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Two ECB Presidents are in Brussels today. For the first time since the European elections, Christine Lagarde is taking part in the Monetary Dialogue with the Parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee. From the conservative side, she will have to hear that high inflation has led to dissatisfaction among the population, see yesterday’s election results in Austria. From the left, Lagarde will be told that she has slowed down economic development too much, which has led to dissatisfaction among the population, see yesterday’s election results in Austria.
Lagarde’s predecessor Mario Draghi is also in Brussels today to promote his report. For example, he has been invited to a panel discussion at the Bruegel think tank. However, it could be that he will mainly preach to already converted minds. He canceled his invitation to a meeting with EU industry ministers last Thursday for scheduling reasons.
His report will also be discussed today in Parliament’s Internal Market Committee (IMCO). The other parliamentary committees are also slowly warming up. The Trade Committee (INTA) is discussing macro-financial support for Ukraine today and, immediately afterwards, the potential tariffs on Chinese EVs with still-Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis.
The economy, inflation, war and the future of industry: all the big issues are once again being discussed in Brussels today. However, voters seem unimpressed for the time being, as the shift to the right continues apace.
Have a productive start to the week,
The EU Commission plans to restrict the use of Chinese technology for the production of green hydrogen for European demand. On Friday, the Brussels authority published the conditions for the second auction of the European Hydrogen Bank. The conditions also include new resilience criteria for electrolyzers. According to the publication, participating projects would have to limit the proportion of electrolysis stacks from China to a maximum of 25 percent to ensure a diversified supply chain.
The Commission justifies the restrictions by stating that more than half of the global electrolyzer manufacturing capacity is already located in China: “It is assessed that there is a significant risk of increased and irreversible dependency of the EU on imports of electrolyzers originating in China, which may threaten the EU’s security of supply.” The European hydrogen industry welcomed the move. “The new terms set out for the second call of the Hydrogen Bank create a fertile environment for companies to invest in Europe,” commented Hydrogen Europe CEO Jorgo Chatzimarkakis.
The EU provides 1.2 billion euros from the Innovation Fund for the second auction budget. The sum will be used to pay a fixed subsidy for up to ten years for every kilogram of hydrogen or its derivatives produced in the European Economic Area (EEA). The subsidy amount will be determined in an auction from 3 December until February 2025.
The EU already created a legal basis for resilience criteria in public procurement procedures with the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA). Earlier this month, Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra lamented an oversupply of Chinese electrolyzers “at ever lower prices” entering the market: “The next auction will be different. We will have explicit criteria to build European electrolyzer supply chains.”
During the first auction, 20 out of 130 bids involved Chinese electrolyzers. According to Reuters, it will be decided by November how many of the seven awarded projects will be built with Chinese equipment. The winners must then submit the relevant contract documents to the European climate agency CINEA.
The new diversification criterion is designed in such a way that it gives European manufacturers leeway when installing cheaper Chinese technology. It does not cover the entire plant and only defines a quota for its centerpiece – the stacks – and individual stages of the value chain: “The sourcing of electrolyzer stacks which include surface treatment, cell unit production and stack assembly from China.” This strategy could pave the way for other net-zero goods, such as batteries, which also face the trade-off between affordability on the one side and industrial and safety policy on the other.
However, the Commission also introduces a resilience criterion for digital components in the second hydrogen auction. In the future, participants will have to submit a cybersecurity plan “outlining how, in order to ensure the security of the installation, the operational control of the installation remains within an entity established in the EEA and the data are stored within the EEA” Failure to do so will result in the Commission not only refusing to grant subsidies, but also imposing a fine of eight percent of the subsidy amount.
François Paquet praised the announcement, saying that the Commission decided to act proactively rather than reactively this time. The Managing Director of the Renewable Hydrogen Coalition mainly represents renewable energy companies. The EU has probably irretrievably lost the solar industry to China, while Chinese producers have also gained a strong foothold in the wind industry.
The hydrogen bank’s cybersecurity criterion could be exemplary for the wind industry. As the turbines must be regularly monitored, controlled and maintained remotely to fulfill operational safety and warranty requirements, it would represent a significant hurdle for Chinese companies.
However, the Renewable Hydrogen Coalition complains that even the strictest resilience criteria are of little help if demand for renewable hydrogen fails to materialize. “Now the funding gap for renewable hydrogen remains the biggest obstacle,” said Paquet, who also called on the member states to create lead markets for green industrial goods such as steel, chemicals, and fertilizers. Several companies have shelved electrolysis projects that have not been funded by the hydrogen bank in recent months, citing increased costs and a lack of demand.
However, the Commission has only partially responded to calls from the industry to increase the maximum price for tenders. The cap will not be lowered from €4.50 to €3.50 per kilogram of hydrogen as planned but to €4. In return, the fines for non-compliance will be doubled and supervision will be tightened to ensure that the projects actually go ahead.
The current price developments and dilemmas of industrial policy were also recently confirmed by an analysis by BNEF. Compared to the last report from 2022, the forecasts for cost development up to 2050 have been significantly increased, writes hydrogen chief analyst Martin Tengler. Although the costs for electrolyzers could fall by half by then, a restrictive trade policy is only expected to reduce them by 28 percent.
The Commission also published another important document for the hydrogen economy on Friday. It is now consulting on the draft delegated act for the definition of low-carbon hydrogen – i.e. mainly blue hydrogen from natural gas with subsequent carbon capture (CCS) – until October 25.
“The EU definition of low-carbon hydrogen that has now been presented creates much-needed investment security, especially for renewable projects that compete with low-carbon production,” says Michaela Holl from Agora Energiewende.
The energy-intensive industry is pinning its hopes on a new review clause. By July 2028, the Commission wants to examine “alternative pathways” that were not considered in the current version – “in particular for the generation of low-carbon electricity from nuclear power plants based on appropriate criteria.”
The energy-intensive European industry now sees this review clause as a new opportunity, particularly for nuclear power plants and some other forms of low-carbon electricity generation such as waste incineration plants and parts of electricity production from renewables. According to “Contexte”, France had campaigned to adjust the CO2 accounting in the legal act so that electrolysers that purchase electricity from a nuclear power plant via a long-term contract (PPA) are more climate-friendly. “The Commission seems to have heard the concerns about the exclusion of low-carbon PPAs, as it is introducing the review clause,” says a spokesperson for the European chemicals association Cefic. However, PPAs are not explicitly mentioned in the clause.
However, Agora would have liked to have seen an explicitly mentioned “alternative path” implemented by now. For example, the Commission wants to examine whether green electricity for hydrogen production can be credited on an hourly rather than annual basis after 2028, which would make business easier for producers.
The hourly approach would ensure that low-carbon hydrogen is produced when a lot of green electricity is available. “This would be in line with existing requirements for hydrogen from renewable energy sources and EU state aid rules,” Agora wrote on Sunday. German Economics Minister Robert Habeck recently spoke out against a similar hourly requirement for the production of green hydrogen. He asked the Commission for a postponement.
As in previous leaks, the Commission has retained the controversial default values for the assumptions on methane emissions from gas production. Because these are considered on a national and not a project-specific basis, according to an earlier Agora analysis, Norway is likely to remain the main trading partner for blue hydrogen for the time being. Cefic, on the other hand, complains that the key legal basis for calculating upstream emissions will only be clarified in a further delegated act on the Methane Regulation. The Commission does not have to present this until 2027.
Note: In the section on the delegated act for low-carbon hydrogen, we have adjusted the paragraph on PPAs. The statements on long-term purchase agreements in this context relate primarily to electricity from nuclear power plants and not from renewable energies.
The President of the Trade Committee in the European Parliament, Bernd Lange (SPD), warns the new EU Commission against isolationism and protectionism. At the same time, he calls for Parliament to have a greater say in international agreements and emergency procedures in crises.
In an interview with “Europe.Table”, Lange said that it was quite understandable that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen would focus on “economic security,” given the behavior of other players such as China or the USA. However, the Commission should not go too far here. He expects some important clarifications and commitments before the hearing of the new Commissioners-designate. This also applies to the new Commissioner-designate for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič.
The first step is to conclude a new framework agreement with the Commission, said Lange. Parliament expects von der Leyen to agree not to submit a request for provisional application of an agreement before Parliament has said yes or no.
This is already standard practice for trade agreements; in future, however, it should apply to all international agreements. According to Lange, Parliament also wants to be more involved in urgent procedures under Article 122 of the TFEU. This is about equal treatment with the Council.
In the last legislature, von der Leyen had initiated numerous important measures, for example on COVID-19 or the war in Ukraine, in an urgent procedure under Article 122. The European Parliament was not consulted and had difficulty accessing the relevant documents.
“We need to look at how we can better integrate the democratically elected EU institution,” says Lange. He hopes to receive corresponding commitments from the new Commission before the elections. However, this is not the only concern.
There are still unanswered questions before the hearings of the designated new Commissioners, as portfolios and competencies overlap, making it difficult in many cases to decide which Commissioners will be heard in which parliamentary committees.
“So far, it is still a three-dimensional puzzle,” says Lange, who prepares the hearings in the Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) as Chairman of the CCC. It is therefore uncertain whether the CCC will agree on a schedule for the hearings next Tuesday as planned.
“The titles are all a bit vague” and the discussion about the new areas of work and mission letters has only just begun. “We have to wait and see what this means in practice,” says Lange. There is still a lot to be clarified.
This also applies to the designated new Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič. The former EU Brexit negotiator will not only be responsible for trade but also for “economic security.”
Šefčovič is “a good choice,” said Lange. He can negotiate tough and has proven to be reliable during Brexit. However, it is unclear what “economic security” means in practice. “It is important to me that we do not become as protectionist as others.”
The EU had already taken some defensive measures in economic and trade policy and created new instruments. These should be exhausted before talking about new competencies. Furthermore, all measures must be compatible with WTO law.
This also applies with regard to the new focus in industrial policy. “If the Commission wants to give preference to European suppliers in future, this could be problematic,” warns Lange. During his talks with the WTO in Geneva, he has repeatedly heard concerns that the EU could abandon the WTO consensus. This is a real threat for the partners.
“I told them clearly that I am perhaps the last defender of the multilateral system – but a strong defender. We don’t want to batten down the hatches.”
Lange is currently particularly concerned about France, where the trend towards protectionism appears to be unbroken, even in the new government. The new trade minister in Paris has already spoken out against the CETA and Mercosur trade agreements. He thus no longer expects any progress on these issues this year.
“At some point, we will have to decide whether we can also conclude a trade agreement against France,” Lange added. However, that moment has not yet arrived.
The SPD politician was cautiously optimistic with regard to the tariff dispute over Chinese cars. The countervailing duties planned by the EU were an “incentive for negotiations,” said Lange. “Basically, it’s about a sensible negotiated solution so that illegal dumping and subsidization measures stop.”
The fact that a preliminary vote of the EU states originally planned for last Wednesday fell through did not worry him. “It’s like collective bargaining. The key date is October 30.”
China’s new ambassador to the EU has taken up his new post in Brussels. The Chinese Mission announced that Cai Run arrived in the Belgian capital on Friday. Cai succeeds Fu Cong, who took over as China’s representative to the United Nations in the spring. Cai had been ambassador to Israel since 2021.
Cai already had a longer stint in Europe: He was China’s envoy to Portugal between 2015 and 2020. Before that, he held various positions in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Between 2005 and 2008, he worked as a minister counselor at the embassy in the USA. ari
The Austrian Magnus Brunner owes his entry into politics to an internship in Brussels. After completing his PhD, the lawyer joined the Committee of the Regions, where he met the governor of his home region of Voralberg at the coffee bar. A few years later, he remembered him and made Brunner his office manager. “Without this encounter, my path might have been completely different,” Brunner told the daily newspaper ‘Der Standard.’
Before Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer brought the now 52-year-old Brunner into the government as Finance Minister in 2021, Brunner had held several positions in the economy and was responsible for climate protection and energy as State Secretary. However, he had no contact with home affairs and migration, his future area of responsibility in the EU Commission. Nevertheless, Nehammer describes his former cabinet member as “highly qualified” for the future post: “He has proven that he can bring together different points of view on difficult issues and reach a compromise.”
He will indeed have to prove this ability over the next five years, as his portfolio includes some of the most controversial issues in the EU. It was one of the biggest surprises of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s personnel line-up that she chose Brunner, of all people, for the home affairs portfolio. He and the political establishment in Vienna had firmly expected an economic portfolio in the future EU Commission. However, the targeted areas of financial markets and competition went to women.
An affable guy like Brunner comes in very handy for von der Leyen. In Austria, he is considered friendly and unobtrusive. He is not someone who goes on the barricades because of his convictions. In his career to date, he has done an excellent job of avoiding mistakes and working his way to the top. Von der Leyen should not expect any contradictions or attempts at profiling from Brunner, who is a member of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and therefore belongs to her own party family.
It was probably a calculated move on von der Leyen’s part to entrust the migration portfolio to an Austrian of all people, as Austria has been insisting on a tougher course in Europe for years. This trend is likely to intensify in the coming years, as the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) became the strongest party in yesterday’s parliamentary elections.
In the course of his career, Brunner has repeatedly landed in surprising positions. Before he was appointed Finance Minister, no one had him in mind. He was also not initially the favorite for the post of EU Commissioner. It is said in Vienna that Nehammer sent him to Brussels because of his high poll ratings. In addition, given his poor performance in the parliamentary elections, Nehammer would benefit from not having an obvious competitor in his entourage.
In his future role, Brunner will be very much in the spotlight. Von der Leyen writes in her mission letter that migration remains a “challenge” for Europe and a priority for its citizens. Among other things, Brunner will be responsible for the implementation of the migration pact and will have to develop a common approach to repatriation. The fight against smugglers also falls within his remit. In addition, there is the strengthening of the common borders and, of course, the major aspect of internal security, for which he is to present a strategy next year.
Brunner will benefit from his excellent English in his future role. At the age of 16, he spent a year at the British boarding school Eton, the elite school attended by 20 British prime ministers, including Boris Johnson and David Cameron. After studying law in Innsbruck, Brunner completed a post-graduate degree at the renowned King’s College in London.
There will be little time for his tennis hobby in his new job. Brunner played tennis professionally in his youth and even defeated the later US Open winner Julian Knowle. He resigned from his position as President of the Austrian Tennis Association when he became Finance Minister. Silke Wettach
When Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivers a government statement on the upcoming European Council in the German Bundestag on December 13, 2023, something unusual happens: in the first few minutes of his government statement, the Chancellor does not address the challenges the EU is facing, but only one EU member state. Scholz congratulates Donald Tusk on his swearing-in as Prime Minister, which took place the same day. And then he goes on to emphasize with great empathy the opportunities that arise for bilateral relations, but especially for the European Union with the new Polish government. Among other things, he says: “Donald Tusk has announced that he will lead Poland back into the heart of the European Union. And that is exactly where Poland belongs: at the heart of Europe as an indispensable part of our European Union.” And he continues: “Poland’s role in and for Europe is greater today than ever before.“
The fact that Olaf Scholz is using a government statement to pay tribute to the new Polish government before the German Bundestag shows that he is very aware of the historic opportunity that has opened up for Europe and bilateral relations between Germany and Poland with the new government in Warsaw. And yet it is precisely at this point that a crucial question arises that is of eminent importance not only for Germany and Poland, but for all of Europe:
To what extent is Germany, is the Federal Government aware that the victory of the democratic forces in the Sejm elections on October 15, 2023 and the resulting new government must be seen not only as a hopeful turning point in history, but also as a great opportunity and test for the Federal Republic of Germany itself?
The Polish people’s love of freedom has given the current German government a unique historical opportunity to address the failings of the previous German governments. By taking a courageous stand for Poland’s security, acknowledging its contribution to securing the EU’s eastern border and coming to terms with the blind spots in German historical awareness of the unbelievable crimes committed by Germans in Poland between 1939 and 1945, Germany would not only regain some of the prestige it has lost with its wrong and dangerous Russia policy among many people in Poland. Berlin would also give the new Polish government the opportunity to cooperate more closely with the German side than perhaps ever before.
Such a turning point in German-Polish relations would not only be a blessing for the people on both sides of the Oder and Neisse rivers. In view of the current multiple threats to the “European way of life”, it is a historical necessity in order to defend freedom in Europe against its internal and external enemies.
That is why the Federal Chancellor must now take the initiative with a great deal of courage and empathy and use his policy-making powers to seize this historic opportunity. Olaf Scholz should make the following five points a top priority and tackle them with courage:
1. For your and our freedom!
In view of the brutal Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the threat to peace and freedom in Europe, Germany should substantially strengthen the defense capabilities of NATO’s eastern flank in Poland as well, particularly in the area of air defense, over and above what has already been achieved to a considerable extent. Germany could be sure of the support of the current Polish government here and would significantly strengthen confidence in Germany with such an initiative (not only) in Poland. Anyone who does not dare to make such an advance, citing the costs, has still not understood that the defense of freedom cannot be made dependent on the budget situation.
2. For a genuine humanitarian gesture
The German government has developed proposals for an appropriate humanitarian gesture to the victims of the criminal German occupation between 1939 and 1945 who are still living in Poland. Such a gesture should be initiated quickly in the spirit of reparation, even if it cannot be achieved with any money in the world. And it should be more than just a symbolic gesture, but should provide tangible material relief to those still alive.
3. For a reappraisal of the blind spots of the past
It is the task of the political generation bearing responsibility today to raise awareness of German crimes in Poland in German society. We owe this to the Polish victims, and the Poles living today have every right to expect this from us. That is why the Federal Government, together with the German Bundestag, should quickly create the conditions to ensure that not only the so-called German-Polish House, but in particular a memorial commemorating the Polish victims of the indescribable crimes committed during the German occupation between 1939 and 1945, is realized consistently and swiftly.
4. For more support for civil society actors
When the German and Polish governments met again for the first time in six years on July 2 in Warsaw for intergovernmental consultations, an action plan was adopted that attaches great importance to civil society actors in particular. However, this commitment is not reflected in any way in the German government’s draft budget for 2025. German-Polish actors such as the Federal Association of German-Polish Societies, the German-Polish Institute, the German-Polish Youth Office and the Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation in particular should now be provided with more funds in the federal budget, which they can then use in a targeted manner without the usual bureaucratic hurdles.
5. For a new German-Polish treaty
With the Treaty of Aachen, Germany and France have opened a new chapter in their relations. This treaty represents a further development of the Élysée Treaty, which takes account of the new realities and also takes parliamentary relations between the two countries to a higher level. However, Germany and Poland should not wait until the German-Polish Neighborhood Treaty is as old as the former Élysée Treaty before they get down to work and develop a new German-Polish treaty together. With such a new treaty, Poland and Germany could provide urgently needed impetus for the defense of peace and freedom on our continent against the internal and external enemies of an open society.
In these times of threats to peace and freedom in Europe, standing on the right side of history, not with words but with deeds, is the order of the day. With Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Olaf Scholz now has the partner he needs to do what is historically necessary – now or never!
Dietmar Nietan, 60, is an SPD member of the Bundestag from the constituency of Düren and the German government’s representative for Poland
Two ECB Presidents are in Brussels today. For the first time since the European elections, Christine Lagarde is taking part in the Monetary Dialogue with the Parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee. From the conservative side, she will have to hear that high inflation has led to dissatisfaction among the population, see yesterday’s election results in Austria. From the left, Lagarde will be told that she has slowed down economic development too much, which has led to dissatisfaction among the population, see yesterday’s election results in Austria.
Lagarde’s predecessor Mario Draghi is also in Brussels today to promote his report. For example, he has been invited to a panel discussion at the Bruegel think tank. However, it could be that he will mainly preach to already converted minds. He canceled his invitation to a meeting with EU industry ministers last Thursday for scheduling reasons.
His report will also be discussed today in Parliament’s Internal Market Committee (IMCO). The other parliamentary committees are also slowly warming up. The Trade Committee (INTA) is discussing macro-financial support for Ukraine today and, immediately afterwards, the potential tariffs on Chinese EVs with still-Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis.
The economy, inflation, war and the future of industry: all the big issues are once again being discussed in Brussels today. However, voters seem unimpressed for the time being, as the shift to the right continues apace.
Have a productive start to the week,
The EU Commission plans to restrict the use of Chinese technology for the production of green hydrogen for European demand. On Friday, the Brussels authority published the conditions for the second auction of the European Hydrogen Bank. The conditions also include new resilience criteria for electrolyzers. According to the publication, participating projects would have to limit the proportion of electrolysis stacks from China to a maximum of 25 percent to ensure a diversified supply chain.
The Commission justifies the restrictions by stating that more than half of the global electrolyzer manufacturing capacity is already located in China: “It is assessed that there is a significant risk of increased and irreversible dependency of the EU on imports of electrolyzers originating in China, which may threaten the EU’s security of supply.” The European hydrogen industry welcomed the move. “The new terms set out for the second call of the Hydrogen Bank create a fertile environment for companies to invest in Europe,” commented Hydrogen Europe CEO Jorgo Chatzimarkakis.
The EU provides 1.2 billion euros from the Innovation Fund for the second auction budget. The sum will be used to pay a fixed subsidy for up to ten years for every kilogram of hydrogen or its derivatives produced in the European Economic Area (EEA). The subsidy amount will be determined in an auction from 3 December until February 2025.
The EU already created a legal basis for resilience criteria in public procurement procedures with the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA). Earlier this month, Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra lamented an oversupply of Chinese electrolyzers “at ever lower prices” entering the market: “The next auction will be different. We will have explicit criteria to build European electrolyzer supply chains.”
During the first auction, 20 out of 130 bids involved Chinese electrolyzers. According to Reuters, it will be decided by November how many of the seven awarded projects will be built with Chinese equipment. The winners must then submit the relevant contract documents to the European climate agency CINEA.
The new diversification criterion is designed in such a way that it gives European manufacturers leeway when installing cheaper Chinese technology. It does not cover the entire plant and only defines a quota for its centerpiece – the stacks – and individual stages of the value chain: “The sourcing of electrolyzer stacks which include surface treatment, cell unit production and stack assembly from China.” This strategy could pave the way for other net-zero goods, such as batteries, which also face the trade-off between affordability on the one side and industrial and safety policy on the other.
However, the Commission also introduces a resilience criterion for digital components in the second hydrogen auction. In the future, participants will have to submit a cybersecurity plan “outlining how, in order to ensure the security of the installation, the operational control of the installation remains within an entity established in the EEA and the data are stored within the EEA” Failure to do so will result in the Commission not only refusing to grant subsidies, but also imposing a fine of eight percent of the subsidy amount.
François Paquet praised the announcement, saying that the Commission decided to act proactively rather than reactively this time. The Managing Director of the Renewable Hydrogen Coalition mainly represents renewable energy companies. The EU has probably irretrievably lost the solar industry to China, while Chinese producers have also gained a strong foothold in the wind industry.
The hydrogen bank’s cybersecurity criterion could be exemplary for the wind industry. As the turbines must be regularly monitored, controlled and maintained remotely to fulfill operational safety and warranty requirements, it would represent a significant hurdle for Chinese companies.
However, the Renewable Hydrogen Coalition complains that even the strictest resilience criteria are of little help if demand for renewable hydrogen fails to materialize. “Now the funding gap for renewable hydrogen remains the biggest obstacle,” said Paquet, who also called on the member states to create lead markets for green industrial goods such as steel, chemicals, and fertilizers. Several companies have shelved electrolysis projects that have not been funded by the hydrogen bank in recent months, citing increased costs and a lack of demand.
However, the Commission has only partially responded to calls from the industry to increase the maximum price for tenders. The cap will not be lowered from €4.50 to €3.50 per kilogram of hydrogen as planned but to €4. In return, the fines for non-compliance will be doubled and supervision will be tightened to ensure that the projects actually go ahead.
The current price developments and dilemmas of industrial policy were also recently confirmed by an analysis by BNEF. Compared to the last report from 2022, the forecasts for cost development up to 2050 have been significantly increased, writes hydrogen chief analyst Martin Tengler. Although the costs for electrolyzers could fall by half by then, a restrictive trade policy is only expected to reduce them by 28 percent.
The Commission also published another important document for the hydrogen economy on Friday. It is now consulting on the draft delegated act for the definition of low-carbon hydrogen – i.e. mainly blue hydrogen from natural gas with subsequent carbon capture (CCS) – until October 25.
“The EU definition of low-carbon hydrogen that has now been presented creates much-needed investment security, especially for renewable projects that compete with low-carbon production,” says Michaela Holl from Agora Energiewende.
The energy-intensive industry is pinning its hopes on a new review clause. By July 2028, the Commission wants to examine “alternative pathways” that were not considered in the current version – “in particular for the generation of low-carbon electricity from nuclear power plants based on appropriate criteria.”
The energy-intensive European industry now sees this review clause as a new opportunity, particularly for nuclear power plants and some other forms of low-carbon electricity generation such as waste incineration plants and parts of electricity production from renewables. According to “Contexte”, France had campaigned to adjust the CO2 accounting in the legal act so that electrolysers that purchase electricity from a nuclear power plant via a long-term contract (PPA) are more climate-friendly. “The Commission seems to have heard the concerns about the exclusion of low-carbon PPAs, as it is introducing the review clause,” says a spokesperson for the European chemicals association Cefic. However, PPAs are not explicitly mentioned in the clause.
However, Agora would have liked to have seen an explicitly mentioned “alternative path” implemented by now. For example, the Commission wants to examine whether green electricity for hydrogen production can be credited on an hourly rather than annual basis after 2028, which would make business easier for producers.
The hourly approach would ensure that low-carbon hydrogen is produced when a lot of green electricity is available. “This would be in line with existing requirements for hydrogen from renewable energy sources and EU state aid rules,” Agora wrote on Sunday. German Economics Minister Robert Habeck recently spoke out against a similar hourly requirement for the production of green hydrogen. He asked the Commission for a postponement.
As in previous leaks, the Commission has retained the controversial default values for the assumptions on methane emissions from gas production. Because these are considered on a national and not a project-specific basis, according to an earlier Agora analysis, Norway is likely to remain the main trading partner for blue hydrogen for the time being. Cefic, on the other hand, complains that the key legal basis for calculating upstream emissions will only be clarified in a further delegated act on the Methane Regulation. The Commission does not have to present this until 2027.
Note: In the section on the delegated act for low-carbon hydrogen, we have adjusted the paragraph on PPAs. The statements on long-term purchase agreements in this context relate primarily to electricity from nuclear power plants and not from renewable energies.
The President of the Trade Committee in the European Parliament, Bernd Lange (SPD), warns the new EU Commission against isolationism and protectionism. At the same time, he calls for Parliament to have a greater say in international agreements and emergency procedures in crises.
In an interview with “Europe.Table”, Lange said that it was quite understandable that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen would focus on “economic security,” given the behavior of other players such as China or the USA. However, the Commission should not go too far here. He expects some important clarifications and commitments before the hearing of the new Commissioners-designate. This also applies to the new Commissioner-designate for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič.
The first step is to conclude a new framework agreement with the Commission, said Lange. Parliament expects von der Leyen to agree not to submit a request for provisional application of an agreement before Parliament has said yes or no.
This is already standard practice for trade agreements; in future, however, it should apply to all international agreements. According to Lange, Parliament also wants to be more involved in urgent procedures under Article 122 of the TFEU. This is about equal treatment with the Council.
In the last legislature, von der Leyen had initiated numerous important measures, for example on COVID-19 or the war in Ukraine, in an urgent procedure under Article 122. The European Parliament was not consulted and had difficulty accessing the relevant documents.
“We need to look at how we can better integrate the democratically elected EU institution,” says Lange. He hopes to receive corresponding commitments from the new Commission before the elections. However, this is not the only concern.
There are still unanswered questions before the hearings of the designated new Commissioners, as portfolios and competencies overlap, making it difficult in many cases to decide which Commissioners will be heard in which parliamentary committees.
“So far, it is still a three-dimensional puzzle,” says Lange, who prepares the hearings in the Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) as Chairman of the CCC. It is therefore uncertain whether the CCC will agree on a schedule for the hearings next Tuesday as planned.
“The titles are all a bit vague” and the discussion about the new areas of work and mission letters has only just begun. “We have to wait and see what this means in practice,” says Lange. There is still a lot to be clarified.
This also applies to the designated new Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič. The former EU Brexit negotiator will not only be responsible for trade but also for “economic security.”
Šefčovič is “a good choice,” said Lange. He can negotiate tough and has proven to be reliable during Brexit. However, it is unclear what “economic security” means in practice. “It is important to me that we do not become as protectionist as others.”
The EU had already taken some defensive measures in economic and trade policy and created new instruments. These should be exhausted before talking about new competencies. Furthermore, all measures must be compatible with WTO law.
This also applies with regard to the new focus in industrial policy. “If the Commission wants to give preference to European suppliers in future, this could be problematic,” warns Lange. During his talks with the WTO in Geneva, he has repeatedly heard concerns that the EU could abandon the WTO consensus. This is a real threat for the partners.
“I told them clearly that I am perhaps the last defender of the multilateral system – but a strong defender. We don’t want to batten down the hatches.”
Lange is currently particularly concerned about France, where the trend towards protectionism appears to be unbroken, even in the new government. The new trade minister in Paris has already spoken out against the CETA and Mercosur trade agreements. He thus no longer expects any progress on these issues this year.
“At some point, we will have to decide whether we can also conclude a trade agreement against France,” Lange added. However, that moment has not yet arrived.
The SPD politician was cautiously optimistic with regard to the tariff dispute over Chinese cars. The countervailing duties planned by the EU were an “incentive for negotiations,” said Lange. “Basically, it’s about a sensible negotiated solution so that illegal dumping and subsidization measures stop.”
The fact that a preliminary vote of the EU states originally planned for last Wednesday fell through did not worry him. “It’s like collective bargaining. The key date is October 30.”
China’s new ambassador to the EU has taken up his new post in Brussels. The Chinese Mission announced that Cai Run arrived in the Belgian capital on Friday. Cai succeeds Fu Cong, who took over as China’s representative to the United Nations in the spring. Cai had been ambassador to Israel since 2021.
Cai already had a longer stint in Europe: He was China’s envoy to Portugal between 2015 and 2020. Before that, he held various positions in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Between 2005 and 2008, he worked as a minister counselor at the embassy in the USA. ari
The Austrian Magnus Brunner owes his entry into politics to an internship in Brussels. After completing his PhD, the lawyer joined the Committee of the Regions, where he met the governor of his home region of Voralberg at the coffee bar. A few years later, he remembered him and made Brunner his office manager. “Without this encounter, my path might have been completely different,” Brunner told the daily newspaper ‘Der Standard.’
Before Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer brought the now 52-year-old Brunner into the government as Finance Minister in 2021, Brunner had held several positions in the economy and was responsible for climate protection and energy as State Secretary. However, he had no contact with home affairs and migration, his future area of responsibility in the EU Commission. Nevertheless, Nehammer describes his former cabinet member as “highly qualified” for the future post: “He has proven that he can bring together different points of view on difficult issues and reach a compromise.”
He will indeed have to prove this ability over the next five years, as his portfolio includes some of the most controversial issues in the EU. It was one of the biggest surprises of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s personnel line-up that she chose Brunner, of all people, for the home affairs portfolio. He and the political establishment in Vienna had firmly expected an economic portfolio in the future EU Commission. However, the targeted areas of financial markets and competition went to women.
An affable guy like Brunner comes in very handy for von der Leyen. In Austria, he is considered friendly and unobtrusive. He is not someone who goes on the barricades because of his convictions. In his career to date, he has done an excellent job of avoiding mistakes and working his way to the top. Von der Leyen should not expect any contradictions or attempts at profiling from Brunner, who is a member of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and therefore belongs to her own party family.
It was probably a calculated move on von der Leyen’s part to entrust the migration portfolio to an Austrian of all people, as Austria has been insisting on a tougher course in Europe for years. This trend is likely to intensify in the coming years, as the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) became the strongest party in yesterday’s parliamentary elections.
In the course of his career, Brunner has repeatedly landed in surprising positions. Before he was appointed Finance Minister, no one had him in mind. He was also not initially the favorite for the post of EU Commissioner. It is said in Vienna that Nehammer sent him to Brussels because of his high poll ratings. In addition, given his poor performance in the parliamentary elections, Nehammer would benefit from not having an obvious competitor in his entourage.
In his future role, Brunner will be very much in the spotlight. Von der Leyen writes in her mission letter that migration remains a “challenge” for Europe and a priority for its citizens. Among other things, Brunner will be responsible for the implementation of the migration pact and will have to develop a common approach to repatriation. The fight against smugglers also falls within his remit. In addition, there is the strengthening of the common borders and, of course, the major aspect of internal security, for which he is to present a strategy next year.
Brunner will benefit from his excellent English in his future role. At the age of 16, he spent a year at the British boarding school Eton, the elite school attended by 20 British prime ministers, including Boris Johnson and David Cameron. After studying law in Innsbruck, Brunner completed a post-graduate degree at the renowned King’s College in London.
There will be little time for his tennis hobby in his new job. Brunner played tennis professionally in his youth and even defeated the later US Open winner Julian Knowle. He resigned from his position as President of the Austrian Tennis Association when he became Finance Minister. Silke Wettach
When Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivers a government statement on the upcoming European Council in the German Bundestag on December 13, 2023, something unusual happens: in the first few minutes of his government statement, the Chancellor does not address the challenges the EU is facing, but only one EU member state. Scholz congratulates Donald Tusk on his swearing-in as Prime Minister, which took place the same day. And then he goes on to emphasize with great empathy the opportunities that arise for bilateral relations, but especially for the European Union with the new Polish government. Among other things, he says: “Donald Tusk has announced that he will lead Poland back into the heart of the European Union. And that is exactly where Poland belongs: at the heart of Europe as an indispensable part of our European Union.” And he continues: “Poland’s role in and for Europe is greater today than ever before.“
The fact that Olaf Scholz is using a government statement to pay tribute to the new Polish government before the German Bundestag shows that he is very aware of the historic opportunity that has opened up for Europe and bilateral relations between Germany and Poland with the new government in Warsaw. And yet it is precisely at this point that a crucial question arises that is of eminent importance not only for Germany and Poland, but for all of Europe:
To what extent is Germany, is the Federal Government aware that the victory of the democratic forces in the Sejm elections on October 15, 2023 and the resulting new government must be seen not only as a hopeful turning point in history, but also as a great opportunity and test for the Federal Republic of Germany itself?
The Polish people’s love of freedom has given the current German government a unique historical opportunity to address the failings of the previous German governments. By taking a courageous stand for Poland’s security, acknowledging its contribution to securing the EU’s eastern border and coming to terms with the blind spots in German historical awareness of the unbelievable crimes committed by Germans in Poland between 1939 and 1945, Germany would not only regain some of the prestige it has lost with its wrong and dangerous Russia policy among many people in Poland. Berlin would also give the new Polish government the opportunity to cooperate more closely with the German side than perhaps ever before.
Such a turning point in German-Polish relations would not only be a blessing for the people on both sides of the Oder and Neisse rivers. In view of the current multiple threats to the “European way of life”, it is a historical necessity in order to defend freedom in Europe against its internal and external enemies.
That is why the Federal Chancellor must now take the initiative with a great deal of courage and empathy and use his policy-making powers to seize this historic opportunity. Olaf Scholz should make the following five points a top priority and tackle them with courage:
1. For your and our freedom!
In view of the brutal Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the threat to peace and freedom in Europe, Germany should substantially strengthen the defense capabilities of NATO’s eastern flank in Poland as well, particularly in the area of air defense, over and above what has already been achieved to a considerable extent. Germany could be sure of the support of the current Polish government here and would significantly strengthen confidence in Germany with such an initiative (not only) in Poland. Anyone who does not dare to make such an advance, citing the costs, has still not understood that the defense of freedom cannot be made dependent on the budget situation.
2. For a genuine humanitarian gesture
The German government has developed proposals for an appropriate humanitarian gesture to the victims of the criminal German occupation between 1939 and 1945 who are still living in Poland. Such a gesture should be initiated quickly in the spirit of reparation, even if it cannot be achieved with any money in the world. And it should be more than just a symbolic gesture, but should provide tangible material relief to those still alive.
3. For a reappraisal of the blind spots of the past
It is the task of the political generation bearing responsibility today to raise awareness of German crimes in Poland in German society. We owe this to the Polish victims, and the Poles living today have every right to expect this from us. That is why the Federal Government, together with the German Bundestag, should quickly create the conditions to ensure that not only the so-called German-Polish House, but in particular a memorial commemorating the Polish victims of the indescribable crimes committed during the German occupation between 1939 and 1945, is realized consistently and swiftly.
4. For more support for civil society actors
When the German and Polish governments met again for the first time in six years on July 2 in Warsaw for intergovernmental consultations, an action plan was adopted that attaches great importance to civil society actors in particular. However, this commitment is not reflected in any way in the German government’s draft budget for 2025. German-Polish actors such as the Federal Association of German-Polish Societies, the German-Polish Institute, the German-Polish Youth Office and the Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation in particular should now be provided with more funds in the federal budget, which they can then use in a targeted manner without the usual bureaucratic hurdles.
5. For a new German-Polish treaty
With the Treaty of Aachen, Germany and France have opened a new chapter in their relations. This treaty represents a further development of the Élysée Treaty, which takes account of the new realities and also takes parliamentary relations between the two countries to a higher level. However, Germany and Poland should not wait until the German-Polish Neighborhood Treaty is as old as the former Élysée Treaty before they get down to work and develop a new German-Polish treaty together. With such a new treaty, Poland and Germany could provide urgently needed impetus for the defense of peace and freedom on our continent against the internal and external enemies of an open society.
In these times of threats to peace and freedom in Europe, standing on the right side of history, not with words but with deeds, is the order of the day. With Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Olaf Scholz now has the partner he needs to do what is historically necessary – now or never!
Dietmar Nietan, 60, is an SPD member of the Bundestag from the constituency of Düren and the German government’s representative for Poland