Two high-ranking politicians get down to business this weekend: German Finance Minister Christian Lindner and Vice Premier He Lifeng will hold a new round of financial talks on Sunday. The meeting was overdue: The previous round took place before the pandemic. The senior counterpart for Lindner also signals that China forgives his party’s visits to Taiwan and critical remarks of important female politicians for now. We will keep you posted on what emerges from the talks in our Monday edition.
Nancy Faeser represents another German minister who has expressed criticism of Huawei as a business partner. The German Ministry of the Interior is forming a strategy for dealing with Huawei’s telecom equipment in German networks. Falk Steiner has summarized the details of the project known so far.
The narwhal is a whale whose most distinctive feature is its long tusk. It is now also the namesake of a new class of submarines with which Taiwan wants to protect its coasts. President Tsai Ing-wen attended the launch of the first one. David Demes reports on the island’s defense capabilities: The government takes the Chinese threat seriously and is systematically preparing for an invasion attempt.
On Thursday, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen christened the first domestically manufactured submarine in Kaohsiung. “A domestically developed submarine was considered an impossible task. But, today, a submarine designed and manufactured by our country’s people sits before our eyes,” Tsai praised the product of Taiwan’s shipyard.
Taiwan’s ambitious defense project is a response to the growing threat posed by the People’s Republic over recent years. At a press event in Taipei on the same day, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu underscored the project’s significance for Taiwan’s national defense. He told a group of foreign journalists that the development of the country’s own submarine showed Taiwan’s determination to defend itself. Wu sees his country as well prepared, but does not want to minimize the threat from the mainland either.
Taiwan has been facing increased military pressure from China since 2016. Beijing relies on so-called gray zone tactics that remain below the threshold of a military conflict, but are intended to gradually undermine Taiwan’s defense capabilities and operational readiness. For instance, China dispatches fighter jets off the coast of the democratically ruled island on a daily basis.
The new submarines are also expected to help break a possible Chinese blockade. The development and construction of the diesel-electric vessel cost Taiwanese taxpayers one and a half billion US dollars. Another submarine is scheduled to be added by 2027.
Together with the two Dutch-built boats that Taiwan acquired in the 1980s, the Taiwanese navy would have four submarines in service. It could thus protect the island’s east coast from attack by China’s new aircraft carriers. That is the plan.
However, some experts believe Taiwan would be better off investing this money in asymmetric capabilities. Joseph Wu strongly disagrees. “Having a new submarine is one of those strategies. For anyone who questions Taiwan’s submarine strategy, I would be a most forceful advocate for Taiwan to acquire submarines because that’s needed to deter war from taking place.”
Wu confirmed that China is conducting more frequent and larger military maneuvers in the region. He said the goal of these exercises is to prepare for a possible attack on Taiwan and intervention by the United States and that Taiwan’s partners in the region, including Japan and the USA, are also keeping a close eye on this escalation.
Wu suspects that another reason behind these exercises could be an attempt to influence Taiwan’s upcoming elections and give the opposition a better chance; the opposition tends to favor a rapprochement with Beijing.
The People’s Republic’s attempts to sway Taiwan’s voters through psychological warfare and disinformation could be more successful than the military threats. Wu said the main goal here is to damage the reputation of the United States as Taiwan’s protector. “They want to make Taiwanese believe that the United States can’t be trusted, that the United States doesn’t really want to help Taiwan,” adding that China is deliberately fueling this skepticism about America.
According to Wu, Taiwan is also better positioned than many other countries in the fight against Chinese disinformation. This is mainly thanks to the efforts of Taiwan’s civil society. NGOs such as the Doublethink Lab, Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts and IORG are doing an excellent job of educating people about media literacy, Wu said.
Thanks to Chinese interference operations, Taiwan has considerable experience in dealing with fake news. “Many countries, especially in Europe, are affected by Russian disinformation campaigns,” and China has also become active in the meantime. “Some countries ask Taiwan to send experts to share our experience with them,” Wu said.
The recent case of Volkswagen clearly shows how dependent companies are on a functioning IT infrastructure. But it would be far more problematic if communications were disrupted on a much larger scale. That is why the German Federal Ministry of the Interior plans to significantly tighten the regulations for mobile networks, with the support of the German Foreign Office. Only the Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport has reservations – debates are in full swing behind the scenes. Nothing less than the implementation of the de-risking approach is at stake – and telecommunications companies are just the start of the debate.
Authorities must already be notified when critical components are used for the first time in the so-called core network – the Federal Ministry of the Interior then has three months to prohibit their use. This regulation of the BSI law was introduced in 2021 and was supposed to provisionally end the debate about Huawei and ZTE, China’s two major component manufacturers.
The US, in particular, warned against using their components, and the EU responded with its so-called 5G toolbox, which member states are encouraged to utilize in order to make their networks more secure: EU countries are supposed to act in unison as far as possible – but internal and external security is not a jointly coordinated area.
German regulations show massive gaps in this respect: They have not worked in practice so far – something that even the Federal Ministry of the Interior indirectly concedes. Since spring this year, it has repeatedly asked Germany’s three largest mobile operators, Telekom, Vodafone and Telefonica, for comment.
So far, the BMI has not actually banned a single component. However, it is not satisfied with either the current regulations or the current degree of dependence on Chinese suppliers. This is why the focus is now being broadened: “The procedural object of these ex-post reviews – in contrast to the ex-ante reviews that have already taken place – are all critical components already in use in the operators’ respective public 5G mobile networks,” a spokeswoman said. It is now being used to assess the situation, followed by new regulations.
There is a lot at stake here: Fear of China on the one side and high costs on the other. Vodafone does not use Huawei hardware in its German core network. Telefonica has also already decided in 2020 to use components made by the Swedish provider Ericsson in its core network. Deutsche Telekom relies on Ericsson and also on the US software provider Avenir.
But BMI apparently also wants to tighten controls in the antenna network RAN. And here, Huawei still plays a significant role. All three providers use Huawei technology – in addition to other manufacturers. “The antenna network has never shown any irregularities from individual manufacturers,” Vodafone said in response to a Table.Media inquiry.
Telefonica and Telekom also emphasize that they have always complied with all the requirements and relied on multi-vendor strategies to avoid one-sided dependencies. They are backed by the German Federal Ministry of Digital Affairs, which points to the high security standards already in place.
Network operators warn of the consequences of a ban considered in government circles for 2026. Deutsche Telekom, for example, believes this is completely unrealistic: “In view of approval procedures, available capacities at alternative suppliers, available capacities at construction companies, and the continued expansion of mobile communications desired by customers and politicians, a target date of 2026 for the RAN replacement is unrealistic.”
And Telefonica warns: “Should there be an exclusion of components, a sufficiently long period must be granted for their replacement. This is essential to maintain network quality and performance.” How many antennas and related components would actually have to be replaced if Chinese providers were banned from the network under government control remains unclear. According to industry estimates, there are about 25,000 sites, usually with three antennas and associated technology.
That is why Telefonica plans to “examine claims for damages against the Federal Republic of Germany in case of a retroactively required conversion of the network.” In addition, it would also have these prohibitions reviewed by the courts, if deemed adequate. According to Norbert Roettgen, foreign policy politician for the German Christian Democratic Union, the providers have only themselves to blame, saying that it has been clear for years what was coming: “These warnings have been ignored.”
In that case, the providers would be left to bear the costs. He also sees government aid in the restructuring process critically: “I see no reason why the taxpayer should now have to pay for the greed of certain companies that, in full awareness, have opted for low prices instead of security.”
The impact of a Huawei ban can currently be observed in Portugal. By making amendments to technical security regulations, the Portuguese government has imposed a de facto ban from the perspective of the Chinese provider – in response, Huawei filed a lawsuit in Lisbon on August 31 against the security committee of the supervisory authority. Meanwhile, companies from the People’s Republic hold stakes in important Portuguese companies – as the fourth-largest foreign investor.
Portuguese newspapers reported that China threatened retaliatory measures. The effect is different in the United Kingdom: Where Chinese providers are forced out of networks, the 5G network rollout progresses relatively slowly. The required replacement of Huawei products is not easy to obtain and expensive.
This is also something that German providers warn of. If RAN elements had to be replaced across the board, it would also impair rollout capacities elsewhere. In this case, entire mast networks would have to be temporarily disconnected from the grid. “It is not clear to us why German mobile communications customers, who benefit from one of the best 5G networks in Europe, should be forced to accept significant quality drops by the BMI,” Telekom says.
And Vodafone stresses that “a way must be found that optimally protects Germany’s digital infrastructure, but does not come at the expense of millions of smartphone users.” The Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport emphasizes that a balanced solution must be found: “Nationwide coverage with stable, fast and affordable mobile Internet remains ensured, that network operators retain control of their networks and that no dependencies arise” must be considered.
One next step could be: The antennas remain untouched for the time being – but the underlying technology of the antenna network would have to be replaced by 2026. This would not be in the interests of the German providers either, but it could be a simpler compromise and at least somewhat more cost-effective.
Other sectors are also closely following the debate about Chinese providers in telecommunications companies. For example, Germany’s national railroad company Deutsche Bahn, part of the critical infrastructure, plans to build its 5G network, including Huawei technology. Among other things, the network is intended to replace the GSM-R railroad radio system.
Deutsche Bahn puts such projects out to tender – and as a publicly owned company, it is obliged to take the lowest bid. “The fact that Deutsche Bahn, as a 100-percent property of the federal government and under the supervision of members of the federal government, wants to build its IP network with Chinese components is scandalous in my view,” Roettgen criticizes. “No lessons have been learned here from the 5G debate.”
Although Deutsche Bahn is subject to critical infrastructure regulations, it is exempt from the special rules for telecommunications networks, which are intended to eliminate Chinese providers from the network. This applies at the European level, as a Commission spokeswoman confirmed in response to a question from Table.Media: While campus networks could be highly relevant, “such networks are not subject to the EU telecommunications framework.” And in Germany, too, there is no effective legal framework yet. That’s because, in its “current version, it applies exclusively to public 5G mobile networks,” according to the BMI. And so-called campus networks, such as those used by Deutsche Bahn, are not considered public.
However, the Federal Ministry of the Interior intends to make many more changes with the KRITIS Umbrella Act: Critical components could be more strictly regulated in all systems in the future – from special screws, chips, and campus networks to entire plants.
A spokesperson for the German Association of Local Public Utilities (VKU) says: “The VKU does currently not have any data that would indicate any major dependence of local public utilities on Chinese manufacturers or suppliers.” However, they are not entirely sure: “Dependencies in certain areas cannot be ruled out, for example, in fiber optics due to the relatively small number of suppliers of active components.” Not even operators are often aware of how much China has invested in critical infrastructure in Germany.
So, the actual debate about practical de-risking has only just begun. Norbert Roettgen believes it is high time for this to happen. He warns: “In the event of conflict, China will use every opportunity to exert influence on the German government for its own interests.”
The Asian Games in Hangzhou continue. Seen are Feng Yingying of China in the blue gi and Gulnoza Matniyazova of Uzbekistan in the judo semifinals.
Two high-ranking politicians get down to business this weekend: German Finance Minister Christian Lindner and Vice Premier He Lifeng will hold a new round of financial talks on Sunday. The meeting was overdue: The previous round took place before the pandemic. The senior counterpart for Lindner also signals that China forgives his party’s visits to Taiwan and critical remarks of important female politicians for now. We will keep you posted on what emerges from the talks in our Monday edition.
Nancy Faeser represents another German minister who has expressed criticism of Huawei as a business partner. The German Ministry of the Interior is forming a strategy for dealing with Huawei’s telecom equipment in German networks. Falk Steiner has summarized the details of the project known so far.
The narwhal is a whale whose most distinctive feature is its long tusk. It is now also the namesake of a new class of submarines with which Taiwan wants to protect its coasts. President Tsai Ing-wen attended the launch of the first one. David Demes reports on the island’s defense capabilities: The government takes the Chinese threat seriously and is systematically preparing for an invasion attempt.
On Thursday, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen christened the first domestically manufactured submarine in Kaohsiung. “A domestically developed submarine was considered an impossible task. But, today, a submarine designed and manufactured by our country’s people sits before our eyes,” Tsai praised the product of Taiwan’s shipyard.
Taiwan’s ambitious defense project is a response to the growing threat posed by the People’s Republic over recent years. At a press event in Taipei on the same day, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu underscored the project’s significance for Taiwan’s national defense. He told a group of foreign journalists that the development of the country’s own submarine showed Taiwan’s determination to defend itself. Wu sees his country as well prepared, but does not want to minimize the threat from the mainland either.
Taiwan has been facing increased military pressure from China since 2016. Beijing relies on so-called gray zone tactics that remain below the threshold of a military conflict, but are intended to gradually undermine Taiwan’s defense capabilities and operational readiness. For instance, China dispatches fighter jets off the coast of the democratically ruled island on a daily basis.
The new submarines are also expected to help break a possible Chinese blockade. The development and construction of the diesel-electric vessel cost Taiwanese taxpayers one and a half billion US dollars. Another submarine is scheduled to be added by 2027.
Together with the two Dutch-built boats that Taiwan acquired in the 1980s, the Taiwanese navy would have four submarines in service. It could thus protect the island’s east coast from attack by China’s new aircraft carriers. That is the plan.
However, some experts believe Taiwan would be better off investing this money in asymmetric capabilities. Joseph Wu strongly disagrees. “Having a new submarine is one of those strategies. For anyone who questions Taiwan’s submarine strategy, I would be a most forceful advocate for Taiwan to acquire submarines because that’s needed to deter war from taking place.”
Wu confirmed that China is conducting more frequent and larger military maneuvers in the region. He said the goal of these exercises is to prepare for a possible attack on Taiwan and intervention by the United States and that Taiwan’s partners in the region, including Japan and the USA, are also keeping a close eye on this escalation.
Wu suspects that another reason behind these exercises could be an attempt to influence Taiwan’s upcoming elections and give the opposition a better chance; the opposition tends to favor a rapprochement with Beijing.
The People’s Republic’s attempts to sway Taiwan’s voters through psychological warfare and disinformation could be more successful than the military threats. Wu said the main goal here is to damage the reputation of the United States as Taiwan’s protector. “They want to make Taiwanese believe that the United States can’t be trusted, that the United States doesn’t really want to help Taiwan,” adding that China is deliberately fueling this skepticism about America.
According to Wu, Taiwan is also better positioned than many other countries in the fight against Chinese disinformation. This is mainly thanks to the efforts of Taiwan’s civil society. NGOs such as the Doublethink Lab, Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts and IORG are doing an excellent job of educating people about media literacy, Wu said.
Thanks to Chinese interference operations, Taiwan has considerable experience in dealing with fake news. “Many countries, especially in Europe, are affected by Russian disinformation campaigns,” and China has also become active in the meantime. “Some countries ask Taiwan to send experts to share our experience with them,” Wu said.
The recent case of Volkswagen clearly shows how dependent companies are on a functioning IT infrastructure. But it would be far more problematic if communications were disrupted on a much larger scale. That is why the German Federal Ministry of the Interior plans to significantly tighten the regulations for mobile networks, with the support of the German Foreign Office. Only the Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport has reservations – debates are in full swing behind the scenes. Nothing less than the implementation of the de-risking approach is at stake – and telecommunications companies are just the start of the debate.
Authorities must already be notified when critical components are used for the first time in the so-called core network – the Federal Ministry of the Interior then has three months to prohibit their use. This regulation of the BSI law was introduced in 2021 and was supposed to provisionally end the debate about Huawei and ZTE, China’s two major component manufacturers.
The US, in particular, warned against using their components, and the EU responded with its so-called 5G toolbox, which member states are encouraged to utilize in order to make their networks more secure: EU countries are supposed to act in unison as far as possible – but internal and external security is not a jointly coordinated area.
German regulations show massive gaps in this respect: They have not worked in practice so far – something that even the Federal Ministry of the Interior indirectly concedes. Since spring this year, it has repeatedly asked Germany’s three largest mobile operators, Telekom, Vodafone and Telefonica, for comment.
So far, the BMI has not actually banned a single component. However, it is not satisfied with either the current regulations or the current degree of dependence on Chinese suppliers. This is why the focus is now being broadened: “The procedural object of these ex-post reviews – in contrast to the ex-ante reviews that have already taken place – are all critical components already in use in the operators’ respective public 5G mobile networks,” a spokeswoman said. It is now being used to assess the situation, followed by new regulations.
There is a lot at stake here: Fear of China on the one side and high costs on the other. Vodafone does not use Huawei hardware in its German core network. Telefonica has also already decided in 2020 to use components made by the Swedish provider Ericsson in its core network. Deutsche Telekom relies on Ericsson and also on the US software provider Avenir.
But BMI apparently also wants to tighten controls in the antenna network RAN. And here, Huawei still plays a significant role. All three providers use Huawei technology – in addition to other manufacturers. “The antenna network has never shown any irregularities from individual manufacturers,” Vodafone said in response to a Table.Media inquiry.
Telefonica and Telekom also emphasize that they have always complied with all the requirements and relied on multi-vendor strategies to avoid one-sided dependencies. They are backed by the German Federal Ministry of Digital Affairs, which points to the high security standards already in place.
Network operators warn of the consequences of a ban considered in government circles for 2026. Deutsche Telekom, for example, believes this is completely unrealistic: “In view of approval procedures, available capacities at alternative suppliers, available capacities at construction companies, and the continued expansion of mobile communications desired by customers and politicians, a target date of 2026 for the RAN replacement is unrealistic.”
And Telefonica warns: “Should there be an exclusion of components, a sufficiently long period must be granted for their replacement. This is essential to maintain network quality and performance.” How many antennas and related components would actually have to be replaced if Chinese providers were banned from the network under government control remains unclear. According to industry estimates, there are about 25,000 sites, usually with three antennas and associated technology.
That is why Telefonica plans to “examine claims for damages against the Federal Republic of Germany in case of a retroactively required conversion of the network.” In addition, it would also have these prohibitions reviewed by the courts, if deemed adequate. According to Norbert Roettgen, foreign policy politician for the German Christian Democratic Union, the providers have only themselves to blame, saying that it has been clear for years what was coming: “These warnings have been ignored.”
In that case, the providers would be left to bear the costs. He also sees government aid in the restructuring process critically: “I see no reason why the taxpayer should now have to pay for the greed of certain companies that, in full awareness, have opted for low prices instead of security.”
The impact of a Huawei ban can currently be observed in Portugal. By making amendments to technical security regulations, the Portuguese government has imposed a de facto ban from the perspective of the Chinese provider – in response, Huawei filed a lawsuit in Lisbon on August 31 against the security committee of the supervisory authority. Meanwhile, companies from the People’s Republic hold stakes in important Portuguese companies – as the fourth-largest foreign investor.
Portuguese newspapers reported that China threatened retaliatory measures. The effect is different in the United Kingdom: Where Chinese providers are forced out of networks, the 5G network rollout progresses relatively slowly. The required replacement of Huawei products is not easy to obtain and expensive.
This is also something that German providers warn of. If RAN elements had to be replaced across the board, it would also impair rollout capacities elsewhere. In this case, entire mast networks would have to be temporarily disconnected from the grid. “It is not clear to us why German mobile communications customers, who benefit from one of the best 5G networks in Europe, should be forced to accept significant quality drops by the BMI,” Telekom says.
And Vodafone stresses that “a way must be found that optimally protects Germany’s digital infrastructure, but does not come at the expense of millions of smartphone users.” The Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport emphasizes that a balanced solution must be found: “Nationwide coverage with stable, fast and affordable mobile Internet remains ensured, that network operators retain control of their networks and that no dependencies arise” must be considered.
One next step could be: The antennas remain untouched for the time being – but the underlying technology of the antenna network would have to be replaced by 2026. This would not be in the interests of the German providers either, but it could be a simpler compromise and at least somewhat more cost-effective.
Other sectors are also closely following the debate about Chinese providers in telecommunications companies. For example, Germany’s national railroad company Deutsche Bahn, part of the critical infrastructure, plans to build its 5G network, including Huawei technology. Among other things, the network is intended to replace the GSM-R railroad radio system.
Deutsche Bahn puts such projects out to tender – and as a publicly owned company, it is obliged to take the lowest bid. “The fact that Deutsche Bahn, as a 100-percent property of the federal government and under the supervision of members of the federal government, wants to build its IP network with Chinese components is scandalous in my view,” Roettgen criticizes. “No lessons have been learned here from the 5G debate.”
Although Deutsche Bahn is subject to critical infrastructure regulations, it is exempt from the special rules for telecommunications networks, which are intended to eliminate Chinese providers from the network. This applies at the European level, as a Commission spokeswoman confirmed in response to a question from Table.Media: While campus networks could be highly relevant, “such networks are not subject to the EU telecommunications framework.” And in Germany, too, there is no effective legal framework yet. That’s because, in its “current version, it applies exclusively to public 5G mobile networks,” according to the BMI. And so-called campus networks, such as those used by Deutsche Bahn, are not considered public.
However, the Federal Ministry of the Interior intends to make many more changes with the KRITIS Umbrella Act: Critical components could be more strictly regulated in all systems in the future – from special screws, chips, and campus networks to entire plants.
A spokesperson for the German Association of Local Public Utilities (VKU) says: “The VKU does currently not have any data that would indicate any major dependence of local public utilities on Chinese manufacturers or suppliers.” However, they are not entirely sure: “Dependencies in certain areas cannot be ruled out, for example, in fiber optics due to the relatively small number of suppliers of active components.” Not even operators are often aware of how much China has invested in critical infrastructure in Germany.
So, the actual debate about practical de-risking has only just begun. Norbert Roettgen believes it is high time for this to happen. He warns: “In the event of conflict, China will use every opportunity to exert influence on the German government for its own interests.”
The Asian Games in Hangzhou continue. Seen are Feng Yingying of China in the blue gi and Gulnoza Matniyazova of Uzbekistan in the judo semifinals.
