parliament does not have fixed coalitions like in the Bundestag anyway, and conservative forces in the EPP do not want to give up the option of pushing through their agenda with the help of right-wing MEPs. This could happen in negotiations on the phase-out of combustion engines or the inclusion of agriculture in the Green Deal.
Leading S&D MEPs are already warning the EPP against “making dirty deals with the far right”. Political scientist Manuel Müller warns: “The more openly the EPP cooperates with the far right, the more trust in the centrist alliance will be destroyed“.
The EPP (188 seats) and the ECR (78) have a combined total of 266 seats. Together with Renew (77), this right-wing liberal majority would have a mathematical total of 343 seats, giving it a size that would enable it to win votes with a few votes from the far right.
The political groups will never vote uniformly in the European Parliament. Group discipline is not that pronounced. Nevertheless, the figures show that there could be alliances between the EPP, ECR and Liberals when it comes to legislation. There are also forces on the right wing of Renew, such as the Dutch VVD, “which would certainly vote with the ECR in individual cases”, says Müller. The party is in coalition in The Hague with the right-wing extremist Geert Wilders.
In addition, an absolute majority of 360 seats is rarely required for votes on individual reports on legislative proposals. The political groups expect that even in the European Parliament, which now has 719 seats, 340 votes are usually enough to win a vote.
ECR Co-President Nicola Procaccini is banking on this: “There is a conservative majority in this European Parliament. That will become apparent in the legislation”, he said in plenary. The balance in the new Parliament has indeed shifted to the right. The EPP, ECR and the Patriots for Europe of Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen have a total of 350 seats. To the right of the Patriots, there is also the radical right-wing group ESN around the AfD with a further 25 seats. For comparison: in the last European Parliament, the EPP, ECR and ID only had 304 seats.
So far, there have been no agreements between the EPP and the radical right. EPP MEPs also did not support any motions put forward by the far right. It has happened that ID MEPs have voted in favor of the EPP, and their votes have even tipped the scales. But they did not talk to each other. EPP leader Manfred Weber affirms that the firewall to the right remains in place.
However, this does not exclude the ECR per se. In the EPP, however, it is expected that ECR leader Giorgia Meloni will urge the 24 Fratelli MEPs to coordinate closely with the EPP line. In addition, three members of the Czech ODS and three members of the Flemish NVA, who are likely to have already voted for von der Leyen, are possible supporters of the ECR.
Bernd Lange (SPD), one of the most experienced MEPs and already in his sixth parliamentary term, trusts that the EPP will maintain the “cordon sanitaire” with the two radical right-wing groups. He also acknowledges: “Without the EPP, there are no majorities in the new Parliament, you have to accept that.”
This puts the Christian Democrats in a new position of power. An experienced EPP MEP expects that the platform of the EPP, S&D and Renew will “almost always ensure majorities ” in legislation, possibly supplemented by votes from the ECR. However, if the Commission were to introduce very far-reaching proposals on environmental policy in the manner of Frans Timmermans, former Vice-President of the Green Deal, for example, the EPP could block them. Possible candidates for this are the new proposals on pesticide reduction or the inclusion of agriculture in emissions trading.
The EPP is watching very closely to see whether Teresa Ribera will be given a role in the Commission like Frans Timmermans used to be. The socialist and former Spanish environment minister is seen as a hardliner.
The Christian Democrats’ blockade options in turn put pressure on the center-left groups. “This gives the EPP leverage to force concessions from the Social Democrats”, says Nicolai von Ondarza, research group leader at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). The latter would then have to show a willingness to compromise.
This is precisely what the S&D Group fears. It therefore pushed for a written agreement between the groups that support von der Leyen. EPP leader Weber, however, did not want to be bound. A high-ranking S&D MEP is therefore calling for a “regular dialog” with the EPP group. Preventing the EPP from making deals with the far right will be a “tightrope act”.
Ms. Del Re,why did Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, of all countries, not send government representatives to the General Assembly of the Sahel Alliance in Berlin?
I don’t think it’s a strong political message. Niger doesn’t always take part in international events, but Mali and Burkina Faso do. I recently met both the Foreign Minister of Mali and the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso in Brussels. We will look into the circumstances in the future, but they have been present on many occasions. Germany has ongoing projects in all the countries of the Sahel, and as I always say, Germany is a giant in the region, both in terms of commitment and in terms of resources.
So do you know why they didn’t come?
I don’t know.
How seriously do you take Russia’s influence in the region?
I take this very seriously. Russia has been present in Africa for decades, so it’s not a newcomer. But obviously everything has changed with the war in Ukraine. They are continuing their normal relations that have always existed. But they are trying to refine, intensify and expand their disinformation capability. This is a real instrument of war. I fear this very much because it is very easy to spread malicious messages. This is becoming a real concern for the EU. The EU has set up a special task force to counter this kind of communication. It penetrates the mentality of the population and can be very damaging because it creates an image of the EU that is unacceptable.
Where do the EU countries’ perspectives on the situation in the Sahel differ?
There are different perspectives. Because, although we have reached a consensus – and I fought really hard to make sure that the 27 countries reached a consensus on the need for engagement – there is this idea that has been prominent recently: it’s about a transactional kind of development cooperation, where you assess the level of cooperation and the willingness to cooperate of the countries that you have partnered with. Based on their behavior, whether they behave well and perform well or not, you decide whether you should continue to invest.
There is talk from German government circles that France’s failure in the Sahel must be worked around.
Well, at the moment I think France is going through a self-reflection. They obviously want to remain engaged in the region, but they need to find a new dimension and also, of course, a way to have a dialog with these countries when, unfortunately, in their current narrative, especially at the political level, the countries are always demonstrating that they are against France.
You say that the EU must cooperate with the junta countries, from your point of view, even with countries like Burkina where people are disappearing. Journalists too. How does that work, and who can you talk to openly?
I also talk to civil society, but the fact that you talk to the authorities is fundamental. Because if we don’t get our messages across, we don’t tell them how dangerous it is to behave in a certain way. It’s a process that needs to be set in motion. Of course, it is very difficult to talk to the military juntas at the moment because they are very aggressive. I myself have met the President of Mali several times.
So do you have access to the President of Mali, General Assimi Goïta?
Yes, I had access to the President. Lately, however, I’ve been talking more with the ministers. And of course there have been things that have affected our relations. In particular, the arrival of the Wagner Group has affected our relations. That was an absolute red line for us. Of course I know that other Russians are also coming, but Iranians are also coming. The region is very crowded. People think it’s a desert, but I think it’s very crowded and also very dynamic. The risk for the EU is to remain excluded from these historic movements.
I always emphasize the resilience of the EU, even though I don’t like the term. We always talk about the resilience of societies. What about the resilience of the EU in the face of these changes? Most of the time we are disoriented. In some cases, we are shocked, as if we were paralyzed. And I think it’s time that we as the EU are prepared to deal with the shocks.
What role do the coastal countries in West Africa play?
Of course, we must defend them and help them because they are suffering from the effects of the security threats from the Sahel. But I think focusing on the coastal countries and not on the Sahel, especially the central Sahel, and especially Burkina Faso, which is the epicenter of all these phenomena, would be a strategic mistake. Now is the time for proper planning for the future in order to increase the EU’s resilience and, in particular, to maintain it as the political partner we need for the Sahel. Because otherwise, if we continue to advocate democracy, we have to support it with very strong arguments, because democracy is not a magic formula. It is a process. And that’s why we have to be political. That’s what I find most difficult in the EU at the moment.
The Italian Emanuela Claudia Del Re was appointed EU Special Representative for the Sahel by the EU Council in 2021. Her term of office runs until November 2024. The sociologist had a long career in research before becoming a member of the Italian parliament in 2018 (Movimento 5 Stelle). Del Re was Italy’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation under Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte.
He has the phone number of Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in his phone. He has worked for EU Commissioners Günther Verheugen and Peter Mandelson. Andreas Schwarz, Deputy Director-General at the EU anti-fraud agency OLAF since March 2023, is one of the really well-wired Germans in the EU Commission.
Schwarz did not initially set his sights on a career in the EU. At the end of the 1990s, he wrote a doctoral thesis in economics at the University of Potsdam on the upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the planned economy. He came to Brussels to do research. “At the end of the week, I had two job offers”, he recalls. He accepted one of them and worked for two years in the Directorate-General for Competition on state aid cases such as that of the Leuna refinery. His interest in the EU was awakened.
After completing his doctorate, Andreas Schwarz initially joined the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit in Germany. In 2003, he returned to the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Development and dealt with microfinance. His career has often been about money. Hardly anyone in Brussels knows as much about the EU budget as the 54-year-old.
In 2005, he initially took on a very political role and coordinated the protection instruments against unfair trade practices such as anti-dumping duties in the Directorate-General for Trade. The then Commissioner Peter Mandelson, a British Social Democrat, wanted to reform the instruments, which met with resistance in member states with a stronger industrial base, such as Germany. And so Schwarz had to fight against precisely this reform of trade instruments when he joined the cabinet of then Industry Commissioner Günter Verheugen (SPD) in 2007.
This post was followed by other cabinet positions, first with Polish Budget Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski as Deputy Head of Cabinet and then in the same position with his Bulgarian successor Georgieva. Budget was to become Schwarz’s major topic. He was involved twice in the difficult negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). From 2016 to 2019, he headed the MFF unit in the Directorate-General for Budget, and from 2018 to 2022 he was Director of Revenue and MFF.
The switch to the EU anti-fraud authority OLAF last year had its logic. After all, the aim here is to ensure that EU funds do not seep away into dark channels. Schwarz would like to bring the investigative authority, which has a somewhat niche existence due to its remit, more into the mainstream of Commission policy.
He benefits from the fact that he has a network within the EU Commission and knows the Directors-General and their deputies: “I can build bridges.” The head of OLAF, Ville Itälä from Finland, has a background in politics, was a minister in his home country and later an MEP, and does not know the EU Commission from the inside.
The anti-fraud authority OLAF with its 400 employees rarely makes it into the headlines. The annual report is regularly only worth a relatively small news item. OLAF’s technical expertise is not really known, even within the Commission. OLAF employs digital forensic experts who can analyze computers and cell phones. “Many people don’t even know what they have with OLAF“, says Schwarz.
Some cases are quite spectacular. For example, after Brexit, the UK had to transfer a total of three billion euros to the EU Commission because fraudsters had deliberately understated the value of shoes and textiles in previous years and therefore paid too little duty. The criminal ring had deliberately chosen a country with weak customs controls. “For me, it is a question of credibility that the EU prevents such fraud,” says Schwarz.
The Mannheim native, who is married to a Danish woman and speaks Danish, cannot imagine working on anything other than European integration. Although the EU’s role in the world is declining in terms of both its economic power and population, Andreas Schwarz is optimistic about the future: “The EU has already overcome many difficulties.” Silke Wettach