It has not been possible so far for corrupt deputies to have their pension rights canceled. Rainer Wieland (CDU), one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament since 2009, wants to change that and initiate a corresponding review in Parliament. Against the backdrop of the scandal surrounding MEP Eva Kaili, he calls for further measures to increase transparency – including transparency of the Commission. Markus Grabitz has the details.
The S&D Group in the European Parliament also wants to draw conclusions from the corruption affair: It is setting up a working group to look into the matter internally – three MEPs, several staff members and former MEPs have been heavily implicated in the scandal. The committee is to investigate whether there was individual misconduct or a structural failure. Read more in the News.
Sweden took over the EU Council presidency at the beginning of the year. The government in Stockholm has not yet attracted attention for its particularly climate-friendly positions. For example, the coalition is counting on support from the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats, some of whom are open deniers of climate change. Before the election, the moderates and the Christian Democrats gradually distanced themselves from climate and energy policy decisions they had previously supported. What does this mean for EU climate policy? Magnus Nielsson gives an outlook.
The Vice President of the European Parliament, Rainer Wieland, is in favor of depriving legally convicted MEPs of their pension rights. “In the aftermath of the corruption affair, the possibility should be created to also deprive MEPs of pension entitlements in such cases,” the CDU politician said in an interview with Europe.Table. So far, the rules of the Members’ Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament do not provide a legal basis for this.
The Stuttgart-based lawyer has been a member of the European Parliament since 1997 and one of its vice presidents since 2009. He wants to initiate a corresponding examination in the parliamentary working group that is revising the implementing provisions of the Members’ Statute independently of the Kaili case. Wieland assumes that majorities can be found for this. However, the focus should be on intentional crimes that have a close connection to the mandate in terms of time and content, he demands.
The Statute for Members of Parliament has been in force in its current version since June 2003. The associated implementing provisions, for which the Presidium is responsible, have applied essentially unchanged since then.
A Member of Parliament is entitled to a pension upon reaching the age of 63. For each full year in Parliament, they receive 3.5 percent of the salary, up to a maximum of 70 percent. “Whether these rights can be interfered with by simply amending the implementing provision, or whether the Members’ Statute must be amended to do so, also requires thorough examination,” Wieland said. If necessary, the EU Parliament would have to initiate a corresponding amendment.
In this context, Wieland also calls for a “Commissioner Statute“: In it, the Council of Ministers and Parliament, as legislators, should regulate the rights and duties of Commissioners. This would include, for example, the expense allowances for Commissioners and the question of whether and which additional earnings and activities are permitted. In addition, it would have to be specified how long a Commissioner would have to spend in the decay pool after leaving office.
Wieland also wants to use such a statute to enable Commissioners to run for the European Parliament without leaving the Commission. In addition, he wants to have it examined whether a Commissioner may return to the Parliament if they give up their post in the course of the election period.
Rasmus Andresen, head of the German Greens in the European Parliament, signaled support: “Vice President Wieland is making an exciting push with his proposals to eliminate pension entitlements and the Commissioner’s Statute.” He said the Green group had already presented a list of demands in December. “We are ready to negotiate. The important thing is that we create binding rules for all EU institutions. Voluntarism and self-regulation have not worked in the past.”
Wieland says, “Parliament’s Constitutional Committee could first decide on an own-initiative report on the Commissioner’s Statute.” Since the right of initiative for laws under the treaties lies exclusively with the Commission, the ball would then be in the Commission’s court. Since the Commission’s role today is more political than it was in the founding years, a contemporary legal framework for the executive is needed.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wants to establish a cross-institutional EU ethics commission as a consequence of the Kaili case. Wieland opposes this: “In the spirit of separation of powers, it would be better if Parliament, the Commission and the Council each evaluated all cases that are not relevant under criminal law in their own ethics bodies and discussed the consequences.” For cases relevant under criminal law, such as the Kaili corruption affair, the public prosecutor’s office would be responsible anyway.
Wieland is rapporteur for the party statute. Negotiations between Parliament and member states on this are deadlocked. The central point of contention is that the party families should, in principle, be prohibited from the membership of friendly parties from third countries. The EPP, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens and Left oppose such a serious encroachment on their freedom of association.
This would make it impossible for the socialist party family to cooperate with the British Labour Party, for example, or for the left to cooperate with parties from Belarus that are critical of Moscow, or for the liberal party family to cooperate with parties in Ukraine. “Under the Swedish Council presidency, a compromise would have to be reached by Easter at the latest, otherwise, the 2024 European elections will still be held according to the current statute,” says Wieland.
The party statute governs the financing of European parties. Wieland: “I think it would be more democratic if the assessment basis for state party funding were changed.” So far, only parties that have members in the European Parliament receive money. “In the future, payments should be linked to the number of votes.” He said there are European parties that receive well over a million votes across the Union but remain without support because they cannot get through an MEP in any country.
In addition, Wieland demands that basic democratic rules be observed in the parties at the national level. “It must be ensured that the candidates for the European Parliament are not determined by a few, but in front of everyone by delegates who are entrusted with this decision in a free and secret election by the members of the party.” That is far from being the case in all member states, he said.
It will be a frosty welcome for the EU Commission: To mark the start of the Swedish Council Presidency, the government of Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson will receive the entire Commission in the town of Kiruna in the far north on Jan. 12 and 13. This is where Europe’s largest iron ore deposits are located. And here, thanks to stricter EU climate legislation, a gigantic industrial transformation is taking place driven by climate policy.
However, it is still unclear how frosty relations between the new Swedish government and the EU will become on climate policy. “Green & energy transitions” is one of four top priorities for Sweden’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, which started on Jan 1. This choice of focus somewhat deviates from the new government’s own domestic agenda, where
During its half-year term, Sweden is likely to bring already tabled climate dossiers forward, but new initiatives are hardly to be expected, maybe except for nuclear power.
The three-party minority government, that took power after the Swedish elections in September 2022, consists of prime minister Ulf Kristersson´s right-wing Moderates (M), the Christian Democrats (KD) and the Liberals (L). As these three only control 103 seats in the Riksdag, fewer than the opposition Social Democrats can muster alone, Kristersson´s government in more or less every vote, is dependent on the active support from the right-populist Sweden Democrats (SD). The latter gained over 20 percent in the September election and form the second-largest parliamentary group.
Infamous for its roots in neo-nazi, xenophobic groupings, SD has, until its recent growth, been politically isolated. Now, this has changed, and its rising influence is mirrored in the new government’s very restrictive immigration policies. On top, SD is also the most powerful critic of Sweden’s traditionally ambitious climate policy. Some of its new MPs are openly climate skeptics, and when the European Parliament adopted the European Climate Law in June 2021, SD’s three MEPs were among the few that voted against it.
In order to win the parliamentary support of the SD, the Moderates and the Christian Democrats gradually distanced themselves before the election from climate and energy policy decisions that they had supported until recently. For example, the new government has promised to dismantle the mandatory blending of transport fuels with renewables. By combining this with lower fuel taxes SD, M and KD, separately, promised the voters to lower fuel prices by 0,5-1 euro per liter if gaining power – promises that probably were crucial for the outcome of the election.
In the energy sector, the rapid expansion of Swedish wind power is likely to be slowed down as the government wants to eliminate some subsidies. It blames the currently high electricity prices on the decommissioning of four nuclear reactors between 2015 and 2020 and now wants the remaining fleet of six reactors to be supplemented by new, probably smaller SMR (Small Modular Reactor). To do so, it promises generous loans in particular, but interest from investors appears mixed. The industry welcomes new power capacity. But while new capacity is being added day by day through wind power, potential new nuclear plants will not come online until the mid-2030s.
In the far north of Sweden, however, where the EU Commission will be visiting, the green transformation is already clearly visible. State-owned mining giant LKAB intends to invest some €40 billion, partly in expanding the mine, but primarily in new advanced processing methods, based on hydrogen, made from water and electricity from existing, nearby hydro plants, and a hastily expanding number of wind turbines. Two new hydrogen-based steel mills and a giant battery factory are already under construction in Luleå, Boden and Skellefteå, all close to the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea. This re-industrialization, a central part of the former Social-democratic government’s national narrative on the green transition as a tool for re-industrialization and economic growth, will now be taken forward by the new government
The Council presidency might, paradoxically, come as a relief to the more environmentally concerned parts of the government base – including Romina Pourmokhtari, the new, liberal minister of climate and energy. As Council Presidency, Sweden will have to seek compromises and be less able to promote its own positions, which are sometimes less ambitious than mainstream EU policy. These include:
Finally, the government is likely to push for a speedy handling of the expected proposal on stricter CO2 requirements on heavy-duty vehicles. That is because two of the world’s largest truck manufacturers, Volvo and Scania, both of which are strongly committed to the electrification of road transport, are based in Sweden. Magnus Nielsson
In the end, he probably had no choice. After a telephone conversation with US President Joe Biden, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced yesterday evening that the Federal Republic of Germany would supply up to 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine.
Unlike the traffic light partners FDP and Greens, the SPD had so far toed the Chancellor’s line and let demands from Ukraine to supply German infantry fighting vehicles or battle tanks go nowhere. The defense policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Wolfgang Hellmich, told Security.Table: In view of a foreseeable Russian spring offensive, “now is the right time.”
The background to this is France’s push to provide AMX-10 RC armored reconnaissance vehicles for Ukraine. Like Germany, France had so far refused to supply armored combat vehicles of Western design. According to SPD circles, however, the French initiative had “not been agreed with Germany” at the present time. In the telephone conversation with Scholz, US President Biden also confirmed the delivery of American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
At the same time, an open letter from two Finnish MPs is increasing pressure on Germany to take over coordination in Europe on tank deliveries. “Germany has a central role, whether it wants it or not,” says Atte Harjanne of the Green parliamentary group in an interview with Security.Table. Her appeal has appeared in Finnish, Swedish and Danish media and here for the first time in German.
In it, Harjanne and Anders Adlercreutz of the liberal Swedish People’s Party call for a “European initiative” to supply Leopard 2 battle tanks: “They would significantly increase Ukraine’s battlefield clout.” They said it was time to “send a signal that we are both willing and able to help Ukraine win this war.”
For the training, logistics and maintenance of the heavy battle tank, it is crucial that a delivery of the same type is assembled. For this purpose, the Leopard 2A4 is the most suitable, which, apart from Finland and Germany, is used primarily by Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Spain and Poland. Ukrainian army chief Valery Salushnyi called for 300 main battle tanks in mid-December. ECFR scientist Jana Puglierin (link only available in German) considers this figure “an illusion.” A “Ukrainian tank brigade of around 90 Leopard 2A4 tanks” would be realistic.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang Hellmich, the SPD’s defense policy spokesman, currently rules out German delivery of Leopard 2 tanks. “These are attack tanks. What Ukraine needs are tanks for defense like the Marder.” Behind this is the fear that Ukraine could use the main battle tanks to attack Russian territory. With Thomas Wiegold
Anyone who wants to make a career in a public authority usually needs patience above all else. One step follows the other, grade after grade. It’s no different in a ministry than in the EU Commission.
Things were different for Renate Nikolay. At the end of the 1990s, the lawyer started working for the German Federal Ministry of Economics, and after just one year, Alfred Tacke, then State Secretary, took her on as his personal advisor. A little later, after her move to the EU Commission, it was also just over a year before she was promoted to the cabinet of Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.
Nikolay has jumped up the career ladder rather than climbed it. This is not possible without ambition, the will to work hard and a quick grasp of things, which her colleagues attest to. In her case, however, she has even more qualities that not too many civil servants possess: Courage – to her own ideas and to political infighting. “I’ve never been afraid of politics, but I’ve enjoyed helping to shape it,” she says.
A quality that the 55-year-old will also need in her new position: Since the beginning of December, she has been Deputy Director General of DG Connect, responsible among other things for overseeing the major platforms. The Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act have propelled the Commission to become the most important counterpart to Amazon, Meta and similar. Nikolay’s team now has to ensure, in the case of the DMA together with the Directorate General for Competition, and in the case of the DSA in coordination with the national authorities, that the new rules are enforced. It’s a “huge new task,” she says.
Nikolay hopes to draw on her experience from previous posts. As head of cabinet for then Justice Commissioner Věra Jourová, she negotiated the first codes of conduct with platforms against disinformation and hate speech years ago. In turn, during her first stint at the Commission, Nikolay witnessed how the agency monitors markets: DG Trade investigates companies when it suspects dumping. “Having worked in different areas helps to see connections,” she says.
She had moved from Berlin to Brussels for personal reasons – the father of her twins worked in the Commission. Nikolay initially had herself transferred to the Permanent Representation as a commercial attaché, then went through the selection process after giving birth.
Mandelson brought her into his cabinet a short time later, where she oversaw in particular the negotiations with South Korea on a free trade agreement. When the Briton returned to London as minister in 2008, Nikolay moved to succeed Catherine Ashton. And stayed there for the time being when Ashton was appointed the first EU foreign affairs representative in 2009.
Two years later, the subject changed: Nikolay moved to the new Directorate General for Justice and Consumer Protection, where she worked as a liaison to the European Parliament on the formulation of the General Data Protection Regulation and the beginnings of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. In 2014, Věra Jourová contacted her; the prospective Justice Commissioner from the Czech Republic was looking for a head of cabinet. This turned into eight years in which the two worked closely together.
“She was open to ideas,” says Nikolay, “we implemented many things that were not in the mission statement.” Unlike in trade policy, the EU has few powers in the area of justice, but Jourová and Nikolay are seizing opportunities by the horns: in the wake of the VW affair, they are pushing through the possibility of class actions throughout the EU, against fierce opposition from industry and the German government. “Without the diesel scandal, we would not have been able to advance collective redress in the EU,” says Nikolay.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office would not exist today without the duo’s tenacity. As a former minister for regional structural policy in the Czech Republic, Jourová knows all about the lure of EU funds; political rivals even briefly put her behind bars with the help of baseless accusations. With her experience, Jourová has succeeded in convincing many skeptical member states, says Nikolay.
With the end of the Juncker Commission, Nikolay actually moved back to DG Trade, but this time her timing wasn’t right when it comes to jumping onto the Commission’s internal job carousel. The change was dragging on; as head of cabinet, she was fully involved in the planning of the new Commission, and Ursula von der Leyen also wanted to see her as a German in the important round of heads of cabinet. The new Director-General for Trade, Sabine Weyand, eventually offered her the post of Director for Africa and Sustainable Development, but the area didn’t excite Nikolay enough. She decided to stay with Jourová, who moved up to Vice President for Values and Transparency.
There, the two dealt with the thorny issue of the rule of law and helped draft the proposal for the Media Freedom Act. It is intended to protect the independence of the press in places where it is particularly endangered, such as Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, but it is also causing German publishers and media watchdogs to flare up.
“Our aim is not to put a straitjacket on publishers or to attack public broadcasting,” Nikolay asserts. Rather, she says, it’s about creating minimum standards. Convincing the critics is also part of her new job at Connect. “I’m convinced we can do it.” Till Hoppe
It has not been possible so far for corrupt deputies to have their pension rights canceled. Rainer Wieland (CDU), one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Parliament since 2009, wants to change that and initiate a corresponding review in Parliament. Against the backdrop of the scandal surrounding MEP Eva Kaili, he calls for further measures to increase transparency – including transparency of the Commission. Markus Grabitz has the details.
The S&D Group in the European Parliament also wants to draw conclusions from the corruption affair: It is setting up a working group to look into the matter internally – three MEPs, several staff members and former MEPs have been heavily implicated in the scandal. The committee is to investigate whether there was individual misconduct or a structural failure. Read more in the News.
Sweden took over the EU Council presidency at the beginning of the year. The government in Stockholm has not yet attracted attention for its particularly climate-friendly positions. For example, the coalition is counting on support from the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats, some of whom are open deniers of climate change. Before the election, the moderates and the Christian Democrats gradually distanced themselves from climate and energy policy decisions they had previously supported. What does this mean for EU climate policy? Magnus Nielsson gives an outlook.
The Vice President of the European Parliament, Rainer Wieland, is in favor of depriving legally convicted MEPs of their pension rights. “In the aftermath of the corruption affair, the possibility should be created to also deprive MEPs of pension entitlements in such cases,” the CDU politician said in an interview with Europe.Table. So far, the rules of the Members’ Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament do not provide a legal basis for this.
The Stuttgart-based lawyer has been a member of the European Parliament since 1997 and one of its vice presidents since 2009. He wants to initiate a corresponding examination in the parliamentary working group that is revising the implementing provisions of the Members’ Statute independently of the Kaili case. Wieland assumes that majorities can be found for this. However, the focus should be on intentional crimes that have a close connection to the mandate in terms of time and content, he demands.
The Statute for Members of Parliament has been in force in its current version since June 2003. The associated implementing provisions, for which the Presidium is responsible, have applied essentially unchanged since then.
A Member of Parliament is entitled to a pension upon reaching the age of 63. For each full year in Parliament, they receive 3.5 percent of the salary, up to a maximum of 70 percent. “Whether these rights can be interfered with by simply amending the implementing provision, or whether the Members’ Statute must be amended to do so, also requires thorough examination,” Wieland said. If necessary, the EU Parliament would have to initiate a corresponding amendment.
In this context, Wieland also calls for a “Commissioner Statute“: In it, the Council of Ministers and Parliament, as legislators, should regulate the rights and duties of Commissioners. This would include, for example, the expense allowances for Commissioners and the question of whether and which additional earnings and activities are permitted. In addition, it would have to be specified how long a Commissioner would have to spend in the decay pool after leaving office.
Wieland also wants to use such a statute to enable Commissioners to run for the European Parliament without leaving the Commission. In addition, he wants to have it examined whether a Commissioner may return to the Parliament if they give up their post in the course of the election period.
Rasmus Andresen, head of the German Greens in the European Parliament, signaled support: “Vice President Wieland is making an exciting push with his proposals to eliminate pension entitlements and the Commissioner’s Statute.” He said the Green group had already presented a list of demands in December. “We are ready to negotiate. The important thing is that we create binding rules for all EU institutions. Voluntarism and self-regulation have not worked in the past.”
Wieland says, “Parliament’s Constitutional Committee could first decide on an own-initiative report on the Commissioner’s Statute.” Since the right of initiative for laws under the treaties lies exclusively with the Commission, the ball would then be in the Commission’s court. Since the Commission’s role today is more political than it was in the founding years, a contemporary legal framework for the executive is needed.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wants to establish a cross-institutional EU ethics commission as a consequence of the Kaili case. Wieland opposes this: “In the spirit of separation of powers, it would be better if Parliament, the Commission and the Council each evaluated all cases that are not relevant under criminal law in their own ethics bodies and discussed the consequences.” For cases relevant under criminal law, such as the Kaili corruption affair, the public prosecutor’s office would be responsible anyway.
Wieland is rapporteur for the party statute. Negotiations between Parliament and member states on this are deadlocked. The central point of contention is that the party families should, in principle, be prohibited from the membership of friendly parties from third countries. The EPP, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens and Left oppose such a serious encroachment on their freedom of association.
This would make it impossible for the socialist party family to cooperate with the British Labour Party, for example, or for the left to cooperate with parties from Belarus that are critical of Moscow, or for the liberal party family to cooperate with parties in Ukraine. “Under the Swedish Council presidency, a compromise would have to be reached by Easter at the latest, otherwise, the 2024 European elections will still be held according to the current statute,” says Wieland.
The party statute governs the financing of European parties. Wieland: “I think it would be more democratic if the assessment basis for state party funding were changed.” So far, only parties that have members in the European Parliament receive money. “In the future, payments should be linked to the number of votes.” He said there are European parties that receive well over a million votes across the Union but remain without support because they cannot get through an MEP in any country.
In addition, Wieland demands that basic democratic rules be observed in the parties at the national level. “It must be ensured that the candidates for the European Parliament are not determined by a few, but in front of everyone by delegates who are entrusted with this decision in a free and secret election by the members of the party.” That is far from being the case in all member states, he said.
It will be a frosty welcome for the EU Commission: To mark the start of the Swedish Council Presidency, the government of Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson will receive the entire Commission in the town of Kiruna in the far north on Jan. 12 and 13. This is where Europe’s largest iron ore deposits are located. And here, thanks to stricter EU climate legislation, a gigantic industrial transformation is taking place driven by climate policy.
However, it is still unclear how frosty relations between the new Swedish government and the EU will become on climate policy. “Green & energy transitions” is one of four top priorities for Sweden’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, which started on Jan 1. This choice of focus somewhat deviates from the new government’s own domestic agenda, where
During its half-year term, Sweden is likely to bring already tabled climate dossiers forward, but new initiatives are hardly to be expected, maybe except for nuclear power.
The three-party minority government, that took power after the Swedish elections in September 2022, consists of prime minister Ulf Kristersson´s right-wing Moderates (M), the Christian Democrats (KD) and the Liberals (L). As these three only control 103 seats in the Riksdag, fewer than the opposition Social Democrats can muster alone, Kristersson´s government in more or less every vote, is dependent on the active support from the right-populist Sweden Democrats (SD). The latter gained over 20 percent in the September election and form the second-largest parliamentary group.
Infamous for its roots in neo-nazi, xenophobic groupings, SD has, until its recent growth, been politically isolated. Now, this has changed, and its rising influence is mirrored in the new government’s very restrictive immigration policies. On top, SD is also the most powerful critic of Sweden’s traditionally ambitious climate policy. Some of its new MPs are openly climate skeptics, and when the European Parliament adopted the European Climate Law in June 2021, SD’s three MEPs were among the few that voted against it.
In order to win the parliamentary support of the SD, the Moderates and the Christian Democrats gradually distanced themselves before the election from climate and energy policy decisions that they had supported until recently. For example, the new government has promised to dismantle the mandatory blending of transport fuels with renewables. By combining this with lower fuel taxes SD, M and KD, separately, promised the voters to lower fuel prices by 0,5-1 euro per liter if gaining power – promises that probably were crucial for the outcome of the election.
In the energy sector, the rapid expansion of Swedish wind power is likely to be slowed down as the government wants to eliminate some subsidies. It blames the currently high electricity prices on the decommissioning of four nuclear reactors between 2015 and 2020 and now wants the remaining fleet of six reactors to be supplemented by new, probably smaller SMR (Small Modular Reactor). To do so, it promises generous loans in particular, but interest from investors appears mixed. The industry welcomes new power capacity. But while new capacity is being added day by day through wind power, potential new nuclear plants will not come online until the mid-2030s.
In the far north of Sweden, however, where the EU Commission will be visiting, the green transformation is already clearly visible. State-owned mining giant LKAB intends to invest some €40 billion, partly in expanding the mine, but primarily in new advanced processing methods, based on hydrogen, made from water and electricity from existing, nearby hydro plants, and a hastily expanding number of wind turbines. Two new hydrogen-based steel mills and a giant battery factory are already under construction in Luleå, Boden and Skellefteå, all close to the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea. This re-industrialization, a central part of the former Social-democratic government’s national narrative on the green transition as a tool for re-industrialization and economic growth, will now be taken forward by the new government
The Council presidency might, paradoxically, come as a relief to the more environmentally concerned parts of the government base – including Romina Pourmokhtari, the new, liberal minister of climate and energy. As Council Presidency, Sweden will have to seek compromises and be less able to promote its own positions, which are sometimes less ambitious than mainstream EU policy. These include:
Finally, the government is likely to push for a speedy handling of the expected proposal on stricter CO2 requirements on heavy-duty vehicles. That is because two of the world’s largest truck manufacturers, Volvo and Scania, both of which are strongly committed to the electrification of road transport, are based in Sweden. Magnus Nielsson
In the end, he probably had no choice. After a telephone conversation with US President Joe Biden, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced yesterday evening that the Federal Republic of Germany would supply up to 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine.
Unlike the traffic light partners FDP and Greens, the SPD had so far toed the Chancellor’s line and let demands from Ukraine to supply German infantry fighting vehicles or battle tanks go nowhere. The defense policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Wolfgang Hellmich, told Security.Table: In view of a foreseeable Russian spring offensive, “now is the right time.”
The background to this is France’s push to provide AMX-10 RC armored reconnaissance vehicles for Ukraine. Like Germany, France had so far refused to supply armored combat vehicles of Western design. According to SPD circles, however, the French initiative had “not been agreed with Germany” at the present time. In the telephone conversation with Scholz, US President Biden also confirmed the delivery of American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
At the same time, an open letter from two Finnish MPs is increasing pressure on Germany to take over coordination in Europe on tank deliveries. “Germany has a central role, whether it wants it or not,” says Atte Harjanne of the Green parliamentary group in an interview with Security.Table. Her appeal has appeared in Finnish, Swedish and Danish media and here for the first time in German.
In it, Harjanne and Anders Adlercreutz of the liberal Swedish People’s Party call for a “European initiative” to supply Leopard 2 battle tanks: “They would significantly increase Ukraine’s battlefield clout.” They said it was time to “send a signal that we are both willing and able to help Ukraine win this war.”
For the training, logistics and maintenance of the heavy battle tank, it is crucial that a delivery of the same type is assembled. For this purpose, the Leopard 2A4 is the most suitable, which, apart from Finland and Germany, is used primarily by Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Spain and Poland. Ukrainian army chief Valery Salushnyi called for 300 main battle tanks in mid-December. ECFR scientist Jana Puglierin (link only available in German) considers this figure “an illusion.” A “Ukrainian tank brigade of around 90 Leopard 2A4 tanks” would be realistic.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang Hellmich, the SPD’s defense policy spokesman, currently rules out German delivery of Leopard 2 tanks. “These are attack tanks. What Ukraine needs are tanks for defense like the Marder.” Behind this is the fear that Ukraine could use the main battle tanks to attack Russian territory. With Thomas Wiegold
Anyone who wants to make a career in a public authority usually needs patience above all else. One step follows the other, grade after grade. It’s no different in a ministry than in the EU Commission.
Things were different for Renate Nikolay. At the end of the 1990s, the lawyer started working for the German Federal Ministry of Economics, and after just one year, Alfred Tacke, then State Secretary, took her on as his personal advisor. A little later, after her move to the EU Commission, it was also just over a year before she was promoted to the cabinet of Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.
Nikolay has jumped up the career ladder rather than climbed it. This is not possible without ambition, the will to work hard and a quick grasp of things, which her colleagues attest to. In her case, however, she has even more qualities that not too many civil servants possess: Courage – to her own ideas and to political infighting. “I’ve never been afraid of politics, but I’ve enjoyed helping to shape it,” she says.
A quality that the 55-year-old will also need in her new position: Since the beginning of December, she has been Deputy Director General of DG Connect, responsible among other things for overseeing the major platforms. The Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act have propelled the Commission to become the most important counterpart to Amazon, Meta and similar. Nikolay’s team now has to ensure, in the case of the DMA together with the Directorate General for Competition, and in the case of the DSA in coordination with the national authorities, that the new rules are enforced. It’s a “huge new task,” she says.
Nikolay hopes to draw on her experience from previous posts. As head of cabinet for then Justice Commissioner Věra Jourová, she negotiated the first codes of conduct with platforms against disinformation and hate speech years ago. In turn, during her first stint at the Commission, Nikolay witnessed how the agency monitors markets: DG Trade investigates companies when it suspects dumping. “Having worked in different areas helps to see connections,” she says.
She had moved from Berlin to Brussels for personal reasons – the father of her twins worked in the Commission. Nikolay initially had herself transferred to the Permanent Representation as a commercial attaché, then went through the selection process after giving birth.
Mandelson brought her into his cabinet a short time later, where she oversaw in particular the negotiations with South Korea on a free trade agreement. When the Briton returned to London as minister in 2008, Nikolay moved to succeed Catherine Ashton. And stayed there for the time being when Ashton was appointed the first EU foreign affairs representative in 2009.
Two years later, the subject changed: Nikolay moved to the new Directorate General for Justice and Consumer Protection, where she worked as a liaison to the European Parliament on the formulation of the General Data Protection Regulation and the beginnings of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. In 2014, Věra Jourová contacted her; the prospective Justice Commissioner from the Czech Republic was looking for a head of cabinet. This turned into eight years in which the two worked closely together.
“She was open to ideas,” says Nikolay, “we implemented many things that were not in the mission statement.” Unlike in trade policy, the EU has few powers in the area of justice, but Jourová and Nikolay are seizing opportunities by the horns: in the wake of the VW affair, they are pushing through the possibility of class actions throughout the EU, against fierce opposition from industry and the German government. “Without the diesel scandal, we would not have been able to advance collective redress in the EU,” says Nikolay.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office would not exist today without the duo’s tenacity. As a former minister for regional structural policy in the Czech Republic, Jourová knows all about the lure of EU funds; political rivals even briefly put her behind bars with the help of baseless accusations. With her experience, Jourová has succeeded in convincing many skeptical member states, says Nikolay.
With the end of the Juncker Commission, Nikolay actually moved back to DG Trade, but this time her timing wasn’t right when it comes to jumping onto the Commission’s internal job carousel. The change was dragging on; as head of cabinet, she was fully involved in the planning of the new Commission, and Ursula von der Leyen also wanted to see her as a German in the important round of heads of cabinet. The new Director-General for Trade, Sabine Weyand, eventually offered her the post of Director for Africa and Sustainable Development, but the area didn’t excite Nikolay enough. She decided to stay with Jourová, who moved up to Vice President for Values and Transparency.
There, the two dealt with the thorny issue of the rule of law and helped draft the proposal for the Media Freedom Act. It is intended to protect the independence of the press in places where it is particularly endangered, such as Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, but it is also causing German publishers and media watchdogs to flare up.
“Our aim is not to put a straitjacket on publishers or to attack public broadcasting,” Nikolay asserts. Rather, she says, it’s about creating minimum standards. Convincing the critics is also part of her new job at Connect. “I’m convinced we can do it.” Till Hoppe
