Interview on EU and Taiwan + ID.4 sales

Dear reader,

An MEP tells us the details of a memorable meeting. Charlie Weimers was one of the parliamentarians who met Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu at the end of October. A taboo breach for Beijing – but for Weimers, it is just the beginning. Now that China is ramping up its threats against the island, Europe must show its colors. The EU needs to stress that action against Taiwan has serious consequences, Weimers said. The room for maneuver is greater than ever: Since trust in China has been shaken anyway, there are fewer concerns about angering Beijing.

Meanwhile, our EU correspondent Amelie Richter took a closer look at the European Union’s draft report on security and defense policy. It does suggest a clearer stance on the part of the Alliance towards powers with conflicting interests. The conclusion: Merely expressing “concern” about global affairs in a nice and friendly manner does no longer suffice. The EU must become capable of military action, according to one of the draft’s cornerstones. Unfortunately, it will be a long time before that happens. And the politicians are running out of time.

The VW Group is also under time pressure. It has set itself the goal of selling one million EVs this year. But on China’s largest market, its flagship series with the ID.4 found few buyers. VW’s Sales were simply not sufficiently organized yet. Now, however, the situation is improving, analyzes Christian Domke Seidel. Sales figures are on the rise.

Your
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk

‘China is no longer a reliable partner’

Disclaimer: This interview has been translated into English and is not considered an official translation by any party involved in the interview.

Recently, a delegation from the European Parliament visited Taipei, and Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu was in Brussels. Is there a special dynamic in EU-Taiwan relations at the moment?

Yes. Moreover, the week before Minister Wu’s visit, the European Parliament’s recommendation on EU-Taiwan relations was also issued. So there is definitely an impetus here.

What is your impression of the visit to Taipei by the deputies of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes (INGE)?

This is a great opportunity to learn more about best practices to combat Chinese disinformation. The EU and Taiwan should work much more closely together to find the best approaches to promote media freedom and journalism, deepen our cooperation on cybersecurity, and work together to strengthen the resilience of Taiwan and EU member states.

It was the very first delegation to visit Taiwan. Why was a delegation not sent earlier?

In 2016, Trump and Brexit tore a huge hole in the “end of history” narrative (“The End of History and the Last Men”). The following year, President Xi Jinping was the darling of Davos, leading some to fantasize that China would replace a US-led international order. Many missed the signs and mistakenly believed that their economic future was with China. Over the past five years, it has become inevitable to recognize China’s belligerence toward its neighbors, brutal internal repression, mercantilism, maligned influence over international institutions and third countries, the cult of personality around President Xi, increasing state control over markets, demographic decline, and cover-ups, disinformation, and lack of transparency about the origins of Covid-19. In short, China is no longer a reliable partner. Therefore, there is less concern about antagonizing China over Taiwan.

Do you think Beijing will retaliate for the INGE visit?

In response to EU sanctions against China for human rights abuses against Uighurs, China already blacklisted MEP Raphaël Glucksmann (along with four other MEPs) earlier this year. In October, they denied visas to China to a US congressional delegation – unless they agreed not to attend an upcoming visit to Taiwan. It is quite possible that they will also impose sanctions on the INGE MEPs.

When Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Wu traveled to Brussels, there were no official meetings with representatives of the EU Commission or the European External Action Service (EEAS). Do you think they should have met with Mr. Wu?

I think Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell should have met with Minister Wu.

As an MEP, are you satisfied with the performance of the EEAS in relation to Taiwan policy?

The EEAS has started to adapt to the current environment.

You met Mr. Wu in Brussels – what did he tell you, and what was his message to the EU?

It was a forward-looking meeting focusing on the issues outlined in the European Parliament’s Taiwan report: strengthening trade relations, Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, academic exchanges, and security in the Taiwan Strait. Foreign Minister Wu called for cooperation in further deepening relations, including the launch of negotiations on an investment agreement.

How can the EU support Taiwan?

The European Parliament’s recommendation on political relations and cooperation between the EU and Taiwan contains many examples:

The introduction of an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment treaty (BIA) with Taiwan.
The EU needs to strongly condemn China’s actions and stress that China’s actions against Taiwan will have consequences for EU-China relations.
The EU must strongly advocate Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international bodies, including the WHO, despite Chinese pressure.

The INGE delegation traveled to Taipei to learn more about disinformation and cyberattacks. Are the EU and Taiwan already planning concrete projects?

Both sides are exploring ways to cooperate, including the possible founding of a joint center for disinformation in Taipei.

The EU Commission sticks to the “one-China policy” in its official communication. Do you think that needs to change? Does the EU need to sharpen its tone when it comes to Taiwan?

Both member states and EU institutions have started to adapt to developments in the Indo-Pacific. Member states such as Lithuania and the Czech Republic are leading the way.

What reaction did you receive from the EU Commission to your Taiwan report?

The reaction was communicated during the October plenary session by EU Vice-President Margrethe Vestager on behalf of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell. It was very positive. For example, she said that the European Union has an interest in improving relations and cooperation with Taiwan. Moreover, according to her response, trade and investment relations with “this important partner and technology leader” will be pursued in greater depth.

INGE delegation leader Glucksmann called in Taipei for high-level meetings between the EU and Taiwan – do you think there will be more meetings in the near future?

Given common interests in important fields such as semiconductors, trade, cybersecurity, it would be wise to do so.

What could be of particular interest to the EU in Taiwan?

Cooperation in cybersecurity and semiconductors are of interest. But Taiwan is also valuable to the international community. Taiwan was the first to inform the World Health Organization about the possible human-to-human transmission of Corona, while China’s CP denied such claims for another three weeks.

Your report also calls for a name change of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan – why is the name so important in this case?

The report calls on the EU Commission and the EEAS to change the name of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to the European Union Office in Taiwan to better reflect the wide range of our relations with the island.

Charlie Weimers (39) is a Conservative MEP. The Swede was most recently in charge of the EU Parliament’s first stand-alone report on relations between Brussels and Taipei. In the paper, MEPs call for closer cooperation with the island. Reimers answered the questions in writing.

EU defense strategy paper: the end of “soft power”

The EU wants to flex its muscles and is preparing for its future security and defense policy with a new strategy paper – and China is playing no small part in it. After all, the People’s Republic is mentioned numerous times in the draft, which is available to China.Table. On Monday, the document was already discussed in the Council of EU Foreign and Defense Ministers. The path is clear: In the future, the EU needs to be much more than a “soft power”, as EU Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell has put it.

To achieve this, the EU’s strategy paper on the one hand repeats previously mentioned assessments and emphasizes its approach of “strategic autonomy” between Washington and Beijing. What’s new is an expansion of defensive instruments against cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. In addition, a rapid EU reaction force is to be introduced. What could be most upsetting to Beijing: Brussels wants to strengthen its coordinated maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific. The plan is for the strategy to be put on the agenda at the December summit of heads of state and government and then adopted in the spring under the French EU presidency.

These points in the paper are key for EU-China policy:

Threat analysis: This strategy warns of China’s activities in the Indo-Pacific region. Geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific threaten regional rules-based order. The EU has “a vital interest in ensuring that international law applies in maritime and other areas.” The paper repeats the familiar triad of “partner, competitor, and systemic rival” that the EU has used to characterize China since 2019, but also warns that, “China is increasingly engaged and involved in regional tensions.” As an economic and systemic competitor, the People’s Republic would gain advantages and tends to restrict access to its market. “It also pursues its policies through its growing presence at sea, in space and online.” For this reason, there must be “close cooperation” between member nations and other regional and global partners.

Positioning on the USA and China: An “increasing bipolarity between the USA and China” currently defines international competition in almost all areas, the draft states. The USA is still a global power and one of the EU’s “most loyal international” partners. Washington, however, is increasingly oriented towards Asia, it says. A shift towards Asia is undeniable. China, as a global power, has different “agendas, ambitions and capabilities.” The strategy paper suggests that Brussels does not plan to take sides: The “EU as a global player” wants to play an active role “by promoting its own values-based vision of a safer and fairer world.”

Involvement in the Indo-Pacific: If adopted by member states, the strategy would lead to the EU expanding its “maritime presence in areas of interest, starting with the Indo-Pacific” from 2022 on. This would include more frequent port calls by EU military vessels, patrols, and naval exercises with regional partners Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. The exchange of information with the ASEAN states on cyber and maritime security, among other things, is also to be expanded. Beijing is also to be involved in Indo-Pacific matters: “We will continue dialogue and consultations with China, in particular to respect maritime law and a rules-based international order.”

EU rapid reaction force: The “EU Rapid Deployment Capacity” is to ensure a quick deployment of up to 5,000 soldiers for various types of crises. The proposal is controversial, but in the course of the Afghanistan crisis, EU member states had already discussed ideas for such a task force and the possibility of ad hoc military cooperation between willing EU member states in the summer. In the event of a crisis, the EU would thus also be able to take action in countries bordering China, such as Afghanistan. However, to what extent the EU wants to shape its own defense policy has not been clarified: France is in favor of becoming completely independent in the long term, for example, from the USA. Germany and above all the countries in Eastern Europe, however, want to continue to cooperate closely with Washington. The EU intervention force now proposed is a kind of compromise. It also aims to avoid overlaps with NATO responsibilities.

Cyber Toolbox: The draft lists a number of new measures and means to improve protection against hybrid threats. For example, it cites a commitment to establish EU “Rapid Hybrid Response Teams” to be deployed on short notice in the event of cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns. “We need to be able to respond quickly to cyberattacks,” the document states. Recently, there has been repeated criticism of how the EU deals with disinformation campaigns from Beijing (China.Table reported). Unlike in the case of Russia, the European Council has so far not given the EEAS an official mandate to consistently pursue Chinese disinformation. Amelie Richter

Volkswagen’s race to catch up with the ID.4

Waiting for buyers: a parking lot with brand-new ID.4 in Jiangsu

China plays a key role for Volkswagen when it comes to the future of mobility and the company. After all, the People’s Republic is the world’s largest car market, customers are open to innovations and the market is at the same time very dynamic and fiercely competitive. Especially in the field of electromobility. VW wants to sell one million electric and plug-in hybrids worldwide before the end of 2021. But because the group makes 40 percent of its sales in the People’s Republic, this technology has to find buyers there.

But that’s exactly what didn’t happen at first when VW presented the ID.4 series at the beginning of the year. The market launch flopped. According to the company, it sold only 1,500 units in May, 3,400 in June, 6,000 in July, and 7,000 in August. The machinery had sand in its gears: In addition to a semiconductor shortage and the ramp-up of production, a new sales department also had to be shouldered.

If you want to sell EVs in China, you have to go where the customers are. Unlike in Germany, the Chinese don’t drive to some industrial area on the outskirts of town to choose their car. Volkswagen has also come to recognize this. However, the launch of its ID.4 electric SUV came so early that the existing sales network was unable to meet the high expectations.

Flop and resurrection of the VW ID.4

It was not until September that VW broke the 10,000-vehicle mark; by October, the figure had risen to 12,700. The background to this is that a network of so-called ID City Stores is currently being set up, which was mostly lacking at market launch. At the beginning of November, however, there are now 60 of them. They are located in central areas with a lot of walk-in customers – for example in shopping malls. By the end of 2021, there should be 170 of them. In addition, there will be 1,500 ID dealers with 5,100 ID sellers in 230 cities.

With its New Energy Vehicles (NEV), VW wants to capture the same market share that the company has already achieved with its internal combustion vehicles – around 20 percent. China defines a NEV as a vehicle with a fully electric (BEV), partially electric (PHEV), or fuel cell drive (FCEV). According to the current Five-Year Plan, these models will continue to be promoted at least until 2025.

However, these NEVs must be produced in China. VW has two plants dedicated to this. One in Foshan, and one in Anting. Their combined capacity is 600,000 units. The German company is currently in the process of driving up the number of units produced. In 2025, however, VW wants and needs to produce more than one million EVs in China – in order to reach the desired market shares, as a group spokeswoman told Table.Media. A corresponding expansion of capacities is therefore a must.

Electric cars made in China

But there are also factors over which VW has no influence. Currently, the group – like every competitor – is struggling with a glaring undersupply of semiconductors. The manufacturer is short by about ten percent. Snowstorms, including power outages and plant closures in Texas, and a fire at Japanese supplier Renesas had further worsened the already tense situation caused by Covid.

A problem that cannot be solved for the time being. VW expects that the shortage of semiconductors will continue to be a concern for the brand well beyond 2021. Only a certain part of the demand could be covered with broker goods – i.e. semiconductors from alternative suppliers, whose products still require further testing and approval by the technical development and quality assurance departments. Semiconductors are now as important in automotive production as they are in the electronics sector (China.Table reported).

Especially in China, where customers expect a high degree of digitalization. An area where VW still has to catch up with other suppliers and is doing so with the ID series. Its models are all compatible with both Apple CarPlay and Baidu CarLife (China.Table reported). A dedicated app offering allows for smart home control or a restaurant reservation, among other things. Christian Domke Seidel

Vaccination for children under eleven

China plans to fully vaccinate all children between the ages of three and eleven against COVID-19 by the end of the year. China’s National Health Commission recently announced that more than 84 million children between the ages of three and eleven have already received the first dose of the vaccine.
“Vaccinating children is voluntary,” said Wang Dengfeng, an official from the Ministry of Education, at a press conference. He praised the fact that out of 160 million children in the age group of three to eleven, half have already received the vaccination.

In June, the Chinese regulatory authority had already approved the vaccines by Sinovac and Sinopharm for the age group between 3 and 17 years. So far, vaccinations of older children have been prioritized. As a result, the vaccination rate of 12 to 17-year-olds is said to be 90 percent. However, after outbreaks in elementary and primary schools, Beijing now appears to have decided to vaccinate the younger age groups as well. In a recent study published by the medical journal Lancet, Sinopharm’s vaccine for children was found to be safe and well-tolerated.

In the United Arab Emirates, Argentina and Chile, the two Chinese vaccines have received emergency approval for children aged three and older. Hong Kong has also been reviewing Sinovac for approval for children of three years and older since Monday, according to Bloomberg. On Monday, Israel approved Biontech’s Covid vaccine for children five years and older. The US also vaccinates children above five. Biontech has also applied in the EU for approval of its vaccine for five to eleven-year-olds. A decision by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is expected before Christmas. niw

MeToo: tennis star Peng Shuai disappeared

Since her allegations against senior cadre Zhang Gaoli (China.Table reported), well-known tennis player Peng Shuai has gone silent on social media. After making the sexual assault public, all of her posts have disappeared from Weibo. The 35-year-old’s whereabouts have been unknown since November 2nd. It is currently not possible to search for the word “tennis” on Weibo. The Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) is demanding China formally investigate Zhang. “Peng Shuai, and all women, deserve to be heard, not censored,” WTA stated. The hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai is trending on Twitter.

Zhang (74) is one of China’s most powerful men. Among other things, he held the position of Vice-Premier and was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. So it is reasonable to assume that the party is repressing the discussion of the case. Anger over the abuses could lead to questions about the party’s unchecked grip on power. Zhang is said to have taken advantage of his position to initially start a more or less voluntary affair with Peng. Later, he allegedly abused her at his home. fin

Wanda denies CEO rumor

Real estate group Dalian Wanda has denied rumors that company chairman Wang Jianlin has died. The company stated that he has attended a regular meeting on Monday. A spokesman told Bloomberg that the company CEO was fine. Online reports of Wang’s death were false. Wanda has filed a complaint. fin

Beijing’s new trading venue – Beijing Stock Exchange

by Christina Gigler, Rödl & Partner Beijing

The growing Chinese capital market, both the stock and the bond market, is often neglected by foreign investors. However, many domestic Chinese companies (especially technology-focused) choose an initial public offering (IPO) as a form of financing. IPOs are also the preferred exit form for Chinese financial investors. In early September, President Xi Jinping announced that China will establish a new stock exchange in Beijing (Beijing Stock Exchange) and develop it into a major trading platform for innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The Beijing Stock Exchange is now the third in mainland China, joining the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges that were introduced in the 1990s.

Trading in an initial 70 companies from the “selected tier” could begin on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations Co., Ltd. (NEEQ, also known as the “New Third Board”) as early as the end of 2021. It was originally intended as China’s counterpart to NASDAQ as part of the construction of a multi-tier capital market system. The Beijing Stock Exchange is to be structured to be an improved version of the New Third Board and has the potential to establish itself as a major third pillar in the capital market alongside the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

The official website of the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System announced that the corporate registration for Beijing Stock Exchange Co, Ltd, was completed and established as well as approved on September 3, 2021. The new stock exchange will be fully owned by NEEQ, which is the sole shareholder. The registered capital is one billion yuan.

De-concentration of southern trading centers

Locating the new stock exchange in the capital is no coincidence – it offers both practical and political advantages. A factor on a political level could be the imbalance of capital resources, as China’s main stock markets are currently positioned in eastern and southern China. On a practical level, Beijing has already laid the foundation for a stock exchange specializing in SMEs with NEEQ. The main objective is to allow SMEs to access the capital market because even though 99.8 percent of enterprises in China are considered SMEs and account for about 50 percent of China’s tax revenues, a large proportion of enterprises face considerable difficulties in accessing alternative sources of financing.

The announcement and formation come at a time when there is growing concern about a possible decoupling of the Chinese economy and the US government is taking steps to make it more difficult for Chinese companies to go public in the US. Since the end of 2020, for example, Chinese companies listed on US exchanges have been required to undergo an audit by a US regulator. Many Chinese companies are being forced to delist because they are prohibited from allowing foreign regulators access to their accounting records without Chinese government approval.

In addition, in early July 2021, China’s cyberspace authority announced that companies with more than one million users must undergo a security review before listing their shares overseas. With regulators concerned that Chinese companies transferring data overseas could cause cybersecurity and national security risks, China is taking steps to encourage companies to push their IPOs domestically. The establishment of the Beijing Stock Exchange could thus be part of this effort.

The role of the new Beijing Stock Exchange in China’s financial system

The Beijing Stock Exchange will serve a different purpose than the existing Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges while maintaining links with these markets. For example, shares on the Beijing Stock Exchange may be transferred to the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges under certain conditions. The Shanghai Stock Exchange is now the largest in mainland China and an important pillar of the national economy. It specializes in listing companies of basic industries and key sectors.

In addition, the Science and Technology Board (STAR Market), a trading market specialized in startups and high-tech enterprises, was established in the summer of 2019. Mainly companies from the fields of high-tech industry, from strategic new industries such as new-generation information technology, high-end equipment, new materials, alternative energy production and saving, environmental protection and biomedicine, and others, are listed on the STAR Market.

The Shenzhen Stock Exchange lists various market indices with different market positioning, e.g. Blue-chips with high market capitalization. As a second market – similar to the American NASDAQ – ChiNext was introduced in 2009, which specializes in private and technology companies. With the Beijing Stock Exchange, a specialized trading venue is now to be created for SMEs. At the same time, NEEQ, with around 6,000 SMEs listed by the end of 2020, will be upgraded.

In mid-September, the Beijing Stock Exchange issued guidelines outlining the criteria for qualified exchange participants. To be listed on the Beijing Stock Exchange, retail investors must have securities assets of at least ¥500,000 (about €67,000) and an investment history of more than two years. No capital threshold has been set for institutional investors. In early November, the Beijing Stock Exchange Trading Rules (Trial) and the Beijing Stock Exchange Member Management Rules (Trial) were published, along with basic business rules and guidelines that will come into effect on November 15, 2021, which also indicates this was the planned official launch of the Beijing Stock Exchange.

Three-tier market access criteria

The NEEQ was established largely for micro-enterprises, SMEs, and start-ups that are unable to meet the listing standards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Currently, NEEQ uses a tier system for investors, with different thresholds for each tier. Only if companies meet one of these tiers are they eligible to trade on the New Third Board.

The Beijing Stock Exchange will adopt the three-tier system to manage the investment event. The three tiers are:

the “selected tier” (currently 70 companies) – exclusive and with the strictest requirements for high quality NEEQ companies that have high profitability or are very innovative,
the “innovative level” for companies that do not meet the requirements for the selected level but are well managed, and
the “basic level” for all other companies.

The Beijing Stock Exchange will only incorporate companies from NEEQ’s “selected tier”. Companies in the other two tiers will remain in NEEQ’s OTC market. Listing on the Beijing Stock Exchange will be possible for companies if they have been listed on the “selected tier” of NEEQ for 12 consecutive months, meet the expected market value and certain financial standards, are registered with the CSRC, and have conducted a public offering to non-specific qualified investors.

There are currently no specific rules for foreign investors. It is expected that the rules for trading by foreign investors will be in line with the relevant NEEQ rules.

With the introduction of the Beijing Stock Exchange, the Chinese government is trying to keep IPOs of Chinese, technology and future-oriented companies in the country, as it did with the establishment of the STAR Market. Regulation for domestic (private) companies planning IPOs overseas or in Hong Kong (S.A.R.) has been tightened in recent years. A prominent example is ride-hailing service provider DiDi, which had to undergo a cybersecurity audit in China shortly after going public in the US and was sanctioned with a ban on downloading its app in China.

Christina Gigler, LL.M., is Senior Associate and Head of the Legal Department at Rödl & Partner in Beijing. She assists and advises clients on their market entry in China. She specializes in corporate law, corporate restructuring, labor law, and contract law.

At a technical college in Dalian, 10,000 students are not allowed to leave their dormitories. Because 60 infections have been registered among students, helpers in protective suits are now bringing water and food. Classes will be held online until further notice. The coastal city in northeastern China had reported more than 200 infections among its six million inhabitants.

CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

Amelie
Richter

Marcel
Grzanna

Fabian
Peltsch

Julia
Fiedler

Angela
Köckritz

Jörn
Petring

Dear reader,

An MEP tells us the details of a memorable meeting. Charlie Weimers was one of the parliamentarians who met Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu at the end of October. A taboo breach for Beijing – but for Weimers, it is just the beginning. Now that China is ramping up its threats against the island, Europe must show its colors. The EU needs to stress that action against Taiwan has serious consequences, Weimers said. The room for maneuver is greater than ever: Since trust in China has been shaken anyway, there are fewer concerns about angering Beijing.

Meanwhile, our EU correspondent Amelie Richter took a closer look at the European Union’s draft report on security and defense policy. It does suggest a clearer stance on the part of the Alliance towards powers with conflicting interests. The conclusion: Merely expressing “concern” about global affairs in a nice and friendly manner does no longer suffice. The EU must become capable of military action, according to one of the draft’s cornerstones. Unfortunately, it will be a long time before that happens. And the politicians are running out of time.

The VW Group is also under time pressure. It has set itself the goal of selling one million EVs this year. But on China’s largest market, its flagship series with the ID.4 found few buyers. VW’s Sales were simply not sufficiently organized yet. Now, however, the situation is improving, analyzes Christian Domke Seidel. Sales figures are on the rise.

Your
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk

‘China is no longer a reliable partner’

Disclaimer: This interview has been translated into English and is not considered an official translation by any party involved in the interview.

Recently, a delegation from the European Parliament visited Taipei, and Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu was in Brussels. Is there a special dynamic in EU-Taiwan relations at the moment?

Yes. Moreover, the week before Minister Wu’s visit, the European Parliament’s recommendation on EU-Taiwan relations was also issued. So there is definitely an impetus here.

What is your impression of the visit to Taipei by the deputies of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes (INGE)?

This is a great opportunity to learn more about best practices to combat Chinese disinformation. The EU and Taiwan should work much more closely together to find the best approaches to promote media freedom and journalism, deepen our cooperation on cybersecurity, and work together to strengthen the resilience of Taiwan and EU member states.

It was the very first delegation to visit Taiwan. Why was a delegation not sent earlier?

In 2016, Trump and Brexit tore a huge hole in the “end of history” narrative (“The End of History and the Last Men”). The following year, President Xi Jinping was the darling of Davos, leading some to fantasize that China would replace a US-led international order. Many missed the signs and mistakenly believed that their economic future was with China. Over the past five years, it has become inevitable to recognize China’s belligerence toward its neighbors, brutal internal repression, mercantilism, maligned influence over international institutions and third countries, the cult of personality around President Xi, increasing state control over markets, demographic decline, and cover-ups, disinformation, and lack of transparency about the origins of Covid-19. In short, China is no longer a reliable partner. Therefore, there is less concern about antagonizing China over Taiwan.

Do you think Beijing will retaliate for the INGE visit?

In response to EU sanctions against China for human rights abuses against Uighurs, China already blacklisted MEP Raphaël Glucksmann (along with four other MEPs) earlier this year. In October, they denied visas to China to a US congressional delegation – unless they agreed not to attend an upcoming visit to Taiwan. It is quite possible that they will also impose sanctions on the INGE MEPs.

When Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Wu traveled to Brussels, there were no official meetings with representatives of the EU Commission or the European External Action Service (EEAS). Do you think they should have met with Mr. Wu?

I think Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell should have met with Minister Wu.

As an MEP, are you satisfied with the performance of the EEAS in relation to Taiwan policy?

The EEAS has started to adapt to the current environment.

You met Mr. Wu in Brussels – what did he tell you, and what was his message to the EU?

It was a forward-looking meeting focusing on the issues outlined in the European Parliament’s Taiwan report: strengthening trade relations, Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, academic exchanges, and security in the Taiwan Strait. Foreign Minister Wu called for cooperation in further deepening relations, including the launch of negotiations on an investment agreement.

How can the EU support Taiwan?

The European Parliament’s recommendation on political relations and cooperation between the EU and Taiwan contains many examples:

The introduction of an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment treaty (BIA) with Taiwan.
The EU needs to strongly condemn China’s actions and stress that China’s actions against Taiwan will have consequences for EU-China relations.
The EU must strongly advocate Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international bodies, including the WHO, despite Chinese pressure.