The world is still fighting Covid-19. In Germany, companies receive Covid aid, but what does the pandemic mean for European companies in China? The latest survey by the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing shows something astonishing: no sign of a crisis. Even in the pandemic year 2020, companies in the People’s Republic earned more than expected. But the problems are increasing: difficult market access, unequal treatment, and political influence. Chamber of Commerce President Joerg Wuttke laments another serious problem in an interview with China.Table: “The number of expats is downright plummeting.” Thus, many years of China experience are being lost and may not be regained, Wuttke warns. But a look into the future also reveals something surprising: More than two-thirds of the respondents continue to expect positive sales developments in their industry and therefore want to invest more in China, reports Christiane Kuehl.
Meanwhile, the origin of the Covid pandemic is still unclear. However, the suspicion that the pathogen could have originated in a laboratory in Wuhan persists. That Beijing is doing little to clarify the situation will cause enormous political damage to the People’s Republic, analyses Marcel Grzanna. Claims for damages or a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics would be just two possible consequences.
In addition to military and economic power, an influential world power also needs an internationally significant currency. So far, China lacks that. But Beijing is working flat out on a revolution in the financial sector: through the digital renminbi. China is well on its way to becoming the first major economy to introduce a state-owned digital currency. The first tests show how much Beijing is gaining control nationally as a result. But this is not intended to stop there. With the e-CNY, Beijing wants to challenge the dominance of the US dollar as the global reserve currency, as Frank Sieren reports.
Business is unexpectedly good. But after the dark time of Covid-19, there is a “storm on the horizon” that requires companies to adjust their strategy. This is how the EU Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC) sums up the findings of its member survey presented on Tuesday. With the world still reeling from the pandemic, the relatively optimistic business expectations – with simultaneous complaints about old and new problems – are exceedingly surprising: 68 percent of respondents expect positive developments in their industry, up from 45 percent in the pre-Covid year of 2019. The last time companies were this optimistic was in 2014.
This may be because business in the Covid year 2020 went better than the companies expected. At the beginning of 2020, half of the companies had expected sales to fall, and only one in two hundred had expected a plus. But in fact, 42 percent reported rising revenues, especially those in the consumer sector. “This was largely thanks to Chinese customers who, unable to travel, instead spent their disposable income on cars, cosmetics and clothes,” the Chamber of Commerce survey says. Only a quarter reported declining revenues, especially in industries directly hit by the pandemic, such as travel. Profits also remained surprisingly stable: 73 percent had positive earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) – roughly the same level as in the past five years.
Meanwhile, the list of concerns is long, as always. For 73 percent, the ongoing Covid travel restrictions are a major concern. 45 percent said they are losing business due to direct and indirect market access restrictions – a figure that has remained constant for years. 44 percent report unequal treatment in areas such as government contracts, licensing, and access to subsidies. 46 percent of respondents expect regulatory barriers to increase in China over the next five years. And 41 percent complained about an increasing politicization of business life – for example, due to the conflict over the Xinjiang sanctions.
It was surprising that half of the companies blamed the Chinese government for this politicization, EUCCC President Joerg Wuttke told China.Table: “40 percent blamed Chinese media in the survey, and 28 percent blamed international media.” Wuttke also said he was surprised by how dramatic the situation was in relation to foreign employees. “The number of expats is downright plummeting.” The chamber has heard from members that so many of the expats still stuck abroad have now given up on returning to China and are settling elsewhere, the survey says. In the process, “years of China experience are lost and may not be regained.” It also could create a gap between the China office and headquarters. There is already discussion in the community about ways to prevent “a sinicization of companies,” Wuttke says.
Despite everything, companies are planning to stay and invest in China. 72 percent of respondents see Chinese companies as innovative or even more innovative than European companies. This is one of the main reasons why members want and need to stay in China, the survey study said. “If you don’t play the game here and have these companies around you as competitors – how are you going to keep up with them on the global market later?” said Wuttke.
In the EUCCC survey a year ago half of the respondents still said they planned to cut costs in China. In 2021, only 38 percent said the same. Instead, 27 percent of respondents in 2020 increased their stake in an existing joint venture – or bought out the partner altogether. “China will account for one-third of world demand in the next ten years,” Wuttke expects. China is too important to save money here.
Therefore, it is not the case that companies would withdraw their production en masse to other emerging markets due to problems or geopolitical tensions. On the contrary: The survey recorded “the lowest ever measured desire to leave the market.” According to the survey, only nine percent intend to relocate existing operations or make new investments more likely in other countries. Twenty-six percent want to bring more parts of their supply chains to China. Wuttke observes a tremendous wave of localization. Companies want to decouple their China operations from their global operations because of the uncertain world situation: “Many companies are trying to secure their supply chains.” And in China, he says, that often means onshoring – so that the entire supply chain is in one place and cannot be disrupted by external factors.
But this is not an easy task. Companies describe “critical inputs”: Important, imported components or equipment that is difficult to replace in China. 34 percent of respondents see no viable alternatives at all for their critical inputs in China. 55 percent are able to find alternatives – but only at higher prices or lower quality. For only 21 percent this is currently not an issue.
Other problems for companies include ambiguities in rules and regulations and unforeseen changes in the law. Increasing data security requirements are a concern for many companies, as much data must now be stored in China, and standards for the required security infrastructure differ from those abroad. In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to companies having to build a wickedly expensive technology island solution in China. While the cybersecurity law is only beginning to take shape, 33 percent of respondents fear drawbacks. 16 percent are also still grappling with the compulsion to transfer technology, even though the new investment law means this should no longer be the case. But there is also progress: In 2021, for the first time, a majority of respondents described the handling of the ongoing issue of intellectual property as adequate or even excellent.
The Chinese government has already let more than a year pass to prove its willingness to be unconditionally transparent in the search for the origin of the Covid-19 virus to the rest of the world. Contrary to its announcement of full support for the World Health Organization (WHO), it gave the impression of having predetermined the outcome of the investigation. Instead of granting the experts quick and unbureaucratic access, China had taken months to prepare. Instead of making all the necessary raw data accessible, the country filtered out according to its own criteria.
Only the Chinese government itself knows why this is the case. But the strategy is certainly not having the desired effect. The discussion about the origin of the pathogen has by no means died down, as Beijing would have liked, but has gained momentum again. This is also because China’s handling of the reappraisal has fuelled new mistrust. The return of the laboratory thesis, which has been discussed again for a few weeks, is based on precisely this mistrust. The question is: Did the Covid virus come from the Institute of Virology in Wuhan? (China.Table reported on the previous exclusion of the WHO experts.)
The truth is: There will be no definite answer in the foreseeable future. China categorically rejects the laboratory thesis and will also prevent anything that would be conducive to a potential confirmation. Nevertheless, the Chinese government is threatened with massive political damage. The Communist Party is already fighting for its credibility on other fronts. It faces accusations of genocide for its treatment of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. In Hong Kong, the introduction of the National Security Act and electoral reform are making Beijing look like a deal breaker. If the international community accepts the suspicion of a laboratory accident as a plausible explanation for the Covid outbreak, the Chinese government must reckon with a further considerable loss of confidence.
And this is at a time when a critical stance toward the second-largest economy is being formulated ever more clearly, even in Germany. For example, Siegfried Russwurm, President of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), told Bild am Sonntag: “China is a growing competitor that repeatedly violates global rules. As an exporting country, we must draw a line where the ability to compromise stops: Human rights are not an internal matter.” And Joe Kaeser, Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business, recommended in an interview with China.Table that German companies look at “what other markets and partner countries exist in the region besides China.”
Both statements show that economic engagement in China is no longer viewed in isolation from political circumstances but that conditions are being set and dangers outlined much more clearly than was the case just a few years ago. In this mixed situation, further loss of confidence is poison for China’s plans to make the world compliant with lures such as sales markets and opportunities. By 2035, China wants to set industrial standards that will serve as benchmarks for other economies. No one has estimated yet how this calculation will work out if confidence continues to fall. As concerns grow about dependence on a country with an increasingly poor reputation, Beijing will face more resistance. Willingness to befriend Chinese leadership roles is likely to decline further in the rest of the world. Already the G7 meeting of the largest economies other than China next weekend in the UK will document the growing resistance when future dealings with the People’s Republic are discussed.
It is all the more astonishing that the Chinese government is not pulling out all the stops to debunk the laboratory thesis once and for all. If the country has nothing to hide, it should be interested in the best possible clarification and comply with the demands for unrestricted access for independent scientists. Especially, since the laboratory thesis is also judged to be baseless by many scientists outside China, with as much of a lack of solid counter-evidence as of evidence to confirm it. So what is holding back the government?
Instead, China is now facing demands for compensation amounting to $10 trillion. Donald Trump was the one who brought this sum into play last week. He is no longer US president, but his influence on his party, the Republicans, remains enormous and his candidacy once again is not out of the question. If Trump succeeds in convincing Americans that the People’s Republic owes the country a trillion-dollar sum, American concessions to the Chinese government will be negotiated even harder. This is not in the interests of the Chinese. Just last week, US President Joe Biden showed his distrust – and temporarily banned 59 Chinese companies as investment targets for American investors (as China.Table reported).
Claims for damages could also massively exacerbate tensions between China and the international community. “Enormous claims for damages from practically the entire world against the Chinese state would be obvious. If China rejects these, the respective countries could seize the foreign assets of Chinese state-owned companies that they have,” writes financial mathematician Andreas Beck in an analysis for the news portal ntv.de. Such an escalation would mean a “dramatic storm” politically, but also for the financial markets.
An additional dose of mistrust towards the Chinese regime also lowers the inhibition threshold for a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. On Monday, the Interparliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a grouping of MEPs from around the world that aims to promote a consistent stance by democratic states toward the People’s Republic, launched a concerted action: Ten IPAC members from the European Parliament are calling on the European Council to adopt an EU position. Representatives from the parliaments of Germany, the US, Canada, Italy, the Czech Republic, Denmark and the UK are involved in the IPAC initiative.
True, the initiative refers to human rights crimes in Xinjiang and not to doubts about the origin of the Covid pandemic. But the chances that it will fall on fertile ground increase if trust in the Chinese government continues to decline due to its lack of transparency on Covid.
Michael Kahn-Ackermann has actually been retired for almost ten years, but the soon-to-be 75-year-old is far from “retired.” Just a few months ago, he was hit by a wave of Chinese indignation after he translated the “Wuhan Diary” by writer Fang Fang into German. The book about the experience of the Covid crisis became a bestseller in Germany. Kahn-Ackermann finds it “completely ridiculous” that he is approached as a translator for the content of the text. But he knows, “The dynamics behind such cases are highly complex.”
Kahn-Ackermann knows China’s approach to culture better than anyone, having advised the Confucius Institute headquarters for eight years until 2019. “China has very little experience in foreign cultural policy.” However, China also seemed to care particularly about changing that, which is why the cooperation was moderately successful, Kahn-Ackermann said. At the same time, he has been working as a “China Special Representative” for the Mercator Foundation since 2011. There, he primarily helps with contacts because he has a “relatively large network of connections,” as he says himself.
That’s not surprising because he already had contacts in China when the country was still little regarded in the West. In 1970, Kahn-Ackermann decided to study Sinology: “The pretty much most useless thing on offer at Munich University at the time.” In 1974, still on scholarship during the Cultural Revolution, he traveled to China as one of ten students. In the two years at Beijing University, he learned Chinese – and in the years that followed, studying sinology turned out to be not so useless.
The first Goethe-Institut in China was officially opened at the end of 1988 – with Kahn-Ackermann as Founding Director. The early years were difficult “until they realized we were not there for espionage purposes.” It was not until 1993 that the Beijing Goethe-Institut was allowed to offer cultural programs and language teaching. For 16 years, it was the only foreign institution in the fields of culture and education in China. At that time, the Goethe-Institut was “a very important window to the outside world for the Chinese.” From 1994 to 2006, Kahn-Ackermann made professional stops at the Goethe Institutes in Moscow and Rome. In 2006 he returned to Beijing to the Goethe-Institut. Even though its function has changed in the meantime, Kahn-Ackermann is convinced: “The Goethe-Institut is still a place where you can try out something that would not be so easy to try out in other institutions.”
He is particularly fascinated by the “acceleration” he has witnessed in China. China was still a developing country when he was there for the first time. Now it is a world power. He describes his relationship with China as having “an emotional scale from love to anger, from joy to pain.” In contrast, he experiences an “unrealistic” image of China among many Europeans and in the Western media. He finds it very difficult to change this.
In the meantime, Michael Kahn-Ackermann lives in Nanjing “because of love.” His circle of friends consists mainly of Chinese. For some time, he has been curating art exhibitions, he still doesn’t get bored. In April 2021, Fang Fang’s novel “Soft Burial” was published in German – translated by Kahn-Ackermann. Paula Faul
The Gaokao exams are taking place in China these days. Gakao, probably the toughest exam in the world, decides on a student’s future career: on access to the country’s universities, on the chances of getting a well-paid job. Here, students in Nanjing are just coming out of their exams. Some even have a smile on their faces.
The world is still fighting Covid-19. In Germany, companies receive Covid aid, but what does the pandemic mean for European companies in China? The latest survey by the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing shows something astonishing: no sign of a crisis. Even in the pandemic year 2020, companies in the People’s Republic earned more than expected. But the problems are increasing: difficult market access, unequal treatment, and political influence. Chamber of Commerce President Joerg Wuttke laments another serious problem in an interview with China.Table: “The number of expats is downright plummeting.” Thus, many years of China experience are being lost and may not be regained, Wuttke warns. But a look into the future also reveals something surprising: More than two-thirds of the respondents continue to expect positive sales developments in their industry and therefore want to invest more in China, reports Christiane Kuehl.
Meanwhile, the origin of the Covid pandemic is still unclear. However, the suspicion that the pathogen could have originated in a laboratory in Wuhan persists. That Beijing is doing little to clarify the situation will cause enormous political damage to the People’s Republic, analyses Marcel Grzanna. Claims for damages or a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics would be just two possible consequences.
In addition to military and economic power, an influential world power also needs an internationally significant currency. So far, China lacks that. But Beijing is working flat out on a revolution in the financial sector: through the digital renminbi. China is well on its way to becoming the first major economy to introduce a state-owned digital currency. The first tests show how much Beijing is gaining control nationally as a result. But this is not intended to stop there. With the e-CNY, Beijing wants to challenge the dominance of the US dollar as the global reserve currency, as Frank Sieren reports.
Business is unexpectedly good. But after the dark time of Covid-19, there is a “storm on the horizon” that requires companies to adjust their strategy. This is how the EU Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC) sums up the findings of its member survey presented on Tuesday. With the world still reeling from the pandemic, the relatively optimistic business expectations – with simultaneous complaints about old and new problems – are exceedingly surprising: 68 percent of respondents expect positive developments in their industry, up from 45 percent in the pre-Covid year of 2019. The last time companies were this optimistic was in 2014.
This may be because business in the Covid year 2020 went better than the companies expected. At the beginning of 2020, half of the companies had expected sales to fall, and only one in two hundred had expected a plus. But in fact, 42 percent reported rising revenues, especially those in the consumer sector. “This was largely thanks to Chinese customers who, unable to travel, instead spent their disposable income on cars, cosmetics and clothes,” the Chamber of Commerce survey says. Only a quarter reported declining revenues, especially in industries directly hit by the pandemic, such as travel. Profits also remained surprisingly stable: 73 percent had positive earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) – roughly the same level as in the past five years.
Meanwhile, the list of concerns is long, as always. For 73 percent, the ongoing Covid travel restrictions are a major concern. 45 percent said they are losing business due to direct and indirect market access restrictions – a figure that has remained constant for years. 44 percent report unequal treatment in areas such as government contracts, licensing, and access to subsidies. 46 percent of respondents expect regulatory barriers to increase in China over the next five years. And 41 percent complained about an increasing politicization of business life – for example, due to the conflict over the Xinjiang sanctions.
It was surprising that half of the companies blamed the Chinese government for this politicization, EUCCC President Joerg Wuttke told China.Table: “40 percent blamed Chinese media in the survey, and 28 percent blamed international media.” Wuttke also said he was surprised by how dramatic the situation was in relation to foreign employees. “The number of expats is downright plummeting.” The chamber has heard from members that so many of the expats still stuck abroad have now given up on returning to China and are settling elsewhere, the survey says. In the process, “years of China experience are lost and may not be regained.” It also could create a gap between the China office and headquarters. There is already discussion in the community about ways to prevent “a sinicization of companies,” Wuttke says.
Despite everything, companies are planning to stay and invest in China. 72 percent of respondents see Chinese companies as innovative or even more innovative than European companies. This is one of the main reasons why members want and need to stay in China, the survey study said. “If you don’t play the game here and have these companies around you as competitors – how are you going to keep up with them on the global market later?” said Wuttke.
In the EUCCC survey a year ago half of the respondents still said they planned to cut costs in China. In 2021, only 38 percent said the same. Instead, 27 percent of respondents in 2020 increased their stake in an existing joint venture – or bought out the partner altogether. “China will account for one-third of world demand in the next ten years,” Wuttke expects. China is too important to save money here.
Therefore, it is not the case that companies would withdraw their production en masse to other emerging markets due to problems or geopolitical tensions. On the contrary: The survey recorded “the lowest ever measured desire to leave the market.” According to the survey, only nine percent intend to relocate existing operations or make new investments more likely in other countries. Twenty-six percent want to bring more parts of their supply chains to China. Wuttke observes a tremendous wave of localization. Companies want to decouple their China operations from their global operations because of the uncertain world situation: “Many companies are trying to secure their supply chains.” And in China, he says, that often means onshoring – so that the entire supply chain is in one place and cannot be disrupted by external factors.
But this is not an easy task. Companies describe “critical inputs”: Important, imported components or equipment that is difficult to replace in China. 34 percent of respondents see no viable alternatives at all for their critical inputs in China. 55 percent are able to find alternatives – but only at higher prices or lower quality. For only 21 percent this is currently not an issue.
Other problems for companies include ambiguities in rules and regulations and unforeseen changes in the law. Increasing data security requirements are a concern for many companies, as much data must now be stored in China, and standards for the required security infrastructure differ from those abroad. In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to companies having to build a wickedly expensive technology island solution in China. While the cybersecurity law is only beginning to take shape, 33 percent of respondents fear drawbacks. 16 percent are also still grappling with the compulsion to transfer technology, even though the new investment law means this should no longer be the case. But there is also progress: In 2021, for the first time, a majority of respondents described the handling of the ongoing issue of intellectual property as adequate or even excellent.
The Chinese government has already let more than a year pass to prove its willingness to be unconditionally transparent in the search for the origin of the Covid-19 virus to the rest of the world. Contrary to its announcement of full support for the World Health Organization (WHO), it gave the impression of having predetermined the outcome of the investigation. Instead of granting the experts quick and unbureaucratic access, China had taken months to prepare. Instead of making all the necessary raw data accessible, the country filtered out according to its own criteria.
Only the Chinese government itself knows why this is the case. But the strategy is certainly not having the desired effect. The discussion about the origin of the pathogen has by no means died down, as Beijing would have liked, but has gained momentum again. This is also because China’s handling of the reappraisal has fuelled new mistrust. The return of the laboratory thesis, which has been discussed again for a few weeks, is based on precisely this mistrust. The question is: Did the Covid virus come from the Institute of Virology in Wuhan? (China.Table reported on the previous exclusion of the WHO experts.)
The truth is: There will be no definite answer in the foreseeable future. China categorically rejects the laboratory thesis and will also prevent anything that would be conducive to a potential confirmation. Nevertheless, the Chinese government is threatened with massive political damage. The Communist Party is already fighting for its credibility on other fronts. It faces accusations of genocide for its treatment of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. In Hong Kong, the introduction of the National Security Act and electoral reform are making Beijing look like a deal breaker. If the international community accepts the suspicion of a laboratory accident as a plausible explanation for the Covid outbreak, the Chinese government must reckon with a further considerable loss of confidence.
And this is at a time when a critical stance toward the second-largest economy is being formulated ever more clearly, even in Germany. For example, Siegfried Russwurm, President of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), told Bild am Sonntag: “China is a growing competitor that repeatedly violates global rules. As an exporting country, we must draw a line where the ability to compromise stops: Human rights are not an internal matter.” And Joe Kaeser, Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business, recommended in an interview with China.Table that German companies look at “what other markets and partner countries exist in the region besides China.”
Both statements show that economic engagement in China is no longer viewed in isolation from political circumstances but that conditions are being set and dangers outlined much more clearly than was the case just a few years ago. In this mixed situation, further loss of confidence is poison for China’s plans to make the world compliant with lures such as sales markets and opportunities. By 2035, China wants to set industrial standards that will serve as benchmarks for other economies. No one has estimated yet how this calculation will work out if confidence continues to fall. As concerns grow about dependence on a country with an increasingly poor reputation, Beijing will face more resistance. Willingness to befriend Chinese leadership roles is likely to decline further in the rest of the world. Already the G7 meeting of the largest economies other than China next weekend in the UK will document the growing resistance when future dealings with the People’s Republic are discussed.
It is all the more astonishing that the Chinese government is not pulling out all the stops to debunk the laboratory thesis once and for all. If the country has nothing to hide, it should be interested in the best possible clarification and comply with the demands for unrestricted access for independent scientists. Especially, since the laboratory thesis is also judged to be baseless by many scientists outside China, with as much of a lack of solid counter-evidence as of evidence to confirm it. So what is holding back the government?
Instead, China is now facing demands for compensation amounting to $10 trillion. Donald Trump was the one who brought this sum into play last week. He is no longer US president, but his influence on his party, the Republicans, remains enormous and his candidacy once again is not out of the question. If Trump succeeds in convincing Americans that the People’s Republic owes the country a trillion-dollar sum, American concessions to the Chinese government will be negotiated even harder. This is not in the interests of the Chinese. Just last week, US President Joe Biden showed his distrust – and temporarily banned 59 Chinese companies as investment targets for American investors (as China.Table reported).
Claims for damages could also massively exacerbate tensions between China and the international community. “Enormous claims for damages from practically the entire world against the Chinese state would be obvious. If China rejects these, the respective countries could seize the foreign assets of Chinese state-owned companies that they have,” writes financial mathematician Andreas Beck in an analysis for the news portal ntv.de. Such an escalation would mean a “dramatic storm” politically, but also for the financial markets.
An additional dose of mistrust towards the Chinese regime also lowers the inhibition threshold for a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. On Monday, the Interparliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a grouping of MEPs from around the world that aims to promote a consistent stance by democratic states toward the People’s Republic, launched a concerted action: Ten IPAC members from the European Parliament are calling on the European Council to adopt an EU position. Representatives from the parliaments of Germany, the US, Canada, Italy, the Czech Republic, Denmark and the UK are involved in the IPAC initiative.
True, the initiative refers to human rights crimes in Xinjiang and not to doubts about the origin of the Covid pandemic. But the chances that it will fall on fertile ground increase if trust in the Chinese government continues to decline due to its lack of transparency on Covid.
Michael Kahn-Ackermann has actually been retired for almost ten years, but the soon-to-be 75-year-old is far from “retired.” Just a few months ago, he was hit by a wave of Chinese indignation after he translated the “Wuhan Diary” by writer Fang Fang into German. The book about the experience of the Covid crisis became a bestseller in Germany. Kahn-Ackermann finds it “completely ridiculous” that he is approached as a translator for the content of the text. But he knows, “The dynamics behind such cases are highly complex.”
Kahn-Ackermann knows China’s approach to culture better than anyone, having advised the Confucius Institute headquarters for eight years until 2019. “China has very little experience in foreign cultural policy.” However, China also seemed to care particularly about changing that, which is why the cooperation was moderately successful, Kahn-Ackermann said. At the same time, he has been working as a “China Special Representative” for the Mercator Foundation since 2011. There, he primarily helps with contacts because he has a “relatively large network of connections,” as he says himself.
That’s not surprising because he already had contacts in China when the country was still little regarded in the West. In 1970, Kahn-Ackermann decided to study Sinology: “The pretty much most useless thing on offer at Munich University at the time.” In 1974, still on scholarship during the Cultural Revolution, he traveled to China as one of ten students. In the two years at Beijing University, he learned Chinese – and in the years that followed, studying sinology turned out to be not so useless.
The first Goethe-Institut in China was officially opened at the end of 1988 – with Kahn-Ackermann as Founding Director. The early years were difficult “until they realized we were not there for espionage purposes.” It was not until 1993 that the Beijing Goethe-Institut was allowed to offer cultural programs and language teaching. For 16 years, it was the only foreign institution in the fields of culture and education in China. At that time, the Goethe-Institut was “a very important window to the outside world for the Chinese.” From 1994 to 2006, Kahn-Ackermann made professional stops at the Goethe Institutes in Moscow and Rome. In 2006 he returned to Beijing to the Goethe-Institut. Even though its function has changed in the meantime, Kahn-Ackermann is convinced: “The Goethe-Institut is still a place where you can try out something that would not be so easy to try out in other institutions.”
He is particularly fascinated by the “acceleration” he has witnessed in China. China was still a developing country when he was there for the first time. Now it is a world power. He describes his relationship with China as having “an emotional scale from love to anger, from joy to pain.” In contrast, he experiences an “unrealistic” image of China among many Europeans and in the Western media. He finds it very difficult to change this.
In the meantime, Michael Kahn-Ackermann lives in Nanjing “because of love.” His circle of friends consists mainly of Chinese. For some time, he has been curating art exhibitions, he still doesn’t get bored. In April 2021, Fang Fang’s novel “Soft Burial” was published in German – translated by Kahn-Ackermann. Paula Faul
The Gaokao exams are taking place in China these days. Gakao, probably the toughest exam in the world, decides on a student’s future career: on access to the country’s universities, on the chances of getting a well-paid job. Here, students in Nanjing are just coming out of their exams. Some even have a smile on their faces.
