Yesterday was not a good day for Ursula von der Leyen. Not only because “Bild” denounced the climate-damaging short trips of the Commission President by charter jet (for example from Vienna to Bratislava, as The Telegraph, reported on Tuesday). What’s more: FDP MEP Moritz Körner spoke out in an extremely critical article in Focus and demanded: “She should leave by 2024 at the latest.”
Something is brewing for von der Leyen in the German “traffic light” coalition negotiations. Körner is not just anyone, he sits on the FDP presidium. Olaf Scholz is not a known fan of the CDU politician anyway: The coalition partner SPD forced Chancellor Angela Merkel to abstain on the appointment of the former German defense minister to the European Council.
To this day, Social Democrats resent the way von der Leyen became Commission president: with the help of Emmanuel Macron and other heads of state and government, not as a top candidate in the European elections. “Ms. von der Leyen’s leadership mandate did not emerge from a coalition born in the European Parliament,” said SPD presidium member Udo Bullmann. “This is simply a structural weakness and noticeable in concrete policy.”
So should von der Leyen seek a second term in Brussels, she can hardly hope for the support of her government. That would still leave her with the option of becoming the EPP’s top candidate. However, that would not only contain a good dose of irony. Given the weakness of the Christian Democrats, not only in Germany, it seems quite possible that the EPP won’t even get a chance.
From Berlin to Glasgow: the headlines from the world climate summit sound quite hopeful these days. On Wednesday, first billion-dollar announcements on climate financing from the private sector, then yesterday numerous countries committed to the coal phase-out, as Timo Landenberger reports.
However, on the issues that could determine the success of this world climate conference, there have been few tangible results so far. The Paris Agreement’s rulebook – and Article 6 in particular – is still awaiting completion. There has been some small progress, as Lukas Scheid analyses. Yet, the EU negotiators are far from satisfied – and are building up pressure on Brazil in particular.
Energy Day in Glasgow. Fossil fuels still account for the largest share of the global energy mix and are responsible for more than 80 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. This is set to change. EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson stressed at the global climate conference (COP26) that the current situation on the energy markets is also no reason to postpone the coal phase-out. “On the contrary, it shows the urgency to accelerate the deployment of clean energy solutions and drastically reduce our dependence on fossil fuels.”
Around 50 countries made new commitments on Thursday to phase out coal-fired power generation, by far the largest source of CO2 emissions. Among them are Poland, Indonesia, Vietnam, South Korea, Egypt, Spain, Chile, and Ukraine. In the Coal to Clean Declaration, countries also pledged to expand renewables and ensure a just transition. This brings the number of countries committed to phasing out coal to 190, with large economies expected to shut down the last power plants in the 2030s and poorer countries in the 2040s.
The German government, which is itself one of the signatories, welcomes the new pledges, but also demands that the phase-out of coal-fired power generation is not accompanied by a move into other fossil fuels or nuclear power. Germany will support its partner countries in making the move away from coal mining and coal use socially and environmentally sustainable, the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Saftey said. Most recently, a new energy partnership was agreed with South Africa (Europe.Table reported).
Previously, the G20 countries had already agreed on an end to international coal financing and pledged support, especially to emerging and developing countries, in phasing out coal and transitioning to green technologies. Banks and financial institutions have also made landmark commitments to end financing for coal-fired power generation. These include major international lenders such as HSBC, Fidelity International, and Ethos.
Furthermore, on Thursday 25th industrialized and developing countries as well as financial institutions committed to phasing out international financing for fossil fuels by the end of next year. This means that, in addition to coal, the focus of international climate protection efforts is now also shifting away from gas and oil production.
The signatories include Italy, Canada, the USA, and Denmark. The European Investment Bank and the French Development Bank are also among the supporters. In total, it is estimated that nearly $18 billion in public subsidies could be shifted from fossil fuels to clean energy each year.
China, which makes the largest investments in fossil fuels, is not represented, nor is Germany. David Ryfisch, head of the International Climate Policy team at Germanwatch, criticizes the reticence: “The coalition negotiations in Berlin should send a clear signal that there will be no more German development and export financing for coal, oil, and gas. German taxpayers’ money must not be allowed to subsidize the international continuation of fossil fuels.”
According to a study, global carbon dioxide emissions have almost returned to pre-Corona levels, mainly because of emissions from coal and gas-fired power plants. Although emissions in the transport sector remain rather low, the study by the Global Carbon Project presented on Thursday said. However, emissions from coal and natural gas in the energy and industrial sectors have risen significantly as a result of the economic recovery. China and India in particular are likely to report even higher greenhouse gas emissions this year than in 2019.
Nevertheless, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was surprisingly optimistic. If all previous climate pledges, including the promised reduction of methane emissions, were fulfilled, global warming could be limited to 1.8 degrees, IEA head Fatih Birol wrote on Twitter. That’s what an IEA analysis showed, he said. With rtr
At the end of September, China’s icebreaker “Xuelong 2” returned to its homeport of Shanghai. Onboard the “Snow Dragon”: the autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) “Tansuo 4500”, which had been used for the first time for scientific research near the seabed in the latitudes of the Arctic. “Tansuo 4500” collected important data in the icy waters at the Gakkel Ridge, state news agency Xinhua reported. According to the report, the data will provide information about the exchange of matter and energy and the geological processes at the mountain range in the deep sea – and contribute to an “intensive participation of China” in environmental protection in the Arctic.
The ice in the Arctic region is melting. “The Arctic is warming three times faster than the global average,” stresses the EU’s special envoy for Arctic affairs, Michael Mann, in an interview with Europe.Table. With its climate ambitions under the Green Deal, the European Union also has increased interest in the polar region. In mid-October, Brussels published the new edition of its Arctic Strategy. This was prepared jointly by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Commission. It is primarily about climate and environmental protection, but also about international cooperation.
For example, the EU wants to end the extraction of fossil fuels in the Arctic: “The EU will press for oil, coal, and gas to remain in the ground,” the paper says. Member states are also to be banned from buying energy from Arctic sources.
However, it’s not just about the environment and the fight against global warming. The melting ice has also awakened geopolitical ambitions – not least in China. Among other things, Beijing wants to integrate the polar routes into its “Belt and Road” initiative and is scenting raw materials in the region. The People’s Republic describes itself as a state “close to the Arctic”.
“The geopolitical situation in the Arctic has changed a lot recently. There is much more global interest in Arctic affairs,” Mann says. He has been the EU ambassador for the region since April 2020; before moving to Brussels, Mann was the EU ambassador to Iceland for two and a half years. He is therefore well aware of the Chinese influence in the region: China maintains the largest embassy in Reykjavík.
For the EU, Chinese activities in the Arctic region are a security issue. Beijing’s projects in the far north are therefore being closely monitored: China is investing in particular in Russian liquefied natural gas, infrastructure projects such as cable links, and mining, Mann said. “Beijing is investing a lot, but is not yet as active in the Arctic as it is in other parts of the world.”
However, the far north has also moved up the agenda in Brussels. Three EU Member States, as well as two members of the European Economic Area, are Polar littoral states. The EU is also a major consumer of raw materials from the area. And it wants to play a role as a “geopolitical player” in the region, as Mann explains. But since the EU is not a military power, it must take the diplomatic route: through regional and international cooperation.
In its revised Arctic strategy, Brussels is also focusing on dialogue with all stakeholders in the region. Mann believes that the potential for conflict in the region is currently low. Russian and Chinese interest in the maritime polar routes is well known. However, the routes are still difficult to navigate, Mann said. It is therefore rather unlikely that transport journeys there will soon become rampant.
The polar region includes all countries whose territory extends into the Arctic Circle. These are the USA, Canada, Russia, as well as Denmark for Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The EU now wants to work even more closely with allies and, for example, expand its diplomatic activities in Greenland; The autonomous territory of Denmark is not part of the EU. A permanent presence on the ground could now help expand Brussels’ influence – and at the same time contain the Chinese one.
In addition to the EEAS and the EU Commission, the European Parliament in particular is pushing for greater engagement in the Arctic. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, David McAllister (CDU), stressed: “Given the growing challenges in the Arctic, it is right and important to reassess the common approach to coordinated European action in the High North. In the future, there should be more EU in the Arctic and more Arctic in the EU.”
The region distinguished itself as a “zone of peace” until a few years ago. “In recent years, however, the Russian government has been militarily arming in the far north. China, too, is developing an ever greater strategic interest in the Arctic,” McAllister warns.
China is moving closer to the European states in the north in the polar region. Estonian MEP Riho Terras, a former army general in his home country, sees this as a major risk: “China is being allowed to influence the security of Europe and the entire West,” he said during the debate on the EU Arctic strategy. The melting ice has given new momentum to the race for the Arctic, Terras said.
Against this background, only time will tell whether the Arctic can be kept free of conflict. The geopolitical race for the North Pole has only just begun.
CO2-neutral has become a popular label for many companies. More and more companies are advertising their products with this label – whether to attract customers or to be classified as sustainable – also with a view to the financial markets. They can usually achieve this by offsetting their emissions with voluntary certificates from so-called offset markets. Elsewhere, for example, renewable energies are promoted to avoid additional emissions, or trees are planted to absorb and store CO2 already emitted from the atmosphere in the long term.
Currently, the global demand for such CO2 credits is increasing. However, the offset markets came into being under the Kyoto Protocol, when many countries did not yet have national savings targets. An adaptation to current circumstances and technical possibilities is urgently needed. At the current COP26, clear rules should be formulated for crediting in the context of international trade in certificates, as provided for in Article 6 of the Paris Climate Agreement.
Unlike under the Kyoto Protocol, virtually all countries have now committed to reducing emissions. Therefore, the question arises as to how internationally traded certificates are counted. If project-financed emission reductions are counted towards national savings targets, they should not simultaneously count as reductions in another country. This means that rules must be formulated that prevent the double counting of avoided emissions.
As long as the offsets are voluntary, the problem of crediting is less critical because these CO2 certificates do not take effect for the savings targets in the country of the recipient. This means that a European company cannot count voluntary CO2 offsets in European emissions trading, and it is the company’s responsibility to credibly communicate to its customers that CO2 has been avoided elsewhere through these projects.
However, this restriction only applies for a limited time – because nationally accounted emissions must fall to zero as quickly as possible. For example, the proposals in the EU’s Fit for 55 package called for the linear reduction factor to be raised and for the EU ETS to become net-zero and then even net negative as early as the end of the next decade.
However, there are industries – such as cement production – in which CO2 emissions cannot be reduced to zero. A continuation of European emissions trading then presupposes that creditable CO2 certificates continue to be available, which cannot additionally be counted as emission reductions outside the EU ETS in another country.
Therefore, in addition to CO2 offsets through additional avoidance, there is an increasing need for CO2 certificates from the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. In the case of such CO2 removal certificates, there has so far been a strong focus on nature-based solutions such as the reforestation of forests or the renaturation of peatlands. However, it is unclear whether these measures could or should create a sufficient supply of CO2 certificates. Here, the focus should initially be on the preservation of threatened areas and the avoidance of emissions that would result from the destruction of the areas.
To meet the demand for CO2 removal, technical solutions are therefore also needed, i.e. CO2 removed from the atmosphere is stored geologically or in building materials, or used as part of a circular CO2 economy. Methods such as the direct air capture process are already being operated on a small scale in Iceland.
Markets for CO2 removal would enable the decentralized development of different technologies and approaches. There, the (still) few suppliers could come together with the demanders for CO2 removal and reduce the relatively high transaction costs of bilateral, project-based CO2 trading. Through standardization and a uniform price signal, decentralized market power can develop here, so that technical CO2 removal can develop sufficiently to still come close to the 1.5-degree target.
At the same time, CO2 removal markets are steps towards comprehensive emissions trading. Allowances that can be used in different national CO2 price systems make it possible to link them. Such a linking appears to be simpler in regulatory terms than a complete linking of national markets. With such an indirect linking, different special features such as the European market stability reserve can be maintained. Moreover, with uniform CO2 removal allowances, it would be easier to prove their additionality and to track offsetting in different countries.
Yesterday was not a good day for Ursula von der Leyen. Not only because “Bild” denounced the climate-damaging short trips of the Commission President by charter jet (for example from Vienna to Bratislava, as The Telegraph, reported on Tuesday). What’s more: FDP MEP Moritz Körner spoke out in an extremely critical article in Focus and demanded: “She should leave by 2024 at the latest.”
Something is brewing for von der Leyen in the German “traffic light” coalition negotiations. Körner is not just anyone, he sits on the FDP presidium. Olaf Scholz is not a known fan of the CDU politician anyway: The coalition partner SPD forced Chancellor Angela Merkel to abstain on the appointment of the former German defense minister to the European Council.
To this day, Social Democrats resent the way von der Leyen became Commission president: with the help of Emmanuel Macron and other heads of state and government, not as a top candidate in the European elections. “Ms. von der Leyen’s leadership mandate did not emerge from a coalition born in the European Parliament,” said SPD presidium member Udo Bullmann. “This is simply a structural weakness and noticeable in concrete policy.”
So should von der Leyen seek a second term in Brussels, she can hardly hope for the support of her government. That would still leave her with the option of becoming the EPP’s top candidate. However, that would not only contain a good dose of irony. Given the weakness of the Christian Democrats, not only in Germany, it seems quite possible that the EPP won’t even get a chance.
From Berlin to Glasgow: the headlines from the world climate summit sound quite hopeful these days. On Wednesday, first billion-dollar announcements on climate financing from the private sector, then yesterday numerous countries committed to the coal phase-out, as Timo Landenberger reports.
However, on the issues that could determine the success of this world climate conference, there have been few tangible results so far. The Paris Agreement’s rulebook – and Article 6 in particular – is still awaiting completion. There has been some small progress, as Lukas Scheid analyses. Yet, the EU negotiators are far from satisfied – and are building up pressure on Brazil in particular.
Energy Day in Glasgow. Fossil fuels still account for the largest share of the global energy mix and are responsible for more than 80 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. This is set to change. EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson stressed at the global climate conference (COP26) that the current situation on the energy markets is also no reason to postpone the coal phase-out. “On the contrary, it shows the urgency to accelerate the deployment of clean energy solutions and drastically reduce our dependence on fossil fuels.”
Around 50 countries made new commitments on Thursday to phase out coal-fired power generation, by far the largest source of CO2 emissions. Among them are Poland, Indonesia, Vietnam, South Korea, Egypt, Spain, Chile, and Ukraine. In the Coal to Clean Declaration, countries also pledged to expand renewables and ensure a just transition. This brings the number of countries committed to phasing out coal to 190, with large economies expected to shut down the last power plants in the 2030s and poorer countries in the 2040s.
The German government, which is itself one of the signatories, welcomes the new pledges, but also demands that the phase-out of coal-fired power generation is not accompanied by a move into other fossil fuels or nuclear power. Germany will support its partner countries in making the move away from coal mining and coal use socially and environmentally sustainable, the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Saftey said. Most recently, a new energy partnership was agreed with South Africa (Europe.Table reported).
Previously, the G20 countries had already agreed on an end to international coal financing and pledged support, especially to emerging and developing countries, in phasing out coal and transitioning to green technologies. Banks and financial institutions have also made landmark commitments to end financing for coal-fired power generation. These include major international lenders such as HSBC, Fidelity International, and Ethos.
Furthermore, on Thursday 25th industrialized and developing countries as well as financial institutions committed to phasing out international financing for fossil fuels by the end of next year. This means that, in addition to coal, the focus of international climate protection efforts is now also shifting away from gas and oil production.
The signatories include Italy, Canada, the USA, and Denmark. The European Investment Bank and the French Development Bank are also among the supporters. In total, it is estimated that nearly $18 billion in public subsidies could be shifted from fossil fuels to clean energy each year.
China, which makes the largest investments in fossil fuels, is not represented, nor is Germany. David Ryfisch, head of the International Climate Policy team at Germanwatch, criticizes the reticence: “The coalition negotiations in Berlin should send a clear signal that there will be no more German development and export financing for coal, oil, and gas. German taxpayers’ money must not be allowed to subsidize the international continuation of fossil fuels.”
According to a study, global carbon dioxide emissions have almost returned to pre-Corona levels, mainly because of emissions from coal and gas-fired power plants. Although emissions in the transport sector remain rather low, the study by the Global Carbon Project presented on Thursday said. However, emissions from coal and natural gas in the energy and industrial sectors have risen significantly as a result of the economic recovery. China and India in particular are likely to report even higher greenhouse gas emissions this year than in 2019.
Nevertheless, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was surprisingly optimistic. If all previous climate pledges, including the promised reduction of methane emissions, were fulfilled, global warming could be limited to 1.8 degrees, IEA head Fatih Birol wrote on Twitter. That’s what an IEA analysis showed, he said. With rtr
At the end of September, China’s icebreaker “Xuelong 2” returned to its homeport of Shanghai. Onboard the “Snow Dragon”: the autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) “Tansuo 4500”, which had been used for the first time for scientific research near the seabed in the latitudes of the Arctic. “Tansuo 4500” collected important data in the icy waters at the Gakkel Ridge, state news agency Xinhua reported. According to the report, the data will provide information about the exchange of matter and energy and the geological processes at the mountain range in the deep sea – and contribute to an “intensive participation of China” in environmental protection in the Arctic.
The ice in the Arctic region is melting. “The Arctic is warming three times faster than the global average,” stresses the EU’s special envoy for Arctic affairs, Michael Mann, in an interview with Europe.Table. With its climate ambitions under the Green Deal, the European Union also has increased interest in the polar region. In mid-October, Brussels published the new edition of its Arctic Strategy. This was prepared jointly by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Commission. It is primarily about climate and environmental protection, but also about international cooperation.
For example, the EU wants to end the extraction of fossil fuels in the Arctic: “The EU will press for oil, coal, and gas to remain in the ground,” the paper says. Member states are also to be banned from buying energy from Arctic sources.
However, it’s not just about the environment and the fight against global warming. The melting ice has also awakened geopolitical ambitions – not least in China. Among other things, Beijing wants to integrate the polar routes into its “Belt and Road” initiative and is scenting raw materials in the region. The People’s Republic describes itself as a state “close to the Arctic”.
“The geopolitical situation in the Arctic has changed a lot recently. There is much more global interest in Arctic affairs,” Mann says. He has been the EU ambassador for the region since April 2020; before moving to Brussels, Mann was the EU ambassador to Iceland for two and a half years. He is therefore well aware of the Chinese influence in the region: China maintains the largest embassy in Reykjavík.
For the EU, Chinese activities in the Arctic region are a security issue. Beijing’s projects in the far north are therefore being closely monitored: China is investing in particular in Russian liquefied natural gas, infrastructure projects such as cable links, and mining, Mann said. “Beijing is investing a lot, but is not yet as active in the Arctic as it is in other parts of the world.”
However, the far north has also moved up the agenda in Brussels. Three EU Member States, as well as two members of the European Economic Area, are Polar littoral states. The EU is also a major consumer of raw materials from the area. And it wants to play a role as a “geopolitical player” in the region, as Mann explains. But since the EU is not a military power, it must take the diplomatic route: through regional and international cooperation.
In its revised Arctic strategy, Brussels is also focusing on dialogue with all stakeholders in the region. Mann believes that the potential for conflict in the region is currently low. Russian and Chinese interest in the maritime polar routes is well known. However, the routes are still difficult to navigate, Mann said. It is therefore rather unlikely that transport journeys there will soon become rampant.
The polar region includes all countries whose territory extends into the Arctic Circle. These are the USA, Canada, Russia, as well as Denmark for Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The EU now wants to work even more closely with allies and, for example, expand its diplomatic activities in Greenland; The autonomous territory of Denmark is not part of the EU. A permanent presence on the ground could now help expand Brussels’ influence – and at the same time contain the Chinese one.
In addition to the EEAS and the EU Commission, the European Parliament in particular is pushing for greater engagement in the Arctic. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, David McAllister (CDU), stressed: “Given the growing challenges in the Arctic, it is right and important to reassess the common approach to coordinated European action in the High North. In the future, there should be more EU in the Arctic and more Arctic in the EU.”
The region distinguished itself as a “zone of peace” until a few years ago. “In recent years, however, the Russian government has been militarily arming in the far north. China, too, is developing an ever greater strategic interest in the Arctic,” McAllister warns.
China is moving closer to the European states in the north in the polar region. Estonian MEP Riho Terras, a former army general in his home country, sees this as a major risk: “China is being allowed to influence the security of Europe and the entire West,” he said during the debate on the EU Arctic strategy. The melting ice has given new momentum to the race for the Arctic, Terras said.
Against this background, only time will tell whether the Arctic can be kept free of conflict. The geopolitical race for the North Pole has only just begun.
CO2-neutral has become a popular label for many companies. More and more companies are advertising their products with this label – whether to attract customers or to be classified as sustainable – also with a view to the financial markets. They can usually achieve this by offsetting their emissions with voluntary certificates from so-called offset markets. Elsewhere, for example, renewable energies are promoted to avoid additional emissions, or trees are planted to absorb and store CO2 already emitted from the atmosphere in the long term.
Currently, the global demand for such CO2 credits is increasing. However, the offset markets came into being under the Kyoto Protocol, when many countries did not yet have national savings targets. An adaptation to current circumstances and technical possibilities is urgently needed. At the current COP26, clear rules should be formulated for crediting in the context of international trade in certificates, as provided for in Article 6 of the Paris Climate Agreement.
Unlike under the Kyoto Protocol, virtually all countries have now committed to reducing emissions. Therefore, the question arises as to how internationally traded certificates are counted. If project-financed emission reductions are counted towards national savings targets, they should not simultaneously count as reductions in another country. This means that rules must be formulated that prevent the double counting of avoided emissions.
As long as the offsets are voluntary, the problem of crediting is less critical because these CO2 certificates do not take effect for the savings targets in the country of the recipient. This means that a European company cannot count voluntary CO2 offsets in European emissions trading, and it is the company’s responsibility to credibly communicate to its customers that CO2 has been avoided elsewhere through these projects.
However, this restriction only applies for a limited time – because nationally accounted emissions must fall to zero as quickly as possible. For example, the proposals in the EU’s Fit for 55 package called for the linear reduction factor to be raised and for the EU ETS to become net-zero and then even net negative as early as the end of the next decade.
However, there are industries – such as cement production – in which CO2 emissions cannot be reduced to zero. A continuation of European emissions trading then presupposes that creditable CO2 certificates continue to be available, which cannot additionally be counted as emission reductions outside the EU ETS in another country.
Therefore, in addition to CO2 offsets through additional avoidance, there is an increasing need for CO2 certificates from the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. In the case of such CO2 removal certificates, there has so far been a strong focus on nature-based solutions such as the reforestation of forests or the renaturation of peatlands. However, it is unclear whether these measures could or should create a sufficient supply of CO2 certificates. Here, the focus should initially be on the preservation of threatened areas and the avoidance of emissions that would result from the destruction of the areas.
To meet the demand for CO2 removal, technical solutions are therefore also needed, i.e. CO2 removed from the atmosphere is stored geologically or in building materials, or used as part of a circular CO2 economy. Methods such as the direct air capture process are already being operated on a small scale in Iceland.
Markets for CO2 removal would enable the decentralized development of different technologies and approaches. There, the (still) few suppliers could come together with the demanders for CO2 removal and reduce the relatively high transaction costs of bilateral, project-based CO2 trading. Through standardization and a uniform price signal, decentralized market power can develop here, so that technical CO2 removal can develop sufficiently to still come close to the 1.5-degree target.
At the same time, CO2 removal markets are steps towards comprehensive emissions trading. Allowances that can be used in different national CO2 price systems make it possible to link them. Such a linking appears to be simpler in regulatory terms than a complete linking of national markets. With such an indirect linking, different special features such as the European market stability reserve can be maintained. Moreover, with uniform CO2 removal allowances, it would be easier to prove their additionality and to track offsetting in different countries.
