Your contact for new licenses
Germany intends to focus all of its foreign policy work on mitigating climate change and overcoming its consequences. With a new interministerial “Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy,” adopted by the Federal Cabinet on Wednesday, the German government aims to intertwine the goals of diplomacy, climate action, business and civil society development. However, the strategy contains formulations that undermine the German delegation’s efforts towards a fossil fuel phase-out at COP28.
“We aim to use all forums, instruments and levers of foreign, development, security, foreign trade, trade and international finance, environmental, economic, social, health, agriculture, forestry, research and education policy to advance the socio-ecological transformation towards a climate-neutral future,” the strategy states.
However, there is one crucial element in the strategy that contradicts Germany’s position at COP28: The role of CCS in the planned phase-out of fossil fuels.
The strategy starts by stating: “We are accelerating the global energy transition in order to phase out unabated fossil fuels in keeping with the 1.5 C pathways.” Referring to “unabated fossil fuels” means only phasing out energies that do not use CCS/CCU. However, the position of phasing out “unabated fossil fuels” reflects the stance of petrostates and the gas and oil industry, which Germany opposes at COP28 under the leadership of Climate State Secretary Jennifer Morgan.
Towards the end of the text, stricter EU positions, which restrict the use of CCS to hard-to-decarbonize sectors, are indeed referenced. And, like the EU, the German government calls for a gradual transition to a predominantly fossil fuel-free energy sector. However, the summary of the “Strategy on Foreign Climate Policy” uses the term “phase out unabated fossil fuels” – precisely the wording that Germany, the EU and a coalition of pioneering states consider unacceptable at COP28. The German delegation also confirmed this to Table Media.
Behind the various formulations hides a dispute within the German government about the use of CCU/CCS. This internal dispute has already prevented German Chancellor Olaf Scholz from signing a declaration by the High Ambition Coalition (HAC) at the UN Climate Summit in September. Coordination between the ministries on the “Climate Foreign Policy Strategy” took much longer than expected.
The strategy comes halfway through COP28 in Dubai, where Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is also expected to attend the crucial second week of negotiations on Thursday evening. The concept follows the German government’s security and China strategy and is intended to show that the German government is at least pulling in the same direction on foreign policy.
The German government’s foreign climate policy strategy defines six priorities for Germany’s global efforts:
This “most comprehensive strategy in the world,” as Jennifer Morgan described it, is also set to bring about some changes in the organization of government work:
However, the strategy does not just rely on “soft power” alone. It also states that the “transition towards climate neutrality” is also a “recalibration of economic strength.” Therefore, Germany will campaign for UN mechanisms and promote the issue at the G7, G20, UN, NATO and OSCE. It also rejects the geopolitically controversial solar radiation management (SRM). The government has requested a climate assessment from the Federal Intelligence Service. Germany’s climate engagement is also intended to serve as an argument for its planned bid for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2026/27. And the new comprehensive climate policy is intended to pay particular attention to the “Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA region” – where the EU’s “own energy systems are linked.”
After all, the strategy focuses primarily on dialog and exchange – but climate policy must also be a means of engaging with countries where it may otherwise be more difficult, according to the country’s security and China strategy: “Climate cooperation, even and particularly with partners that do not share all our values, can often form part of a positive agenda and build bridges,” it says.
The strategy remains cautious when it comes to subsidies: While Germany also debates cutting subsidies in the search for funding for its national budget, the climate foreign policy strategy remains vague on the subject: the aim is to “implement our commitment made at the G7 to reduce inefficient (climate-damaging) subsidies by 2025.” The paper does not include any additional or surprising steps that some climate activists at COP28 had hoped would send a clear signal on the reform of global financial flows.
Jule Könnike from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs believes the concept provides a “strategic and coherent framework that integrates all facets of foreign policy.” The fronts at COP showed the need to consider geopolitics, trade issues and climate. “This is exactly what climate foreign policy can achieve: It is an opportunity to complement measures like CBAM with diplomatic efforts and communicate readiness to cooperate and support, so that alienation of partners and further polarization of negotiations can be prevented.”
For Sabine Minninger, climate expert at the German aid organization “Bread for the World,” the strategy is necessary to “focus on the needs of the poorest population groups” in particular. “All ministries that have participated must now make things happen,” she demands. “This means that they also have to contribute financially to the implementation of the strategy and provide additional climate financing.”
Germany intends to focus all of its foreign policy work on mitigating climate change and overcoming its consequences. With a new interministerial “Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy,” adopted by the Federal Cabinet on Wednesday, the German government aims to intertwine the goals of diplomacy, climate action, business and civil society development. However, the strategy contains formulations that undermine the German delegation’s efforts towards a fossil fuel phase-out at COP28.
“We aim to use all forums, instruments and levers of foreign, development, security, foreign trade, trade and international finance, environmental, economic, social, health, agriculture, forestry, research and education policy to advance the socio-ecological transformation towards a climate-neutral future,” the strategy states.
However, there is one crucial element in the strategy that contradicts Germany’s position at COP28: The role of CCS in the planned phase-out of fossil fuels.
The strategy starts by stating: “We are accelerating the global energy transition in order to phase out unabated fossil fuels in keeping with the 1.5 C pathways.” Referring to “unabated fossil fuels” means only phasing out energies that do not use CCS/CCU. However, the position of phasing out “unabated fossil fuels” reflects the stance of petrostates and the gas and oil industry, which Germany opposes at COP28 under the leadership of Climate State Secretary Jennifer Morgan.
Towards the end of the text, stricter EU positions, which restrict the use of CCS to hard-to-decarbonize sectors, are indeed referenced. And, like the EU, the German government calls for a gradual transition to a predominantly fossil fuel-free energy sector. However, the summary of the “Strategy on Foreign Climate Policy” uses the term “phase out unabated fossil fuels” – precisely the wording that Germany, the EU and a coalition of pioneering states consider unacceptable at COP28. The German delegation also confirmed this to Table Media.
Behind the various formulations hides a dispute within the German government about the use of CCU/CCS. This internal dispute has already prevented German Chancellor Olaf Scholz from signing a declaration by the High Ambition Coalition (HAC) at the UN Climate Summit in September. Coordination between the ministries on the “Climate Foreign Policy Strategy” took much longer than expected.
The strategy comes halfway through COP28 in Dubai, where Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is also expected to attend the crucial second week of negotiations on Thursday evening. The concept follows the German government’s security and China strategy and is intended to show that the German government is at least pulling in the same direction on foreign policy.
The German government’s foreign climate policy strategy defines six priorities for Germany’s global efforts:
This “most comprehensive strategy in the world,” as Jennifer Morgan described it, is also set to bring about some changes in the organization of government work:
However, the strategy does not just rely on “soft power” alone. It also states that the “transition towards climate neutrality” is also a “recalibration of economic strength.” Therefore, Germany will campaign for UN mechanisms and promote the issue at the G7, G20, UN, NATO and OSCE. It also rejects the geopolitically controversial solar radiation management (SRM). The government has requested a climate assessment from the Federal Intelligence Service. Germany’s climate engagement is also intended to serve as an argument for its planned bid for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2026/27. And the new comprehensive climate policy is intended to pay particular attention to the “Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA region” – where the EU’s “own energy systems are linked.”
After all, the strategy focuses primarily on dialog and exchange – but climate policy must also be a means of engaging with countries where it may otherwise be more difficult, according to the country’s security and China strategy: “Climate cooperation, even and particularly with partners that do not share all our values, can often form part of a positive agenda and build bridges,” it says.
The strategy remains cautious when it comes to subsidies: While Germany also debates cutting subsidies in the search for funding for its national budget, the climate foreign policy strategy remains vague on the subject: the aim is to “implement our commitment made at the G7 to reduce inefficient (climate-damaging) subsidies by 2025.” The paper does not include any additional or surprising steps that some climate activists at COP28 had hoped would send a clear signal on the reform of global financial flows.
Jule Könnike from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs believes the concept provides a “strategic and coherent framework that integrates all facets of foreign policy.” The fronts at COP showed the need to consider geopolitics, trade issues and climate. “This is exactly what climate foreign policy can achieve: It is an opportunity to complement measures like CBAM with diplomatic efforts and communicate readiness to cooperate and support, so that alienation of partners and further polarization of negotiations can be prevented.”
For Sabine Minninger, climate expert at the German aid organization “Bread for the World,” the strategy is necessary to “focus on the needs of the poorest population groups” in particular. “All ministries that have participated must now make things happen,” she demands. “This means that they also have to contribute financially to the implementation of the strategy and provide additional climate financing.”