Last Friday, the EU Commission presented its draft for the European Sustainability Reporting Standards. The delegated act is intended to supplement the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) adopted last year. It is now open for public consultation until July 7.
The draft has drawn strong criticism from think tanks and NGOs: the Commission has weakened the recommendations drawn up by the EFRAG advisory body in key areas. Critics warn that this endangers the efficiency and credibility of the standards. Read more about this in the News.
As part of a package on sustainable finance, the planned proposal for a regulation to regulate the market for ESG ratings is expected today. We have taken a look at the draft in advance and give you an overview of the plans: For example, providers of ESG ratings will in the future be subject to strict requirements for transparency and independence and will be controlled by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
I wish you a good read!
As part of a package of measures for sustainable finance, the EU Commission is today presenting a draft for the planned ESG rating regulation. With it, it wants to ensure transparency and integrity in the market for sustainability ratings. According to the proposal, which Table.Media has received in advance, providers of ESG ratings will in the future be subject to strict requirements for transparency and independence and will be monitored by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
A Commission impact assessment had previously identified concerns about transparency in data sourcing and methodologies in the rapidly growing ESG ratings market. It also said the ratings were often inaccurate, unreliable and not up to date.
With the draft legislation, the Commission defines ESG ratings and their providers for the first time: It is “an opinion or an assessment on an entity, financial instrument, financial product or the ESG profile of a company, based on an established methodology and a defined system of assessment categories, and made available to third parties”.
Anyone wishing to offer sustainability ratings in the EU in the future must apply for authorization by ESMA and meet certain criteria. Rating providers from third countries must also meet specific EU requirements and be recorded in a register. This is a necessary measure because, according to the Commission, “large non-EU-based ESG rating providers currently provide services to investors in the EU”. The largest and most important providers, on which the market is heavily concentrated (such as MSCI, ISS and Moody’s), are US or UK firms. MSCI, for example, has a 30 percent market share.
The draft provides for strict provisions to ensure the integrity and reliability of ESG ratings. Providers are to regularly review the methodology of the ratings, document their rating activities, introduce internal control mechanisms, and in the future must explicitly state that their ESG ratings are a subjective assessment.
They must also ensure the independence of their rating activities and therefore may not engage in any of the following activities:
Among other things, this separates the advisory and rating business, which has led to conflicts of interest in the past. “If an ESG rating provider sells consulting services to a company, the rating provider should not also rate the company. Otherwise, he ends up giving a rating on a company from which he receives money”, demanded Thierry Philipponnat, chief economist of the NGO Finance Watch, in an interview with Table.Media.
Markus Ferber, spokesman for the EPP Group in the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, on the other hand, sees this requirement as the model of a “stand-alone ESG rating agency”, which the Commission has in mind as the ideal business model and which enormously narrows the pool of potential providers. “It may well backfire and at the end of the day there will be significantly fewer reliable ESG ratings available in Europe“, he said. “The Commission would do well to reconsider its rigid approach to ESG ratings providers”, Ferber commented on the draft.
According to the draft, ESMA is to be responsible for market supervision and submit an annual report to the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Member states are also to each designate a competent authority. ESMA is also empowered to take sanctioning measures if a credit rating provider fails to comply with its obligations and, for example, to temporarily or permanently withdraw its authorization, impose fines or make the violations public.
The Commission will also present today a Communication on a Sustainable Finance Framework and a Recommendation on Transitional Financing. All proposals are part of the EU Sustainable Finance Strategy.
Voluntary commitment, international guard rails, AI pact and AI law – politicians are currently quite active when it comes to drafting rules for artificial intelligence. But how do the various projects interact and which initiatives make sense at all?
The EU’s AI Act is the most concrete and farthest advanced. Already tomorrow, Wednesday, the MEPs in the plenary of the EU Parliament will vote on their proposal for the AI Act. If there is a majority in favor of the compromise in the Parliament, the start of the trilogue is to take place immediately on the evening after the vote. Work will then begin immediately at the technical level. Further dates are scheduled for July 18 and September 26, then under the Spanish Council presidency. The discussion on generative AI, which includes large language models such as ChatGPT, will be exciting in the trilogue.
As a kind of antechamber to the AI Act, Commissioner Thierry Breton announced the AI Pact. It is a voluntary instrument designed to help companies prepare for the future European rules. So AI Pact and AI Act are going in the same direction. The AI Act regulates the obligations for companies that want to develop and operate AI systems in the EU. The AI Pact bridges the time until then.
Beyond the EU, however, the Commission also wants to coordinate with international partners on guidelines for AI. In doing so, it is focusing on the Hiroshima AI Process of the G7. The aim here is to promote guard rails at an international level, especially for generative AI or advanced general-purpose AI models (GPAI models).
This is linked to the Code of Conduct for AI. This was launched by the EU and the USA at their most recent meeting of the Joint Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Both the Hiroshima Process and the Code of Conduct are open to other like-minded partners – in addition to the G7 countries, for example, Brazil, Indonesia and India.
Because there are both overlaps and differences in scope, such as the topics to be addressed or the interlocutors, two processes will likely be necessary. Here’s how the commission intends to address these interrelated goals while maintaining consistency between them, according to a spokesperson. “The processes will take full account of the AI Act legislative process and will not prejudge its outcome“.
The British also want to have a say when it comes to rules for AI. During his first visit to the White House, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak proposed holding an international summit on AI security on the island in the fall. He has received the approval of the USA for this, writes “Le Monde”.
The German government also wants to play an active role in the process. “There is nothing to be gained from national regulations in the field of AI“, Minister for Transport Volker Wissing told Table.Media on the sidelines of the Republica digital conference. “European regulation is a minimum step. I think it would be even better if we agreed on minimum standards as a G7. A voluntary commitment alone is not enough”. He said it is also important to create transparency about what was generated by a human and what was generated by an AI. “Otherwise, we will lose people’s trust“.
The G7’s international standards could also provide guidance for the AI Act negotiations, Wissing said. “That is, on the one hand, respecting our values and, on the other hand, maintaining our competitiveness”. Wissing expects the G7 digital ministers to address international rules for AI again later this year.
Scientists also believe that a voluntary commitment by companies would not achieve its goals. “The AI Act, even if it is only an EU regulation, is more important than a Code of Conduct at the international level”, says Christian Katzenbach, professor of communication and media studies at the University of Bremen. “The AI Act will have its impact beyond Europe“.
Not only is a voluntary code of conduct less binding, at this high level there is too little input from research, civil society and parliaments, he said. “That’s why such informal norms are often shaped by big players – in this case, Big Tech from the US”.
Katzenbach cited the Santa Clara Principles as an example of a successful process. These rules on transparency and responsibilities for moderating content on online platforms emerged from discussions among a broad coalition of organizations and experts. “These principles, starting with human rights and due process, could also guide a code of conduct for AI”, Katzenbach said.
The digital association Bitkom believes that a code of conduct can be fundamentally helpful in implementing concrete requirements and protection goals in the field of AI. This is particularly the case in an international context beyond the EU. “It is crucial that there is a fundamental link to the AI Act, which is currently being negotiated at the EU level.” For such a Code of Conduct to work, it is important that all relevant market participants participate and that there are concrete instructions on how to implement it.
Ideas for standards such as transparency and good definitions of terms are important content for possible international agreements on AI before AI laws are introduced, says Gergana Baeva, an expert on AI certification at the Center for Trusted Artificial Intelligence (ZVKI). That said, it’s usually easy to agree on a technical level – for example, on data quality, copyrights or robustness. “But there are also difficult issues, such as fairness and non-discrimination, that are not internationally consensual”, Baeva says.
Take the US as an example: Here, unlike in Europe, authorities have been using predictive policing for 20 years, which is expected to be a prohibited practice under the AI Act. “Predictive policing is hugely error-prone and demonstrably discriminatory, but the US will probably want to stick with it”, Baeva says. She says it’s similarly difficult with data protection, which has an important status in Europe but none at all in Asia. In the US, she says, it is valued only as long as it does not block business interests. “So there is a lot of tension”, Baeva says. “The overall secure package is only being seriously negotiated in Europe right now.”
However, there are already international standards in the production process that can also be applied to AI and thus could also become the content of a code of conduct: “Product safety – including the social risks – should be internationally consensual”, says Baeva.
Matthias Spielkamp, managing director of Algorithmwatch, also points out that already existing rules should also be applied to AI. “The use of AI is part of the risk assessment that major online platforms already have to submit by August under the Digital Services Act (DSA).”
Spielkamp, on the other hand, does not want to get involved in the discussion about what elements of a voluntary commitment might be. “We need real regulation as soon as possible”, he says. “Only binding rules will help.”
A few days ago, reports surfaced that China is supplying Russia with weapons. What do you know about this?
Yes, that’s right. However, these are not deadly weapons in large quantities, but apparently certain quantities of small arms, armored vehicles or drones. In addition, the Chinese military industry is said to supply some parts for Russian weapon systems. But these connections go back a long way and take place between sanctioned Chinese and sanctioned Russian companies.
All without consequences. So will China be delivering more soon?
If China were to do more, it would be exposed immediately – and all efforts to position itself as a neutral actor would be nullified. China knows that Russia needs Chinese weapons to win, but Russia is not losing this war. China is completely agnostic. Whether the front line runs 100 kilometers to the west, or whether a Russian or Ukrainian flag flies over Bakhmut, China doesn’t give a damn. Beijing cares about Putin’s fate. The maximum I can think of would be an artillery shell exchange where North Korea sends more to Russia and then China supplies North Korea.
In light of these reports, how honest is China’s diplomatic approach to Ukraine?
China’s foreign policy is all about China. Not that it’s unique to China, there are a lot of selfish countries, but I think that China is the embodiment of this pragmatic egoism wrapped in the PR coverage that would enable China to position itself as a force for good in the international community.
But wasn’t it more of a PR disaster that China, as a self-proclaimed mediator, didn’t talk to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for so long?
China’s approach is driven by risk perception. And China thought that the risks of talking to President Zelensky far outweighed the potential benefits.
What risks?
There was a real risk that when a discussion between Xi and Zelenskiy will happen, Zelenskiy will take a very aggressive tone. He will put China on the spot for enabling Russian aggression, continue to be the largest trading partner of Russia and so on. So if President Zelenskiy would have taken such an approach that would have been the real PR disaster for China.
So what made Xi Jinping finally talk to Zelenskiy?
To a certain degree the pressure from the West. China has a couple of interests that it needs to balance. First, Russia as a junior partner, which is very beneficial for China as an outcome of this war. Second, there is the strategic competition with the United States. That will not go away. And third, it’s partnership with Europe
So Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz were successful with their approach to China?
Let’s take a look from the Chinese side: China is very smart to figure out that people like Scholz and Macron need to have some justification for reaching out to the CCP. So Beijing had to give them just sufficient amounts of deliverables. Xi Jinping figured out that positioning China as a force for diplomacy and peaceful resolution is good AND also provides Western leaders that want to make pragmatic deals with China about the economy a cheap cover. For Scholz and Macron, but also for Meloni, Sanchez and so on.
And how do you specifically assess China’s solution for Ukraine?
So far, China is doing pretty well.
Really? The fighting continues relentlessly, the war is far from over.
The fact that China’s proposal does not go into detail on crucial issues is not an accident, but intentional. In its 12-point-position China doesn’t name Russia as the aggressor, and even doesn’t mention war at all. But nonetheless, China positions itself as a force for good and a bilateral partner for Ukraine. The Ukrainian readout is also very beneficial. It talks about long-standing commitment, doesn’t criticize China and basically says: We are happy about the partnership. So good scores for China.
And for peace?
I wouldn’t expect that China’s 12-points will materialize into more serious engagement. China understands that there is no real demand for peace at this point in either Moscow or Kyiv. Zelenskiy went all in, and he cannot dial the expectations down, at least before the counteroffensive is over. And Putin believes that time is on his side. His army is doing miserably, but he’s not losing this war. His expectation is that Ukraine will be just another Syria, Libya for the West, and at some point the US and American partners will get tired and distracted.
Without a meaningful result for the people of Ukraine.
Well, I don’t think that China is interested in resolving the conflict, not that they are interested in the conflict going on indefinitely. I think that they are simply adapting to the situation on the ground.
You stick by your opinion: This is a good result for China?
From Beijing’s perspective: Yes. Since Russia is becoming their junior partner, it’s very beneficial for China. Russia was on this trajectory, but now it’s a junior partnership on steroids and China still wants to get access to Russia’s cheap energy resources, fertilizers, metals, agricultural capacity. Everything that Russia has to offer, China gets access to, even to the most advanced Russian military technology. Unthinkable a few years ago.
How much influence does China have over Russia?
It has leverage, and it’s growing. My metaphor would be China’s relationship with North Korea, although North Korea is so much more dependent on China and a far smaller power than Russia. But even there: Kim Jong-un’s policy is not dictated by Beijing. He’s doing stuff that China doesn’t want to see but still has to tolerate because Kim knows how to navigate this. Russia will be the same, but in a different category. China is smart, they know how to manage this and they know how to massage the ego of Putin, how to cultivate these long term bonds that will increasingly make Russia’s elite anti-Western.
Would China’s influence be enough to end the war?
No. China does not have leverage on the Ukrainian side. And its leverage on Russia in this sense is slightly overestimated. If China would fully withdraw its support from Russia, will Putin stop, dis-invade Ukraine and buy himself a ticket to Hague? Unlikely. It’s likely that Russia will still continue. Russia with Putin can hardly accept an agreement with Ukraine.
How dangerous is this China-Russia-partnership for the West?
With the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia, the Kremlin has fewer options and is more dependent on China than ever before. At the same time, China’s fierce competition with the US makes Moscow an indispensable junior partner in Beijing’s efforts to push back the US and its allies. China has no other friend that has so much to offer. And Xi, preparing his country for a long period of confrontation with the most powerful country on the planet, may need all the help he can get.
Where will that lead to?
If we enter a new Cold War with China, China is the next Soviet Union and Russia is the next Warsaw Pact. Just one difference: Russia is there voluntarily, not unlike the Warsaw Pact countries that have been occupied by the Soviet Union.
This makes the situation more dangerous than in the past.
No doubt, the China-Russia-partnership is dangerous for the West. NATO’s border with China will be its border with Russia. Any serious military planner should look at China-Russia increasingly as an entity, even without a formal alliance. That has tremendous consequences for the West where to focus its resources, and where to spend money. For example, Russia could be asked by China to do a large military drill in the Baltics or escalate there to tie Western one’s up in order to allow China to do something in Asia. That’s the scenario we should increasingly focus on.
Silvio Berlusconi died of chronic leukemia at 9:30 a.m. Monday at San Raffaele Hospital in Milan at the age of 86. The Milanese businessman had been hospitalized several times in recent months, most recently on Friday. He leaves behind five children from two marriages.
He was Italy’s Prime Minister four times, owner of the media giant Mediaset and president of the AC Milan soccer club. A gigantic life that has evoked both admiration and horror. He changed the way politics is done in Italy. His relationship with Europe was marked as much by his Europeanism and Atlanticism as by the contradictions of his dissolute behavior.
Berlusconi’s public life began in 1994. The end of the First Republic in the wake of the Tangentopoli scandal was also the end of traditional parties. Berlusconi, then a successful businessman in construction, media and soccer, founded the Forza Italia party and became Prime Minister after the 1994 general election. The political transformation of Italy that he carried out was unprecedented.
The party of the “Cavaliere” blew up the old politics and sowed the silent seeds for all the phenomena that were to sprout up years later: from Matteo Renzi to Matteo Salvini to the 5-Star Movement. They are all children of his way of understanding power, communication and parliamentarism in Italy.
Berlusconi’s first term lasted only one year (1994-1995). In 2001, he returned to Palazzo Chiggi and remained until 2006. The year before, he was forced to resign due to government squabbles, but promptly took over as Prime Minister for a second time. In 2008 he became Prime Minister for the fourth time, but resigned in 2011 before the end of his term due to the economic crisis.
Berlusconi’s political career has also been marked by prosecutions (more than 20) and scandals. In August 2013, Berlusconi was sentenced to four years in prison for tax fraud in the Mediaset trial.
Berlusconi’s temperament, for better or worse, has often defined his relationship with Europe. His flamboyance clashed with his institutional profile, so that he often took center stage more through personal affairs than through political action. Two examples:
Berlusconi’s relations with the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Libya caused great suspicion, but also admiration. Vladimir Putin, Alexander Lukashenko, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Muammar al-Gaddafi were among Berlusconi’s pals. In May 2002, Berlusconi invited Putin to the NATO summit in Pratica di Mare and brokered a meeting with then US President George W. Bush. The result was a cooperation agreement, the NATO-Russia Council, which Berlusconi portrayed as ending the Cold War.
When Giorgia Meloni became Italian Prime Minister last year, Berlusconi was seen as a guarantor that there would be no extremist and nationalist ideas in Italy’s right-wing government. Closing the conservative coalition’s election campaign in Rome’s Piazza del Popolo in September 2022, Berlusconi said, “As you know, we are part of Europe, part of NATO, part of the West, and we are even friends of the United States. We want a better Europe. A real Europe of citizens. A Europe that can be a protagonist in the world and become a military power.”
Berlusconi was undoubtedly the most influential figure of the last quarter century in Italy. His body was transferred Monday to the family villa in Arcore, where a private funeral service will be held. The state funeral will be held Wednesday at Milan Cathedral. Isabel Cuesta Camacho
To mark the 60th anniversary of the Élysée Treaties, the governments in Berlin and Paris have launched the Friendship Pass. 30,000 of them are available to 18- to 27-year-olds on both sides of the Rhine. The tickets were distributed to travel enthusiasts yesterday. It’s a bit like Interrail: on seven days within a month, seven train journeys are possible in the neighboring country.
Only naysayers will now object that the website through which the German transport minister wanted to give away the free tickets had massive problems. At first, it was not accessible at all. Then, around noon, it said that the fun was already over and that all the tickets had been allocated.
One hears that people wanting to travel should have filled out more forms than for a student loan application. Whether this is malicious gossip or whether the action really did not get by without German bureaucratic mania can no longer be checked, because: The page is currently offline.
Fans of Franco-German friendship who didn’t get their turn will regret what they’re missing: French high-speed trains are usually on time – because the TGV has its own network and is therefore not permanently slowed down by regional traffic. What’s more, air conditioning works on SNCF trains even when it’s hot.
Perhaps France is simply better prepared for the 21st century: Technical teething problems of the website for the Friendship Passport in France were not reported. Markus Grabitz
Last Friday, the EU Commission presented its draft for the European Sustainability Reporting Standards. The delegated act is intended to supplement the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) adopted last year. It is now open for public consultation until July 7.
The draft has drawn strong criticism from think tanks and NGOs: the Commission has weakened the recommendations drawn up by the EFRAG advisory body in key areas. Critics warn that this endangers the efficiency and credibility of the standards. Read more about this in the News.
As part of a package on sustainable finance, the planned proposal for a regulation to regulate the market for ESG ratings is expected today. We have taken a look at the draft in advance and give you an overview of the plans: For example, providers of ESG ratings will in the future be subject to strict requirements for transparency and independence and will be controlled by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
I wish you a good read!
As part of a package of measures for sustainable finance, the EU Commission is today presenting a draft for the planned ESG rating regulation. With it, it wants to ensure transparency and integrity in the market for sustainability ratings. According to the proposal, which Table.Media has received in advance, providers of ESG ratings will in the future be subject to strict requirements for transparency and independence and will be monitored by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
A Commission impact assessment had previously identified concerns about transparency in data sourcing and methodologies in the rapidly growing ESG ratings market. It also said the ratings were often inaccurate, unreliable and not up to date.
With the draft legislation, the Commission defines ESG ratings and their providers for the first time: It is “an opinion or an assessment on an entity, financial instrument, financial product or the ESG profile of a company, based on an established methodology and a defined system of assessment categories, and made available to third parties”.
Anyone wishing to offer sustainability ratings in the EU in the future must apply for authorization by ESMA and meet certain criteria. Rating providers from third countries must also meet specific EU requirements and be recorded in a register. This is a necessary measure because, according to the Commission, “large non-EU-based ESG rating providers currently provide services to investors in the EU”. The largest and most important providers, on which the market is heavily concentrated (such as MSCI, ISS and Moody’s), are US or UK firms. MSCI, for example, has a 30 percent market share.
The draft provides for strict provisions to ensure the integrity and reliability of ESG ratings. Providers are to regularly review the methodology of the ratings, document their rating activities, introduce internal control mechanisms, and in the future must explicitly state that their ESG ratings are a subjective assessment.
They must also ensure the independence of their rating activities and therefore may not engage in any of the following activities:
Among other things, this separates the advisory and rating business, which has led to conflicts of interest in the past. “If an ESG rating provider sells consulting services to a company, the rating provider should not also rate the company. Otherwise, he ends up giving a rating on a company from which he receives money”, demanded Thierry Philipponnat, chief economist of the NGO Finance Watch, in an interview with Table.Media.
Markus Ferber, spokesman for the EPP Group in the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, on the other hand, sees this requirement as the model of a “stand-alone ESG rating agency”, which the Commission has in mind as the ideal business model and which enormously narrows the pool of potential providers. “It may well backfire and at the end of the day there will be significantly fewer reliable ESG ratings available in Europe“, he said. “The Commission would do well to reconsider its rigid approach to ESG ratings providers”, Ferber commented on the draft.
According to the draft, ESMA is to be responsible for market supervision and submit an annual report to the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Member states are also to each designate a competent authority. ESMA is also empowered to take sanctioning measures if a credit rating provider fails to comply with its obligations and, for example, to temporarily or permanently withdraw its authorization, impose fines or make the violations public.
The Commission will also present today a Communication on a Sustainable Finance Framework and a Recommendation on Transitional Financing. All proposals are part of the EU Sustainable Finance Strategy.
Voluntary commitment, international guard rails, AI pact and AI law – politicians are currently quite active when it comes to drafting rules for artificial intelligence. But how do the various projects interact and which initiatives make sense at all?
The EU’s AI Act is the most concrete and farthest advanced. Already tomorrow, Wednesday, the MEPs in the plenary of the EU Parliament will vote on their proposal for the AI Act. If there is a majority in favor of the compromise in the Parliament, the start of the trilogue is to take place immediately on the evening after the vote. Work will then begin immediately at the technical level. Further dates are scheduled for July 18 and September 26, then under the Spanish Council presidency. The discussion on generative AI, which includes large language models such as ChatGPT, will be exciting in the trilogue.
As a kind of antechamber to the AI Act, Commissioner Thierry Breton announced the AI Pact. It is a voluntary instrument designed to help companies prepare for the future European rules. So AI Pact and AI Act are going in the same direction. The AI Act regulates the obligations for companies that want to develop and operate AI systems in the EU. The AI Pact bridges the time until then.
Beyond the EU, however, the Commission also wants to coordinate with international partners on guidelines for AI. In doing so, it is focusing on the Hiroshima AI Process of the G7. The aim here is to promote guard rails at an international level, especially for generative AI or advanced general-purpose AI models (GPAI models).
This is linked to the Code of Conduct for AI. This was launched by the EU and the USA at their most recent meeting of the Joint Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Both the Hiroshima Process and the Code of Conduct are open to other like-minded partners – in addition to the G7 countries, for example, Brazil, Indonesia and India.
Because there are both overlaps and differences in scope, such as the topics to be addressed or the interlocutors, two processes will likely be necessary. Here’s how the commission intends to address these interrelated goals while maintaining consistency between them, according to a spokesperson. “The processes will take full account of the AI Act legislative process and will not prejudge its outcome“.
The British also want to have a say when it comes to rules for AI. During his first visit to the White House, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak proposed holding an international summit on AI security on the island in the fall. He has received the approval of the USA for this, writes “Le Monde”.
The German government also wants to play an active role in the process. “There is nothing to be gained from national regulations in the field of AI“, Minister for Transport Volker Wissing told Table.Media on the sidelines of the Republica digital conference. “European regulation is a minimum step. I think it would be even better if we agreed on minimum standards as a G7. A voluntary commitment alone is not enough”. He said it is also important to create transparency about what was generated by a human and what was generated by an AI. “Otherwise, we will lose people’s trust“.
The G7’s international standards could also provide guidance for the AI Act negotiations, Wissing said. “That is, on the one hand, respecting our values and, on the other hand, maintaining our competitiveness”. Wissing expects the G7 digital ministers to address international rules for AI again later this year.
Scientists also believe that a voluntary commitment by companies would not achieve its goals. “The AI Act, even if it is only an EU regulation, is more important than a Code of Conduct at the international level”, says Christian Katzenbach, professor of communication and media studies at the University of Bremen. “The AI Act will have its impact beyond Europe“.
Not only is a voluntary code of conduct less binding, at this high level there is too little input from research, civil society and parliaments, he said. “That’s why such informal norms are often shaped by big players – in this case, Big Tech from the US”.
Katzenbach cited the Santa Clara Principles as an example of a successful process. These rules on transparency and responsibilities for moderating content on online platforms emerged from discussions among a broad coalition of organizations and experts. “These principles, starting with human rights and due process, could also guide a code of conduct for AI”, Katzenbach said.
The digital association Bitkom believes that a code of conduct can be fundamentally helpful in implementing concrete requirements and protection goals in the field of AI. This is particularly the case in an international context beyond the EU. “It is crucial that there is a fundamental link to the AI Act, which is currently being negotiated at the EU level.” For such a Code of Conduct to work, it is important that all relevant market participants participate and that there are concrete instructions on how to implement it.
Ideas for standards such as transparency and good definitions of terms are important content for possible international agreements on AI before AI laws are introduced, says Gergana Baeva, an expert on AI certification at the Center for Trusted Artificial Intelligence (ZVKI). That said, it’s usually easy to agree on a technical level – for example, on data quality, copyrights or robustness. “But there are also difficult issues, such as fairness and non-discrimination, that are not internationally consensual”, Baeva says.
Take the US as an example: Here, unlike in Europe, authorities have been using predictive policing for 20 years, which is expected to be a prohibited practice under the AI Act. “Predictive policing is hugely error-prone and demonstrably discriminatory, but the US will probably want to stick with it”, Baeva says. She says it’s similarly difficult with data protection, which has an important status in Europe but none at all in Asia. In the US, she says, it is valued only as long as it does not block business interests. “So there is a lot of tension”, Baeva says. “The overall secure package is only being seriously negotiated in Europe right now.”
However, there are already international standards in the production process that can also be applied to AI and thus could also become the content of a code of conduct: “Product safety – including the social risks – should be internationally consensual”, says Baeva.
Matthias Spielkamp, managing director of Algorithmwatch, also points out that already existing rules should also be applied to AI. “The use of AI is part of the risk assessment that major online platforms already have to submit by August under the Digital Services Act (DSA).”
Spielkamp, on the other hand, does not want to get involved in the discussion about what elements of a voluntary commitment might be. “We need real regulation as soon as possible”, he says. “Only binding rules will help.”
A few days ago, reports surfaced that China is supplying Russia with weapons. What do you know about this?
Yes, that’s right. However, these are not deadly weapons in large quantities, but apparently certain quantities of small arms, armored vehicles or drones. In addition, the Chinese military industry is said to supply some parts for Russian weapon systems. But these connections go back a long way and take place between sanctioned Chinese and sanctioned Russian companies.
All without consequences. So will China be delivering more soon?
If China were to do more, it would be exposed immediately – and all efforts to position itself as a neutral actor would be nullified. China knows that Russia needs Chinese weapons to win, but Russia is not losing this war. China is completely agnostic. Whether the front line runs 100 kilometers to the west, or whether a Russian or Ukrainian flag flies over Bakhmut, China doesn’t give a damn. Beijing cares about Putin’s fate. The maximum I can think of would be an artillery shell exchange where North Korea sends more to Russia and then China supplies North Korea.
In light of these reports, how honest is China’s diplomatic approach to Ukraine?
China’s foreign policy is all about China. Not that it’s unique to China, there are a lot of selfish countries, but I think that China is the embodiment of this pragmatic egoism wrapped in the PR coverage that would enable China to position itself as a force for good in the international community.
But wasn’t it more of a PR disaster that China, as a self-proclaimed mediator, didn’t talk to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for so long?
China’s approach is driven by risk perception. And China thought that the risks of talking to President Zelensky far outweighed the potential benefits.
What risks?
There was a real risk that when a discussion between Xi and Zelenskiy will happen, Zelenskiy will take a very aggressive tone. He will put China on the spot for enabling Russian aggression, continue to be the largest trading partner of Russia and so on. So if President Zelenskiy would have taken such an approach that would have been the real PR disaster for China.
So what made Xi Jinping finally talk to Zelenskiy?
To a certain degree the pressure from the West. China has a couple of interests that it needs to balance. First, Russia as a junior partner, which is very beneficial for China as an outcome of this war. Second, there is the strategic competition with the United States. That will not go away. And third, it’s partnership with Europe
So Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz were successful with their approach to China?
Let’s take a look from the Chinese side: China is very smart to figure out that people like Scholz and Macron need to have some justification for reaching out to the CCP. So Beijing had to give them just sufficient amounts of deliverables. Xi Jinping figured out that positioning China as a force for diplomacy and peaceful resolution is good AND also provides Western leaders that want to make pragmatic deals with China about the economy a cheap cover. For Scholz and Macron, but also for Meloni, Sanchez and so on.
And how do you specifically assess China’s solution for Ukraine?
So far, China is doing pretty well.
Really? The fighting continues relentlessly, the war is far from over.
The fact that China’s proposal does not go into detail on crucial issues is not an accident, but intentional. In its 12-point-position China doesn’t name Russia as the aggressor, and even doesn’t mention war at all. But nonetheless, China positions itself as a force for good and a bilateral partner for Ukraine. The Ukrainian readout is also very beneficial. It talks about long-standing commitment, doesn’t criticize China and basically says: We are happy about the partnership. So good scores for China.
And for peace?
I wouldn’t expect that China’s 12-points will materialize into more serious engagement. China understands that there is no real demand for peace at this point in either Moscow or Kyiv. Zelenskiy went all in, and he cannot dial the expectations down, at least before the counteroffensive is over. And Putin believes that time is on his side. His army is doing miserably, but he’s not losing this war. His expectation is that Ukraine will be just another Syria, Libya for the West, and at some point the US and American partners will get tired and distracted.
Without a meaningful result for the people of Ukraine.
Well, I don’t think that China is interested in resolving the conflict, not that they are interested in the conflict going on indefinitely. I think that they are simply adapting to the situation on the ground.
You stick by your opinion: This is a good result for China?
From Beijing’s perspective: Yes. Since Russia is becoming their junior partner, it’s very beneficial for China. Russia was on this trajectory, but now it’s a junior partnership on steroids and China still wants to get access to Russia’s cheap energy resources, fertilizers, metals, agricultural capacity. Everything that Russia has to offer, China gets access to, even to the most advanced Russian military technology. Unthinkable a few years ago.
How much influence does China have over Russia?
It has leverage, and it’s growing. My metaphor would be China’s relationship with North Korea, although North Korea is so much more dependent on China and a far smaller power than Russia. But even there: Kim Jong-un’s policy is not dictated by Beijing. He’s doing stuff that China doesn’t want to see but still has to tolerate because Kim knows how to navigate this. Russia will be the same, but in a different category. China is smart, they know how to manage this and they know how to massage the ego of Putin, how to cultivate these long term bonds that will increasingly make Russia’s elite anti-Western.
Would China’s influence be enough to end the war?
No. China does not have leverage on the Ukrainian side. And its leverage on Russia in this sense is slightly overestimated. If China would fully withdraw its support from Russia, will Putin stop, dis-invade Ukraine and buy himself a ticket to Hague? Unlikely. It’s likely that Russia will still continue. Russia with Putin can hardly accept an agreement with Ukraine.
How dangerous is this China-Russia-partnership for the West?
With the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia, the Kremlin has fewer options and is more dependent on China than ever before. At the same time, China’s fierce competition with the US makes Moscow an indispensable junior partner in Beijing’s efforts to push back the US and its allies. China has no other friend that has so much to offer. And Xi, preparing his country for a long period of confrontation with the most powerful country on the planet, may need all the help he can get.
Where will that lead to?
If we enter a new Cold War with China, China is the next Soviet Union and Russia is the next Warsaw Pact. Just one difference: Russia is there voluntarily, not unlike the Warsaw Pact countries that have been occupied by the Soviet Union.
This makes the situation more dangerous than in the past.
No doubt, the China-Russia-partnership is dangerous for the West. NATO’s border with China will be its border with Russia. Any serious military planner should look at China-Russia increasingly as an entity, even without a formal alliance. That has tremendous consequences for the West where to focus its resources, and where to spend money. For example, Russia could be asked by China to do a large military drill in the Baltics or escalate there to tie Western one’s up in order to allow China to do something in Asia. That’s the scenario we should increasingly focus on.
Silvio Berlusconi died of chronic leukemia at 9:30 a.m. Monday at San Raffaele Hospital in Milan at the age of 86. The Milanese businessman had been hospitalized several times in recent months, most recently on Friday. He leaves behind five children from two marriages.
He was Italy’s Prime Minister four times, owner of the media giant Mediaset and president of the AC Milan soccer club. A gigantic life that has evoked both admiration and horror. He changed the way politics is done in Italy. His relationship with Europe was marked as much by his Europeanism and Atlanticism as by the contradictions of his dissolute behavior.
Berlusconi’s public life began in 1994. The end of the First Republic in the wake of the Tangentopoli scandal was also the end of traditional parties. Berlusconi, then a successful businessman in construction, media and soccer, founded the Forza Italia party and became Prime Minister after the 1994 general election. The political transformation of Italy that he carried out was unprecedented.
The party of the “Cavaliere” blew up the old politics and sowed the silent seeds for all the phenomena that were to sprout up years later: from Matteo Renzi to Matteo Salvini to the 5-Star Movement. They are all children of his way of understanding power, communication and parliamentarism in Italy.
Berlusconi’s first term lasted only one year (1994-1995). In 2001, he returned to Palazzo Chiggi and remained until 2006. The year before, he was forced to resign due to government squabbles, but promptly took over as Prime Minister for a second time. In 2008 he became Prime Minister for the fourth time, but resigned in 2011 before the end of his term due to the economic crisis.
Berlusconi’s political career has also been marked by prosecutions (more than 20) and scandals. In August 2013, Berlusconi was sentenced to four years in prison for tax fraud in the Mediaset trial.
Berlusconi’s temperament, for better or worse, has often defined his relationship with Europe. His flamboyance clashed with his institutional profile, so that he often took center stage more through personal affairs than through political action. Two examples:
Berlusconi’s relations with the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Libya caused great suspicion, but also admiration. Vladimir Putin, Alexander Lukashenko, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Muammar al-Gaddafi were among Berlusconi’s pals. In May 2002, Berlusconi invited Putin to the NATO summit in Pratica di Mare and brokered a meeting with then US President George W. Bush. The result was a cooperation agreement, the NATO-Russia Council, which Berlusconi portrayed as ending the Cold War.
When Giorgia Meloni became Italian Prime Minister last year, Berlusconi was seen as a guarantor that there would be no extremist and nationalist ideas in Italy’s right-wing government. Closing the conservative coalition’s election campaign in Rome’s Piazza del Popolo in September 2022, Berlusconi said, “As you know, we are part of Europe, part of NATO, part of the West, and we are even friends of the United States. We want a better Europe. A real Europe of citizens. A Europe that can be a protagonist in the world and become a military power.”
Berlusconi was undoubtedly the most influential figure of the last quarter century in Italy. His body was transferred Monday to the family villa in Arcore, where a private funeral service will be held. The state funeral will be held Wednesday at Milan Cathedral. Isabel Cuesta Camacho
To mark the 60th anniversary of the Élysée Treaties, the governments in Berlin and Paris have launched the Friendship Pass. 30,000 of them are available to 18- to 27-year-olds on both sides of the Rhine. The tickets were distributed to travel enthusiasts yesterday. It’s a bit like Interrail: on seven days within a month, seven train journeys are possible in the neighboring country.
Only naysayers will now object that the website through which the German transport minister wanted to give away the free tickets had massive problems. At first, it was not accessible at all. Then, around noon, it said that the fun was already over and that all the tickets had been allocated.
One hears that people wanting to travel should have filled out more forms than for a student loan application. Whether this is malicious gossip or whether the action really did not get by without German bureaucratic mania can no longer be checked, because: The page is currently offline.
Fans of Franco-German friendship who didn’t get their turn will regret what they’re missing: French high-speed trains are usually on time – because the TGV has its own network and is therefore not permanently slowed down by regional traffic. What’s more, air conditioning works on SNCF trains even when it’s hot.
Perhaps France is simply better prepared for the 21st century: Technical teething problems of the website for the Friendship Passport in France were not reported. Markus Grabitz
