The US leaves through the front door – China slips in through the back. Well, the current situation in Afghanistan is not quite that simple. While the withdrawal of US troops is still in progress, China’s Foreign Minister Wang is already meeting with a Taliban delegation. The downside of this move is that Wang is making the dreaded holy warriors seem respectable; on a positive note, he is urging them to submit to the Afghan government. China’s presence can do a lot of good. The new superpower is taking a completely different approach, one that perhaps acknowledges the reality in the country rather than assuming pretty theories.
During the visit, Wang assured that China would never “interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs”. A familiar phrase; after all, China equally demands “non-interference” from Western countries. It is a classic “Tifa,” a fixed phrase that has a special meaning in the Chinese CCP’s parlance. In all official communication by China’s leadership, the same Tifa crops up again and again. In today’s issue, we give you a brief introduction to the art of decoding China’s political verbiage. Those who are proficient at it can even derive some amusement from CCP conference speeches. You could even play “Tifa Bingo” because phrases like the “Three Tough Battles” or “Five Major Development Concepts” are guaranteed to appear.
The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan is in progress. All troops are to leave the country in the Hindu Kush by the end of August. This is the will of US President Joe Biden.
However, the fewer US troops in the country, the stronger terrorist groups are spreading – above all the Islamist Taliban. The self-proclaimed holy warriors are on the advance. Region by region, district by district, the Taliban are reclaiming territory from the central government in Kabul. In the past two months alone, 120 districts are said to have fallen into their hands, including most recently the Wakhan district in the province of Badakhshan, which is of strategic importance to China. Meanwhile, the Taliban claim to already control 75 percent of the country. This may be exaggerated propaganda, but one thing is certain: the last month had seen the highest casualties in two decades.
Insecurity, violence, and instability are spreading. And Afghanistan’s neighbors are growing concerned that it could spread beyond the country’s borders. Beijing, in particular, is growing restless. “The arbitrary withdrawal of the Americans only leaves instability, chaos, and disaster in its wake,” judges Wang Jin, professor at Northwest University in Xi’an. It is a completely irresponsible action, and Afghanistan’s neighboring states now pay the price and try to get a grip on the situation, especially China.
On Wednesday, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with a Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Tianjin. The events earlier this week showed how important this process is for China: on Monday, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman was still on her trip in Tianjin (as reported by China.Table). As soon as the Deputy Secretary left, Wang took matters with the Taliban into his own hands.
The important thing now is to bring stability and security to Afghanistan in order to prevent the spread of violence across its borders. “China will play a very important and constructive role in this,” Wang announced confidently.
Yet, the Taliban’s advance may not be such a big problem for Beijing after all. What is truly terrifying news for Kabul, the Americans and their Western allies might not bother China much, says Vanda Felbab-Brown. “For years, the People’s Republic sought to establish good relations with the Taliban,” as the security expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington told China.Table. Through covert channels, Beijing has quite literally courted the holy warriors, said Felbab-Brown and described it as a “wine-and-dine” strategy. A strategy with obvious success.
In an interview with newsletter This Week in Asia, the Taliban spokesman even called China a friend. It is their hope that the People’s Republic will participate in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. “Should the Chinese invest here, we will of course guarantee their security,” Suhail Shaheen stated. What the Taliban spokesman then had to say probably was music to the ears of his special friends in Beijing. “We care about the oppression of Muslims, be it in Palestine, Myanmar or China. But we will not interfere in China’s internal affairs,” Shaheen promised. What was even more important, was his promise that Uighur separatists would not be allowed to retreat into Afghanistan in the future.
What China’s security experts have been preparing in secret for a long time is now being brought up to the public. “If these statements clearly prove one thing, it is that the Taliban are slowly becoming a political organization focused on developing Afghanistan and preparing to take over power,” Cao Wei of Lanzhou University told the newspaper Global Times. It seems China wants to make the Taliban look presentable.
Keeping that in mind, it quickly becomes obvious that Beijing is less concerned about the security situation in the country as a whole than in the Wakhan Corridor. This narrow strip of land is located in the province of Badakhshan in northeastern Afghanistan; to China, it is a key strategic region. After all, this narrow corridor connects the Chinese province of Xinjiang to Afghanistan.
According to a report released by the UN, however, several hundred Uighur fighters are active in this very region. This is why China sought to establish its own military base in the Badakhshan province a few years back. But the plans failed – ultimately because the government in Kabul probably did not want to alienate the US troops present, explains security expert Felbab-Brown.
After the Taliban’s withdrawal, Beijing’s main goal was to prevent Uighur extremists, who have been fighting alongside the Taliban for years, from finding a safe retreat in Afghanistan. For time and again, there had been attacks in China or on Chinese targets in the region. Just two weeks ago, an attack on a bus in northwestern Pakistan killed 13 people, including nine Chinese citizens. The bus was supposed to take Chinese engineers, experts and other personnel to the construction site of the Dasu dam in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Afghanistan expert Cao Wei believes that securing the border to Afghanistan is a manageable task. It is only about 90 kilometers long and consists mainly of impassable mountains. If necessary, this short section could simply be blocked. In any case, China will not repeat the same mistakes as several great powers such as the British Empire, the Soviet Union and most recently the United States have made in the past: sending troops to Afghanistan. “China will uphold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. We will focus on the country’s economic development and will not seek any military involvement in Afghanistan,” Wei assured.
Economically, China has been trying for some time to integrate Afghanistan into its prestigious New Silk Road project. A highway between Peshawar-Kabul would fill an important gap in the infrastructure project, but so far Beijing’s plans have failed because Kabul did not want to anger Washington. In contrast, Beijing is already building several roads in the Wakhan Corridor. This would connect Xinjiang with Afghanistan, from where goods and commodities would be shipped via Pakistan to Central Asia – and ultimately Europe.
“If Beijing succeeds in building these links, trade in the region and the exploitation of Afghanistan’s natural resources will increase dramatically,” Derek Grossman of US think tank Rand Corporation told China.Table. According to experts, Afghanistan is said to own huge deposits of rare-earth elements and other rare minerals – estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion.
It seems China has far-reaching plans for Afghanistan and the region. But to make all of this possible in the first place, the country would first have to be stabilized. Politically, however, this requires a difficult balancing act. “Officially, Beijing supports reconciliation between the central government in Kabul and the Taliban fighters,” says Grossmann. But China is mindful of current developments – the withdrawal of Kabul’s US partner and the simultaneous advance of the Taliban – and is planning accordingly. “At the same time, they are sending a very clear signal that they would also recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government, should it come to that,” Grossman adds.
The expert’s prediction proved to be true during the foreign minister’s meeting with Taliban representatives on Wednesday. Wang Yi urged the holy warriors to turn away from terrorism and take up arms against other terrorist groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). As a “major military force, they should take responsibility for their country, make a clear break with all terrorist forces and return to the mainstream of Afghan politics,” China’s foreign minister said.
The connection between China and the Taliban will be very relevant from a geostrategic perspective, Grossman predicts. China is already exerting increasing influence in the region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It is no coincidence that before the meeting with the Taliban, Foreign Minister Wang visited three countries in Central Asia and invited SCO members to a special session on Afghanistan.
Grossman is certain that profound cooperation with the Taliban would massively benefit Beijing’s position. “If it succeeds, the New Silk Road project, as well as Beijing’s self-declared fight against Uighur terrorism, will benefit enormously.”
But Beijing’s growing influence could also cause problems. China’s “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan would be put to the test. After all, Islamabad is known to be a crucial supporter of several terrorist organizations. Moreover, its excellent relations with Russia would be the first to show cracks. After all, Moscow sees itself as the successor to the Soviet Union. Central Asia would thus be its own backyard, where no one should question Russian authority. And India is also alarmed at the growing ties between China and the Taliban.
One thing is clear: China’s involvement in Afghanistan is at a turning point. Rhetorically, China has repeatedly struck a high note – especially when it comes to criticizing the United States. But in practice, Beijing has kept a low profile for a long time. This seems to be changing with the withdrawal of US troops. With or without the Taliban, China intends to use the vacuum left by the US troops.
When Xi Jinping gives an “important speech”, as recently on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the CCP (as reported by China.Table), a very specific group of China experts begins to count and investigate. Which set of phrases did Xi use? And how often do certain fixed keywords occur in comparison to the previous speech?
The term “revolution,” for example, is currently enjoying more popularity than it has been since the Mao era. It also appears in particularly pithy phrases such as “The Party unites and leads the Chinese people in fighting bloody battles with unyielding determination, achieving great success in the new democratic revolution.” Even Enumerations of terms often carry their own meanings, such as “the great struggle, the great project, the great cause, and the great dream.”
What sounds like coffee cup reading actually provides valuable insight into the mindset of the Chinese leadership. Since playing with terms and phrases is deeply embedded in the party’s culture. “The language of the Chinese Communist Party is highly formalized,” said sinologist Marina Rudyak of Heidelberg University in a lecture at the Confucius Institute in Leipzig on Monday. Rudyak is among the Beijing watchers who engage in playing with phrases and terms on a professional level. “By predetermining the phrases, they regulate what is done.” In doing so, they influence reality.
Exploring Party Chinese is particularly worthwhile in current times. Xi speaks every word purposefully. There are no linguistic slips, as they happen time and again to Western politicians. His words, as strange as they may sound at times, all have a defined meaning. The cadres learn this language at the party schools and understand it. These phrases also refer to each other and form their own web of meaning.
Xi cannot afford to make spontaneous statements, because 90 million party members are closely paying attention to the finest nuances. In addition, sinologists and news agencies around the world also try to make sense of it. The variation of a phrase – or its reintroduction – often signals a change in policy. That can send strategy departments into turmoil and move stock markets. For example, when Xi announces a “greater contribution to human history,” it is quickly understood as a “departure from the policy of keeping a low profile.”
That is why observers like Rudyak must be vigilant. Most speeches consist largely of the same repetition of established phrases, with minor changes hidden among them. Xi did switch out the repertoire early in his term, but since then he has essentially stuck to a set of basic terms that are always repeated. Here, a small selection of examples:
The list could go on and on. Almost every word in a typical Xi speech can be assigned to his standard stock of phrases. In Chinese, these word combinations are called “Tifa“: “expressions to hold on to”. Those who know the most important Tifa will recognize them in practically every remark made by the party.
From a Western perspective, the use of basic political terms such as “democracy” or “cooperation” seems somewhat malignant. These are Tifa which have a different meaning to China’s leaders. It goes without saying that, in different languages, terms are never entirely congruent, even when one is used as a translation for the other. But there are universally accepted definitions of democracy. But the meaning of the word minzhu 民主 in the CCP’s language has less and less to do with them.
Rudyak is therefore particularly critical when authorities from other countries adopt Chinese usage without questioning it. She cites Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum (WEF), i.e. the Davos Conference, as an example. Schwab has picked up the phrase “Fate community of mankind” on several occasions. This is one of Xi Jinping’s favorite phrases. The official German version is a direct rendition of 人类命运共同体 rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ. In Schwab’s defense: The English version, “community with shared future for mankind” sounds a bit more neutral without the heavy word “fate” instead of “future”.
Nevertheless, one can only hope that Schwab knows what he is repeating. The concept of community with shared future for mankind indicates the will to replace the Western order with a Chinese model. The implication is that the Declaration of Human Rights need not necessarily be the basis of this model. In any case, Chinese state media is always quick to report when Xi’s words have been adopted internationally.
So Xi is also making international policy with his very own words. “Xiplomacy”, as his style is already called, and sinologist Rudyak already warns against falling for his phrases and being lulled by pretty words. “Those who would adopt his words are usually unaware of the diverging definitions,” she observes. “Yet there should be a common understanding on such critically important terms.” Even if it is easy for Western politicians to tick it off with pleasure when Xi announces a strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and reforms – but he only ever means a strengthening of his own system:
The origin of this particular linguistic culture traces back to the Soviet Union. In the coverage of state newspapers, it is already a big difference whether it is “first secretary” or “First Secretary” with a capitalized first letters. To understand the Tifa, not only Mandarin knowledge is needed, but knowledge of particular CCP codes as well. Even unaware Chinese cannot easily decipher this language either. For them, however, it is the familiar political vocabulary with which they have grown up. In fact, nowadays, anyone can become aware, even in the West: China’s state media offer official explanations and translations for the most important of the recurring slogans.
Tech giant Huawei has fired a high-ranking executive for expressing doubts about the safety of self-driving cars. At an event in Shanghai earlier this month, Su Qing, pointed to the numerous accidents of rival company Tesla; if AI took over, incidents involving fatalities were inevitable. Huawei deemed these remarks unacceptable for a smart mobility solutions executive, Caixin reports.
Sus’ presentation has made waves on social media. The headline of the Weibo post compared Tesla’s high rate of fatal accidents to “murder”. The discussion about the video had the same tone. In doing so, a Huawei representative not only publicly attacks a competitor, but also raises doubts in general about the safety of AI-controlled vehicles. Huawei has already invested around $1 billion in technology for self-driving cars. fin
Taiwan’s president has urged people to get immunized with the domestically produced Covid vaccine, Medigen. On Wednesday, Tsai Ing-wen announced she will receive the vaccine herself. Medigen and all other Covid vaccines available in Taiwan are safe and effective, the president wrote.
Medigen’s vaccine had been added to the available options in Taiwan’s Covid vaccine registration system on Tuesday. Medigen is currently only approved for adults of 20 years or older, and received emergency approval in Taiwan on July 17. Two doses of Medigen are required for immunization.
Taiwan has significantly expanded its vaccination campaign following a donation of around six million doses from Japan and the US, as well as smaller donations from EU countries. About 20 percent of Taiwan’s 23.5 million citizens have received at least one of two vaccine doses, according to local media. ari
Influential agricultural entrepreneur and billionaire Sun Dawu has been sentenced to a long prison term. On Wednesday, a court in Gaobeidian found the 67-year-old guilty of charges including “gathering people to attack state organs” as well as “obstructing public affairs” and “sedition” and sentenced Dawu to 18 years in prison, as news agency AP reported. Sun had been arrested along with business partners last November, according to the report, after his company Dawu Agriculture Group became involved in a land dispute with a state-owned competitor. The arrest was made after Dawu employees tried to stop a state-owned company from demolishing a company building in August 2020.
According to the report, the trial against the entrepreneur had begun in secret. Additionally, Sun was fined 3.1 million yuan ($480,000). Other defendants were sentenced to between one and twelve years in prison.
The entrepreneur and pig farmer gained nationwide attention in 2003 when he was charged with “illegal fundraising” after asking friends and neighbors to invest in his business. The case sparked a wave of public support for Sun. Since then, Sun has publicly praised lawyers who represent people in lawsuits against the state several times. Sun’s lawyer in his 2003 case, Xu Zhiyong, disappeared in February 2020. According to reports by fellow activists, Xu had been charged with treason. ari
Heightened US-China tensions have raised the prospect of a deep global technology divide, potentially forcing other countries to choose which camp to join. There are plenty of grim scenarios involving irreconcilable splits between core technologies that power a wide range of products and services, from aircraft and automobiles to precision engineering for robotics and payment systems for e-commerce. Should these scenarios materialize, the world’s two largest economies will pour huge amounts of resources into a zero-sum race to control the cutting edge.
Both the United States and China understand the central role of technology in driving their economies and global development. They also know that mastering it, as well as safeguarding relevant intellectual property, can bolster their national security and geopolitical influence, with important feedback effects for their sustained growth and resilience.
In the medium term, the US faces a stiff challenge to its long-standing dominance in science and engineering, as well as to its capacity to produce critical components. For example, although US firms design cutting-edge semiconductors, America’s share of global output has declined from 37% in 1990 to only 12% today.
Meanwhile, China, for all its progress, remains a long way from the technological frontier in many products such as computer chips and airplanes. True, the country has developed a deep ecosystem in many types of manufacturing, and has exceptional capacity to produce rapidly and at scale. It is also near the top of the global rankings for patents and research and development expenditure. But China is vulnerable in many areas. It imports about $300 billion worth of semiconductors annually, with approximately half going into export manufacturing. Moreover, many services that are intertwined with goods need semiconductors to operate, as is true of the apps embedded in smartphones.
Other advanced economies with the capacity to design or manufacture critical components in semiconductor supply chains, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Netherlands, are caught in the crosshairs of US-China tensions. For these countries, geopolitical considerations will inevitably play a role alongside commercial ones, necessitating careful calculations.
The likeliest medium-term outcome is that technology bifurcation will occur as countries intensify their efforts to reduce their vulnerabilities, but that it will remain contained. US companies are building several high-end semiconductor plants, while China is recruiting global talent and ramping up its R&D in semiconductors, as well as in the software, machinery, and equipment needed to produce them.
Meanwhile, other countries are pursuing various options. These include forging alliances to secure supplies of critical components, developing their capability to achieve interoperability between different technology standards, and strengthening their offerings of more sophisticated products and services to global markets, and thus their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the US and China.
But in the longer term, the world needs to be more ambitious, and step up multilateral efforts to boost global technological cooperation. Developed and emerging economies alike should therefore frame issues related to technology tensions in a broader context.
They should start by recalling that economic openness has boosted growth and welfare immensely. In Asia, mainland China’s rapid economic development attests to that. South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, despite having little or no natural resources, also managed to industrialize and modernize, partly through globalization. And a growing number of developing and emerging economies across Africa, Latin America, and Europe are moving up the income ladder by finding niches and participating in global value chains.
Moreover, no economy – no matter how large or advanced – can turn away from globalization and ensure that it will always occupy the leading position in all high-tech products, enjoy secure supplies of critical components, and have the capacity to operate an exponentially growing web of intricate production processes. Semiconductors are again a prime example: their production chain is extraordinarily complex and relies on hundreds of inputs that are processed and produced by highly engineered tools sourced from around the world. Gaining even a foothold in this sector requires huge R&D and a long lead time.
True, a country can reduce its vulnerability to adverse external developments. But the costs could be immense, especially if the objective is to be fully self-sufficient and cost-effective in as many technology products as possible.
Given these constraints, countries should aim for globalization based on multilateral agreements. One priority should be to disseminate technological advances faster and more widely to both developed and emerging-market economies in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and to enable more newly emerging economies to advance, including via technology transfer. Policymakers should also expand the reach of trade and investment agreements to safeguard the interests of businesses, workers, and countries while minimizing the negative externalities of protectionism. This could include expanding free-trade agreements to include dedicated chapters on technology issues and annexes on safeguarding the rights of lower-income and vulnerable workers.
Such developments will not unfold spontaneously. But the corporate sector may be able to help find a constructive way forward without undermining national-security interests. In March, for example, the Chinese and US semiconductor industry associations said they will form a joint working group. Representatives of ten chip companies from each country will meet twice a year to discuss matters including export restrictions, supply-chain safety, and encryption technology.
The policies adopted by the US and China will of course be key to averting a major technological split. But the rest of the world, by staying above the Sino-American fray, can help to take the lead in forging a new trust-based consensus based on a common vision of shared technological progress.
Hoe Ee Khor is a chief economist at the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). Suan Yong Foo is a senior economist at AMRO.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021.
www.project-syndicate.org
Daniel Diehl is now Project Lead for electronics procurement, with a focus on China, at Bosch. He performs his duties at the Pfullingen location. Previously, he was Project Manager of semiconductor operations.
Philipp Breuer has taken charge of Audi’s portfolio strategy for China in Ingolstadt. He analyzes strategic influencing factors in the region and the competitive environment for the company.
Joerg Ziegler has become BASF’s Director of Materials Management for the New Verbund Site in Guangdong. His office is located at BASF headquarters in Ludwigshafen.
Wolfgang Lamprecht is now the Head of Product Line Chassis Systems for the Chinese region at ZF Asia Pacific. His office is located in Shanghai.
A pool for big cats: Siberian tigers gather at a pool of water in the forest park of the Hengdaohezi Feline Breeding Center in the northeastern Chinese province of Heilongjiang. The facility is the world’s largest breeding center for Siberian tigers. Here, about 400 tigers live in an area of 40,000 square meters. So far, 30 tiger cubs have been born in the park this year. The animals are either trained or prepared for release into the wild.
The US leaves through the front door – China slips in through the back. Well, the current situation in Afghanistan is not quite that simple. While the withdrawal of US troops is still in progress, China’s Foreign Minister Wang is already meeting with a Taliban delegation. The downside of this move is that Wang is making the dreaded holy warriors seem respectable; on a positive note, he is urging them to submit to the Afghan government. China’s presence can do a lot of good. The new superpower is taking a completely different approach, one that perhaps acknowledges the reality in the country rather than assuming pretty theories.
During the visit, Wang assured that China would never “interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs”. A familiar phrase; after all, China equally demands “non-interference” from Western countries. It is a classic “Tifa,” a fixed phrase that has a special meaning in the Chinese CCP’s parlance. In all official communication by China’s leadership, the same Tifa crops up again and again. In today’s issue, we give you a brief introduction to the art of decoding China’s political verbiage. Those who are proficient at it can even derive some amusement from CCP conference speeches. You could even play “Tifa Bingo” because phrases like the “Three Tough Battles” or “Five Major Development Concepts” are guaranteed to appear.
The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan is in progress. All troops are to leave the country in the Hindu Kush by the end of August. This is the will of US President Joe Biden.
However, the fewer US troops in the country, the stronger terrorist groups are spreading – above all the Islamist Taliban. The self-proclaimed holy warriors are on the advance. Region by region, district by district, the Taliban are reclaiming territory from the central government in Kabul. In the past two months alone, 120 districts are said to have fallen into their hands, including most recently the Wakhan district in the province of Badakhshan, which is of strategic importance to China. Meanwhile, the Taliban claim to already control 75 percent of the country. This may be exaggerated propaganda, but one thing is certain: the last month had seen the highest casualties in two decades.
Insecurity, violence, and instability are spreading. And Afghanistan’s neighbors are growing concerned that it could spread beyond the country’s borders. Beijing, in particular, is growing restless. “The arbitrary withdrawal of the Americans only leaves instability, chaos, and disaster in its wake,” judges Wang Jin, professor at Northwest University in Xi’an. It is a completely irresponsible action, and Afghanistan’s neighboring states now pay the price and try to get a grip on the situation, especially China.
On Wednesday, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with a Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Tianjin. The events earlier this week showed how important this process is for China: on Monday, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman was still on her trip in Tianjin (as reported by China.Table). As soon as the Deputy Secretary left, Wang took matters with the Taliban into his own hands.
The important thing now is to bring stability and security to Afghanistan in order to prevent the spread of violence across its borders. “China will play a very important and constructive role in this,” Wang announced confidently.
Yet, the Taliban’s advance may not be such a big problem for Beijing after all. What is truly terrifying news for Kabul, the Americans and their Western allies might not bother China much, says Vanda Felbab-Brown. “For years, the People’s Republic sought to establish good relations with the Taliban,” as the security expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington told China.Table. Through covert channels, Beijing has quite literally courted the holy warriors, said Felbab-Brown and described it as a “wine-and-dine” strategy. A strategy with obvious success.
In an interview with newsletter This Week in Asia, the Taliban spokesman even called China a friend. It is their hope that the People’s Republic will participate in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. “Should the Chinese invest here, we will of course guarantee their security,” Suhail Shaheen stated. What the Taliban spokesman then had to say probably was music to the ears of his special friends in Beijing. “We care about the oppression of Muslims, be it in Palestine, Myanmar or China. But we will not interfere in China’s internal affairs,” Shaheen promised. What was even more important, was his promise that Uighur separatists would not be allowed to retreat into Afghanistan in the future.
What China’s security experts have been preparing in secret for a long time is now being brought up to the public. “If these statements clearly prove one thing, it is that the Taliban are slowly becoming a political organization focused on developing Afghanistan and preparing to take over power,” Cao Wei of Lanzhou University told the newspaper Global Times. It seems China wants to make the Taliban look presentable.
Keeping that in mind, it quickly becomes obvious that Beijing is less concerned about the security situation in the country as a whole than in the Wakhan Corridor. This narrow strip of land is located in the province of Badakhshan in northeastern Afghanistan; to China, it is a key strategic region. After all, this narrow corridor connects the Chinese province of Xinjiang to Afghanistan.
According to a report released by the UN, however, several hundred Uighur fighters are active in this very region. This is why China sought to establish its own military base in the Badakhshan province a few years back. But the plans failed – ultimately because the government in Kabul probably did not want to alienate the US troops present, explains security expert Felbab-Brown.
After the Taliban’s withdrawal, Beijing’s main goal was to prevent Uighur extremists, who have been fighting alongside the Taliban for years, from finding a safe retreat in Afghanistan. For time and again, there had been attacks in China or on Chinese targets in the region. Just two weeks ago, an attack on a bus in northwestern Pakistan killed 13 people, including nine Chinese citizens. The bus was supposed to take Chinese engineers, experts and other personnel to the construction site of the Dasu dam in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Afghanistan expert Cao Wei believes that securing the border to Afghanistan is a manageable task. It is only about 90 kilometers long and consists mainly of impassable mountains. If necessary, this short section could simply be blocked. In any case, China will not repeat the same mistakes as several great powers such as the British Empire, the Soviet Union and most recently the United States have made in the past: sending troops to Afghanistan. “China will uphold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. We will focus on the country’s economic development and will not seek any military involvement in Afghanistan,” Wei assured.
Economically, China has been trying for some time to integrate Afghanistan into its prestigious New Silk Road project. A highway between Peshawar-Kabul would fill an important gap in the infrastructure project, but so far Beijing’s plans have failed because Kabul did not want to anger Washington. In contrast, Beijing is already building several roads in the Wakhan Corridor. This would connect Xinjiang with Afghanistan, from where goods and commodities would be shipped via Pakistan to Central Asia – and ultimately Europe.
“If Beijing succeeds in building these links, trade in the region and the exploitation of Afghanistan’s natural resources will increase dramatically,” Derek Grossman of US think tank Rand Corporation told China.Table. According to experts, Afghanistan is said to own huge deposits of rare-earth elements and other rare minerals – estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion.
It seems China has far-reaching plans for Afghanistan and the region. But to make all of this possible in the first place, the country would first have to be stabilized. Politically, however, this requires a difficult balancing act. “Officially, Beijing supports reconciliation between the central government in Kabul and the Taliban fighters,” says Grossmann. But China is mindful of current developments – the withdrawal of Kabul’s US partner and the simultaneous advance of the Taliban – and is planning accordingly. “At the same time, they are sending a very clear signal that they would also recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government, should it come to that,” Grossman adds.
The expert’s prediction proved to be true during the foreign minister’s meeting with Taliban representatives on Wednesday. Wang Yi urged the holy warriors to turn away from terrorism and take up arms against other terrorist groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). As a “major military force, they should take responsibility for their country, make a clear break with all terrorist forces and return to the mainstream of Afghan politics,” China’s foreign minister said.
The connection between China and the Taliban will be very relevant from a geostrategic perspective, Grossman predicts. China is already exerting increasing influence in the region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It is no coincidence that before the meeting with the Taliban, Foreign Minister Wang visited three countries in Central Asia and invited SCO members to a special session on Afghanistan.
Grossman is certain that profound cooperation with the Taliban would massively benefit Beijing’s position. “If it succeeds, the New Silk Road project, as well as Beijing’s self-declared fight against Uighur terrorism, will benefit enormously.”
But Beijing’s growing influence could also cause problems. China’s “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan would be put to the test. After all, Islamabad is known to be a crucial supporter of several terrorist organizations. Moreover, its excellent relations with Russia would be the first to show cracks. After all, Moscow sees itself as the successor to the Soviet Union. Central Asia would thus be its own backyard, where no one should question Russian authority. And India is also alarmed at the growing ties between China and the Taliban.
One thing is clear: China’s involvement in Afghanistan is at a turning point. Rhetorically, China has repeatedly struck a high note – especially when it comes to criticizing the United States. But in practice, Beijing has kept a low profile for a long time. This seems to be changing with the withdrawal of US troops. With or without the Taliban, China intends to use the vacuum left by the US troops.
When Xi Jinping gives an “important speech”, as recently on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the CCP (as reported by China.Table), a very specific group of China experts begins to count and investigate. Which set of phrases did Xi use? And how often do certain fixed keywords occur in comparison to the previous speech?
The term “revolution,” for example, is currently enjoying more popularity than it has been since the Mao era. It also appears in particularly pithy phrases such as “The Party unites and leads the Chinese people in fighting bloody battles with unyielding determination, achieving great success in the new democratic revolution.” Even Enumerations of terms often carry their own meanings, such as “the great struggle, the great project, the great cause, and the great dream.”
What sounds like coffee cup reading actually provides valuable insight into the mindset of the Chinese leadership. Since playing with terms and phrases is deeply embedded in the party’s culture. “The language of the Chinese Communist Party is highly formalized,” said sinologist Marina Rudyak of Heidelberg University in a lecture at the Confucius Institute in Leipzig on Monday. Rudyak is among the Beijing watchers who engage in playing with phrases and terms on a professional level. “By predetermining the phrases, they regulate what is done.” In doing so, they influence reality.
Exploring Party Chinese is particularly worthwhile in current times. Xi speaks every word purposefully. There are no linguistic slips, as they happen time and again to Western politicians. His words, as strange as they may sound at times, all have a defined meaning. The cadres learn this language at the party schools and understand it. These phrases also refer to each other and form their own web of meaning.
Xi cannot afford to make spontaneous statements, because 90 million party members are closely paying attention to the finest nuances. In addition, sinologists and news agencies around the world also try to make sense of it. The variation of a phrase – or its reintroduction – often signals a change in policy. That can send strategy departments into turmoil and move stock markets. For example, when Xi announces a “greater contribution to human history,” it is quickly understood as a “departure from the policy of keeping a low profile.”
That is why observers like Rudyak must be vigilant. Most speeches consist largely of the same repetition of established phrases, with minor changes hidden among them. Xi did switch out the repertoire early in his term, but since then he has essentially stuck to a set of basic terms that are always repeated. Here, a small selection of examples:
The list could go on and on. Almost every word in a typical Xi speech can be assigned to his standard stock of phrases. In Chinese, these word combinations are called “Tifa“: “expressions to hold on to”. Those who know the most important Tifa will recognize them in practically every remark made by the party.
From a Western perspective, the use of basic political terms such as “democracy” or “cooperation” seems somewhat malignant. These are Tifa which have a different meaning to China’s leaders. It goes without saying that, in different languages, terms are never entirely congruent, even when one is used as a translation for the other. But there are universally accepted definitions of democracy. But the meaning of the word minzhu 民主 in the CCP’s language has less and less to do with them.
Rudyak is therefore particularly critical when authorities from other countries adopt Chinese usage without questioning it. She cites Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum (WEF), i.e. the Davos Conference, as an example. Schwab has picked up the phrase “Fate community of mankind” on several occasions. This is one of Xi Jinping’s favorite phrases. The official German version is a direct rendition of 人类命运共同体 rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ. In Schwab’s defense: The English version, “community with shared future for mankind” sounds a bit more neutral without the heavy word “fate” instead of “future”.
Nevertheless, one can only hope that Schwab knows what he is repeating. The concept of community with shared future for mankind indicates the will to replace the Western order with a Chinese model. The implication is that the Declaration of Human Rights need not necessarily be the basis of this model. In any case, Chinese state media is always quick to report when Xi’s words have been adopted internationally.
So Xi is also making international policy with his very own words. “Xiplomacy”, as his style is already called, and sinologist Rudyak already warns against falling for his phrases and being lulled by pretty words. “Those who would adopt his words are usually unaware of the diverging definitions,” she observes. “Yet there should be a common understanding on such critically important terms.” Even if it is easy for Western politicians to tick it off with pleasure when Xi announces a strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and reforms – but he only ever means a strengthening of his own system:
The origin of this particular linguistic culture traces back to the Soviet Union. In the coverage of state newspapers, it is already a big difference whether it is “first secretary” or “First Secretary” with a capitalized first letters. To understand the Tifa, not only Mandarin knowledge is needed, but knowledge of particular CCP codes as well. Even unaware Chinese cannot easily decipher this language either. For them, however, it is the familiar political vocabulary with which they have grown up. In fact, nowadays, anyone can become aware, even in the West: China’s state media offer official explanations and translations for the most important of the recurring slogans.
Tech giant Huawei has fired a high-ranking executive for expressing doubts about the safety of self-driving cars. At an event in Shanghai earlier this month, Su Qing, pointed to the numerous accidents of rival company Tesla; if AI took over, incidents involving fatalities were inevitable. Huawei deemed these remarks unacceptable for a smart mobility solutions executive, Caixin reports.
Sus’ presentation has made waves on social media. The headline of the Weibo post compared Tesla’s high rate of fatal accidents to “murder”. The discussion about the video had the same tone. In doing so, a Huawei representative not only publicly attacks a competitor, but also raises doubts in general about the safety of AI-controlled vehicles. Huawei has already invested around $1 billion in technology for self-driving cars. fin
Taiwan’s president has urged people to get immunized with the domestically produced Covid vaccine, Medigen. On Wednesday, Tsai Ing-wen announced she will receive the vaccine herself. Medigen and all other Covid vaccines available in Taiwan are safe and effective, the president wrote.
Medigen’s vaccine had been added to the available options in Taiwan’s Covid vaccine registration system on Tuesday. Medigen is currently only approved for adults of 20 years or older, and received emergency approval in Taiwan on July 17. Two doses of Medigen are required for immunization.
Taiwan has significantly expanded its vaccination campaign following a donation of around six million doses from Japan and the US, as well as smaller donations from EU countries. About 20 percent of Taiwan’s 23.5 million citizens have received at least one of two vaccine doses, according to local media. ari
Influential agricultural entrepreneur and billionaire Sun Dawu has been sentenced to a long prison term. On Wednesday, a court in Gaobeidian found the 67-year-old guilty of charges including “gathering people to attack state organs” as well as “obstructing public affairs” and “sedition” and sentenced Dawu to 18 years in prison, as news agency AP reported. Sun had been arrested along with business partners last November, according to the report, after his company Dawu Agriculture Group became involved in a land dispute with a state-owned competitor. The arrest was made after Dawu employees tried to stop a state-owned company from demolishing a company building in August 2020.
According to the report, the trial against the entrepreneur had begun in secret. Additionally, Sun was fined 3.1 million yuan ($480,000). Other defendants were sentenced to between one and twelve years in prison.
The entrepreneur and pig farmer gained nationwide attention in 2003 when he was charged with “illegal fundraising” after asking friends and neighbors to invest in his business. The case sparked a wave of public support for Sun. Since then, Sun has publicly praised lawyers who represent people in lawsuits against the state several times. Sun’s lawyer in his 2003 case, Xu Zhiyong, disappeared in February 2020. According to reports by fellow activists, Xu had been charged with treason. ari
Heightened US-China tensions have raised the prospect of a deep global technology divide, potentially forcing other countries to choose which camp to join. There are plenty of grim scenarios involving irreconcilable splits between core technologies that power a wide range of products and services, from aircraft and automobiles to precision engineering for robotics and payment systems for e-commerce. Should these scenarios materialize, the world’s two largest economies will pour huge amounts of resources into a zero-sum race to control the cutting edge.
Both the United States and China understand the central role of technology in driving their economies and global development. They also know that mastering it, as well as safeguarding relevant intellectual property, can bolster their national security and geopolitical influence, with important feedback effects for their sustained growth and resilience.
In the medium term, the US faces a stiff challenge to its long-standing dominance in science and engineering, as well as to its capacity to produce critical components. For example, although US firms design cutting-edge semiconductors, America’s share of global output has declined from 37% in 1990 to only 12% today.
Meanwhile, China, for all its progress, remains a long way from the technological frontier in many products such as computer chips and airplanes. True, the country has developed a deep ecosystem in many types of manufacturing, and has exceptional capacity to produce rapidly and at scale. It is also near the top of the global rankings for patents and research and development expenditure. But China is vulnerable in many areas. It imports about $300 billion worth of semiconductors annually, with approximately half going into export manufacturing. Moreover, many services that are intertwined with goods need semiconductors to operate, as is true of the apps embedded in smartphones.
Other advanced economies with the capacity to design or manufacture critical components in semiconductor supply chains, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Netherlands, are caught in the crosshairs of US-China tensions. For these countries, geopolitical considerations will inevitably play a role alongside commercial ones, necessitating careful calculations.
The likeliest medium-term outcome is that technology bifurcation will occur as countries intensify their efforts to reduce their vulnerabilities, but that it will remain contained. US companies are building several high-end semiconductor plants, while China is recruiting global talent and ramping up its R&D in semiconductors, as well as in the software, machinery, and equipment needed to produce them.
Meanwhile, other countries are pursuing various options. These include forging alliances to secure supplies of critical components, developing their capability to achieve interoperability between different technology standards, and strengthening their offerings of more sophisticated products and services to global markets, and thus their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the US and China.
But in the longer term, the world needs to be more ambitious, and step up multilateral efforts to boost global technological cooperation. Developed and emerging economies alike should therefore frame issues related to technology tensions in a broader context.
They should start by recalling that economic openness has boosted growth and welfare immensely. In Asia, mainland China’s rapid economic development attests to that. South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, despite having little or no natural resources, also managed to industrialize and modernize, partly through globalization. And a growing number of developing and emerging economies across Africa, Latin America, and Europe are moving up the income ladder by finding niches and participating in global value chains.
Moreover, no economy – no matter how large or advanced – can turn away from globalization and ensure that it will always occupy the leading position in all high-tech products, enjoy secure supplies of critical components, and have the capacity to operate an exponentially growing web of intricate production processes. Semiconductors are again a prime example: their production chain is extraordinarily complex and relies on hundreds of inputs that are processed and produced by highly engineered tools sourced from around the world. Gaining even a foothold in this sector requires huge R&D and a long lead time.
True, a country can reduce its vulnerability to adverse external developments. But the costs could be immense, especially if the objective is to be fully self-sufficient and cost-effective in as many technology products as possible.
Given these constraints, countries should aim for globalization based on multilateral agreements. One priority should be to disseminate technological advances faster and more widely to both developed and emerging-market economies in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and to enable more newly emerging economies to advance, including via technology transfer. Policymakers should also expand the reach of trade and investment agreements to safeguard the interests of businesses, workers, and countries while minimizing the negative externalities of protectionism. This could include expanding free-trade agreements to include dedicated chapters on technology issues and annexes on safeguarding the rights of lower-income and vulnerable workers.
Such developments will not unfold spontaneously. But the corporate sector may be able to help find a constructive way forward without undermining national-security interests. In March, for example, the Chinese and US semiconductor industry associations said they will form a joint working group. Representatives of ten chip companies from each country will meet twice a year to discuss matters including export restrictions, supply-chain safety, and encryption technology.
The policies adopted by the US and China will of course be key to averting a major technological split. But the rest of the world, by staying above the Sino-American fray, can help to take the lead in forging a new trust-based consensus based on a common vision of shared technological progress.
Hoe Ee Khor is a chief economist at the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). Suan Yong Foo is a senior economist at AMRO.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021.
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Daniel Diehl is now Project Lead for electronics procurement, with a focus on China, at Bosch. He performs his duties at the Pfullingen location. Previously, he was Project Manager of semiconductor operations.
Philipp Breuer has taken charge of Audi’s portfolio strategy for China in Ingolstadt. He analyzes strategic influencing factors in the region and the competitive environment for the company.
Joerg Ziegler has become BASF’s Director of Materials Management for the New Verbund Site in Guangdong. His office is located at BASF headquarters in Ludwigshafen.
Wolfgang Lamprecht is now the Head of Product Line Chassis Systems for the Chinese region at ZF Asia Pacific. His office is located in Shanghai.
A pool for big cats: Siberian tigers gather at a pool of water in the forest park of the Hengdaohezi Feline Breeding Center in the northeastern Chinese province of Heilongjiang. The facility is the world’s largest breeding center for Siberian tigers. Here, about 400 tigers live in an area of 40,000 square meters. So far, 30 tiger cubs have been born in the park this year. The animals are either trained or prepared for release into the wild.