Famines caused by higher prices, heat waves in Italy and India, Russia’s attack on Ukraine – as if we didn’t have enough crises already, a new, very big concern has been added to the list: the escalating tensions between China and the USA.
The security conference in Singapore over the weekend, which is of great importance for the region, did not promote the desired communication. It was dominated by the simmering conflict between the two world powers. The defense ministers of both countries traded fierce blows over Taiwan and China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea. But despite all the fierceness – it is a good sign that both sides are at least holding out the prospect of continued talks in the future, analyzes Michael Radunski.
Omicron also remains one of the big concerns of these months. The virus remains unpredictable. So it is highly questionable that the CP leadership sticks downright fanatically to its zero-Covid strategy. But it is interesting to note that while two million Shanghainese have to go back into lockdown after only a few days of reopening, life in Beijing, which is actually stricter, is largely normal. What makes Beijing different from Shanghai? Frank Sieren explores this question. His answer: Shanghai was far too late with its measures – at Beijing’s behest.
China’s Minister of Defense Wei Fenghe met his American counterpart Lloyd Austin in person for the first time on the weekend. The stage for the meeting is the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. This is the most important security conference in the Asia-Pacific region. But relations between China and the US are extremely tense, with disputes ranging from the Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the South China Sea and from Taiwan to China’s position on the Ukraine war.
And so, Wei Fenghe wastes no time in Singapore on pleasantries. On Friday – even before the official opening of the conference – China’s top military officer sets the tone: While directly talking to Austin, Wei strongly warns of a potential war. “If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese army will definitely not hesitate to start a war no matter the cost.” Any conspiracy to bring independence to Taiwan would be crushed, and the unification of the motherland would be resolutely upheld. Wei makes it unequivocally clear: “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan”.
China’s Minister of Defense then followed up in the same tone when he gave his official speech at the Shangri-La Forum on Sunday – just as determined and just as unequivocal: “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China, we will not hesitate to fight,” Wei said. “We will fight at all costs, and we will fight to the very end“. No one should underestimate the determination and ability of Chinese forces to maintain their territorial integrity. This primarily was aimed at the United States.
That is because the day before, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had outlined the American view of Taiwan and the region. In his nearly one-hour speech, Austin repeatedly drew parallels between Russia’s actions in Ukraine and China’s “more coercive and aggressive approach” in the Indo-Pacific. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is what happens when oppressors trample the rules that protect us all,” Austin said. “It’s what happens when big powers decide that their imperial appetites matter more than the rights of their peaceful neighbors. And it’s a preview of a possible world of chaos and turmoil that none of us would want to live in,” Austin said in Singapore.
And so Austin promised that the US would help countries in Asia to resist Chinese “bullying”. That, he said, was necessary to prevent a Ukraine crisis from repeating itself in the Pacific. Referring to Russia and China, he said, “We feel the headwinds – from threats, and intimidation, and the obsolete belief in a world carved up into spheres of influence”.
He noted with great concern that China was increasingly aggressive in trying to assert its territorial claims. Austin cited, among other things, China’s military activities around Taiwan, such as its regular military flights, and warned of destabilization in the region. Only a few days ago, 30 Chinese aircraft had entered Taiwan’s so-called Air Defense Zone; according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense, more than 20 fighter jets were among them (China.Table reported).
Observers recently have noted a sharpening of US policy on Taiwan. When US President Joe Biden was asked in Japan in late May whether the United States would also defend Taiwan by deploying the US Army, Biden said, “Yes, that’s the commitment we made”. (China.Table reported). Shortly before, the US State Department changed the description of Taiwan on its website: It removed the reference to “one China” – a supposedly small but exceedingly symbolic change (China.Table reported). Until now, the US strategy was to remain intentionally vague. In this way, China was to remain in the dark about the US’s determination; and concurrently, Taiwan was not to be given any incentive to declare independence with supposed American backing.
However, US Secretary of Defense Austin reassured on Saturday, “Our policy hasn’t changed, but unfortunately, that doesn’t seem to be true for the PRC”. Maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait was not just a US interest, he said, but one of international importance. “We do not seek confrontation or conflict. And we do not seek a new Cold War, an Asian NATO, or a region split into hostile blocs,” Austin said. The US Secretary of Defense’s words were meant to show everyone at the conference, as well as the people in the region, who the good guys are and who the bad guys are.
China simply could not let that stand. Only moments after the Secretary of Defense finished his speech, China’s first angry reaction followed. Lieutenant General Zhang Zhenzhong called Austin’s remarks a series of falsehoods and malicious insinuations, all aimed at confrontation. “The US has been strengthening its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, consolidating bilateral military alliances and beefing up the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, the QUAD, the Five-Eyes alliance. What should we call this other than a confrontation?” He said it was the US that had wreaked havoc in the Middle East and brought instability to Europe. And now they are trying to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region, said the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission.
China’s Minister of Defense Wei also presented this line of reasoning again to delegates on Sunday, saying America’s behavior is the main cause of tensions – all over the world, from Ukraine to the South China Sea.
At the same time, China surprisingly repositioned itself on the Ukraine issue, albeit indirectly. First, Wei retaliated against Austin’s attacks on his country, saying that anyone who supplied Ukraine with weapons was pouring fuel into the fire. He strongly criticized the EU and the NATO countries, which have been supporting Ukraine for weeks with military equipment to defend itself against Russia.
He also stressed that his country had not provided any material support to Russia in its war. The closer ties between the People’s Republic and Russia were a partnership, not an alliance. He apparently wanted to counter speculations that China would side with Russia to join forces against the West.
However, the message of the Chinese Minister of Defense was met with skepticism in the audience, as was evident from the critical follow-up questions. And here, too, observant listeners in Singapore could detect small changes: Whereas in his speech he had still adhered to China’s official terminology of a “conflict”, Wei subsequently spoke of a “war” in Ukraine after all.
But the remarks on Ukraine were also aimed at Washington. Overall, the Asian security conference in Singapore was dominated by tensions between China and the United States. Both sides tried to promote their conflicting visions of regional order and stability. It was a frank and tough trade of blows that Wei Fenghe and Llyod Austin engaged in Singapore. The task now is to find solutions. Too much is at stake. But this will only succeed through dialogue. So it is a good sign that, despite all the harshness, the two defense ministers held out the prospect of continued talks. Collaboration: Felix Lee
Shanghai has suffered a relapse: Over ten percent of the city’s 25 million is again in lockdown. The entire district of Minhang. In parallel, 15 million people were tested again over the weekend. Further rounds of testing will follow over the coming week. After measures had been lifted just a week ago, the Covid-19 flare-up now comes as a bit of a shock. On Sunday, the city reported 5 detected infections. On Saturday, it was 29.
Shanghai’s never-ending terror raises the question of why the lockdowns in Beijing and Shanghai turned out so differently. Some suspected that it was Beijing’s revenge for Shanghai being too liberal. A way to drive out the last foreigners, others said. Yet others believe that state and party leader Xi Jinping wants a new Cultural Revolution. Some even went so far as to assume that a martial law situation was being tested before an invasion of Taiwan.
The most likely explanation is simpler. Shanghai still saw the arrival of most flights from the infested Omicron world out there. At the same time, Shanghai authorities were supposed to keep quiet at the behest of Beijing. The capital itself was hosting the Olympics and the National People’s Congress in close succession. The leadership did not need bad news about rising infection rates. Meanwhile, the city of Beijing itself was meticulously enforcing the various systems and bubbles that prevented the introduction of the disease.
The standstill course masked the reality in Shanghai: The first Omicron carriers arrived in Shanghai from abroad as early as the second week of January. Some became positive only after more than 21 days and the end of their quarantine. But the political motto was to keep the lid on. There were only small lockdowns. In any case, on January 18, the entry quarantine was extended from 14 to 21 days.
Other than that, the whole of China was supposed to appear calm and stable ahead of the most important holidays around Chinese New Year in February and, above all, the Olympic Games, which in fact went almost smoothly. But weeks of politically decreed inactivity passed in this way. Only after March 11, when the National People’s Congress ended, was action taken in Shanghai to deal with the rising incidence.
The big lockdown hit on March 17 – too late to stop Omicron. Now, local cadres in Shanghai overreacted to the other extreme, using methods reminiscent of the days of the Cultural Revolution. A spiral of brutality: Tens of thousands of people who tested positive but showed no symptoms were locked away in mess halls, mothers separated from their children, animals beaten to death. Parts of the population at times did not have enough to eat. Despite such harsh measures, it took two and a half months for Shanghai to reopen in early June.
One important reason for the late reaction in Shanghai: China was altogether too proud of its zero-Covid policy. The leadership felt too safe. After all, this strategy had enabled around 90 percent of the 1.4 billion Chinese to live a normal life for the past two years, while the world was turned upside down. China’s zero-Covid policy was originally born out of necessity. China’s health care system is still underdeveloped. While the country has about 3 ICU beds per 100,000 people, Germany, for example, has more than 30. Zero-Covid was so successful, however, that people were not too concerned about vaccinations either. Above all, the elderly, who are skeptical about vaccinations, were not bothered. They said to themselves: If there is no Covid in China, why vaccinate?
However, the leadership was caught off guard by Omicron. Zero-covid was not a suitable strategy for the highly contagious variant. The Omicron development in Hong Kong revealed a new threat situation for the first time. As infections became almost impossible to prevent, the focus was now on preventing severe infections, especially among the elderly. Here, however, the government stood politically blank, with some 100 million old people insufficiently vaccinated or not vaccinated at all to date. And this is only a few months before the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party, at which Xi Jinping is to be appointed head of state and party for the third time in decades.
So Shanghai was first doomed to inaction, but then, after the visible flare-up of infections, it was all the more harshly dealt with. The severity calmed the majority of the Chinese population, but in Shanghai, the economically and politically most important city along with Beijing and Guangzhou, trust in politics has developed deep cracks.
For President Xi’s opponents, this development is a glimmer of hope. They never tire of pointing out the cracks and, if possible, widening them. The discord within the party is more visible than ever. This has put Xi in a bind. He is now unable to admit that his zero-Covid policy is outdated. That would look like he is being forced to yield to his political opponents.
Xi at least had to prove that Shanghai was not the rule of his policy, but an exception. Therefore, he used the Shenzhen method to fight the virus in Beijing, as he did in most of China’s cities. This method works, if action is taken early on, unlike in Shanghai: Intensive daily testing in partial-lockdown to trace infection routes, and isolating individual apartment blocks or streets – in the event of people testing positive.
For most of the people in Beijing, that meant in the last few weeks: You were free to move around the city, but you couldn’t congregate. Sports facilities and large parks were closed. People worked from home. Going to the office for a change – no problem. Schools were switched to online classes. Shopping malls were closed. You could order anything at restaurants, but you couldn’t eat there. You had to log in with your Covid app everywhere. And daily testing was mandatory, although the lines were rarely as long as in Shanghai, where waiting times could be as long as 4 hours. Between 2 and 20 minutes was the Beijing rule.
The people of Beijing made the best of the situation. People met for picnics on the outskirts of the city, rode bicycles in the empty streets in clear air and perfect weather, and went for walks and jogs. Many stand-up boards appeared on Beijing’s rivers – something of a detox for the restless city dwellers.
The mood was a mix of queasiness and serenity, enjoying every day outside as if it were the last. Will tomorrow be like Shanghai? Only once there was panic buying for a few hours, due to false rumors on social media. Otherwise, the stores were normally stocked and always open.
New business ideas were born, such as beer carts that sold draft beer on-the-go, or food that could be eaten while walking. After all, people weren’t allowed to congregate. Not even to play soccer. Some soccer fields were fenced off with barbed wire. But as soon as it was dark, the teenagers cut holes in the fence and played until they were chased away by local police. Meanwhile, the young partied spontaneously in small groups under echoing highway bridges, with big loudspeakers strapped to grandma’s old shopping trolley, which they pulled behind their e-scooters until the police chased them away. Off to the next bridge, further away from the center. 3rd ring. 4th ring. 5th ring.
However, a shifting minority had bad luck in Beijing as well: A positive test in the neighborhood meant a week of house arrest. This resulted in occasional unrest, leading to abuses and harassment. Overall, however, the Beijing lockdown was well-balanced. And its citizens said: Shanghai, look at us! That’s how lockdown works. Now, the order of the day is to get back to economic normalcy. China may still get its act together for the rest of the year. The May export figures give a reason for hope: 16.9 percent growth. After only 3.9 percent in April.
Meanwhile, the Jiangsu province bordering Shanghai shortened the entry quarantine over the weekend: 3 days hotel quarantine after arrival in Shanghai, 4 days hotel quarantine in Jiangsu, and 7 days quarantine at home. Only two weeks – there is certainly worse.
But it was also a weekend of setbacks. On Saturday alone, 46 new cases were registered in Beijing alone. 61 on Friday. At least all cases could be traced back to a bar at the Workers’ Stadium and are already in isolation. Still, bars and clubs were closed again in at least two districts, including the Chaoyang foreigner district. Restaurants remain open. But unlike planned, schools did not reopen this Monday.
Justin Yifu Lin presents himself more confident than the Chinese government itself. At the beginning of the year, the economist predicted a six percent growth rate for the country’s economy for 2022. The government forecast only 5.5 percent. Without Covid, annual growth of as much as eight percent is possible by 2035, estimates the 69-year-old honorary dean of Peking University. Analysts from European rating agencies are rubbing their eyes in disbelief at such optimism. They see China growing by just over four percent this year.
But confidence is an essential building block for Justin Yifu Lin’s career. This was also the case in 1979, when the Taiwanese-born economist looked from the shore of Kinmen Island toward the People’s Republic and boldly climbed into the water. Legend has it that the deserting soldier used two basketballs to help him swim to Xiamen Island, two kilometers away. In a sense, Lin fled in reverse from democratic Taiwan to the authoritarian People’s Republic.
His motivation? Inner conviction: Based on his cultural, historical, political and economic understanding, he had come to the conclusion that the return to the motherland was historically inevitable, he wrote shortly after his escape. He left his family behind.
He then studied Marxist economics in Beijing. It was there that he met Theodore Schultz. The American Nobel laureate arranged a scholarship for him to pursue a doctorate in Chicago, where he researched topics such as China’s opening to a market economy.
Justin Yifu Lin sees a major reason for the country’s rise in the utilization of the comparative advantages of labor in the country. Labor is cheap in China, a fact that was long underestimated. After all, heavy industry from the time before Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1979 was primarily capital-intensive. From then on, however, China relied on mass production, on nimble hands that didn’t cost much.
Justin Yifu Lin turned down an offer to teach in the USA after earning his PhD. Instead, he is drawn back to China. “The country was changing from a planned economy to a market economy. That was fascinating,” he told Brand eins magazine looking back. In 1986, he returned to Beijing and founded an economic policy think tank, the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER), at Peking University in 1993. He quickly rose to become one of the most important government advisors.
In 2008, he was appointed Chief Economist of the World Bank. During his four-year term, he promoted his New Structural Economics. This theory aims to help emerging and developing countries achieve greater prosperity. According to Justin Yifu Lin, successful economic development always requires the interaction of state and market.
In industries where working conditions are more favorable than abroad, the state must use intelligent strategies and investments to promote innovation in the country. That’s what China has done – successfully, in his opinion: “The world,” Lin once said during his time at the World Bank, “can learn a lot from China. And I want to help with that.”
Today, the university professor and author of more than 20 books is also an advisor to the Chinese government. But recently, his influence on politics has probably waned. At least that is what China observer Angela Stanzel suspects. He is not to blame: “The Xi Jinping leadership is obviously less and less concerned with economic development and more and more with party-political control,” says the China expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.
On foreign trade, Justin Yifu Lin is in line with the government’s stance. Beijing accuses the United States of hindering its rise. Lin also laments that the US stifles the Chinese economy by imposing sanctions, such as those against the IT group Huawei.
But as is often the case, he is confident that this situation will soon change – in China’s favor. The country’s enormous growth will do the trick. “One day, our economy will be twice as strong as that of the United States.” He then expects the United States to follow China’s lead. “Only in trade with China can the US benefit,” he said at an economic forum in Beijing in May. Andreas Schulte
Prof. Justin Yifu Lin will discuss the topic “Can China achieve its 2022 GDP growth target of 5.5%?” at an event hosted by IfW Kiel as part of the Global China Conversations series on Thursday (June 16). China.Table is a media partner of the event series.
For some it is the pinnacle of all snacking pleasure, for others an acoustic nightmare. If you have rather sensitive auditory canals and have ever been within the crunching radius of a passionate seed cruncher, you know: Now it’s either munch along or get the hell out. The seeds we are talking about here are called “guazi” (瓜子 guāzǐ) in China – the Chinese collective term for all seeds that can be snacked on. Mostly this refers to sunflower seeds, but occasionally also pumpkin, pine, watermelon or other seeds.
Crunching pros loudly split the seeds using their front teeth and then fish them out of the shell in their mouths with a lot of tongue skill. 嗑瓜子 kè guāzǐ (“to crack (seeds) between one’s teeth”) is the Chinese expression for this procedure. Whether it’s for a spring festival, movie night, or after-work beer – for many Chinese, “guazi” are a staple of sociable group events. They are also a welcome treat while waiting in restaurant foyers or train station halls.
Even a blemish is named after the small seeds, namely the guazi tooth (瓜子牙 guāzǐyá). It is the burden that brands die-hard crunch fanatics when they have overdone it over the years by ecstatically cracking open hard shells. As a “punishment”, some have developed a small notch in their front incisors over time. This makes it easy to identify them as Guazi aficionados at the first smile.
Those who want to prevent this from happening are best advised to purchase an automatic guazi cracking machine. They actually exist. On Taobao, you can choose from a wide variety of models. Among genuine guazi connoisseurs, however, such devices are notorious for spoiling the fun and taste. After all, the seeds are roasted in special flavor mixtures, so much of what makes the taste buds tingle is on the outer crunchy shell. A seed without a shell – for true crunch fans, that’s like lovemaking without foreplay. By the way, the most popular guazi flavors in the Middle Kingdom include caramel (焦糖 jiāotáng), five-spice blend (五香 wǔxiāng – made from fennel, Chinese pepper, star anise, cinnamon and clove), cream (奶油 nǎiyóu) and green tea (绿茶 lǜchá).
Just how deeply the mental concept of the “guazi” has burned itself into the minds of the Chinese is demonstrated by the concept of the guazi face (瓜子脸 guāzǐliǎn). This is considered the epitome of a harmonious facial shape and thus the ideal of beauty. A classic “seed face” is characterized by soft, flowing lines, tends to be roundish at the top, but narrows towards the chin. Of course, not everyone has such an ideal face. But don’t worry, Taobao has got you covered.
If you type in the search term “guazi face” on the online shopping portal, you will find numerous “guazi facial remedies” (瓜子脸神器 guāzǐliǎn shénqì) advertised, which are supposed to ensure a slim facial shape. The wild choices range from manual to electric facial massagers to bite balls for facial muscle training and cosmetic masks with special slimming formulas to shaping rubber masks and tension belts. Those who would like to conceal their supposedly abnormal face until the first successes are achieved can also choose from a wide range of special eyeglass frames, sunglasses and headgear designed to make the face appear more “seedy”. Or maybe just continuing to chew guazi will do the trick? Try it out!
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Famines caused by higher prices, heat waves in Italy and India, Russia’s attack on Ukraine – as if we didn’t have enough crises already, a new, very big concern has been added to the list: the escalating tensions between China and the USA.
The security conference in Singapore over the weekend, which is of great importance for the region, did not promote the desired communication. It was dominated by the simmering conflict between the two world powers. The defense ministers of both countries traded fierce blows over Taiwan and China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea. But despite all the fierceness – it is a good sign that both sides are at least holding out the prospect of continued talks in the future, analyzes Michael Radunski.
Omicron also remains one of the big concerns of these months. The virus remains unpredictable. So it is highly questionable that the CP leadership sticks downright fanatically to its zero-Covid strategy. But it is interesting to note that while two million Shanghainese have to go back into lockdown after only a few days of reopening, life in Beijing, which is actually stricter, is largely normal. What makes Beijing different from Shanghai? Frank Sieren explores this question. His answer: Shanghai was far too late with its measures – at Beijing’s behest.
China’s Minister of Defense Wei Fenghe met his American counterpart Lloyd Austin in person for the first time on the weekend. The stage for the meeting is the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. This is the most important security conference in the Asia-Pacific region. But relations between China and the US are extremely tense, with disputes ranging from the Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the South China Sea and from Taiwan to China’s position on the Ukraine war.
And so, Wei Fenghe wastes no time in Singapore on pleasantries. On Friday – even before the official opening of the conference – China’s top military officer sets the tone: While directly talking to Austin, Wei strongly warns of a potential war. “If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese army will definitely not hesitate to start a war no matter the cost.” Any conspiracy to bring independence to Taiwan would be crushed, and the unification of the motherland would be resolutely upheld. Wei makes it unequivocally clear: “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan”.
China’s Minister of Defense then followed up in the same tone when he gave his official speech at the Shangri-La Forum on Sunday – just as determined and just as unequivocal: “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China, we will not hesitate to fight,” Wei said. “We will fight at all costs, and we will fight to the very end“. No one should underestimate the determination and ability of Chinese forces to maintain their territorial integrity. This primarily was aimed at the United States.
That is because the day before, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had outlined the American view of Taiwan and the region. In his nearly one-hour speech, Austin repeatedly drew parallels between Russia’s actions in Ukraine and China’s “more coercive and aggressive approach” in the Indo-Pacific. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is what happens when oppressors trample the rules that protect us all,” Austin said. “It’s what happens when big powers decide that their imperial appetites matter more than the rights of their peaceful neighbors. And it’s a preview of a possible world of chaos and turmoil that none of us would want to live in,” Austin said in Singapore.
And so Austin promised that the US would help countries in Asia to resist Chinese “bullying”. That, he said, was necessary to prevent a Ukraine crisis from repeating itself in the Pacific. Referring to Russia and China, he said, “We feel the headwinds – from threats, and intimidation, and the obsolete belief in a world carved up into spheres of influence”.
He noted with great concern that China was increasingly aggressive in trying to assert its territorial claims. Austin cited, among other things, China’s military activities around Taiwan, such as its regular military flights, and warned of destabilization in the region. Only a few days ago, 30 Chinese aircraft had entered Taiwan’s so-called Air Defense Zone; according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense, more than 20 fighter jets were among them (China.Table reported).
Observers recently have noted a sharpening of US policy on Taiwan. When US President Joe Biden was asked in Japan in late May whether the United States would also defend Taiwan by deploying the US Army, Biden said, “Yes, that’s the commitment we made”. (China.Table reported). Shortly before, the US State Department changed the description of Taiwan on its website: It removed the reference to “one China” – a supposedly small but exceedingly symbolic change (China.Table reported). Until now, the US strategy was to remain intentionally vague. In this way, China was to remain in the dark about the US’s determination; and concurrently, Taiwan was not to be given any incentive to declare independence with supposed American backing.
However, US Secretary of Defense Austin reassured on Saturday, “Our policy hasn’t changed, but unfortunately, that doesn’t seem to be true for the PRC”. Maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait was not just a US interest, he said, but one of international importance. “We do not seek confrontation or conflict. And we do not seek a new Cold War, an Asian NATO, or a region split into hostile blocs,” Austin said. The US Secretary of Defense’s words were meant to show everyone at the conference, as well as the people in the region, who the good guys are and who the bad guys are.
China simply could not let that stand. Only moments after the Secretary of Defense finished his speech, China’s first angry reaction followed. Lieutenant General Zhang Zhenzhong called Austin’s remarks a series of falsehoods and malicious insinuations, all aimed at confrontation. “The US has been strengthening its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, consolidating bilateral military alliances and beefing up the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, the QUAD, the Five-Eyes alliance. What should we call this other than a confrontation?” He said it was the US that had wreaked havoc in the Middle East and brought instability to Europe. And now they are trying to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region, said the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission.
China’s Minister of Defense Wei also presented this line of reasoning again to delegates on Sunday, saying America’s behavior is the main cause of tensions – all over the world, from Ukraine to the South China Sea.
At the same time, China surprisingly repositioned itself on the Ukraine issue, albeit indirectly. First, Wei retaliated against Austin’s attacks on his country, saying that anyone who supplied Ukraine with weapons was pouring fuel into the fire. He strongly criticized the EU and the NATO countries, which have been supporting Ukraine for weeks with military equipment to defend itself against Russia.
He also stressed that his country had not provided any material support to Russia in its war. The closer ties between the People’s Republic and Russia were a partnership, not an alliance. He apparently wanted to counter speculations that China would side with Russia to join forces against the West.
However, the message of the Chinese Minister of Defense was met with skepticism in the audience, as was evident from the critical follow-up questions. And here, too, observant listeners in Singapore could detect small changes: Whereas in his speech he had still adhered to China’s official terminology of a “conflict”, Wei subsequently spoke of a “war” in Ukraine after all.
But the remarks on Ukraine were also aimed at Washington. Overall, the Asian security conference in Singapore was dominated by tensions between China and the United States. Both sides tried to promote their conflicting visions of regional order and stability. It was a frank and tough trade of blows that Wei Fenghe and Llyod Austin engaged in Singapore. The task now is to find solutions. Too much is at stake. But this will only succeed through dialogue. So it is a good sign that, despite all the harshness, the two defense ministers held out the prospect of continued talks. Collaboration: Felix Lee
Shanghai has suffered a relapse: Over ten percent of the city’s 25 million is again in lockdown. The entire district of Minhang. In parallel, 15 million people were tested again over the weekend. Further rounds of testing will follow over the coming week. After measures had been lifted just a week ago, the Covid-19 flare-up now comes as a bit of a shock. On Sunday, the city reported 5 detected infections. On Saturday, it was 29.
Shanghai’s never-ending terror raises the question of why the lockdowns in Beijing and Shanghai turned out so differently. Some suspected that it was Beijing’s revenge for Shanghai being too liberal. A way to drive out the last foreigners, others said. Yet others believe that state and party leader Xi Jinping wants a new Cultural Revolution. Some even went so far as to assume that a martial law situation was being tested before an invasion of Taiwan.
The most likely explanation is simpler. Shanghai still saw the arrival of most flights from the infested Omicron world out there. At the same time, Shanghai authorities were supposed to keep quiet at the behest of Beijing. The capital itself was hosting the Olympics and the National People’s Congress in close succession. The leadership did not need bad news about rising infection rates. Meanwhile, the city of Beijing itself was meticulously enforcing the various systems and bubbles that prevented the introduction of the disease.
The standstill course masked the reality in Shanghai: The first Omicron carriers arrived in Shanghai from abroad as early as the second week of January. Some became positive only after more than 21 days and the end of their quarantine. But the political motto was to keep the lid on. There were only small lockdowns. In any case, on January 18, the entry quarantine was extended from 14 to 21 days.
Other than that, the whole of China was supposed to appear calm and stable ahead of the most important holidays around Chinese New Year in February and, above all, the Olympic Games, which in fact went almost smoothly. But weeks of politically decreed inactivity passed in this way. Only after March 11, when the National People’s Congress ended, was action taken in Shanghai to deal with the rising incidence.
The big lockdown hit on March 17 – too late to stop Omicron. Now, local cadres in Shanghai overreacted to the other extreme, using methods reminiscent of the days of the Cultural Revolution. A spiral of brutality: Tens of thousands of people who tested positive but showed no symptoms were locked away in mess halls, mothers separated from their children, animals beaten to death. Parts of the population at times did not have enough to eat. Despite such harsh measures, it took two and a half months for Shanghai to reopen in early June.
One important reason for the late reaction in Shanghai: China was altogether too proud of its zero-Covid policy. The leadership felt too safe. After all, this strategy had enabled around 90 percent of the 1.4 billion Chinese to live a normal life for the past two years, while the world was turned upside down. China’s zero-Covid policy was originally born out of necessity. China’s health care system is still underdeveloped. While the country has about 3 ICU beds per 100,000 people, Germany, for example, has more than 30. Zero-Covid was so successful, however, that people were not too concerned about vaccinations either. Above all, the elderly, who are skeptical about vaccinations, were not bothered. They said to themselves: If there is no Covid in China, why vaccinate?
However, the leadership was caught off guard by Omicron. Zero-covid was not a suitable strategy for the highly contagious variant. The Omicron development in Hong Kong revealed a new threat situation for the first time. As infections became almost impossible to prevent, the focus was now on preventing severe infections, especially among the elderly. Here, however, the government stood politically blank, with some 100 million old people insufficiently vaccinated or not vaccinated at all to date. And this is only a few months before the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party, at which Xi Jinping is to be appointed head of state and party for the third time in decades.
So Shanghai was first doomed to inaction, but then, after the visible flare-up of infections, it was all the more harshly dealt with. The severity calmed the majority of the Chinese population, but in Shanghai, the economically and politically most important city along with Beijing and Guangzhou, trust in politics has developed deep cracks.
For President Xi’s opponents, this development is a glimmer of hope. They never tire of pointing out the cracks and, if possible, widening them. The discord within the party is more visible than ever. This has put Xi in a bind. He is now unable to admit that his zero-Covid policy is outdated. That would look like he is being forced to yield to his political opponents.
Xi at least had to prove that Shanghai was not the rule of his policy, but an exception. Therefore, he used the Shenzhen method to fight the virus in Beijing, as he did in most of China’s cities. This method works, if action is taken early on, unlike in Shanghai: Intensive daily testing in partial-lockdown to trace infection routes, and isolating individual apartment blocks or streets – in the event of people testing positive.
For most of the people in Beijing, that meant in the last few weeks: You were free to move around the city, but you couldn’t congregate. Sports facilities and large parks were closed. People worked from home. Going to the office for a change – no problem. Schools were switched to online classes. Shopping malls were closed. You could order anything at restaurants, but you couldn’t eat there. You had to log in with your Covid app everywhere. And daily testing was mandatory, although the lines were rarely as long as in Shanghai, where waiting times could be as long as 4 hours. Between 2 and 20 minutes was the Beijing rule.
The people of Beijing made the best of the situation. People met for picnics on the outskirts of the city, rode bicycles in the empty streets in clear air and perfect weather, and went for walks and jogs. Many stand-up boards appeared on Beijing’s rivers – something of a detox for the restless city dwellers.
The mood was a mix of queasiness and serenity, enjoying every day outside as if it were the last. Will tomorrow be like Shanghai? Only once there was panic buying for a few hours, due to false rumors on social media. Otherwise, the stores were normally stocked and always open.
New business ideas were born, such as beer carts that sold draft beer on-the-go, or food that could be eaten while walking. After all, people weren’t allowed to congregate. Not even to play soccer. Some soccer fields were fenced off with barbed wire. But as soon as it was dark, the teenagers cut holes in the fence and played until they were chased away by local police. Meanwhile, the young partied spontaneously in small groups under echoing highway bridges, with big loudspeakers strapped to grandma’s old shopping trolley, which they pulled behind their e-scooters until the police chased them away. Off to the next bridge, further away from the center. 3rd ring. 4th ring. 5th ring.
However, a shifting minority had bad luck in Beijing as well: A positive test in the neighborhood meant a week of house arrest. This resulted in occasional unrest, leading to abuses and harassment. Overall, however, the Beijing lockdown was well-balanced. And its citizens said: Shanghai, look at us! That’s how lockdown works. Now, the order of the day is to get back to economic normalcy. China may still get its act together for the rest of the year. The May export figures give a reason for hope: 16.9 percent growth. After only 3.9 percent in April.
Meanwhile, the Jiangsu province bordering Shanghai shortened the entry quarantine over the weekend: 3 days hotel quarantine after arrival in Shanghai, 4 days hotel quarantine in Jiangsu, and 7 days quarantine at home. Only two weeks – there is certainly worse.
But it was also a weekend of setbacks. On Saturday alone, 46 new cases were registered in Beijing alone. 61 on Friday. At least all cases could be traced back to a bar at the Workers’ Stadium and are already in isolation. Still, bars and clubs were closed again in at least two districts, including the Chaoyang foreigner district. Restaurants remain open. But unlike planned, schools did not reopen this Monday.
Justin Yifu Lin presents himself more confident than the Chinese government itself. At the beginning of the year, the economist predicted a six percent growth rate for the country’s economy for 2022. The government forecast only 5.5 percent. Without Covid, annual growth of as much as eight percent is possible by 2035, estimates the 69-year-old honorary dean of Peking University. Analysts from European rating agencies are rubbing their eyes in disbelief at such optimism. They see China growing by just over four percent this year.
But confidence is an essential building block for Justin Yifu Lin’s career. This was also the case in 1979, when the Taiwanese-born economist looked from the shore of Kinmen Island toward the People’s Republic and boldly climbed into the water. Legend has it that the deserting soldier used two basketballs to help him swim to Xiamen Island, two kilometers away. In a sense, Lin fled in reverse from democratic Taiwan to the authoritarian People’s Republic.
His motivation? Inner conviction: Based on his cultural, historical, political and economic understanding, he had come to the conclusion that the return to the motherland was historically inevitable, he wrote shortly after his escape. He left his family behind.
He then studied Marxist economics in Beijing. It was there that he met Theodore Schultz. The American Nobel laureate arranged a scholarship for him to pursue a doctorate in Chicago, where he researched topics such as China’s opening to a market economy.
Justin Yifu Lin sees a major reason for the country’s rise in the utilization of the comparative advantages of labor in the country. Labor is cheap in China, a fact that was long underestimated. After all, heavy industry from the time before Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1979 was primarily capital-intensive. From then on, however, China relied on mass production, on nimble hands that didn’t cost much.
Justin Yifu Lin turned down an offer to teach in the USA after earning his PhD. Instead, he is drawn back to China. “The country was changing from a planned economy to a market economy. That was fascinating,” he told Brand eins magazine looking back. In 1986, he returned to Beijing and founded an economic policy think tank, the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER), at Peking University in 1993. He quickly rose to become one of the most important government advisors.
In 2008, he was appointed Chief Economist of the World Bank. During his four-year term, he promoted his New Structural Economics. This theory aims to help emerging and developing countries achieve greater prosperity. According to Justin Yifu Lin, successful economic development always requires the interaction of state and market.
In industries where working conditions are more favorable than abroad, the state must use intelligent strategies and investments to promote innovation in the country. That’s what China has done – successfully, in his opinion: “The world,” Lin once said during his time at the World Bank, “can learn a lot from China. And I want to help with that.”
Today, the university professor and author of more than 20 books is also an advisor to the Chinese government. But recently, his influence on politics has probably waned. At least that is what China observer Angela Stanzel suspects. He is not to blame: “The Xi Jinping leadership is obviously less and less concerned with economic development and more and more with party-political control,” says the China expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.
On foreign trade, Justin Yifu Lin is in line with the government’s stance. Beijing accuses the United States of hindering its rise. Lin also laments that the US stifles the Chinese economy by imposing sanctions, such as those against the IT group Huawei.
But as is often the case, he is confident that this situation will soon change – in China’s favor. The country’s enormous growth will do the trick. “One day, our economy will be twice as strong as that of the United States.” He then expects the United States to follow China’s lead. “Only in trade with China can the US benefit,” he said at an economic forum in Beijing in May. Andreas Schulte
Prof. Justin Yifu Lin will discuss the topic “Can China achieve its 2022 GDP growth target of 5.5%?” at an event hosted by IfW Kiel as part of the Global China Conversations series on Thursday (June 16). China.Table is a media partner of the event series.
For some it is the pinnacle of all snacking pleasure, for others an acoustic nightmare. If you have rather sensitive auditory canals and have ever been within the crunching radius of a passionate seed cruncher, you know: Now it’s either munch along or get the hell out. The seeds we are talking about here are called “guazi” (瓜子 guāzǐ) in China – the Chinese collective term for all seeds that can be snacked on. Mostly this refers to sunflower seeds, but occasionally also pumpkin, pine, watermelon or other seeds.
Crunching pros loudly split the seeds using their front teeth and then fish them out of the shell in their mouths with a lot of tongue skill. 嗑瓜子 kè guāzǐ (“to crack (seeds) between one’s teeth”) is the Chinese expression for this procedure. Whether it’s for a spring festival, movie night, or after-work beer – for many Chinese, “guazi” are a staple of sociable group events. They are also a welcome treat while waiting in restaurant foyers or train station halls.
Even a blemish is named after the small seeds, namely the guazi tooth (瓜子牙 guāzǐyá). It is the burden that brands die-hard crunch fanatics when they have overdone it over the years by ecstatically cracking open hard shells. As a “punishment”, some have developed a small notch in their front incisors over time. This makes it easy to identify them as Guazi aficionados at the first smile.
Those who want to prevent this from happening are best advised to purchase an automatic guazi cracking machine. They actually exist. On Taobao, you can choose from a wide variety of models. Among genuine guazi connoisseurs, however, such devices are notorious for spoiling the fun and taste. After all, the seeds are roasted in special flavor mixtures, so much of what makes the taste buds tingle is on the outer crunchy shell. A seed without a shell – for true crunch fans, that’s like lovemaking without foreplay. By the way, the most popular guazi flavors in the Middle Kingdom include caramel (焦糖 jiāotáng), five-spice blend (五香 wǔxiāng – made from fennel, Chinese pepper, star anise, cinnamon and clove), cream (奶油 nǎiyóu) and green tea (绿茶 lǜchá).
Just how deeply the mental concept of the “guazi” has burned itself into the minds of the Chinese is demonstrated by the concept of the guazi face (瓜子脸 guāzǐliǎn). This is considered the epitome of a harmonious facial shape and thus the ideal of beauty. A classic “seed face” is characterized by soft, flowing lines, tends to be roundish at the top, but narrows towards the chin. Of course, not everyone has such an ideal face. But don’t worry, Taobao has got you covered.
If you type in the search term “guazi face” on the online shopping portal, you will find numerous “guazi facial remedies” (瓜子脸神器 guāzǐliǎn shénqì) advertised, which are supposed to ensure a slim facial shape. The wild choices range from manual to electric facial massagers to bite balls for facial muscle training and cosmetic masks with special slimming formulas to shaping rubber masks and tension belts. Those who would like to conceal their supposedly abnormal face until the first successes are achieved can also choose from a wide range of special eyeglass frames, sunglasses and headgear designed to make the face appear more “seedy”. Or maybe just continuing to chew guazi will do the trick? Try it out!
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
