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On Sunday, the people of Moldova will make two decisions: There are presidential elections and a referendum that will determine whether the planned accession to the European Union should be enshrined in the constitution.
The likely positive result of the referendum is intended to prevent future governments from diverting the republic from its pro-European course. The precautionary measure makes sense: although President Maia Sandu’s re-election is considered relatively certain, her party, the pro-European “Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate”, is expected to lose the parliamentary elections next summer.
As the accession negotiations with the EU already began at the end of June, the referendum is more of a symbolic nature, but also has a democratic purpose. The more people who visit the polling stations to cast a positive vote in the referendum, the more are likely to vote for Maia Sandu.
Meanwhile, Russia is attempting to influence the outcome of the election by various means – from illegal party funding to buying votes for pro-Russian candidates. The OSCE therefore sent eleven election observers back in September to ensure the democratic conduct of the process. This will be particularly important in the breakaway region of Transnistria, which is close to Russia, and where Russia and its influencers are particularly active in trying to fuel anti-European sentiment.
Have a good start to the weekend!
Wolodymyr Zelenskiy received much support for his “victory plan” during discussions with the heads of state and government, said a diplomat during the EU summit on Thursday. However, the strategy with which Ukraine’s president wants to force Russia to the negotiating table found no mention in the summit’s conclusions.
Zelenskiy himself said in Brussels that the approach of his plan is peace through deterrence: For this, Western supporters like the USA, France, the UK, and also Germany must supply his country with suitable missile systems. Russia then has the choice to enter into serious peace negotiations or risk the destruction of military targets. The invitation to NATO is also important for the morale and resilience of the population and, in the longer term, the only reliable security guarantee.
“It makes no sense to discuss Zelenskiy’s plan publicly”, countered Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the evening. Some attachments are also classified. It was not intended to include the “victory plan” in the conclusions. Most of the heads of state and government had not known the plan beforehand. On the two central points – the invitation to NATO and the delivery of missile systems with greater range – however, Scholz had clearly positioned himself upon arrival at the summit. His stance on both questions was known and had not changed.
Zelenskiy’s “victory plan” and the situation in Ukraine are likely to be topics on Friday during the meeting with US President Joe Biden in Berlin, as Scholz hinted. From the Chancellor’s point of view, it was more important that the summit formally approved the implementation of the G7 plan to grant Ukraine macroeconomic assistance amounting to €35 billion based on the frozen Russian state funds. The EU Parliament is to pass the necessary legislation before the end of the month. This is proof that solidarity with Ukraine is unbroken and that help will be provided as long as necessary. Scholz also sees this as a clear sign to Putin that Europe and the USA stand by Ukraine in the long term.
Comparatively less controversial this time was the discussion about the situation in the Middle East. The positions between the friends of Israel and the rather pro-Palestinian camp have come closer, according to a diplomat. An indication of this: Germany and Spain together submitted a compromise proposal on individual passages in the conclusions. There, the attacks on UN positions in Lebanon are condemned, but an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is also demanded.
The news of the killing of the Hamas leader interrupted the summit. Yahya al-Sinwar is responsible for the worst crimes against Israeli citizens, said Scholz. The Chancellor did not want to speculate on whether the liberation of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas would now become easier or more difficult.
In asylum and migration policy, the EU summit marks a turn towards a further tightening of policies. The 27 heads of state and government no longer want to rely solely on the “historic” reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) adopted in May. Instead, they discussed several measures that should accelerate the implementation of the reform but, in some cases, go significantly beyond it.
The basis of the debate was the ten-point plan that EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had sent to the 27 on Oct. 14. In it, von der Leyen announced a draft law to reform the Return Directive, which should enable faster deportation of migrants. The CDU politician also advocated deportation centers outside the EU “as a possible way forward”. The new Italian camp in Albania is considered a model.
Germany, Spain, and Belgium are skeptical to dismissive of this approach, in which EU procedures are outsourced to third countries. “We need European solutions, not bilateral ones”, they said. But the debate about so-called “Return Hubs” and other “innovative solutions” regarding the “external dimension” of migration policy – i.e., further shielding against unwanted or irregular immigrants – could no longer be stopped.
Additional momentum was given to the migration debate by separate consultations that Italy’s right-wing Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni organized on the sidelines of the summit. Almost a dozen heads of state and government took part. In addition to Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, and Poland were represented. Von der Leyen also joined. Scholz and France’s President Emmanuel Macron were absent. Usually, initiatives come from them; this time, they seemed rather driven.
Meloni promoted her Albanian experiment and called for further third-country agreements following the model of the deal with Tunisia, which she had negotiated together with von der Leyen in 2023. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also took an assertive stance. He demanded exemptions for migrants smuggled into Poland from Belarus. Tusk had previously announced that he wanted to temporarily suspend asylum law for these migrants. Additionally, according to diplomats, he resisted reaffirming the CEAS reform in the summit text.
In the conclusions, there is now only a general reference to the “implementation of the adopted EU legislation.” Moreover, the heads of state expressed their solidarity with Poland. “Exceptional situations require appropriate measures”, it says, apparently with a view to the situation at the border with Belarus. However, all measures must be in accordance with European and international law. This also applies to “new ways to prevent and repel irregular migration”. The controversial “Return Hubs” are not mentioned.
In contrast, a new law for the faster deportation of migrants is demanded. “The European Union calls at all levels for decisive action to facilitate and accelerate returns (…)”, the heads of state and government stated. They called on the Commission to “urgently” present a new legislative proposal. Von der Leyen agreed to quickly reform the Return Directive.
Chancellor Scholz was satisfied with the result of the migration debate. It had taken place in a “very constructive atmosphere”; the most important German concerns had been taken into account in the conclusions. Scholz expressly acknowledged the German border controls, which are intended to curb irregular migration and have a positive effect. These controls had been much criticized in the run-up to the summit; in the end, they were no longer an issue.
The Directorate-General for Energy (DG Ener) intends to present a roadmap for the complete phase-out of Russian oil and gas in the near future. “Russian fossil fuels are still present in the EU, especially gas. I therefore plan to present a roadmap in the first quarter of 2025 to drive forward the phase-out of Russian energy imports”, reads a document from the Directorate-General for Energy, which is intended to prepare the designated Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen for his hearing in the EU Parliament.
The 85-page document was made available to Table.Briefings on Thursday evening. However, the Directorate-General can still make changes up until the hearing on Nov. 5. In addition, the Commissioner candidates can deviate from the texts in the hearings. The document contains proposed answers to 157 questions that MEPs could ask.
With REPowerEU, the EU set itself the goal of ending Russian imports as quickly as possible, by 2027 at the latest. “I am determined to achieve the REPowerEU goal and end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Member states must do everything in their power to accelerate the phase-out of Russian gas”, the document continues.
Once the current gas supply expansion projects have been completed, the EU will have all the infrastructure it needs to do without Russian gas. “Furthermore, financial support from the EU budget for gas infrastructure is not provided for in the legislation on trans-European networks and can no longer be justified.”
Elsewhere, however, it also states: “Any price increase on world markets would ultimately benefit Russia, so we must ensure that our actions do not have unintended consequences.” On the issue of possible sanctions against Russian nuclear fuels and components, the Directorate-General writes: “I will work with member states to accelerate efforts to diversify nuclear supply chains in line with the REPowerEU plan. Of course, I will also participate in the analysis and work towards further sanctions.” And elsewhere: “I will ensure that the roadmap to end Russian energy imports also covers the entire nuclear supply chain to ensure the EU’s autonomy.”
The document ranges from questions of international cooperation to detailed questions for individual member states. With regard to the possible splitting of the German electricity price zone, it is emphasized that the transmission system operators must first submit a proposal for the European bidding zones.
Immediately afterwards, it states: “Independently of this process, there are also elements other than changing bidding zones that can help to better direct investments to where they are needed. These include, for example, the use of location criteria in support schemes for renewable energies and grid charges.” This can be interpreted as a pointer to a possible way out, as the Commission has political discretion in the further process as to whether it implements a splitting of bidding zones.
DG Ener is signaling concessions to France and like-minded countries on the nuclear issue and even on the Renewable Energy Directive. On the question of whether specific targets are also needed for the energy sector in view of the EU’s 2040 climate target, for example for renewables and energy efficiency, the briefing states: “I see room for simplification in a number of sub-targets in the energy sector.”
On nuclear energy, however, it states: “As part of my new mandate, I will work to ensure that nuclear energy is more closely integrated into EU energy policy.” According to the document, the need for nuclear projects is to be determined. However, a new nuclear program (PINC), as called for by the Nuclear Alliance, is not clearly promised. Plans for a “Nuclear Act“, as the former French Commissioner Thierry Breton had arbitrarily held out the prospect of, are “not known” to the designated Energy Commissioner, as the text smugly states. What is needed, however, is a new strategy for nuclear fusion.
So that Jørgensen can counter reservations that he was too critical of nuclear power as Danish climate minister, the officials give him the argument that five percent of the Danish electricity mix consisted of nuclear power due to imports. According to the text, Jørgensen could promise Parliament extensive consultation on nuclear issues – the Euratom Treaty does not provide for this to the same extent as regular EU legislation.
Also explosive for Germany: The Directorate-General announces an evaluation of the Euratom Directive on radioactive waste in order to possibly present a draft amendment. There is still a lack of permanent solutions for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
With regard to renewable energies, the document does not go much further than the mission letter from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. It merely confirms the mandate to present an initiative for a faster expansion of renewables and flexibility solutions such as storage.
The Directorate-General is cautious about Germany’s demands to relax the Delegated Act for the production of renewable hydrogen and refers to the review already planned for 2028. Hydrogen production will become the largest consumer of electricity by 2050: “It is therefore important that we get the equation right.”
After the farmer demos in Germany and Europe last winter, an objective, solution-oriented dialog on the future of agriculture at EU level seemed barely conceivable. Since the beginning of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the agricultural discourse has once again become increasingly polarized. The buzzword of food security quickly overshadowed the management of ecological crises. With the agricultural diesel protests, the competitiveness of the sector became the leitmotif, accompanied by a reduction in regulations and bureaucracy as well as the decoupling of agricultural subsidies from minimum ecological standards. Climate and nature conservation? Secondary.
And yet the almost 30 stakeholders from EU farmers’ associations, industry, trade and environmental protection have agreed on a common vision in the so-called “Strategic Dialogue”. The final report, which the participants presented to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, is certainly forward-looking. It breathes a different spirit than last winter’s Europe-wide farmers’ protests, the subsequent debates and political reactions, which focused primarily on the dismantling of environmental standards. The German Commission for the Future of Agriculture (ZKL), which had already presented its findings in 2021, served as a blueprint for the Brussels dialog. Both have now come to comparable conclusions. And yet Brussels is taking a different tone than Berlin on some issues: somewhat more decisive, more courageous.
“The time for change is now.” What sounds like an election campaign slogan is a central sentence of this compromise. The longer agricultural policy decisions towards nature conservation and climate action are delayed, the more expensive it will be for society, and for agriculture too, for example in terms of degraded soils or pollinator decline. This should have been clear at the latest since the climate ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court. But the agricultural sector likes to claim a special role.
The agreement on a reform of hectare-based direct payments is noteworthy. This means that the current beneficiaries of the system will no longer receive support – especially the larger arable farms, which are profitable even without subsidies.
Consequently, the Strategy Dialogue recognizes that competition for public funds is increasing, meaning that agricultural budgets are coming under increasing pressure. According to the report, it is therefore all the more important that these not only contribute to income support and food production, but also to environmental goals. It is a nod in the direction of the upcoming multi-annual EU financial framework. This is already the subject of a lively debate, which is also shaking up the self-image of the Common Agricultural Policy.
The Brussels text is also clear when it comes to the regulatory framework for agriculture. What is actually a self-evident basis for all economic sectors apparently only applies to agriculture to a limited extent: The German Agriculture Act dates back to 1955 when the climate and species crisis was not an issue. And even if something is actually prescribed by law, such as integrated crop protection, this does not mean that it is actually implemented.
EU laws such as the Flora Fauna Habitat Directive are also insufficiently implemented. The strategy dialogue speaks a clear language here: first, regulatory law must be effective – this includes the design of the rules at national level and enforcement at farm level. Then farmers should receive a decent reward for the services they provide to society. Models such as the public goods premium have been around for a long time.
However, the crucial sticking point remains political implementation. The German CCL submitted its recommendations to Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel back in 2021. Agriculture Minister Julia Klöckner did not touch the report at the end of her term of office, and her successor Cem Özdemir let it disappear into a drawer. The political courage of the new EU Commission is therefore crucial to the success of the current agricultural recommendations. After the failure to implement the ZKL recommendations, this is a second chance to make agriculture ecologically and economically crisis-proof with the consensus of all stakeholders. Ursula von der Leyen would therefore be well advised to learn from the former hesitation of German politicians and seize this opportunity.
Jörg-Andreas Krüger is President of the German Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU). Previously, Krüger worked for six years as Managing Director of “Ecological Footprint” at WWF.
On Sunday, the people of Moldova will make two decisions: There are presidential elections and a referendum that will determine whether the planned accession to the European Union should be enshrined in the constitution.
The likely positive result of the referendum is intended to prevent future governments from diverting the republic from its pro-European course. The precautionary measure makes sense: although President Maia Sandu’s re-election is considered relatively certain, her party, the pro-European “Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate”, is expected to lose the parliamentary elections next summer.
As the accession negotiations with the EU already began at the end of June, the referendum is more of a symbolic nature, but also has a democratic purpose. The more people who visit the polling stations to cast a positive vote in the referendum, the more are likely to vote for Maia Sandu.
Meanwhile, Russia is attempting to influence the outcome of the election by various means – from illegal party funding to buying votes for pro-Russian candidates. The OSCE therefore sent eleven election observers back in September to ensure the democratic conduct of the process. This will be particularly important in the breakaway region of Transnistria, which is close to Russia, and where Russia and its influencers are particularly active in trying to fuel anti-European sentiment.
Have a good start to the weekend!
Wolodymyr Zelenskiy received much support for his “victory plan” during discussions with the heads of state and government, said a diplomat during the EU summit on Thursday. However, the strategy with which Ukraine’s president wants to force Russia to the negotiating table found no mention in the summit’s conclusions.
Zelenskiy himself said in Brussels that the approach of his plan is peace through deterrence: For this, Western supporters like the USA, France, the UK, and also Germany must supply his country with suitable missile systems. Russia then has the choice to enter into serious peace negotiations or risk the destruction of military targets. The invitation to NATO is also important for the morale and resilience of the population and, in the longer term, the only reliable security guarantee.
“It makes no sense to discuss Zelenskiy’s plan publicly”, countered Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the evening. Some attachments are also classified. It was not intended to include the “victory plan” in the conclusions. Most of the heads of state and government had not known the plan beforehand. On the two central points – the invitation to NATO and the delivery of missile systems with greater range – however, Scholz had clearly positioned himself upon arrival at the summit. His stance on both questions was known and had not changed.
Zelenskiy’s “victory plan” and the situation in Ukraine are likely to be topics on Friday during the meeting with US President Joe Biden in Berlin, as Scholz hinted. From the Chancellor’s point of view, it was more important that the summit formally approved the implementation of the G7 plan to grant Ukraine macroeconomic assistance amounting to €35 billion based on the frozen Russian state funds. The EU Parliament is to pass the necessary legislation before the end of the month. This is proof that solidarity with Ukraine is unbroken and that help will be provided as long as necessary. Scholz also sees this as a clear sign to Putin that Europe and the USA stand by Ukraine in the long term.
Comparatively less controversial this time was the discussion about the situation in the Middle East. The positions between the friends of Israel and the rather pro-Palestinian camp have come closer, according to a diplomat. An indication of this: Germany and Spain together submitted a compromise proposal on individual passages in the conclusions. There, the attacks on UN positions in Lebanon are condemned, but an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is also demanded.
The news of the killing of the Hamas leader interrupted the summit. Yahya al-Sinwar is responsible for the worst crimes against Israeli citizens, said Scholz. The Chancellor did not want to speculate on whether the liberation of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas would now become easier or more difficult.
In asylum and migration policy, the EU summit marks a turn towards a further tightening of policies. The 27 heads of state and government no longer want to rely solely on the “historic” reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) adopted in May. Instead, they discussed several measures that should accelerate the implementation of the reform but, in some cases, go significantly beyond it.
The basis of the debate was the ten-point plan that EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had sent to the 27 on Oct. 14. In it, von der Leyen announced a draft law to reform the Return Directive, which should enable faster deportation of migrants. The CDU politician also advocated deportation centers outside the EU “as a possible way forward”. The new Italian camp in Albania is considered a model.
Germany, Spain, and Belgium are skeptical to dismissive of this approach, in which EU procedures are outsourced to third countries. “We need European solutions, not bilateral ones”, they said. But the debate about so-called “Return Hubs” and other “innovative solutions” regarding the “external dimension” of migration policy – i.e., further shielding against unwanted or irregular immigrants – could no longer be stopped.
Additional momentum was given to the migration debate by separate consultations that Italy’s right-wing Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni organized on the sidelines of the summit. Almost a dozen heads of state and government took part. In addition to Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, and Poland were represented. Von der Leyen also joined. Scholz and France’s President Emmanuel Macron were absent. Usually, initiatives come from them; this time, they seemed rather driven.
Meloni promoted her Albanian experiment and called for further third-country agreements following the model of the deal with Tunisia, which she had negotiated together with von der Leyen in 2023. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also took an assertive stance. He demanded exemptions for migrants smuggled into Poland from Belarus. Tusk had previously announced that he wanted to temporarily suspend asylum law for these migrants. Additionally, according to diplomats, he resisted reaffirming the CEAS reform in the summit text.
In the conclusions, there is now only a general reference to the “implementation of the adopted EU legislation.” Moreover, the heads of state expressed their solidarity with Poland. “Exceptional situations require appropriate measures”, it says, apparently with a view to the situation at the border with Belarus. However, all measures must be in accordance with European and international law. This also applies to “new ways to prevent and repel irregular migration”. The controversial “Return Hubs” are not mentioned.
In contrast, a new law for the faster deportation of migrants is demanded. “The European Union calls at all levels for decisive action to facilitate and accelerate returns (…)”, the heads of state and government stated. They called on the Commission to “urgently” present a new legislative proposal. Von der Leyen agreed to quickly reform the Return Directive.
Chancellor Scholz was satisfied with the result of the migration debate. It had taken place in a “very constructive atmosphere”; the most important German concerns had been taken into account in the conclusions. Scholz expressly acknowledged the German border controls, which are intended to curb irregular migration and have a positive effect. These controls had been much criticized in the run-up to the summit; in the end, they were no longer an issue.
The Directorate-General for Energy (DG Ener) intends to present a roadmap for the complete phase-out of Russian oil and gas in the near future. “Russian fossil fuels are still present in the EU, especially gas. I therefore plan to present a roadmap in the first quarter of 2025 to drive forward the phase-out of Russian energy imports”, reads a document from the Directorate-General for Energy, which is intended to prepare the designated Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen for his hearing in the EU Parliament.
The 85-page document was made available to Table.Briefings on Thursday evening. However, the Directorate-General can still make changes up until the hearing on Nov. 5. In addition, the Commissioner candidates can deviate from the texts in the hearings. The document contains proposed answers to 157 questions that MEPs could ask.
With REPowerEU, the EU set itself the goal of ending Russian imports as quickly as possible, by 2027 at the latest. “I am determined to achieve the REPowerEU goal and end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Member states must do everything in their power to accelerate the phase-out of Russian gas”, the document continues.
Once the current gas supply expansion projects have been completed, the EU will have all the infrastructure it needs to do without Russian gas. “Furthermore, financial support from the EU budget for gas infrastructure is not provided for in the legislation on trans-European networks and can no longer be justified.”
Elsewhere, however, it also states: “Any price increase on world markets would ultimately benefit Russia, so we must ensure that our actions do not have unintended consequences.” On the issue of possible sanctions against Russian nuclear fuels and components, the Directorate-General writes: “I will work with member states to accelerate efforts to diversify nuclear supply chains in line with the REPowerEU plan. Of course, I will also participate in the analysis and work towards further sanctions.” And elsewhere: “I will ensure that the roadmap to end Russian energy imports also covers the entire nuclear supply chain to ensure the EU’s autonomy.”
The document ranges from questions of international cooperation to detailed questions for individual member states. With regard to the possible splitting of the German electricity price zone, it is emphasized that the transmission system operators must first submit a proposal for the European bidding zones.
Immediately afterwards, it states: “Independently of this process, there are also elements other than changing bidding zones that can help to better direct investments to where they are needed. These include, for example, the use of location criteria in support schemes for renewable energies and grid charges.” This can be interpreted as a pointer to a possible way out, as the Commission has political discretion in the further process as to whether it implements a splitting of bidding zones.
DG Ener is signaling concessions to France and like-minded countries on the nuclear issue and even on the Renewable Energy Directive. On the question of whether specific targets are also needed for the energy sector in view of the EU’s 2040 climate target, for example for renewables and energy efficiency, the briefing states: “I see room for simplification in a number of sub-targets in the energy sector.”
On nuclear energy, however, it states: “As part of my new mandate, I will work to ensure that nuclear energy is more closely integrated into EU energy policy.” According to the document, the need for nuclear projects is to be determined. However, a new nuclear program (PINC), as called for by the Nuclear Alliance, is not clearly promised. Plans for a “Nuclear Act“, as the former French Commissioner Thierry Breton had arbitrarily held out the prospect of, are “not known” to the designated Energy Commissioner, as the text smugly states. What is needed, however, is a new strategy for nuclear fusion.
So that Jørgensen can counter reservations that he was too critical of nuclear power as Danish climate minister, the officials give him the argument that five percent of the Danish electricity mix consisted of nuclear power due to imports. According to the text, Jørgensen could promise Parliament extensive consultation on nuclear issues – the Euratom Treaty does not provide for this to the same extent as regular EU legislation.
Also explosive for Germany: The Directorate-General announces an evaluation of the Euratom Directive on radioactive waste in order to possibly present a draft amendment. There is still a lack of permanent solutions for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
With regard to renewable energies, the document does not go much further than the mission letter from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. It merely confirms the mandate to present an initiative for a faster expansion of renewables and flexibility solutions such as storage.
The Directorate-General is cautious about Germany’s demands to relax the Delegated Act for the production of renewable hydrogen and refers to the review already planned for 2028. Hydrogen production will become the largest consumer of electricity by 2050: “It is therefore important that we get the equation right.”
After the farmer demos in Germany and Europe last winter, an objective, solution-oriented dialog on the future of agriculture at EU level seemed barely conceivable. Since the beginning of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the agricultural discourse has once again become increasingly polarized. The buzzword of food security quickly overshadowed the management of ecological crises. With the agricultural diesel protests, the competitiveness of the sector became the leitmotif, accompanied by a reduction in regulations and bureaucracy as well as the decoupling of agricultural subsidies from minimum ecological standards. Climate and nature conservation? Secondary.
And yet the almost 30 stakeholders from EU farmers’ associations, industry, trade and environmental protection have agreed on a common vision in the so-called “Strategic Dialogue”. The final report, which the participants presented to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, is certainly forward-looking. It breathes a different spirit than last winter’s Europe-wide farmers’ protests, the subsequent debates and political reactions, which focused primarily on the dismantling of environmental standards. The German Commission for the Future of Agriculture (ZKL), which had already presented its findings in 2021, served as a blueprint for the Brussels dialog. Both have now come to comparable conclusions. And yet Brussels is taking a different tone than Berlin on some issues: somewhat more decisive, more courageous.
“The time for change is now.” What sounds like an election campaign slogan is a central sentence of this compromise. The longer agricultural policy decisions towards nature conservation and climate action are delayed, the more expensive it will be for society, and for agriculture too, for example in terms of degraded soils or pollinator decline. This should have been clear at the latest since the climate ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court. But the agricultural sector likes to claim a special role.
The agreement on a reform of hectare-based direct payments is noteworthy. This means that the current beneficiaries of the system will no longer receive support – especially the larger arable farms, which are profitable even without subsidies.
Consequently, the Strategy Dialogue recognizes that competition for public funds is increasing, meaning that agricultural budgets are coming under increasing pressure. According to the report, it is therefore all the more important that these not only contribute to income support and food production, but also to environmental goals. It is a nod in the direction of the upcoming multi-annual EU financial framework. This is already the subject of a lively debate, which is also shaking up the self-image of the Common Agricultural Policy.
The Brussels text is also clear when it comes to the regulatory framework for agriculture. What is actually a self-evident basis for all economic sectors apparently only applies to agriculture to a limited extent: The German Agriculture Act dates back to 1955 when the climate and species crisis was not an issue. And even if something is actually prescribed by law, such as integrated crop protection, this does not mean that it is actually implemented.
EU laws such as the Flora Fauna Habitat Directive are also insufficiently implemented. The strategy dialogue speaks a clear language here: first, regulatory law must be effective – this includes the design of the rules at national level and enforcement at farm level. Then farmers should receive a decent reward for the services they provide to society. Models such as the public goods premium have been around for a long time.
However, the crucial sticking point remains political implementation. The German CCL submitted its recommendations to Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel back in 2021. Agriculture Minister Julia Klöckner did not touch the report at the end of her term of office, and her successor Cem Özdemir let it disappear into a drawer. The political courage of the new EU Commission is therefore crucial to the success of the current agricultural recommendations. After the failure to implement the ZKL recommendations, this is a second chance to make agriculture ecologically and economically crisis-proof with the consensus of all stakeholders. Ursula von der Leyen would therefore be well advised to learn from the former hesitation of German politicians and seize this opportunity.
Jörg-Andreas Krüger is President of the German Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU). Previously, Krüger worked for six years as Managing Director of “Ecological Footprint” at WWF.