France’s climate presidency + Exen • Table.Briefings

Dear reader,

Sometimes it’s quite good to see a concrete figure: €500 billion. This is the order of magnitude for investment in the new generation of nuclear power plants that EU Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton believes is necessary by 2050, as he told the Journal di Dimanche in an interview. Given the price history of nuclear power plants, the construction of which has rarely stayed on budget, this could be even more profound. But Breton, the go-getting commissioner whom critics like to accuse of being a French commissioner first and an EU commissioner second, is convinced of the need. So are parts of Europe and large sections of French politics, though not the German government, as the new Minister of the Environment Steffi Lemke made clear once again yesterday – though probably without consequence.

France’s presidency coincides with Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign for the April election. Macron’s credo: sovereignty. In terms of energy and climate policy, the second most populous member state is entering the Council presidency with massive vested interests. Stephan Israel analyzes what this means for the Fit for 55 package and why France’s government loves the border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

How China and its emissions trading system are dealt with will also play a significant role, when CBAM is implemented. The concrete EU CBAM design is still in the distance – but a look at the Chinese ETS, which is now entering its second calendar year, is all the more worthwhile. Christiane Kühl has analyzed the start-up phase.

The German government’s hydrogen strategy focuses on green hydrogen – but what is green? This is currently the subject of intense debate within the framework of the taxonomy. Why this is also highly relevant for the hydrogen market, why hydrogen as a substitute fuel still needs some time, and what role geopolitics will play, Markus Exenberger, the managing director of the H2Global Foundation, revealed to Timo Landenberger in an interview.

But it’s not quite that easy: Cornelius Matthes is to make the energy transition in the desert a reality. Desertec, now also with green hydrogen, the Profile in this energy-packed issue.

More than energy prices are at stake as Russia and the West confer in multiple formats over how cold or hot things should now get between states. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, in any case, made clear in an ABC interview, “We do nothing and commit to nothing on Europe without Europe. Anything that affects European security interests will be fully coordinated with the Europeans at the table.” Blinken did not reveal exactly which Europeans may sit at his table in the process. SPD Secretary-General Kevin Kühnert is unlikely to find a place there at the moment, following his comments on Nord Stream 2 that legal peace is necessary at some point and that the pipeline is now as good as finished.

A safe start to the new week,

Your
Falk Steiner

Ecological sovereignty: France’s concept for Europe

At the end of last week, the French government invited the Brussels press corps to Paris to present its plans, as customary at the rotating presidency. Emmanuel Macron himself remained very vague. He talked about advancing the most important legislative texts of the “Fit for 55” climate package by summer, i.e., the declared goal of reducing climate-damaging CO2 emissions by 55 percent by 2030 compared to 1990. And explicitly mentioned that the housing and transport sectors would also have to contribute to “decarbonization” in the future.

The president left the details to his ministers, who presented their plans in turn but were not allowed to be quoted. In France, the president has the last word in the pre-election mode. Macron’s big headline: “ecological sovereignty”: Europe should produce its own carbon-free energy, secure the supply of critical raw materials, develop and also manufacture the green technologies of the future on the continent. Europe should also export its norms and ecological standards, among other things, with the help of the planned CO2 border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

So much for the broad lines. In concrete terms, Barbara Pompili, Minister for Ecological Transition, wants to invite the environment and energy ministers of the member states to an informal meeting in Amiens from January 20th to 22nd. There, they will prepare for the Environment Council on March 6th and 7th. An agreement among the member states is planned for March on the new battery regulation, which will regulate ecological production and recycling. Also on the agenda is the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR), which will require charging stations every 60 kilometers at the latest.

ETS and CBAM as key instruments

Transport is the only sector in which emissions of climate pollutants have continued to increase since 1990, it was said in Paris. In addition to promoting electromobility, the aim is to reverse the trend with the emissions trading system (ETS), which in the future will cover not only industry and electricity but also housing and transport. The presidency attaches great importance to this being done in a socially acceptable way. The reform will fail if it is not accepted by the population. In France, the protests of the so-called yellow vests against higher fuel prices are still fresh in people’s minds.

France supports, in principle, the goal of banning the production of internal combustion engines by 2035 but is pushing for a transitional period for hybrid vehicles until 2040. All the legislative texts of the Fit for 55 package are interlinked, the goal of the Council Presidency is a political agreement in the Council of member states by the end of the French Presidency. The top priority for France in this regard is the Carbon Boundary Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The mechanism would force the EU’s trading partners to also rely on green technology. The CO2 levy on imports from high-carbon production and emissions trading are also “two sides of the same coin”.

Paris is cautious about its own success in taxonomy, where Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, at the request of the French, wants to classify not only gas but also nuclear as green energy sources under certain conditions. This is seen as an invitation to private investors. Alongside Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg are particularly critical of this and are threatening to challenge the classification with a lawsuit before the European Court of Justice. This is a scenario that worries the government in Paris: Up to now, the ecological transformation has been largely financed by public funds. Without private investment, it will not be possible to achieve the climate targets.

European Parliamentarians: much France, little balance

The ambitions of the French Council Presidency are not causing jubilation in the European Parliament. For Rasmus Andresen, spokesman for the German Greens, the Commission’s proposal on taxonomy, in general, has cast a shadow over the French presidency and its Fit for 55 plans. The inclusion of nuclear energy in green energy sources was clearly a gift from Ursula von der Leyen to Emmanuel Macron, he said. France’s president, he said, is not the great mediator that is actually needed now on the climate package. On the contrary, the taxonomy proposal is dividing the EU.

Jens Geier notes France’s particular preference for the border levy. The CBAM, he says, is in the tradition of French industrial policy, with its penchant for protectionism. However, the chairman of the SPD group in the S&D parliamentary group in the EU Parliament is not against the mechanism in principle. The question is how exactly it will be designed. The MEP from the Ruhr region warns that there is a great deal of skepticism among the industry. At present, the steel industry, aluminum producers, and fertilizer manufacturers receive free certificates through the ETS system in order to remain competitive with China or Brazil. In parallel with the introduction of the border mechanism, however, these free certificates would have to be gradually reduced to zero.

Whether the border mechanism will produce the desired results is not yet certain, Geier said. Manufacturers from third countries could circumvent the mechanism by, for example, producing steel for export to Europe with green energy but continuing to produce climate-damaging products at home and for other markets. The EU would then not have achieved its actual goal, and European industry would be left without effective protection.

“It is good that the French presidency wants to pursue the Fit for 55 package with great commitment,” says Peter Liese (CDU/EVP). So far, however, the positions in Paris have been strongly colored by national spectacles. Liese has the impression that France wants to tighten emissions trading for industry and electricity, but is hesitant when it comes to including housing and transport. “Personally, I think the opposite is true, and the French position is also certainly shaped at this point by the strong role of nuclear energy in France,” says the member of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). Liese also finds the schedule unrealistic: “It would already be a great success if the presidency reaches an agreement in the Council.” Stephan Israel

Markus Exenberger: “Hydrogen colonialism must not exist”

Markus Exenberger is Managing Director of the H2Global Foundation.

With the H2Global Foundation, the German government wants to support the import of hydrogen products and stimulate the ramp-up with a funding mechanism. A company set up for this purpose (Hydrogen Intermediary Network Company, HINT.Co) is commissioned to put certain green hydrogen products out to global tender. The cheapest provider will be awarded the contract for ten years at a fixed guaranteed purchase price.

HINT.Co then brings the product onto the European market via short-term auctions. The price difference between buying and selling is compensated by subsidies from the German government (a total of €900 billion is earmarked). As a result of the increasing demand for hydrogen, the price difference should close after ten years at the latest, the market ramp-up has been stimulated, and the foundation will cease its work.

Disclaimer: This interview has been translated into English and is not considered an official translation by any party involved in the interview.

Mr. Exenberger, we are facing a mammoth task with the green transformation. Opportunity or obstacle for the European energy industry?

Great opportunity and pretty much the last one we get to meet our climate commitments. But I see a lot of opportunities here for German industry in particular.

In what way?

We have to respond to new conditions worldwide, and this requires a great deal of innovative strength. I see Germany in a pole position here. The cards are being reshuffled on the international table. And the new federal government and German industry would be well advised to make consistent use of the opportunity that now presents itself. If you read the coalition agreement and the national hydrogen strategy carefully and talk to the industry, you quickly realize that both the federal government and the industry want to implement these points consistently.

However, many of the political framework conditions in the area of climate and energy are decided at the European level, and the players there are becoming increasingly entangled in disputes about what these should look like. How can the energy transition succeed in this way?

Germany has a powerful voice in Brussels as the largest European economy. It is also clear that there can be no national solo effort approach to the energy transition. There may be pioneering roles and different views on how to achieve the goals. But on the whole, this can only be solved in a European context and ultimately globally. I have confidence in the European Commission. Even if negotiations are often tough, this is the way we have to go.

Hydrogen, in particular, is seen as the hope and energy carrier of the future. Hydrogen has been catapulted from its shadowy existence into the limelight. Rightly so?

Absolutely. Sure, many are asking: “Is this just another hype that won’t catch on?” But the numbers are perfectly clear, and that’s where politicians argue along the same lines: Not everything can be electrified. That’s why it needs a substitute. And the only one that is suitable is green hydrogen with its derivatives. In the past, many terawatt hours have already been produced, traded, and transported worldwide. Up to now, this has always been in the form of gray hydrogen, i.e., produced using fossil energy sources. But it is possible to build on these existing structures.

Derivatives include, for example, ammonia, which is highly traded as a marine fuel.

Exactly. Ammonia is particularly suitable. It can be refueled directly in the ships. This means that not only the production of hydrogen and its derivatives but also the transport can be climate-neutral, which opens up many possibilities.

But demand is expected to grow faster than electrolysis capacities. So what role should so-called colored hydrogen play?

The German government has taken a clear position. The national hydrogen strategy is based on green hydrogen. I have no reason to question that. Other countries are taking a different approach, and whether the German government will use blue or turquoise hydrogen as a bridging technology is not for me to determine. There are arguments for it as well as against it. At the moment, the path is green. It’s ambitious, but in my estimation, it’s feasible.

Can hydrogen from nuclear energy be green?

There are strong advocates at the EU level, especially from France. But there is also a strong group against it. For us, green hydrogen is clearly defined as electricity generated from renewable energies. I don’t expect the new government to deviate from this definition. It remains to be seen whether a different assessment will be reached at the EU level. Presumably, it will also come down to a compromise formula here for the time being.

But if hydrogen produced with nuclear power is classified as green in France but is not recognized as such here in Germany. Won’t we then have a problem with the internal energy market?

Quite. Many points hang on the definition of this one core question. This could completely overturn the existing concept. In such a case, completely different hydrogen volumes would be marketable, which would cause the price to develop differently. This then also affects the question of import requirements. Here, the cards would probably be reshuffled. The influence of this definition on the European energy market is so great that even nuances in the design have a major impact.

As Germany is the only country to phase out coal and nuclear power at the same time, the German government is counting on is focusing on expanding the gas infrastructure for the transition. This is to be made H2-ready, and the EU’s latest gas package also provides for hydrogen to be added to the existing network. Opponents criticize that the gas infrastructure does not permit this and that blending hydrogen into the heating system wastes hydrogen. Who is right?

The extent to which blending is possible has been relatively well clarified technically. It is also clear that the gas network first has to be upgraded for the operation of hydrogen. We need different compressors, different compression, and, if necessary, the replacement of components with new materials. But it is technically feasible. The question is: What do we want to use hydrogen for? The heating market is an extremely large consumer. In the next three to five years, I don’t see production capacities growing to such an extent that we can add hydrogen to our very large gas network.

Especially since we need hydrogen in other areas where there are no alternatives. For the transformation of energy-intensive industry, for example.

For the total volume that we will need in Germany in the future, we will reach limits that are not affordable. Some reckon with 20 percent that we will have to import, others with up to 80 percent. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. In any case, we need large volumes that we cannot produce in Germany or in Europe. And then the question arises: Which countries can we cooperate with? That is also a geopolitical decision. How can countries be supported and promoted along this path? Developing and emerging countries also have enormous potential to play a role in the green hydrogen market.

Which regions come into question?

There are very many countries that have great potential: Chile, Australia, the Arabian Peninsula, South Africa. But you have to look at the whole value chain. It’s not just about exploiting the solar potential in a desert. You have to be able to bring the product to the markets in Europe without emissions in terms of logistics and transport. This requires the appropriate know-how, technologies, and financial strength on site.

With the H2Global Foundation, the German government wants to support the import of hydrogen products. How can it be ensured that the production conditions for which there are clear standards in Europe are also applied in the country of production?

There will be clear criteria. These include not endangering the water supply, especially in areas where water is scarce. With H2Global, we do not want to ensure that scarce drinking water becomes even scarcer. Criteria for local use, occupational health and safety, and human rights are also requirements that the German government will set. We will not only demand this but also check it over the entire term. But as far as guarantees of origin, certification, and social standards are concerned, there are already numerous models on which we can build.

The Commission is currently working on a delegated act that explicitly defines the production standards for green hydrogen. According to initial drafts, for example, the electrolyzer must be commissioned in the same year as the underlying PV or wind power plant.

There will be challenging specifications, but they will not be impossible to implement. This will make the product more expensive if necessary, which will tend to increase its relevance for H2Global, as the differential compensation will then be higher, and the market ramp-up will require a further stimulus.

Doesn’t this approach of import promotion cut off domestic production in Europe to some extent?

The question is extremely relevant: Also, in order to be able to guarantee energy security in the long term, we should really focus on increasing and simplifying production in Germany and Europe. But it’s also clear that another source will be needed, and you can do one without leaving the other. I also think that for geopolitical and economic policy reasons, it makes sense to tap international sources. That’s about cooperation, supporting countries, and, last but not least, getting the lowest possible price for hydrogen. This is what the European industry needs in order to remain competitive internationally.

Doesn’t this put us into a new form of import dependency, which in turn can influence geopolitical tensions, as we are currently seeing with gas?

Suppose you do it badly, yes. But a whole new map is emerging. Countries on the Arabian Peninsula not only have large oil reserves, but also a lot of sun, a lot of wind, and a good transportation infrastructure. But there are also completely new players, which means that we can completely redesign our import security. We no longer have to depend on two or three players.

Opponents would say: The potential of renewable energies should be exploited in the regions themselves and used for their own decarbonization.

I know the specter of hydrogen colonialism. This is real and should be handled professionally and with sustainability in mind. Hydrogen colonialism must not exist! In fact, the countries themselves will have a high demand for hydrogen in the foreseeable future. In freight transport or in the heat sector. But H2Global is designed in such a way that, while the focus is on exports to Europe, it also supports regional value creation and utilization and gets them on their way. This is in the interest not only of the German government and the EU but also of the companies themselves. Because that secures the investment.

In addition, we can also use H2Global to promote a region in a targeted manner by not just looking for the lowest possible price. The funder, i.e., the federal government, can also control this via the instrument. Such a regional funding option has also been examined by the EU Commission. H2Global can therefore be used to provide targeted, sustainable development aid.

Second year of China’s emissions trading

China’s emissions trading system is entering its second calendar year, and the first trading cycle of the Chinese emissions trading system (ETS) has been completed: Time to take stock. And the results are mixed. On the positive side, the system started successfully: Trading of CO2 emission allowances has been underway on the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange (SEEE) since mid-July. But even though there have been actual transactions on the market, 2021 should more be considered a test run for a future, more comprehensive ETS. This is because the instrument so far had little impact on emissions due to low coverage:

Only power companies are participating so far, almost all of them operate coal-fired power plants.
Emission allowances were allocated free of charge.
They applied to the years 2019 and 2020 – and thus retroactively to emissions that have long since been blown into the air.
The CO2 price is low.

As of the December 31 deadline, virtually all approximately 2,200 participating companies met the requirements, at 99.5 percent, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment announced on New Year’s Eve. That means they were able to present and submit a sufficient amount of emissions allowances for their verified CO2 emissions from 2019 and 2020. They either received these allowances from the allocation or bought additional ones through the ETS. As a rule, older power plants with high CO2 emissions acquire surplus allowances from newer, more efficient plants in the process.

According to calculations by the financial services provider Refinitiv, 99.5 percent of properly registered companies emitted in both years a massive 8.693 gigatons of CO2 equivalent, or around 4.35 gigatons per year. That’s a good 40 percent of China’s emissions and, according to the British trade website Carbon Brief, about 12 percent of global emissions. By comparison, the 1,817 German plants covered by the EU’s ETS emitted only 320 million metric tons (0.32 gigatons) of greenhouse gases in 2020.

Germany’s total CO2 emissions in 2020 were just under 0.59 gigatons, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). These figures show how just important China’s ETS will be for the global climate if it eventually works properly.

Problem: too many certificates

According to Refinitiv data, allowances for a good 178 million metric tons of CO2 were traded in 2021. In addition, just under 33 million metric tons of Chinese Certified Emissions Reductions (CCERs) were traded. CCERs verify climate protection projects by ETS companies to offset their emissions, for example by investing in renewable energies, carbon sinks, or methane use. In China’s ETS, companies are allowed to offset up to five percent of their compliance obligations with such CCERs. Refinitiv estimates that there are currently CCERs for an additional 30 million tons of CO2 remaining in the market, which companies can now acquire this year.

In general, critics note that there is a surplus of emission allowances in China’s ETS because the distribution criteria are too loose or too inaccurate. (China.Table reported). The ETS also provides little incentive for companies to reduce their emissions. The reason, according to Carbon Brief, is that power plants are only required to buy additional allowances for the first 20 percent of emissions above their allocated allowances. Those that emit above this limit do not have to fear any consequences.

The few gas-fired power plants in the ETS do not even have to buy any additional certificates if they emit more than the allocated amount of CO2. The only incentive to save CO2: Selling allowances brings money. But according to many experts, this has hardly been on the minds of most power plants so far.

Low CO2 price, hardly any penalties

Because of these problems, the market price on the ETS is decidedly low. At the end of New Year’s Day, the allowance for one ton of CO2 emissions cost ¥54.22 (€7.52), 13 percent more than at the beginning of trading on July 16, 2021, according to Refinitiv. On average, the price was ¥43.85 over the 104 trading days last year. In the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, prices rose rapidly recently and are now above €60 per ton of CO2. The EU’s ETS was also initially criticized for low prices.

Meanwhile, one of the most criticized shortcomings in China are the low penalties for violating rules or falsifying emissions data: The maximum fines are only ¥30,000 (€4,175).

However, it is quite normal that these teething troubles occur in a new system, Yan Qin and Yuan Lin concluded in the latest Refinitive study on the ETS in December. It’s a learning process for all involved. Parts of the regulatory framework were not finished until trading was already underway: For example, the Ministry of Ecology did not issue guidelines until late October, such as the December compliance deadline. The distribution of emissions allowances, scheduled for the end of September, was delayed until November. In between, the Ministry of Ecology also required a review of all verified emissions data after data fraud in Inner Mongolia was uncovered.

China’s ETS: many initial compromises

The current ETS system is a compromise aimed at ensuring participation by corporations and avoiding conflicts, says Chen Zhibin, senior consultant at Beijing-based consulting firm Sino-Carbon Innovation & Investment. “It’s a result of years of negotiation between regulators, industry associations, and big enterprises.”

As a result, there is no fixed upper limit of distributed CO2 allowances in the ETS so far. The maximum can vary each year depending on the actual output of power plants. There are still no concrete plans to withdraw CO2 allowances from the market. Bloomberg reported on Thursday, however, of initial proposals to reduce allowances by a maximum of one percent. China has not yet achieved the emissions peaks set in its climate protection targets. Increases are allowed at least until 2025 in most energy-intensive sectors. This is likely to be reflected in the ETS format.

Power companies now have until the end of March to submit their emissions for 2021 for verification. Experts expect these to remain above four gigatons.

Other sectors to be added

After all, the system is soon to include other sectors. SEEE head Lai Xiaoming wants to include financial companies first and then groups from energy-intensive sectors such as non-ferrous metals or construction materials. That could start as early as 2022. By 2025, according to Lai, all eight of China’s major emissions-heavy industries should be included. These include chemicals, concrete, refineries, steel and pulp, and paper production. Respective influential industry associations already have to prepare their participation. The companies in these sectors also had to report their emissions for 2020 by New Year’s Eve and have them verified.

SEEE also plans to launch CO2-related derivative products, Lai told the Shanghai Stock Exchange newspaper in late December. These include swaps, forwards, and options. The goal, he said, is to make China a global center for CO2 trading and pricing. At some point, the allowances should also cost something and be auctioned, according to the Ministry of Ecology’s ETS rules. But there are no timetables for all these reforms yet.

It is clear that CO2 emissions in China will have to become much more expensive and allowances scarcer. Otherwise, the ETS would have no steering effect at all. Many experts assume that only a so-called cap-and-trade system with a steadily decreasing “cap,” i.e., an upper limit for all CO2 allowances in the market, will have any real effect on reducing emissions. This is how it works in the EU.

The biggest effect of the ETS in its current form is that it represents the beginning of nationwide carbon pricing – with the potential for later expansion and tightening. Christiane Kühl

Fight against CSAM: Johansson wants to engage large providers

EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has announced that the EU Commission’s proposal to combat depictions of child sexual abuse online (CSAM), which was previously scheduled for March, will include a concrete obligation to search and report instead of voluntary regulations. “Voluntary reporting will then no longer be sufficient,” Johansson said, according to Welt am Sonntag.

So far, the Swedish-born Socialist EU commissioner said, 95 percent of the reporting volume is due to notifications from a single company, Facebook parent Meta. Children’s right to physical integrity, safety online, and privacy online must be the focus, Johansson said. One of the reasons the new rule is controversial is that it could not only legalize automated content searches by providers but make them mandatory. fst

Lemke announces German rejection of taxonomy proposal

The new German Minister of the Environment Steffi Lemke (Greens) has announced that the German government’s formal statement to the EU Commission on the taxonomy proposal will be negative. “This statement will contain a clear no to the inclusion of nuclear power in the taxonomy. This is the united position of the federal government,” Lemke said on Sunday evening in the ARD program Report from Berlin.

Meanwhile, the German rejection has no legal consequences. Only the Council of the member states or the European Parliament can prevent a delegated act in accordance with the underlying taxonomy regulation by majority vote and without retroactive effect. Neither is currently foreseeable. “The EU Commission must then decide for itself how it will continue to deal with its taxonomy proposal,” said Lemke, who has been head of environmental and consumer protection since December. She criticizes: If nuclear power were included, the taxonomy would miss its real goal of directing financial flows to sustainable forms of energy. fst

Cornelius Matthes: energy transition in the desert

Cornelius Matthes, CEO der Dii Desert Energy — Cornelius Matthes is CEO of Dii Desert Energy, which aims to finally turn the old dream of energy from the desert into reality.

Cornelius Matthes lives in Dubai. In other words, the city that, over the past twenty years, has become a symbol of wealth, abundance, and petroleum-based waste like no other, without relying permanently on the finite black gold. As CEO of Dii Desert Energy, the 46-year-old is working to kick-start the energy revolution not only in the United Arab Emirates but also in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Yet the Dii is an old acquaintance: It has been trying to push the Desertec initiative since 2009. The goal was, and still is, to produce enough renewable energy in North Africa and the Middle East so that it can also be exported to Europe. The project was declared dead in the media in 2014 when several investors pulled out. The problem at the time: The European electricity market was saturated, and electricity exports were flowing in the opposite direction via the existing transmission lines instead of from Morocco to Spain. But after more than ten years in the region, he says, they learned a lot about the countries and local energy economies. “After all, Desertec never had a mandate to build or operate projects; Dii was supposed to pave the way for the energy transition,” Matthes recounts.

The EU’s Green Deal is also providing new impetus for the region, says Matthes: “The initiative is being very well perceived here.” Morocco has come a long way with a 42 percent share of renewables in its electricity mix, and Jordan was also quick to embrace solar and wind,” Matthes explains. In the meantime, however, there is also a second generation, such as Egypt or the United Arab Emirates, which are investing heavily in the green transformation.

Green hydrogen livens the imagination

In addition to the classic renewables of solar and wind energy, however, there is an even more important new energy source, he says. “With green hydrogen, a game-changer is now in play,” Matthes says. Now, it is no longer just about electricity from the MENA region, but a green energy carrier could be delivered to Europe that can be stored seasonally. A direct comparison to the transmission capacities of submarine cables, which are currently at two to three gigawatts, shows the potential of hydrogen, Matthes explains: “Large pipelines have a transmission capacity for an energy equivalent of 70 gigawatts.” Thus, the old Desertec project is turning into the idea of Desertec 3.0, with First Vice President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans as a prominent hydrogen ally from Brussels at his side, Matthes reveals.

Before Dii, Matthes worked for Deutsche Bank, among others, for many years. “But even then, I had a reputation as a green investment guy,” says Matthes. However, the Munich native also has a family background. Matthes’ father was vice president at the Bavarian State Office for the Environment, and his brother worked in the wind sector at Siemens for a long time, but now his focus is also on green hydrogen production.

Matthes developed his fascination for the MENA region on a trip with a student friend: In an old VW Passat, they drove from Passau to Morocco to climb the Jbel Toubkal in the Atlas Mountains, which is a good 4,100 meters high. This fascination has remained to this day. David Renke

The French Academy has been around for five hundred years. Pardon, the Académie française, naturellement. Even more weighty than the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache (Association for the German Language, which is often somewhat overweight in the media), it watches over the preservation of French culture and fights, above all, against any threats to the French language.

What a disgrace it must have been for her that her warnings were overheard and ignored. So much so that she is now considering appealing to the Conseil d’Etat of the Fifth Republic. The object of her wrath: Bilingualism, that is, the dilution of French culture. And this on an official, regulatory document. Not just any, no, many German readers will be able to understand that. But rather: the national identification card.

The current version, issued since August 2021, contains the names of all categories not only in French but also in English. So not only the Date d’expir, but also the Expiry Date.

Hopefully, no one will reveal to the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache, which would really like to be as important as the Académie française, that something much worse lurks on German identity cards: All categories are labeled in German, English, and even French. Mon dieu! Falk Steiner

EUROPE.TABLE EDITORS

Till
Hoppe

Charlotte
Wirth

Falk
Steiner

Timo
Landenberger

Corinna
Visser

Lukas
Knigge

Eric
Bonse

Sarah
Schaefer

Manuel
Berkel

Lisa-Martina
Klein

Markus
Grabitz

Stephan
Israel

Claire
Stam