China claims that the whole story about the balloon is blown out of proportion. But what are the Americans supposed to think when such an object floats over their own military territory? And another one simultaneously over Colombia. As is always the case with such incidents, two truths are being put out there – one from Washington and one from Beijing. Which one to believe is probably a question of one’s worldview. Even if the USA has the moral and legal high ground in this case, as Michael Radunski attests to this episode. In China, the focus seems to be on damage control.
The assumption that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken did not travel to Beijing solely because of the white ball in the air loses some of its credibility in light of a Wall Street Journal report. The Americans could be at least as displeased because Chinese companies shipped large quantities of dual-use components to Russia last year. In other words, components that can also be used for military purposes.
The Chinese may not have joined the US sanctions against Russia, but did they not indignantly proclaim to not support Russia militarily? The Russians claim that they are capable of equipping themselves technologically. But that is somehow hard to believe. Especially when taking a closer look at other industrial sectors. As Christian Domke-Seidel puts it, Russia has since become a dumping ground for Chinese carmakers.
If one already has this reputation, then it is hardly imaginable that one can manage without outside military help. Cynicism over.
No one would have wanted to be in Mao Ning’s shoes on Monday. The evidence so far on the balloon incident over the USA is too clear. And so the spokeswoman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry kept her tone low: Yes, the second balloon over South America also came from China. It, too, had unintentionally drifted into the airspace of other countries. But much like the one over the US, the second balloon was allegedly only used for civilian purposes to investigate the weather.
When asked how it could be that China supposedly lost control over two balloons within a few days, even Mao Ning had to pass: “I am not an expert.”
But not only the Chinese Foreign Ministry is left feeling crestfallen at the beginning of the week. The incident involving an alleged spy object over the USA comes at an inopportune time for Xi Jinping. Morally and legally, the US has the upper hand. But the leadership in Beijing cannot possibly admit this publicly. Nevertheless, the search for a face-saving way out has long been in full swing.
Because President and Party leader Xi Jinping is currently facing pressure: The domestic economy is still feeling the effects of his strict zero-Covid policy. He urgently needs to defuse a prolonged real estate crisis. And with the latest US restrictions on the export of high-end semiconductor technology to China, the next tough challenge already awaits.
Accordingly, Xi recently tried to ease tensions with the West – first with Europe, then with Australia. Now, relations with the USA are also to undergo improvement: On the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, a first easing conversation took place between Xi and US President Joe Biden. This week, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken intended to travel to China, where he even was supposed to meet with Xi.
But the balloon incident casts a shadow over China’s charm offensive even before it has really begun. It is obvious: China harmed itself with the balloon incident. In tennis, this is called an “unforced error” – mistakes of this kind are only one’s own fault and cannot be blamed on the opponent’s skills or behavior.
And so China seeks to limit the damage – without losing face. Following the downing of the balloon, Beijing threatened to take its own measures. Moreover, it can be expected that they will continue to deny that the balloon could have been used for espionage. And the first scapegoat was also quickly found: Still on Friday, Zhuang Guotai was removed from his post as head of the China Meteorological Administration. But all this should not distract too much.
In fact, the Chinese authorities’ choice of words reveals an effort not to drag out the dispute. China accuses the United States of having violated international practice (违反国际惯例) by shooting down the balloon – but not international law, as Beijing usually likes to complain.
In addition, it was said with regard to the balloon that they would “defend the legitimate rights and interests of the company involved”. Here, too, a diplomatic way out presents itself, as it could be argued at some point that China’s government was not directly involved in the launch of the balloon.
The situation is more complicated on the US side. On the one hand, many security experts consider the incident to be harmless. On the other hand, Chinese spy balloons have been repeatedly deployed over the USA in the recent past, as the Pentagon spokesperson conceded. Among other places, they have been sighted near Hawaii, where the Indo-Pacific Command of the US armed forces is stationed.
Also, there should be no illusions: China and the USA spy on each other every day. And especially compared to the far more comprehensive espionage in the economic or cyber domain, the white balloon over Montana represented a technically rather modest security threat. The US government also reacted calmly. The fact that Secretary of State Blinken merely postponed his trip to China is a good sign.
The truth about the balloon will only be revealed when the remains are recovered. Until then, innocent until proven guilty – or the assumption: weather balloon with Chinese characteristics. But even if the commotion fades quickly, it is to be feared that such incidents will continue to increase, which is why constant and reliable communication away from the public eye is indispensable.
The Chinese leadership has been walking a fine line since the war in Ukraine broke out. It officially maintains a neutral position, but puts the blame on the Americans. It dismisses any knowledge about Russia’s intentions beforehand as fiction but refrains from condemning the aggression.
A report by the Wall Street Journal reveals new inconsistencies in Beijing’s conduct in the conflict. It obtained Russian customs data showing imports of arms from the People’s Republic of China. It quotes from a list of “tens of thousands of deliveries” of goods that can have both commercial and military use. Not all, but most of these shipments came directly from China.
The Wall Street Journal refers to customs documents provided by the Washington-based Centre for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). C4ADS is considered a non-profit research organization that studies global conflicts using data-driven analysis and fact-based reports, it says.
Navigation equipment for military transport helicopters, telescopic antennas for military vehicles, radar equipment or components for combat aircraft were reportedly shipped to Russia last year. Such deliveries from Western sources would be a violation of US economic sanctions.
China, on the other hand, primarily is risking a severe dent in its credibility, because the country rejects accusations of supporting the Russian military in its campaign in Ukraine. The fact that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken canceled his planned trip to China at short notice may also have something to do with the C4ADS report.
Among other things, the institute meticulously examines publicly available data. “Despite international scrutiny and sanctions protocols, reliable global trade data shows that Chinese state-owned defense companies continue to send military-applicable parts to sanctioned Russian defense companies,” Naomi Garcia of C4ADS told the Journal. “These Russian companies have been recorded using these same types of parts directly in Russia’s war in Ukraine.”
State-owned companies such as the defense company Poly Technologies, the military utility JSC Rosoboronexport or the aviation company AVIC International Holding Corp were identified as suppliers of dual-use components, as was the private electronics company Fujian Nanan Baofeng Electronic.
In a statement to the Wall Street Journal, the CEO of Fujian Baofeng Electronics categorically rejected the accusations. His company would not manufacture telescopic antennas. Nor were there any records of shipments to state-owned Uzbek defense companies through which the trade had been conducted, according to customs data.
Russia manufactures most of its military equipment domestically, but in certain technical areas, such as semiconductors, it is urgently dependent on subcontractors. However, defense equipment does not only find its way to Russia for China, but also via countries such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates or Uzbekistan. However, the Kremlin denies speculations that the dual-use components would serve a military purpose. Russia possesses sufficient technological potential, a spokesperson said.
Outrage is also heard from Beijing. Allegations that the People’s Republic is supplying Russia with such goods would not only lack any factual basis but are also purely speculative and deliberately exaggerated. In any case, Beijing has long opposed unilateral sanctions that would have no legal basis under international law.
Chinese car manufacturers, who risk losing ground on their domestic market, are now creating another foothold in Russia. There, they are gaining massive market shares, even without producing more cars. They benefit from the fact that the Russian car market has collapsed and the Western competition has largely withdrawn. This allows them to get rid of overcapacity and finance R&D in the People’s Republic. However, this economic commitment is not a political statement. The Russian market is too small for that.
Russians do not want to buy any more cars at the moment. This is as much due to the war as to the ever-smaller car selection. In 2022, sales collapsed by 58.8 percent to 687,370 cars. In the previous year, it was still 1.7 million cars. Russia reached its absolute record year in 2013 with 2.8 million cars. At that time, the Boston Consulting Group published a study suggesting that Russia would become the largest car market in Europe by 2020. Sales figures have been declining ever since.
The current slump is dramatic. Major Western brands have withdrawn from Russia. At the same time, Russian manufacturers could not keep production going because of parts shortages due to the sanctions policy. Avtovaz, for example, was left on its own after Renault withdrew – the French gave up their roughly 68 percent stake for a symbolic rouble. The brand continued to produce until stocks were empty. Many vehicles rolled off the assembly line without airbags and ABS. Other manufacturers are hardly doing any better. Lada had to cut its production by half.
Chinese manufacturers are currently taking advantage of the huge gaps that are opening up – albeit at a low level. This is more due to the collapsed market than to the efforts of the manufacturers. “You can clearly see from the market shares that the Chinese manufacturers are catching up. However, the unit numbers and Chinese exports are almost identical to the previous year,” Gregor Sebastian, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics), told Table Media.
Chery was able to increase its car production by around four percent in 2022. Geely stagnated and Haval built 14 percent fewer cars. Because the Russian competition is suffering more and the Western competition has almost completely abandoned its activities, this is enough to maintain a total market share of almost 25 percent. More than ever before. A trend that is expected to continue in 2023. “My prognosis for this year: 60 percent Chinese and 40 percent Russian manufacturers,” speculated Andrei Olkhovsky of the car dealer Avtodom in an interview with the German business newspaper Handelsblatt.
The rise of Chinese brands is unsurprising. For quite some time now, they have been investing in Russia. Haval has already invested about 500 million euros in Russia in 2021. Chery does not publish official figures, but it has also been investing in its neighbor for some time and is planning a new plant. Sebastian sees the reasons for this primarily in the shift towards more electromobility in China. “Some private Chinese manufacturers that are doing badly in EV sales – like Chery or Great Wall Motor – are entering the Russian market particularly strongly,” explains the Merics analyst.
In addition, there are problems on the domestic market. In 2017, 28.9 million vehicles were sold in China (including commercial vehicles). A record level that has not been matched since. “Since 2017, China has had a stagnating and even weakening domestic market. However, the manufacturers have built up large capacities. That is why they are increasingly looking for foreign sales markets,” says Sebastian.
Russia, however, is a politically sensitive area. However, Sebastian believes that the leadership in Beijing does not see any problems here. Although they have been meticulous so far in ensuring that no export and import regulations are violated, the focus of the ruling party is not greater. “The Communist Party is certainly pleased to see that the car industry can help the Russian economy. But I do not believe that this is big-state driven. This development is driven by the market,” Sebastian explains.
China has become Russia’s most important trading partner. Goods trade between the two countries totaled 190 billion euros in 2022. However, the opposite is only true to a limited extent. Three percent of all Chinese trade went to Russia. “For some Chinese companies, the Russian market definitely has benefits, but for China as an overall economy, Russia’s car market has a rather low significance,” Sebastian assesses the situation.
After a two-year travel hiatus, David Feng can finally ride the train again. Now that the Covid measures have been lifted, the Swiss national is once again sharing details about China’s rail network – from high-speed lines to ticketing machines – on Twitter and his website.
But Feng is contributing even more as an independent consultant to the elimination of the messy combination of Chinese and English (Chinglish) from the services offered by the passenger transport network. After all, the standardization of English signs, displays, signals and announcements in China’s train stations is largely owed to him – although some foreigners might be sad to see the linguistic mess disappear. After all, despite all the confusion, it was at least entertaining.
Feng got his language skills from Switzerland, where he moved with his family as a young boy in 1988. There, he attended school and learned German, Swiss German, English and French. In 2000, he returned to China, earned his master’s degree, and later rose to become a professor at the Beijing University of Communications. It was there that Feng ultimately fell under the spell of the trains. After all, Feng is also fascinated by local rail traffic. So it was fitting that the new Line 5 subway was being built in Beijing at the same time.
Non-geeks need to know: “Line 5 revolutionized subway travel in Beijing. In terms of service, ticketing, speed and clarity, it was a new level,” says Feng. Line 5 is connected to eight other metropolitan subway lines, some of them multiple times. It connects densely populated suburbs directly with the city center – and is constantly crowded.
Whenever Feng looks out the train window, he is struck by the massive urbanization. “What I saw in China is the rapid urbanization in all provinces, cities and regions.” Stations that used to stand in the middle of nowhere are now surrounded by high-rise buildings and expressways, he says. China has managed to combine urbanization with the expansion of its rail and road systems. “They basicially build two nationwide, extensive networks on top of each other,” he says.
For Feng, this is a success story. Because the expansion of the train network meets the demand of the Chinese people. Passengers no longer travel simply because they have to, but because they can. Feng calls this the “just because industry.” And work life has also changed, he says. With the new high-speed line between Beijing and Tianjin, it is possible to commute 120 kilometers between two megacities every day, he explains.
Inspired by this rapid expansion, Feng turned his hobby – train travel – into a profession and became a consultant for the standardization of English communication at stations and on trains. After Covid, Feng is now working consistently towards his goal of visiting and inspecting every train station in China. Partly because he can now earn a living from it. China’s media like the tall train specialist; his expertise is in high demand. His motto: “Let’s make something which is pretty cool even better.” Jonathan Lehrer
China certainly has plenty of humor. Over the weekend, numerous photos of the Chinese spy balloon over the USA with the best wishes for the Lantern Festival on Sunday appeared on social media.
China claims that the whole story about the balloon is blown out of proportion. But what are the Americans supposed to think when such an object floats over their own military territory? And another one simultaneously over Colombia. As is always the case with such incidents, two truths are being put out there – one from Washington and one from Beijing. Which one to believe is probably a question of one’s worldview. Even if the USA has the moral and legal high ground in this case, as Michael Radunski attests to this episode. In China, the focus seems to be on damage control.
The assumption that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken did not travel to Beijing solely because of the white ball in the air loses some of its credibility in light of a Wall Street Journal report. The Americans could be at least as displeased because Chinese companies shipped large quantities of dual-use components to Russia last year. In other words, components that can also be used for military purposes.
The Chinese may not have joined the US sanctions against Russia, but did they not indignantly proclaim to not support Russia militarily? The Russians claim that they are capable of equipping themselves technologically. But that is somehow hard to believe. Especially when taking a closer look at other industrial sectors. As Christian Domke-Seidel puts it, Russia has since become a dumping ground for Chinese carmakers.
If one already has this reputation, then it is hardly imaginable that one can manage without outside military help. Cynicism over.
No one would have wanted to be in Mao Ning’s shoes on Monday. The evidence so far on the balloon incident over the USA is too clear. And so the spokeswoman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry kept her tone low: Yes, the second balloon over South America also came from China. It, too, had unintentionally drifted into the airspace of other countries. But much like the one over the US, the second balloon was allegedly only used for civilian purposes to investigate the weather.
When asked how it could be that China supposedly lost control over two balloons within a few days, even Mao Ning had to pass: “I am not an expert.”
But not only the Chinese Foreign Ministry is left feeling crestfallen at the beginning of the week. The incident involving an alleged spy object over the USA comes at an inopportune time for Xi Jinping. Morally and legally, the US has the upper hand. But the leadership in Beijing cannot possibly admit this publicly. Nevertheless, the search for a face-saving way out has long been in full swing.
Because President and Party leader Xi Jinping is currently facing pressure: The domestic economy is still feeling the effects of his strict zero-Covid policy. He urgently needs to defuse a prolonged real estate crisis. And with the latest US restrictions on the export of high-end semiconductor technology to China, the next tough challenge already awaits.
Accordingly, Xi recently tried to ease tensions with the West – first with Europe, then with Australia. Now, relations with the USA are also to undergo improvement: On the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, a first easing conversation took place between Xi and US President Joe Biden. This week, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken intended to travel to China, where he even was supposed to meet with Xi.
But the balloon incident casts a shadow over China’s charm offensive even before it has really begun. It is obvious: China harmed itself with the balloon incident. In tennis, this is called an “unforced error” – mistakes of this kind are only one’s own fault and cannot be blamed on the opponent’s skills or behavior.
And so China seeks to limit the damage – without losing face. Following the downing of the balloon, Beijing threatened to take its own measures. Moreover, it can be expected that they will continue to deny that the balloon could have been used for espionage. And the first scapegoat was also quickly found: Still on Friday, Zhuang Guotai was removed from his post as head of the China Meteorological Administration. But all this should not distract too much.
In fact, the Chinese authorities’ choice of words reveals an effort not to drag out the dispute. China accuses the United States of having violated international practice (违反国际惯例) by shooting down the balloon – but not international law, as Beijing usually likes to complain.
In addition, it was said with regard to the balloon that they would “defend the legitimate rights and interests of the company involved”. Here, too, a diplomatic way out presents itself, as it could be argued at some point that China’s government was not directly involved in the launch of the balloon.
The situation is more complicated on the US side. On the one hand, many security experts consider the incident to be harmless. On the other hand, Chinese spy balloons have been repeatedly deployed over the USA in the recent past, as the Pentagon spokesperson conceded. Among other places, they have been sighted near Hawaii, where the Indo-Pacific Command of the US armed forces is stationed.
Also, there should be no illusions: China and the USA spy on each other every day. And especially compared to the far more comprehensive espionage in the economic or cyber domain, the white balloon over Montana represented a technically rather modest security threat. The US government also reacted calmly. The fact that Secretary of State Blinken merely postponed his trip to China is a good sign.
The truth about the balloon will only be revealed when the remains are recovered. Until then, innocent until proven guilty – or the assumption: weather balloon with Chinese characteristics. But even if the commotion fades quickly, it is to be feared that such incidents will continue to increase, which is why constant and reliable communication away from the public eye is indispensable.
The Chinese leadership has been walking a fine line since the war in Ukraine broke out. It officially maintains a neutral position, but puts the blame on the Americans. It dismisses any knowledge about Russia’s intentions beforehand as fiction but refrains from condemning the aggression.
A report by the Wall Street Journal reveals new inconsistencies in Beijing’s conduct in the conflict. It obtained Russian customs data showing imports of arms from the People’s Republic of China. It quotes from a list of “tens of thousands of deliveries” of goods that can have both commercial and military use. Not all, but most of these shipments came directly from China.
The Wall Street Journal refers to customs documents provided by the Washington-based Centre for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). C4ADS is considered a non-profit research organization that studies global conflicts using data-driven analysis and fact-based reports, it says.
Navigation equipment for military transport helicopters, telescopic antennas for military vehicles, radar equipment or components for combat aircraft were reportedly shipped to Russia last year. Such deliveries from Western sources would be a violation of US economic sanctions.
China, on the other hand, primarily is risking a severe dent in its credibility, because the country rejects accusations of supporting the Russian military in its campaign in Ukraine. The fact that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken canceled his planned trip to China at short notice may also have something to do with the C4ADS report.
Among other things, the institute meticulously examines publicly available data. “Despite international scrutiny and sanctions protocols, reliable global trade data shows that Chinese state-owned defense companies continue to send military-applicable parts to sanctioned Russian defense companies,” Naomi Garcia of C4ADS told the Journal. “These Russian companies have been recorded using these same types of parts directly in Russia’s war in Ukraine.”
State-owned companies such as the defense company Poly Technologies, the military utility JSC Rosoboronexport or the aviation company AVIC International Holding Corp were identified as suppliers of dual-use components, as was the private electronics company Fujian Nanan Baofeng Electronic.
In a statement to the Wall Street Journal, the CEO of Fujian Baofeng Electronics categorically rejected the accusations. His company would not manufacture telescopic antennas. Nor were there any records of shipments to state-owned Uzbek defense companies through which the trade had been conducted, according to customs data.
Russia manufactures most of its military equipment domestically, but in certain technical areas, such as semiconductors, it is urgently dependent on subcontractors. However, defense equipment does not only find its way to Russia for China, but also via countries such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates or Uzbekistan. However, the Kremlin denies speculations that the dual-use components would serve a military purpose. Russia possesses sufficient technological potential, a spokesperson said.
Outrage is also heard from Beijing. Allegations that the People’s Republic is supplying Russia with such goods would not only lack any factual basis but are also purely speculative and deliberately exaggerated. In any case, Beijing has long opposed unilateral sanctions that would have no legal basis under international law.
Chinese car manufacturers, who risk losing ground on their domestic market, are now creating another foothold in Russia. There, they are gaining massive market shares, even without producing more cars. They benefit from the fact that the Russian car market has collapsed and the Western competition has largely withdrawn. This allows them to get rid of overcapacity and finance R&D in the People’s Republic. However, this economic commitment is not a political statement. The Russian market is too small for that.
Russians do not want to buy any more cars at the moment. This is as much due to the war as to the ever-smaller car selection. In 2022, sales collapsed by 58.8 percent to 687,370 cars. In the previous year, it was still 1.7 million cars. Russia reached its absolute record year in 2013 with 2.8 million cars. At that time, the Boston Consulting Group published a study suggesting that Russia would become the largest car market in Europe by 2020. Sales figures have been declining ever since.
The current slump is dramatic. Major Western brands have withdrawn from Russia. At the same time, Russian manufacturers could not keep production going because of parts shortages due to the sanctions policy. Avtovaz, for example, was left on its own after Renault withdrew – the French gave up their roughly 68 percent stake for a symbolic rouble. The brand continued to produce until stocks were empty. Many vehicles rolled off the assembly line without airbags and ABS. Other manufacturers are hardly doing any better. Lada had to cut its production by half.
Chinese manufacturers are currently taking advantage of the huge gaps that are opening up – albeit at a low level. This is more due to the collapsed market than to the efforts of the manufacturers. “You can clearly see from the market shares that the Chinese manufacturers are catching up. However, the unit numbers and Chinese exports are almost identical to the previous year,” Gregor Sebastian, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics), told Table Media.
Chery was able to increase its car production by around four percent in 2022. Geely stagnated and Haval built 14 percent fewer cars. Because the Russian competition is suffering more and the Western competition has almost completely abandoned its activities, this is enough to maintain a total market share of almost 25 percent. More than ever before. A trend that is expected to continue in 2023. “My prognosis for this year: 60 percent Chinese and 40 percent Russian manufacturers,” speculated Andrei Olkhovsky of the car dealer Avtodom in an interview with the German business newspaper Handelsblatt.
The rise of Chinese brands is unsurprising. For quite some time now, they have been investing in Russia. Haval has already invested about 500 million euros in Russia in 2021. Chery does not publish official figures, but it has also been investing in its neighbor for some time and is planning a new plant. Sebastian sees the reasons for this primarily in the shift towards more electromobility in China. “Some private Chinese manufacturers that are doing badly in EV sales – like Chery or Great Wall Motor – are entering the Russian market particularly strongly,” explains the Merics analyst.
In addition, there are problems on the domestic market. In 2017, 28.9 million vehicles were sold in China (including commercial vehicles). A record level that has not been matched since. “Since 2017, China has had a stagnating and even weakening domestic market. However, the manufacturers have built up large capacities. That is why they are increasingly looking for foreign sales markets,” says Sebastian.
Russia, however, is a politically sensitive area. However, Sebastian believes that the leadership in Beijing does not see any problems here. Although they have been meticulous so far in ensuring that no export and import regulations are violated, the focus of the ruling party is not greater. “The Communist Party is certainly pleased to see that the car industry can help the Russian economy. But I do not believe that this is big-state driven. This development is driven by the market,” Sebastian explains.
China has become Russia’s most important trading partner. Goods trade between the two countries totaled 190 billion euros in 2022. However, the opposite is only true to a limited extent. Three percent of all Chinese trade went to Russia. “For some Chinese companies, the Russian market definitely has benefits, but for China as an overall economy, Russia’s car market has a rather low significance,” Sebastian assesses the situation.
After a two-year travel hiatus, David Feng can finally ride the train again. Now that the Covid measures have been lifted, the Swiss national is once again sharing details about China’s rail network – from high-speed lines to ticketing machines – on Twitter and his website.
But Feng is contributing even more as an independent consultant to the elimination of the messy combination of Chinese and English (Chinglish) from the services offered by the passenger transport network. After all, the standardization of English signs, displays, signals and announcements in China’s train stations is largely owed to him – although some foreigners might be sad to see the linguistic mess disappear. After all, despite all the confusion, it was at least entertaining.
Feng got his language skills from Switzerland, where he moved with his family as a young boy in 1988. There, he attended school and learned German, Swiss German, English and French. In 2000, he returned to China, earned his master’s degree, and later rose to become a professor at the Beijing University of Communications. It was there that Feng ultimately fell under the spell of the trains. After all, Feng is also fascinated by local rail traffic. So it was fitting that the new Line 5 subway was being built in Beijing at the same time.
Non-geeks need to know: “Line 5 revolutionized subway travel in Beijing. In terms of service, ticketing, speed and clarity, it was a new level,” says Feng. Line 5 is connected to eight other metropolitan subway lines, some of them multiple times. It connects densely populated suburbs directly with the city center – and is constantly crowded.
Whenever Feng looks out the train window, he is struck by the massive urbanization. “What I saw in China is the rapid urbanization in all provinces, cities and regions.” Stations that used to stand in the middle of nowhere are now surrounded by high-rise buildings and expressways, he says. China has managed to combine urbanization with the expansion of its rail and road systems. “They basicially build two nationwide, extensive networks on top of each other,” he says.
For Feng, this is a success story. Because the expansion of the train network meets the demand of the Chinese people. Passengers no longer travel simply because they have to, but because they can. Feng calls this the “just because industry.” And work life has also changed, he says. With the new high-speed line between Beijing and Tianjin, it is possible to commute 120 kilometers between two megacities every day, he explains.
Inspired by this rapid expansion, Feng turned his hobby – train travel – into a profession and became a consultant for the standardization of English communication at stations and on trains. After Covid, Feng is now working consistently towards his goal of visiting and inspecting every train station in China. Partly because he can now earn a living from it. China’s media like the tall train specialist; his expertise is in high demand. His motto: “Let’s make something which is pretty cool even better.” Jonathan Lehrer
China certainly has plenty of humor. Over the weekend, numerous photos of the Chinese spy balloon over the USA with the best wishes for the Lantern Festival on Sunday appeared on social media.
