the global climate scene is looking to New York these days. At the 77th UN General Assembly, the overheating of the earth is pushing its way up the agenda alongside the Ukraine war. No one denies anymore: the global climate crisis is acute: heat and drought in the northern hemisphere, temperature records in India and Pakistan, then the flood disaster in Pakistan and the current hurricane “Fiona” in Costa Rica show: The issue can no longer be ignored.
That is why we are presenting the first issue of the new Decision Brief Climate.Table to you right now. Because the effects of the global climate crisis are increasingly determining your decisions. Starting in mid-October, we will compile news, background, analysis, opinions and data once a week to provide you exclusively and intensively with important information about the global climate crisis. We won’t just bring you the quick news, but we’ll analyze what it means, the background against which politics, business, science and civil society make their decisions. And we help filter out the really relevant information from the flood of information that lands in your mailbox every day.
Our view is like the crisis: global. Economic, environmental and energy policy can no longer be thought of in national terms. With our network of correspondents, we look at decisions and developments in the important markets and the relevant countries.
In this first issue of Climate.Table, we present the radical report of the UN Rapporteur on Human Rights in Climate Change. My colleague Urmi Goswami writes from New Delhi about India’s important steps toward a CO₂ market.
We reveal what a socially just energy transition in the coal country of South Africa is supposed to cost and critically assess China’s promise not to build any new coal-fired power plants abroad. And Dirk Messner, President of the German Federal Environment Agency, joins us to debate the question of how urgently needed international cooperation should be possible in times of cold and hot wars.
Climate.Table – For you, dear readers, this could be like a COP, once a week. With all the multinational perspective, drama, and meaningful decisions of these major UN conferences – but without the frustration, lack of sleep, and bad moods that often accompany COPs.
We hope Climate.Table finds your interest. Please feel free to contact us with criticism, suggestions, and tips on topics. Our address for this is climate@briefing.table.media.
And: Keep a long breath!
The document holds political explosives for the UN General Assembly and the upcoming climate summit in Sharm el Sheikh. In his first report, Ian Fry, the new United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the context of climate change, presents explosive demands that are highly controversial among UN states: among other things, the outlawing of fossil fuels by the UN, a rapid and drastic reduction of CO₂ emissions, an aid fund for climate damage and climate tribunalsagainst states and companies. UN Secretary-General António Guterres submitted the report to the UN General Assembly on July 26.
Among other things, Fry’s report endorses the call by environmental groups and developing countries for compensation for climate-related loss and damage (“L&D”). He identifies the responsibility of wealthy industrialized nations for the climate crisis and the “enormous injustice” they are inflicting on people in the poorest countries. He reminds us that global warming is already endangering the right to life of millions of people and urges us to finally act quickly.
Specifically, the Special Rapporteur calls for, among other things, a 55 percent reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. But he also has clear political demands: He wants the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which allows investors to sue against climate policy decisions by states, to be repealed. This has a real background: only recently, in a lawsuit based on the ECT, the Italian state was ordered to pay the oil company Rockhopper compensation amounting to 190 million euros plus interest. The climate scene and climate diplomats fear that the ECT will promote further lawsuits worth millions. They would tie up money that is urgently needed for the global transformation to a climate-friendly world.
In addition, Fry is calling for a UN resolution to outlaw the further exploitation of oil, coal and gas resources. In the future, an international human rights tribunal should hold governments, companies and financial institutions accountable that continue to invest in fossil fuels and thereby violate human rights. Ecocide, i.e. the serious damage to or destruction of nature, is to become a separate criminal offense before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although there are already several charges before the ICC against Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro for this and other crimes, ecocide has not yet been integrated as an offense in the court’s statutes.
Finally, for Fry, the UN General Assembly should address a key issue that has so far made little headway in the climate negotiations between delegations: the establishment of a loss-and-damage fund to pay for repairs to climate-related damage in particularly affected countries – with fresh money financed by the biggest emitters. Fry reiterated this call during a mid-September visit to Bangladesh. And communities particularly at risk from climate change should be able to sue for compensation for the damage done to them.
Many of these demands have already been made by representatives of the most vulnerable countries and human rights experts. What is new, however, is that someone in such a prominent position as Fry is now articulating them in such clear language. Sébastien Duyck, a lawyer in the Climate and Energy Program at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), therefore hopes that the report will give new impetus to international climate negotiations, especially on loss and damage (L&D): “The report is an opportunity for a broader dialogue. Civil society and concerned governments will use it to push harder than before for progress.” Duyck hopes that the Special Rapporteur’s authority will create “new momentum for solutions” in the eternal dispute over Loss and Damage “.
On October 21, a few days before the start of the 27th UN Climate Summit COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, Fry will officially present his report. At that point, attention to the issue is likely to increase even further.
Fry, an Australian expert on international environmental law and policy, is no stranger to the international climate scene. He began his three-year term as Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights in the context of climate change in May 2022. From his previous work, he is intimately familiar with the existential threat that climate change poses, particularly to vulnerable regions such as the Pacific island states. He considers climate-induced displacement to be one of the greatest human rights threats of our time. Before taking office, Fry worked for the government of Tuvalu for two decades and served as its climate and environment ambassador from 2015 to 2019. At U.N. climate summits, including one in Paris in 2015, he negotiated on behalf of Pacific nations and coordinated the work of delegations from the so-called Least Developed Countries (LDCs). He also teaches environmental policy and international environmental politics at the Australian National University.
Fry’s position as UN Special Rapporteur is still young: The position was only created by the UN Human Rights Council on October 8, 2021 – the same day the Council passed a resolution recognizing the right of all people to live in a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. In July 2022, the UN General Assembly also recognized the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.
In purely legal terms, United Nations resolutions are not binding on its member states. And so far, similar publications within the UN framework have achieved little. For example, David Boyd, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, along with other UN human rights experts, had already called on the world’s states to divest from fossil fuels in 2019. At the same time, several UN human rights bodies demanded that states cut their climate-damaging emissions as radically as possible. This has not happened.
Still, Boyd calls UN resolutions “a catalyst for action.” After the General Assembly recognized the human right to water and sanitation in 2010, for example, some countries enshrined it in their laws and constitutions, he says. Thus, UN resolutions “empower ordinary people to hold their governments accountable in a very powerful way.”
For the decarbonization of an economy in a “just transition,” there is now, for the first time, a price tag for coal phase-out in a major emerging economy. Rapidly reducing coal power in South Africa, building new grids and renewables, and providing social cushioning for the affected population would cost the equivalent of $61.8 billion in total from 2023 to 2027. This is according to the as yet unpublished draft of an official government report, which has now been presented to the South African “Climate Commission” and international donors and is available exclusively to Climate Table.
With this submission, the country with the highest CO₂ emissions in Africa fleshes out its climate plan for the UN (NDC). At the same time, South Africa is responding to an offer from the EU, USA, Germany, France and the UK. These had announced at COP26 in Glasgow that they would provide a total of $8.5 billion in grants, loans or guarantees to help South Africa decarbonize more quickly. This “Just Energy Transition Partnership” (JETP) is intended to promote the green transformation of one of the most important CO₂ emitters.
In addition, the project with South Africa is seen as a model for helping other emerging economies break their dependence on fossil fuels: At their meeting in Elmau in June, the G7 declared that they would also negotiate such decarbonization partnerships with India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Senegal. However, negotiations with current G20 chair Indonesia on an accelerated coal phase-out are apparently proving difficult.
For South Africa, the 72-page paper makes clear how the green transition is expected to transform the country: “If successfully implemented, it will fundamentally change the economic landscape, guarantee electricity security, generate new employment in renewable energy, and ensure the necessary support for communities affected by the transition,” the authors write. The focus is on “systemic change and addressing poverty, inequality and unemployment” in the country.
The lion’s share of 41 billion is planned for infrastructure in the electricity sector, just under four billion each for e-cars and as structural aid for the affected regions, and 13 billion for the development of a green hydrogen industry. The total sum, he said, is “more than double the climate funding” the country currently receives. He said it was clear that these sums “cannot come frompublic funding alone ” and needed optimal financing instruments.
The plan aims to significantly reduce the country’s high emissions. From the current level of about 470 million tons of CO₂ annually, emissions could drop to “420 to 350 million tons by 2030, depending on support from the international community.” The goals in doing so: “accelerate decarbonization, a just transition to protect workers, manage the deficit of the national power company Eskom, ensure local value creation, and seize technical opportunities.”
According to the concept, a coal phase-out would entail “significant social and economic disruptions. That’s because South Africa’s economy is dependent on coal, which has provided 80 percent of its electricity needs to date, despite excellent potential for wind and solar power. “South Africa has the most carbon-intensive economy of the major emitting countries,” the authors write, with 0.6 kilograms of CO₂ emissions per dollar of gross national product (EU average: 0.1 kg) and 40 percent of all African CO₂ emissions. At the same time, social inequality is extreme: 86 percent of wealth belongs to ten percent of the population, 55 percent of people live in poverty, and youth unemployment is 65 percent. In the coal province of Mpumalanga alone, 100,000 jobs are directly linked to coal, according to the report.
The decarbonization plans come at a time when South Africa needs to renew its energy system: The country’s coal fleet of 39 gigawatts of capacity is old, and 22 GW of it is due to be decommissioned by 2035 anyway. By then, 55 GW of capacity from renewable generation would be needed. This would require six GW of solar and wind power per year. For the energy transition by 2035, the paper’s authors calculate annual investments of about $14 billion per year to “retire 70 percent of coal-fired power plants, strengthen and expand power grids, meet renewable electricity demand, and electrify transportation.”
Of the $61.8 billion needed by 2027 alone, the report says $18.8 billion has been secured so far – just under eight billion so far from Western donor countries, six billion from South Africa’s budget and $4.8 billion from international development banks. “The difference shows the size of the funding gap,” it says succinctly: so far, $43 billion is missing for the next five years. Private investments have not been included so far.
But these could finance the development of renewable energy, finds the study “Making Climate Capital Work,” produced by the South African Blended Finance Taskforce and Stellenbosch University’s Centre for Sustainabiltiy Transitions. According to the study, South Africa needs $250 billion, two-thirds of it private capital, over the next 30 years to transform its energy system – about three percent of its gross domestic product.
The demands from South Africa are currently with the donor countries for review. Apparently, however, the USA is not yet satisfied. On September 15, U.S. climate envoy John Kerry said they were waiting for the proposals. “It’s up to President Ramaphosa, we’re waiting for the South African government to put some things on the table,” Kerry said at a conference of environment ministers in Dakar. “It would be wonderful to have this done by COP27 in November,” Kerry said. “That’s what I’m hoping for, but I’m not saying we can do it.”
As recently as the end of May, the British government announced that it was considering providing guarantees for South Africa’s $1 billion debt as part of the JETP.
The Just Energy Transition Partnership is a flagship of global efforts to phase out fossil fuels as quickly and socially justly as possible. The detailed plan for South Africa is to be published at COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, in November. The industrialized countries would thus at least partially address the criticism that the $100 billion in annual climate financing promised from 2020 has not yet been achieved.
The announcement in New York was seen as a milestone in climate protection: “China will no longer build any new coal-fired power plants abroad” – that was Xi Jinping’s promise at the last UN General Assembly. Until then, the People’s Republic had been the last major state donor for coal projects. Between the years 2000 and 2019, China’s major development banks had injected nearly $52 billion into 66 coal-fired power plants abroad after Western development banks gradually exited the business (China.Table reported).
But a year later, the balance of this promise is clouded: Due to loopholes and gray areas in the regulation, 18 new coal-fired power plants with a capacity of 19.2 gigawatts could apparently continue to be built, even though they contradict Xi’s words, as an analysis by the think tank Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air shows. According to the report, the coal-fired piles would generate circa 94 million tons of CO₂ per year. Some of these power plants are to be built in industrial parks that are being promoted as part of the New Silk Road. In addition, power plants are being expanded with Chinese support and projects that were already decided before Xi’s announcement can also still be realized.
The analysis shows examples where China continues to finance coal: In Indonesia, a power plant is to be built in an industrial park and supply the nickel and steel industries. The contract was only signed on February 14 of this year – a good five months after Xi’s announcement. Another industrial coal-fired power plant in Indonesia is to be expanded with Chinese equipment, the CREA analysis shows.
In Laos, on the other hand, a coal-fired power plant is being built which was decided years ago and whose planning was interrupted in the meantime. Another new contract for a construction project was signed on May 24, 2022. Here, too, a Chinese company is to supply parts for the construction. The 660 MW project is officially called a “clean energy generation project.” However, according to CREA, the published information strongly suggests a coal-fired power plant.
In addition, China remains willing to upgrade existing coal-fired power plants abroad to meet new emission standards. This would limit emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides and thus reduce air pollution at the power plants. But if the upgrades kept power plants online longer than originally planned, overall CO₂ emissions could rise, CREA analysts said. This risk is particularly present in old power plants, for example in Indonesia and India, says CREA’s Isabella Suarez.
Despite these loopholes, however, Xi’s announcement is still seen as a major milestone. China’s ban on building coal-fired power plants abroad “is hugely important for climate protection and the energy transition worldwide,” Suarez told Climate.Table. That’s partly because other sources of financing are drying up more and more.
To be sure, China was the last major state backer. But even before Xi’s announcement, 87 percent of public and private financing to build coal-fired power plants came from outside China, according to calculations by Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center – “most of it from institutional investors and commercial banks from Japan and Western countries,” according to Cecilia Springer, associate director of Boston University’s Global China Initiative.
“Many private lenders have put their own restrictions on coal financing. Developing countries that want to continue building coal-fired power plants will be hard-pressed to find financing in the future,” says the Boston University expert. What’s more, boilers, steam turbines and generators from China have a major cost advantage over offerings from other regions of the world. If this equipment is no longer allowed to be installed abroad, coal-fired power plants will become more expensive and thus less likely to be built, even if private financiers would finance them.
Although China itself plans to rely more heavily on natural gas in the future, Springer says there is little evidence of major investment by Chinese development banks in gas projects in the global South. “China has hardly provided any development financing for gas-fired power plants,” Springer says. Nor is investment expected to increase, he adds. That’s because “China’s domestic natural gas industry is small and doesn’t have the same incentives for global expansion as China’s domestic coal and hydropower industries.” However, Chinese companies are making outward direct investments in the gas sector, he said, but that is driven by demand from host countries, not by China’s strategic interests.
Natural gas also plays hardly any role in the revised policy guidelines for financing and investment abroad following Xi’s UN announcement, Springer said. Instead, renewable energies are emphasized there. After all, Xi had also emphasized in his UN speech, “China will step up support for other developing countries to develop green and low-carbon energy.”
So far, China’s development banks have been reluctant to get involved in wind and solar energy. They have “considered the risk of financeability too high. And the demand from host countries for renewables has been lacking. They preferred traditional energy sources,” Springer says. But the Boston University scholar is optimistic. Should China overcome its own economic problems and once again approve more development financing, she says, it will invest more in renewables.
Already in recent years, China’s wind and solar companies have been involved in numerous wind and solar projects through foreign direct investment. They have financed the majority of the 20 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity financed by China. Suarez is also optimistic: “We expect the number of renewable energy projects abroad to increase and be systematically pursued, as was the case with coal.”
Just how difficult it is for China to leave fossil fuels behind is shown by the joint declaration with Russia and India at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand on September 15 and 16. In it, the members of the economic and security alliance, which are among the biggest CO₂ polluters, insist on the right of emerging economies to use oil and gas for their economic development. SCO members call for a “balanced approach between emissions reduction and development” by nations.
The leaders called for increased investment in oil and gas production and exploration. In doing so, they directly contradict calculations by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which warns that no new fossil fuel infrastructure should be built worldwide with immediate effect to meet the 1.5-degree target.
The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine makes it clear, as if through a burning glass, that the entire world order is reeling: because the nuclear power Russia is acting belligerently and imperialistically, trying to enforce the law of the strongest by force, against any idea of a rule-based world order.
If democracy, freedom, peace and sustainable development are to have a future in the age of global interconnectedness, Putin’s war of conquest must undoubtedly be stopped. But the much-invoked turn of the times goes far beyond security policy issues. Not only is the Bundeswehr’s ability to act massively limited, but our climate, development, diplomacy and economic efforts in favor of global governance are not enough to avoid the increasingly dramatic cascades of crisis.
One thing is certain in all of this: the 2020s are the decisive decade, especially if we are to avoid dangerous climate change. But we are running out of time. The transformations towards climate neutrality and sustainable development within the limits of the planetary system can only succeed if global cooperation in these fields works and is massively deepened. Therefore, a more comprehensive effort is needed, especially now, so that the current international crisis constellation leads to a catharsis, a reconsideration that expands the opportunities for international cooperative alliances in the 21st century and averts a dangerous disintegration of the global order.
In the last two decades, we have experienced a veritable cascade of global interdependence crises – a sobering balance: first the terrorist attack on New York on September 11 , 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. September 11, 2001 , and the subsequent War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, then the international financial market crisis in 2008-2009 and, from 2015, refugee movements toward Europe, which account for only a small part of the refugee dynamics in countries of the global South, and in addition (by no means coincidentally at the same time) nationalist-authoritarian movements in the countries of the West (Trump, Orban, Le Pen), but in parallel nationalist trends in China and India, among others, with simultaneous weakening and sometimes even paralysis of multilateral forums and organizations – and finally, from 2020, the pandemic, which has increased inequalities worldwide and destroyed progress in the fight against poverty, and in 2022 Russia’s attack of Ukraine.
We are not in control of the dynamics of globalization. On the contrary, the permanent mode of global interdependence crises is perceived by many people as a loss of control and fuels nationalist-authoritarian movements.
To speak of the rule-based world order before the “turn of the times” that now needs to be restored negates this structural fragility of an international order that has so far failed to do justice to the dynamics of the highly interconnected global economies, societies and ecosystems. We will therefore have to provide for global exchange much more and in a different way in order to get through the 21st century “in one piece”.
Our Western perception of the Russian war is: This is about the basic pillars of the global order and international law, the right of weaker states against great powers that are ready to use force, even the prevention of a nuclear war. If we do not stand together worldwide in such a threatening situation, when will we?
In relevant parts of the world, however, the Ukraine war is perceived less as a potentially global crisis and often more as a conflict between “Russia and the West.”
In many regions of the world, the framing of “the West against Russia” masks the perception that the West cannot be entirely innocent of the disaster; in other words, we are not really trusted; on the contrary, we are distrusted.
But we react to it perplexed: How can there be such a picture after 70 years of development cooperation ? Is Europe not a model region of a tamed, social, ecological market economy? We are proud of the European Green Deal. Is Europe not the most successful peace project in the world? We have to admit to ourselves: In the global South, it is partly seen quite differently.
In the face of Russian aggression, our governments always argue with reference to universalist principles: International law, human rights, democracy, freedom. Not infrequently, the accusation of Eurocentrism comes back.
The Eurocentric focus can be seen, for example, in the EU flagship, the European Green Deal (EGD): The EGD is undoubtedly an ambitious green economy program for Europe, but the EU has initially “forgotten” to discuss its implications with the neighboring continent of Africa in order to develop a European-African Green Deal. The EGD implies in the short term: less resource imports from Africa (circular economy), less fossil energy from African countries (climate protection). What benefits everyone in the long term, on the other hand, creates significant adaptation problems in the neighboring region in the short term. The Eurocentrism of the Europeans, so the accusation goes, obscures the view of the effects of European policy on the livelihoods of Africans.
We Europeans in particular consider ourselves to be the greatest universalists on the planet, while observers from the global South attest us hypocrisy and double standards, often behind closed doors. The example of the Ukraine war makes this particularly clear. “This is your war, not ours,” is the accusation. “Have you taken any interest in the current war in Yemen, where 250,000 people have died, at the hands of Saudi weapons, supplied also by NATO countries?” That Putin must be brought before an international court as a war criminal is definitely seen as a correct idea. But what about the Iraq war, which was illegal under international law – where were loud voices from the West demanding that President Bush be brought before an international court? The same applies to the refugee crisis: “You in Europe also only noticed it in 2015, when refugees appeared in your cities. The more than 90 percent of refugees who have to be housed in poor countries have long been, and still are, overlooked.”
The West expects support from all sides in Ukraine, but when it comes to the central concerns of the poorer countries, it is often heard that it does not “deliver” itself. And thus lacks the necessary global fairness. Again, just a few examples: During the pandemic, the importance of global health protection was stressed many times – in Sunday speeches. Masks and vaccines were initially distributed in the West – rich countries first. In recent decades, the high-emission countries of the West have neglected and delayed climate protection, the consequences of which are mainly felt in the South. It is therefore all the more irritating that the 100 billion dollars for adaptation to climate change in the developing countries have been delayed for years. This gives the impression that the developing countries cannot escape their second-class status in many international organizations.
We are not good at looking at the world through “the eyes of others” either. One does not have to share all the arguments put forward for distrust of Europe and the West, but we should take very seriously that they fall on very fertile ground in many countries around the world, and not only in authoritarian societies. Perhaps in the current great shake-up of the world order we have a chance to shine the spotlight on factors of non-gelling global cooperation that often become covered up with money and thus invisible in the routine mode of international cooperation. Opportunities could emerge from this. We urgently need to learn not to automatically confuse our European view of the world with global common good interests.
Against the backdrop of the outlined reservations about Europe or the West, Finland’s ex-Prime Minister Alexander Stubb suggests in a Twitter post: “Instead of asking the rest of the world to choose sides, maybe it’s time to sit down and think about what a new world order based on common rules might look like? Difficult? Yes. Impossible? No. Probable? I don’t think so.” We should follow Alexander Stubbe’s advice.
Dirk Messner is President of the Federal Environment Agency (UBA). This article is based on a text published in full in July 2022 in the “Blättern für deutsche und internationale Politik”.
He’ll get used to these puns on his name: “This is the new head of the U.N. Climate Change Secretariat, Simon Stiell,” the moderator introduced him in English at a U.N. discussion Monday, “and boy do we need a lot of steel in this game.”
The new UN Executive Secretary, who is making his first public appearances this week, is by no means hard as nails. On the contrary: polite, authoritative, well-informed, eager to compromise– that’s how companions describe the man from the Caribbean island of Grenada, who was promoted surprisingly quickly to head the UN Climate Secretariat in August. The former environment minister of Grenada is an experienced politician and climate negotiator. He knows from his own experience how slowly climate diplomacy works. And that’s why, during his brief appearance in New York, he also cited “momentum” as the most important word for the climate process.
Born in 1968, the elegantly dressed Stiell, with suit and bald head, moves confidently on the diplomatic stage. Nevertheless, in his first major appearance in the hall of the UN General Assembly, he reads sentences from the manuscript that he has on his lap like the other discussants. He says all the things about the urgency and opportunities of climate protection and about rolling up his sleeves that a UN climate chief has to say from morning to night. But he also warns that ahead of the upcoming COP27 in Egypt, “things look bleak.” CO₂ emissions would have to be halved by 2030, which would only be “two more World Cups or Olympic Games.” Stiell is very familiar with the emissions data; he led the negotiations at the last COP in Glasgow. That’s why there should be “no falling back,” he warns. “We need progress and a clear direction,” is the next sentence he will probably be saying all the time in the near future.
As quickly as Stiell was appointed, he made himself scarce in the first weeks of his new office. After an introduction at the Bonn headquarters of the UN Climate Change Secretariat, the new UN chief is focusing primarily on quiet diplomacy behind the scenes: He traveled to Egypt to meet the hosts of the COP and is talking to key players around the world. He needs to forge alliances because the signs in the international debate look really “grim,” including in the climate. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the debt crisis in many developing countries, the Covid pandemic, the new Cold War between the CO₂ superpowers China and the USA with the suspension of climate talks, all these are weighing on the atmosphere of the negotiations.
In addition, the industrialized countries have not honored their commitment to provide $100 billion a year from 2020 and are not moving as fast as they should in reducing greenhouse gases. Moreover, they are still resisting a loss and damage mechanism, which already led to serious tensions at the interim conference in Bonn.
Stiell wants and needs to build bridges over all these obstacles. His background can help him do that: He comes from the Caribbean island of Grenada, where his family still lives. After his predecessors Patricia Espinosa (Mexico) and Christiana Figueres (Costa Rica), he is already the third climate chief from Central America. But as a representative of the “small island states,” with their particular vulnerability to poverty and climate change, he brings the experience of the most vulnerable people to the negotiating table. Many poor countries, his native Grenada among them, are trapped by debt and storm damage. Stiell knows exactly what the abstract term “loss and damage” feels like in concrete terms. So it is surely no coincidence that in the heated debate about it, which could become an explosive mixture at COP27, the UN Secretary-General has put his faith in Simon Stiell.
Stiell, who describes himself as a “family man,” grew up in Great Britain. Because his father worked for the British armed forces, he also lived in Germany for two years as a boy – in Lemgo, Westphalia, not that far from his current office in Bonn. Stiell studied business administration and worked for companies such as Silicon Valley start-ups and Nokia. Later, he went into politics in his home state: became a member of parliament, minister, among other things, for agriculture, tourism and then for the environment. So he knows many sides of the climate debate with its very own constraints: international diplomacy, global economics, national politics.
Stiell says of himself that he is an activist, but not a stubborn one: a political thinker through and through, but open to compromise. This is also appreciated by people he has sat with at the climate negotiation tables in recent years. They describe him as fact- and compromise-oriented and as someone who clearly brings in the voice of the most vulnerable. The circumstances surrounding his appearance on Monday showed just how necessary that is: while Stiell sat at the podium in New York, Hurricane Fiona cut its path of devastation across the territory of Puerto Rico. Bernhard Pötter
the global climate scene is looking to New York these days. At the 77th UN General Assembly, the overheating of the earth is pushing its way up the agenda alongside the Ukraine war. No one denies anymore: the global climate crisis is acute: heat and drought in the northern hemisphere, temperature records in India and Pakistan, then the flood disaster in Pakistan and the current hurricane “Fiona” in Costa Rica show: The issue can no longer be ignored.
That is why we are presenting the first issue of the new Decision Brief Climate.Table to you right now. Because the effects of the global climate crisis are increasingly determining your decisions. Starting in mid-October, we will compile news, background, analysis, opinions and data once a week to provide you exclusively and intensively with important information about the global climate crisis. We won’t just bring you the quick news, but we’ll analyze what it means, the background against which politics, business, science and civil society make their decisions. And we help filter out the really relevant information from the flood of information that lands in your mailbox every day.
Our view is like the crisis: global. Economic, environmental and energy policy can no longer be thought of in national terms. With our network of correspondents, we look at decisions and developments in the important markets and the relevant countries.
In this first issue of Climate.Table, we present the radical report of the UN Rapporteur on Human Rights in Climate Change. My colleague Urmi Goswami writes from New Delhi about India’s important steps toward a CO₂ market.
We reveal what a socially just energy transition in the coal country of South Africa is supposed to cost and critically assess China’s promise not to build any new coal-fired power plants abroad. And Dirk Messner, President of the German Federal Environment Agency, joins us to debate the question of how urgently needed international cooperation should be possible in times of cold and hot wars.
Climate.Table – For you, dear readers, this could be like a COP, once a week. With all the multinational perspective, drama, and meaningful decisions of these major UN conferences – but without the frustration, lack of sleep, and bad moods that often accompany COPs.
We hope Climate.Table finds your interest. Please feel free to contact us with criticism, suggestions, and tips on topics. Our address for this is climate@briefing.table.media.
And: Keep a long breath!
The document holds political explosives for the UN General Assembly and the upcoming climate summit in Sharm el Sheikh. In his first report, Ian Fry, the new United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the context of climate change, presents explosive demands that are highly controversial among UN states: among other things, the outlawing of fossil fuels by the UN, a rapid and drastic reduction of CO₂ emissions, an aid fund for climate damage and climate tribunalsagainst states and companies. UN Secretary-General António Guterres submitted the report to the UN General Assembly on July 26.
Among other things, Fry’s report endorses the call by environmental groups and developing countries for compensation for climate-related loss and damage (“L&D”). He identifies the responsibility of wealthy industrialized nations for the climate crisis and the “enormous injustice” they are inflicting on people in the poorest countries. He reminds us that global warming is already endangering the right to life of millions of people and urges us to finally act quickly.
Specifically, the Special Rapporteur calls for, among other things, a 55 percent reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. But he also has clear political demands: He wants the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which allows investors to sue against climate policy decisions by states, to be repealed. This has a real background: only recently, in a lawsuit based on the ECT, the Italian state was ordered to pay the oil company Rockhopper compensation amounting to 190 million euros plus interest. The climate scene and climate diplomats fear that the ECT will promote further lawsuits worth millions. They would tie up money that is urgently needed for the global transformation to a climate-friendly world.
In addition, Fry is calling for a UN resolution to outlaw the further exploitation of oil, coal and gas resources. In the future, an international human rights tribunal should hold governments, companies and financial institutions accountable that continue to invest in fossil fuels and thereby violate human rights. Ecocide, i.e. the serious damage to or destruction of nature, is to become a separate criminal offense before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although there are already several charges before the ICC against Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro for this and other crimes, ecocide has not yet been integrated as an offense in the court’s statutes.
Finally, for Fry, the UN General Assembly should address a key issue that has so far made little headway in the climate negotiations between delegations: the establishment of a loss-and-damage fund to pay for repairs to climate-related damage in particularly affected countries – with fresh money financed by the biggest emitters. Fry reiterated this call during a mid-September visit to Bangladesh. And communities particularly at risk from climate change should be able to sue for compensation for the damage done to them.
Many of these demands have already been made by representatives of the most vulnerable countries and human rights experts. What is new, however, is that someone in such a prominent position as Fry is now articulating them in such clear language. Sébastien Duyck, a lawyer in the Climate and Energy Program at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), therefore hopes that the report will give new impetus to international climate negotiations, especially on loss and damage (L&D): “The report is an opportunity for a broader dialogue. Civil society and concerned governments will use it to push harder than before for progress.” Duyck hopes that the Special Rapporteur’s authority will create “new momentum for solutions” in the eternal dispute over Loss and Damage “.
On October 21, a few days before the start of the 27th UN Climate Summit COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, Fry will officially present his report. At that point, attention to the issue is likely to increase even further.
Fry, an Australian expert on international environmental law and policy, is no stranger to the international climate scene. He began his three-year term as Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights in the context of climate change in May 2022. From his previous work, he is intimately familiar with the existential threat that climate change poses, particularly to vulnerable regions such as the Pacific island states. He considers climate-induced displacement to be one of the greatest human rights threats of our time. Before taking office, Fry worked for the government of Tuvalu for two decades and served as its climate and environment ambassador from 2015 to 2019. At U.N. climate summits, including one in Paris in 2015, he negotiated on behalf of Pacific nations and coordinated the work of delegations from the so-called Least Developed Countries (LDCs). He also teaches environmental policy and international environmental politics at the Australian National University.
Fry’s position as UN Special Rapporteur is still young: The position was only created by the UN Human Rights Council on October 8, 2021 – the same day the Council passed a resolution recognizing the right of all people to live in a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. In July 2022, the UN General Assembly also recognized the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.
In purely legal terms, United Nations resolutions are not binding on its member states. And so far, similar publications within the UN framework have achieved little. For example, David Boyd, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, along with other UN human rights experts, had already called on the world’s states to divest from fossil fuels in 2019. At the same time, several UN human rights bodies demanded that states cut their climate-damaging emissions as radically as possible. This has not happened.
Still, Boyd calls UN resolutions “a catalyst for action.” After the General Assembly recognized the human right to water and sanitation in 2010, for example, some countries enshrined it in their laws and constitutions, he says. Thus, UN resolutions “empower ordinary people to hold their governments accountable in a very powerful way.”
For the decarbonization of an economy in a “just transition,” there is now, for the first time, a price tag for coal phase-out in a major emerging economy. Rapidly reducing coal power in South Africa, building new grids and renewables, and providing social cushioning for the affected population would cost the equivalent of $61.8 billion in total from 2023 to 2027. This is according to the as yet unpublished draft of an official government report, which has now been presented to the South African “Climate Commission” and international donors and is available exclusively to Climate Table.
With this submission, the country with the highest CO₂ emissions in Africa fleshes out its climate plan for the UN (NDC). At the same time, South Africa is responding to an offer from the EU, USA, Germany, France and the UK. These had announced at COP26 in Glasgow that they would provide a total of $8.5 billion in grants, loans or guarantees to help South Africa decarbonize more quickly. This “Just Energy Transition Partnership” (JETP) is intended to promote the green transformation of one of the most important CO₂ emitters.
In addition, the project with South Africa is seen as a model for helping other emerging economies break their dependence on fossil fuels: At their meeting in Elmau in June, the G7 declared that they would also negotiate such decarbonization partnerships with India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Senegal. However, negotiations with current G20 chair Indonesia on an accelerated coal phase-out are apparently proving difficult.
For South Africa, the 72-page paper makes clear how the green transition is expected to transform the country: “If successfully implemented, it will fundamentally change the economic landscape, guarantee electricity security, generate new employment in renewable energy, and ensure the necessary support for communities affected by the transition,” the authors write. The focus is on “systemic change and addressing poverty, inequality and unemployment” in the country.
The lion’s share of 41 billion is planned for infrastructure in the electricity sector, just under four billion each for e-cars and as structural aid for the affected regions, and 13 billion for the development of a green hydrogen industry. The total sum, he said, is “more than double the climate funding” the country currently receives. He said it was clear that these sums “cannot come frompublic funding alone ” and needed optimal financing instruments.
The plan aims to significantly reduce the country’s high emissions. From the current level of about 470 million tons of CO₂ annually, emissions could drop to “420 to 350 million tons by 2030, depending on support from the international community.” The goals in doing so: “accelerate decarbonization, a just transition to protect workers, manage the deficit of the national power company Eskom, ensure local value creation, and seize technical opportunities.”
According to the concept, a coal phase-out would entail “significant social and economic disruptions. That’s because South Africa’s economy is dependent on coal, which has provided 80 percent of its electricity needs to date, despite excellent potential for wind and solar power. “South Africa has the most carbon-intensive economy of the major emitting countries,” the authors write, with 0.6 kilograms of CO₂ emissions per dollar of gross national product (EU average: 0.1 kg) and 40 percent of all African CO₂ emissions. At the same time, social inequality is extreme: 86 percent of wealth belongs to ten percent of the population, 55 percent of people live in poverty, and youth unemployment is 65 percent. In the coal province of Mpumalanga alone, 100,000 jobs are directly linked to coal, according to the report.
The decarbonization plans come at a time when South Africa needs to renew its energy system: The country’s coal fleet of 39 gigawatts of capacity is old, and 22 GW of it is due to be decommissioned by 2035 anyway. By then, 55 GW of capacity from renewable generation would be needed. This would require six GW of solar and wind power per year. For the energy transition by 2035, the paper’s authors calculate annual investments of about $14 billion per year to “retire 70 percent of coal-fired power plants, strengthen and expand power grids, meet renewable electricity demand, and electrify transportation.”
Of the $61.8 billion needed by 2027 alone, the report says $18.8 billion has been secured so far – just under eight billion so far from Western donor countries, six billion from South Africa’s budget and $4.8 billion from international development banks. “The difference shows the size of the funding gap,” it says succinctly: so far, $43 billion is missing for the next five years. Private investments have not been included so far.
But these could finance the development of renewable energy, finds the study “Making Climate Capital Work,” produced by the South African Blended Finance Taskforce and Stellenbosch University’s Centre for Sustainabiltiy Transitions. According to the study, South Africa needs $250 billion, two-thirds of it private capital, over the next 30 years to transform its energy system – about three percent of its gross domestic product.
The demands from South Africa are currently with the donor countries for review. Apparently, however, the USA is not yet satisfied. On September 15, U.S. climate envoy John Kerry said they were waiting for the proposals. “It’s up to President Ramaphosa, we’re waiting for the South African government to put some things on the table,” Kerry said at a conference of environment ministers in Dakar. “It would be wonderful to have this done by COP27 in November,” Kerry said. “That’s what I’m hoping for, but I’m not saying we can do it.”
As recently as the end of May, the British government announced that it was considering providing guarantees for South Africa’s $1 billion debt as part of the JETP.
The Just Energy Transition Partnership is a flagship of global efforts to phase out fossil fuels as quickly and socially justly as possible. The detailed plan for South Africa is to be published at COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, in November. The industrialized countries would thus at least partially address the criticism that the $100 billion in annual climate financing promised from 2020 has not yet been achieved.
The announcement in New York was seen as a milestone in climate protection: “China will no longer build any new coal-fired power plants abroad” – that was Xi Jinping’s promise at the last UN General Assembly. Until then, the People’s Republic had been the last major state donor for coal projects. Between the years 2000 and 2019, China’s major development banks had injected nearly $52 billion into 66 coal-fired power plants abroad after Western development banks gradually exited the business (China.Table reported).
But a year later, the balance of this promise is clouded: Due to loopholes and gray areas in the regulation, 18 new coal-fired power plants with a capacity of 19.2 gigawatts could apparently continue to be built, even though they contradict Xi’s words, as an analysis by the think tank Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air shows. According to the report, the coal-fired piles would generate circa 94 million tons of CO₂ per year. Some of these power plants are to be built in industrial parks that are being promoted as part of the New Silk Road. In addition, power plants are being expanded with Chinese support and projects that were already decided before Xi’s announcement can also still be realized.
The analysis shows examples where China continues to finance coal: In Indonesia, a power plant is to be built in an industrial park and supply the nickel and steel industries. The contract was only signed on February 14 of this year – a good five months after Xi’s announcement. Another industrial coal-fired power plant in Indonesia is to be expanded with Chinese equipment, the CREA analysis shows.
In Laos, on the other hand, a coal-fired power plant is being built which was decided years ago and whose planning was interrupted in the meantime. Another new contract for a construction project was signed on May 24, 2022. Here, too, a Chinese company is to supply parts for the construction. The 660 MW project is officially called a “clean energy generation project.” However, according to CREA, the published information strongly suggests a coal-fired power plant.
In addition, China remains willing to upgrade existing coal-fired power plants abroad to meet new emission standards. This would limit emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides and thus reduce air pollution at the power plants. But if the upgrades kept power plants online longer than originally planned, overall CO₂ emissions could rise, CREA analysts said. This risk is particularly present in old power plants, for example in Indonesia and India, says CREA’s Isabella Suarez.
Despite these loopholes, however, Xi’s announcement is still seen as a major milestone. China’s ban on building coal-fired power plants abroad “is hugely important for climate protection and the energy transition worldwide,” Suarez told Climate.Table. That’s partly because other sources of financing are drying up more and more.
To be sure, China was the last major state backer. But even before Xi’s announcement, 87 percent of public and private financing to build coal-fired power plants came from outside China, according to calculations by Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center – “most of it from institutional investors and commercial banks from Japan and Western countries,” according to Cecilia Springer, associate director of Boston University’s Global China Initiative.
“Many private lenders have put their own restrictions on coal financing. Developing countries that want to continue building coal-fired power plants will be hard-pressed to find financing in the future,” says the Boston University expert. What’s more, boilers, steam turbines and generators from China have a major cost advantage over offerings from other regions of the world. If this equipment is no longer allowed to be installed abroad, coal-fired power plants will become more expensive and thus less likely to be built, even if private financiers would finance them.
Although China itself plans to rely more heavily on natural gas in the future, Springer says there is little evidence of major investment by Chinese development banks in gas projects in the global South. “China has hardly provided any development financing for gas-fired power plants,” Springer says. Nor is investment expected to increase, he adds. That’s because “China’s domestic natural gas industry is small and doesn’t have the same incentives for global expansion as China’s domestic coal and hydropower industries.” However, Chinese companies are making outward direct investments in the gas sector, he said, but that is driven by demand from host countries, not by China’s strategic interests.
Natural gas also plays hardly any role in the revised policy guidelines for financing and investment abroad following Xi’s UN announcement, Springer said. Instead, renewable energies are emphasized there. After all, Xi had also emphasized in his UN speech, “China will step up support for other developing countries to develop green and low-carbon energy.”
So far, China’s development banks have been reluctant to get involved in wind and solar energy. They have “considered the risk of financeability too high. And the demand from host countries for renewables has been lacking. They preferred traditional energy sources,” Springer says. But the Boston University scholar is optimistic. Should China overcome its own economic problems and once again approve more development financing, she says, it will invest more in renewables.
Already in recent years, China’s wind and solar companies have been involved in numerous wind and solar projects through foreign direct investment. They have financed the majority of the 20 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity financed by China. Suarez is also optimistic: “We expect the number of renewable energy projects abroad to increase and be systematically pursued, as was the case with coal.”
Just how difficult it is for China to leave fossil fuels behind is shown by the joint declaration with Russia and India at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand on September 15 and 16. In it, the members of the economic and security alliance, which are among the biggest CO₂ polluters, insist on the right of emerging economies to use oil and gas for their economic development. SCO members call for a “balanced approach between emissions reduction and development” by nations.
The leaders called for increased investment in oil and gas production and exploration. In doing so, they directly contradict calculations by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which warns that no new fossil fuel infrastructure should be built worldwide with immediate effect to meet the 1.5-degree target.
The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine makes it clear, as if through a burning glass, that the entire world order is reeling: because the nuclear power Russia is acting belligerently and imperialistically, trying to enforce the law of the strongest by force, against any idea of a rule-based world order.
If democracy, freedom, peace and sustainable development are to have a future in the age of global interconnectedness, Putin’s war of conquest must undoubtedly be stopped. But the much-invoked turn of the times goes far beyond security policy issues. Not only is the Bundeswehr’s ability to act massively limited, but our climate, development, diplomacy and economic efforts in favor of global governance are not enough to avoid the increasingly dramatic cascades of crisis.
One thing is certain in all of this: the 2020s are the decisive decade, especially if we are to avoid dangerous climate change. But we are running out of time. The transformations towards climate neutrality and sustainable development within the limits of the planetary system can only succeed if global cooperation in these fields works and is massively deepened. Therefore, a more comprehensive effort is needed, especially now, so that the current international crisis constellation leads to a catharsis, a reconsideration that expands the opportunities for international cooperative alliances in the 21st century and averts a dangerous disintegration of the global order.
In the last two decades, we have experienced a veritable cascade of global interdependence crises – a sobering balance: first the terrorist attack on New York on September 11 , 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. September 11, 2001 , and the subsequent War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, then the international financial market crisis in 2008-2009 and, from 2015, refugee movements toward Europe, which account for only a small part of the refugee dynamics in countries of the global South, and in addition (by no means coincidentally at the same time) nationalist-authoritarian movements in the countries of the West (Trump, Orban, Le Pen), but in parallel nationalist trends in China and India, among others, with simultaneous weakening and sometimes even paralysis of multilateral forums and organizations – and finally, from 2020, the pandemic, which has increased inequalities worldwide and destroyed progress in the fight against poverty, and in 2022 Russia’s attack of Ukraine.
We are not in control of the dynamics of globalization. On the contrary, the permanent mode of global interdependence crises is perceived by many people as a loss of control and fuels nationalist-authoritarian movements.
To speak of the rule-based world order before the “turn of the times” that now needs to be restored negates this structural fragility of an international order that has so far failed to do justice to the dynamics of the highly interconnected global economies, societies and ecosystems. We will therefore have to provide for global exchange much more and in a different way in order to get through the 21st century “in one piece”.
Our Western perception of the Russian war is: This is about the basic pillars of the global order and international law, the right of weaker states against great powers that are ready to use force, even the prevention of a nuclear war. If we do not stand together worldwide in such a threatening situation, when will we?
In relevant parts of the world, however, the Ukraine war is perceived less as a potentially global crisis and often more as a conflict between “Russia and the West.”
In many regions of the world, the framing of “the West against Russia” masks the perception that the West cannot be entirely innocent of the disaster; in other words, we are not really trusted; on the contrary, we are distrusted.
But we react to it perplexed: How can there be such a picture after 70 years of development cooperation ? Is Europe not a model region of a tamed, social, ecological market economy? We are proud of the European Green Deal. Is Europe not the most successful peace project in the world? We have to admit to ourselves: In the global South, it is partly seen quite differently.
In the face of Russian aggression, our governments always argue with reference to universalist principles: International law, human rights, democracy, freedom. Not infrequently, the accusation of Eurocentrism comes back.
The Eurocentric focus can be seen, for example, in the EU flagship, the European Green Deal (EGD): The EGD is undoubtedly an ambitious green economy program for Europe, but the EU has initially “forgotten” to discuss its implications with the neighboring continent of Africa in order to develop a European-African Green Deal. The EGD implies in the short term: less resource imports from Africa (circular economy), less fossil energy from African countries (climate protection). What benefits everyone in the long term, on the other hand, creates significant adaptation problems in the neighboring region in the short term. The Eurocentrism of the Europeans, so the accusation goes, obscures the view of the effects of European policy on the livelihoods of Africans.
We Europeans in particular consider ourselves to be the greatest universalists on the planet, while observers from the global South attest us hypocrisy and double standards, often behind closed doors. The example of the Ukraine war makes this particularly clear. “This is your war, not ours,” is the accusation. “Have you taken any interest in the current war in Yemen, where 250,000 people have died, at the hands of Saudi weapons, supplied also by NATO countries?” That Putin must be brought before an international court as a war criminal is definitely seen as a correct idea. But what about the Iraq war, which was illegal under international law – where were loud voices from the West demanding that President Bush be brought before an international court? The same applies to the refugee crisis: “You in Europe also only noticed it in 2015, when refugees appeared in your cities. The more than 90 percent of refugees who have to be housed in poor countries have long been, and still are, overlooked.”
The West expects support from all sides in Ukraine, but when it comes to the central concerns of the poorer countries, it is often heard that it does not “deliver” itself. And thus lacks the necessary global fairness. Again, just a few examples: During the pandemic, the importance of global health protection was stressed many times – in Sunday speeches. Masks and vaccines were initially distributed in the West – rich countries first. In recent decades, the high-emission countries of the West have neglected and delayed climate protection, the consequences of which are mainly felt in the South. It is therefore all the more irritating that the 100 billion dollars for adaptation to climate change in the developing countries have been delayed for years. This gives the impression that the developing countries cannot escape their second-class status in many international organizations.
We are not good at looking at the world through “the eyes of others” either. One does not have to share all the arguments put forward for distrust of Europe and the West, but we should take very seriously that they fall on very fertile ground in many countries around the world, and not only in authoritarian societies. Perhaps in the current great shake-up of the world order we have a chance to shine the spotlight on factors of non-gelling global cooperation that often become covered up with money and thus invisible in the routine mode of international cooperation. Opportunities could emerge from this. We urgently need to learn not to automatically confuse our European view of the world with global common good interests.
Against the backdrop of the outlined reservations about Europe or the West, Finland’s ex-Prime Minister Alexander Stubb suggests in a Twitter post: “Instead of asking the rest of the world to choose sides, maybe it’s time to sit down and think about what a new world order based on common rules might look like? Difficult? Yes. Impossible? No. Probable? I don’t think so.” We should follow Alexander Stubbe’s advice.
Dirk Messner is President of the Federal Environment Agency (UBA). This article is based on a text published in full in July 2022 in the “Blättern für deutsche und internationale Politik”.
He’ll get used to these puns on his name: “This is the new head of the U.N. Climate Change Secretariat, Simon Stiell,” the moderator introduced him in English at a U.N. discussion Monday, “and boy do we need a lot of steel in this game.”
The new UN Executive Secretary, who is making his first public appearances this week, is by no means hard as nails. On the contrary: polite, authoritative, well-informed, eager to compromise– that’s how companions describe the man from the Caribbean island of Grenada, who was promoted surprisingly quickly to head the UN Climate Secretariat in August. The former environment minister of Grenada is an experienced politician and climate negotiator. He knows from his own experience how slowly climate diplomacy works. And that’s why, during his brief appearance in New York, he also cited “momentum” as the most important word for the climate process.
Born in 1968, the elegantly dressed Stiell, with suit and bald head, moves confidently on the diplomatic stage. Nevertheless, in his first major appearance in the hall of the UN General Assembly, he reads sentences from the manuscript that he has on his lap like the other discussants. He says all the things about the urgency and opportunities of climate protection and about rolling up his sleeves that a UN climate chief has to say from morning to night. But he also warns that ahead of the upcoming COP27 in Egypt, “things look bleak.” CO₂ emissions would have to be halved by 2030, which would only be “two more World Cups or Olympic Games.” Stiell is very familiar with the emissions data; he led the negotiations at the last COP in Glasgow. That’s why there should be “no falling back,” he warns. “We need progress and a clear direction,” is the next sentence he will probably be saying all the time in the near future.
As quickly as Stiell was appointed, he made himself scarce in the first weeks of his new office. After an introduction at the Bonn headquarters of the UN Climate Change Secretariat, the new UN chief is focusing primarily on quiet diplomacy behind the scenes: He traveled to Egypt to meet the hosts of the COP and is talking to key players around the world. He needs to forge alliances because the signs in the international debate look really “grim,” including in the climate. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the debt crisis in many developing countries, the Covid pandemic, the new Cold War between the CO₂ superpowers China and the USA with the suspension of climate talks, all these are weighing on the atmosphere of the negotiations.
In addition, the industrialized countries have not honored their commitment to provide $100 billion a year from 2020 and are not moving as fast as they should in reducing greenhouse gases. Moreover, they are still resisting a loss and damage mechanism, which already led to serious tensions at the interim conference in Bonn.
Stiell wants and needs to build bridges over all these obstacles. His background can help him do that: He comes from the Caribbean island of Grenada, where his family still lives. After his predecessors Patricia Espinosa (Mexico) and Christiana Figueres (Costa Rica), he is already the third climate chief from Central America. But as a representative of the “small island states,” with their particular vulnerability to poverty and climate change, he brings the experience of the most vulnerable people to the negotiating table. Many poor countries, his native Grenada among them, are trapped by debt and storm damage. Stiell knows exactly what the abstract term “loss and damage” feels like in concrete terms. So it is surely no coincidence that in the heated debate about it, which could become an explosive mixture at COP27, the UN Secretary-General has put his faith in Simon Stiell.
Stiell, who describes himself as a “family man,” grew up in Great Britain. Because his father worked for the British armed forces, he also lived in Germany for two years as a boy – in Lemgo, Westphalia, not that far from his current office in Bonn. Stiell studied business administration and worked for companies such as Silicon Valley start-ups and Nokia. Later, he went into politics in his home state: became a member of parliament, minister, among other things, for agriculture, tourism and then for the environment. So he knows many sides of the climate debate with its very own constraints: international diplomacy, global economics, national politics.
Stiell says of himself that he is an activist, but not a stubborn one: a political thinker through and through, but open to compromise. This is also appreciated by people he has sat with at the climate negotiation tables in recent years. They describe him as fact- and compromise-oriented and as someone who clearly brings in the voice of the most vulnerable. The circumstances surrounding his appearance on Monday showed just how necessary that is: while Stiell sat at the podium in New York, Hurricane Fiona cut its path of devastation across the territory of Puerto Rico. Bernhard Pötter
