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This week, Germany’s Economy Minister starts his four-day visit to South Korea and China. Robert Habeck will have a different focus than Chancellor Olaf Scholz during his visit to the People’s Republic in April, writes Finn Mayer-Kuckuk, who will accompany Habeck on his trip. Habeck is a staunch supporter of de-risking – which he demonstrates by making his first stop in South Korea.
After all, South Korea represents an economic alternative to China and can also serve as a model of a successful industrial policy for Germany. The delegation of entrepreneurs from mid-sized companies – which Habeck, unlike the German Chancellor, favors more than large corporations – will be watching this with interest.
Just two weeks before this trip, Habeck had sparked concerns among many companies with his proposed moratorium on the German Supply Chain Act. After all, many companies, including smaller ones, have long been planning for this. The solar industry must be particularly vigilant: Xinjiang is one of the strongholds of the Chinese solar industry. That is why German solar companies must consider not only the general human rights and environmental standards, but also the oppression of the Uyghurs and the allegations of extensive forced labor programs in the region. Christiane Kuehl has looked into how the companies deal with this.
Many companies are increasingly considering investing in Vietnam as part of their diversification strategy or have already done so. The country’s new president, Tô Lâm, could give them second thoughts – after all, he seems to be behind the so-called “Tiergarten kidnapping.” Michael Radunski analyzes what exactly he has to do with it and what this means for the German perception of the country he now rules.
Robert Habeck will travel to South Korea and China from Thursday to Sunday. The visit is in line with the German government’s China strategy from July last year. The aim is to bring its idea of risk minimization to life.
This means that the German Economy Minister will presumably have a different focus than Chancellor Scholz in April, who largely ignored the China strategy. While Olaf Scholz has tended to work towards more investment in China in the interests of the Dax board members, Habeck will likely focus on a better distribution of risks, in other words, de-risking.
Habeck’s delegation will tend to include more entrepreneurs from medium-sized companies than large corporations. According to news agency reports, the delegation includes representatives from the solar company Enpal and the metal processing group Schoder, as both companies announced on Tuesday. Insiders say that the Vice-Chancellor will also be accompanied by representatives of the automotive supplier Voss and the biopharmaceutical supplier Sartorius. While Voss initially declined to comment, Sartorius – the only DAX-listed company on the Minister’s trip – confirmed the information.
Habeck is a staunch proponent of de-risking, which he primarily understands as reducing economic risk. This is why the first stop in South Korea is characterized by the aim of creating economic alternatives to China in line with the China strategy. South Korea can also serve as a role model for a successful industrial policy. South Korea has many things that Germany would also like in its efforts to minimize dependencies – above all, its own state-of-the-art chip industry.
Above all, however, South Korea has often been at odds with China. As a result, the government in Seoul has been trying to reduce dependencies and arm its government against geopolitical upheavals for much longer than Germany. Germany can still learn something from this. Despite minor trade disagreements, the South Korean part is expected to be very amicable.
However, the talks in Beijing will not be easy: The German Economy Minister will travel to Beijing amid a looming trade conflict, while geopolitical concerns have recently increased due to China’s close ties with Russia. Added to this is the formation of a North Korean-Chinese axis with Chinese approval.
But the Minister’s visit will mainly be about trade. The big sticking point for China is the looming corrective tariffs imposed by the EU on Chinese EVs. The Chinese leadership will attempt a tactic with Habeck that it has already successfully pulled off with Emmanuel Macron and many other European guests: The representative of a large EU member state will be wooed to use him to further their own interests.
Because China is trying to bypass and ignore the EU wherever it can. It is not in Beijing’s interest to upgrade the EU by taking it seriously. This would only strengthen a potential major rival on the international stage. It is easier to get the EU member states individually to represent Chinese interests in Europe: divide and conquer.
Habeck will also be presented with China’s wishes. The Chinese want to see the EU’s extra tariffs on Chinese EVs disappear. Brussels aims to offset unfair advantages from Chinese subsidies with differentiated tariffs in order to create a level playing field for European manufacturers who do not receive direct subsidies. However, China – itself a world champion in market distortion – loudly cries protectionism. The German industry is now responding to the implicit threat of a trade war by adopting China’s concerns and arguing that the provisional tariffs should not become permanent after November. China has already made it clear that things could get unpleasant if push comes to shove.
This situation puts Habeck in a dilemma. He is known to be particularly sympathetic to companies’ concerns at the moment. After the poor election and opinion poll results of recent months, he does not want to be suspected of only supporting green projects instead of the interests of the entire economy. But now Habeck has to weigh up what he should think of the German car manufacturers’ demands for reversing the decision to impose extra tariffs., for example. He could pledge German support for Chinese demands in Beijing. However, he could also conclude that the German economy is effectively a victim of blackmail and unwilling to give up the EU’s protection.
The obvious thing to do is compromise and choose the middle way. In this case, Habeck would not position himself clearly for or against the tariffs vis-à-vis the Chinese side in Beijing. If Habeck were to enter into a dialogue at all, which is actually the prerogative of the EU negotiators, he could say that although the tariffs are objectively justified, Germany does not want a trade war and is willing to compromise for this overarching reason – if China clearly makes concessions to the EU. Then, everything would depend on what China offers in return.
Habeck must be careful not to be tricked by fine-sounding formulas of cooperation, friendship, open markets, world peace and a win-win situation. Experience has shown that China is good at reeling in Western politicians and pulling the wool over their eyes.
On his first trip to China as minister, Habeck has a challenging program ahead of him that touches on the current trade conflicts, the overall geopolitical situation, market opportunities, and the future viability of the German economy. He must stand up to Beijing without putting the ailing German car manufacturers in even more trouble.
Companies that buy from China have long been in the process of adapting their supply chains to the German Supply Chain Act (LkSG). Even Economy Minister Habeck’s proposal to suspend the law for two years did not change that. One of the sectors that is particularly affected by the new regulations is the solar industry. In addition to general human rights and environmental standards, it must also consider the oppression of the Uyghurs and the allegations of extensive forced labor programs in Xinjiang. The region is one of the strongholds of the Chinese solar industry.
There have been repeated studies in the past that identified forced labor in the supply chains of Western solar companies. According to a 2021 study by the British Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, 90 Chinese and international solar companies were affected by forced labor somewhere in their supply chain. At that time, all Chinese polysilicon manufacturers in Xinjiang were also involved in forced labor programs or were supplied by raw material companies engaged in it.
The planned regulation to ban products manufactured using forced labor from the EU internal market is currently passing through the EU institutions. The Parliament finally confirmed this ban in May. Now, the EU Council and the individual EU states still have to approve the plan. The US has long prohibited the import of products from Xinjiang unless forced labor can be explicitly excluded. As a result, experts had feared a split in export flows, with solar products with Xinjiang content ending up permanently in the EU or the UK. The upcoming EU ban is intended to prevent this.
China dominates the sector’s global supply chains – down to the complete solar system. Manufacturers buy preliminary products in China, installers usually buy entire systems. EU solar companies have to set up new supply chains for these purchases entirely outside Xinjiang – and all of this has to be certified. After all, independent human rights audits are not possible in Xinjiang.
The German Solar Industry Association (BSW-Solar) regularly informs its member companies about “current standards and certification options”, says Managing Director Carsten Koernig. “For example, in cooperation with member companies, we have developed updates to supply contracts that are intended to exclude the use of forced labor in supply chains,” Koernig told Table.Briefings. The Association condemns all forms of human rights violations and considers “more responsibility and more transparency in the value chain to be expressly warranted.”
One company that claims to be buying exclusively from outside Xinjiang is the Berlin-based solar system company Enpal. “We source 100 percent of our wafer cells and other preliminary products from three provinces: Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. We can be 100 percent certain that no forced labor is involved,” says Henning Rath, Chief Supply Chain Manager at Enpal. “These are completely normal, highly automated factories, to be honest, with a standard that is significantly higher than we currently see in Europe.”
According to Rath, Enpal sources a large share of the polysilicon it needs from Yunnan. His team travels there regularly to ensure everything is traceable and transparent for Enpal. Rath estimates that Xinjiang currently accounts for around 30 to 40 percent of Chinese polysilicon. “This means that everything that is produced in Xinjiang remains in the domestic market. What is exported actually comes from other provinces.”
Enpal has been buying directly from China since 2021 and has audited every supplier itself since then, with its own people from Rath’s team in Shenzhen. “We are the buyer, we want to know where it comes from – because we are responsible for it according to the LkSG.”
Rath says that Chinese companies that insist on the freedom to supply products from Xinjiang for Enpal products fail the audit. “We no longer actively work with these companies.” These companies are the majority. “But there are companies that have specialized in setting themselves up properly for international markets because they have understood that this can definitely offer added value. And we work well with them.”
Alongside electric cars and batteries, the solar industry is one of the “New Three” emerging industries that Beijing hopes to develop into an export hit. This makes a separate supply chain for exports to the West definitely worthwhile. No one says so openly, says Rath. “But there is a clear instruction from Beijing that says: ‘Build an export-barrier-free supply chain!’” Therefore, Chinese solar companies are increasingly setting up production facilities far from Xinjiang. Anhui’s capital Hefei, for example, has built up a large cluster of solar companies, many of which manufacture for export.
The effectiveness of due diligence in the supply chain requires “transparency and, more importantly, trust,” says Joseph Negrine from the Australian National University. “The ethical sourcing of materials and labor in the solar industry requires importing companies to have traceable supply chains and exporting companies to be transparent about labor conditions.” Enpal, for example, requests information such as labor contracts, wage statements, insurance and employee accommodation.
All this is a challenging task. This is why companies are now thinking about setting up joint ventures in Europe with their Chinese suppliers, as Rath explains, who will be traveling to China with Habeck as Enpal’s representative. “The idea is to establish the core technology of photovoltaics with large production capacities in Europe,” says Rath. The company has been in talks with technology partners in China for about a year. Up to four partners from the EU and China are involved in the plans for each production step – polysilicon, wafers, cells and modules.
Basically, Vietnam is the answer to the German government’s China strategy. The Southeast Asian country is an obvious choice as a diversification location. If Germany really wants to reduce its excessive dependence on China, Vietnam is the obvious partner.
“China plus 1” is the mantra in many German corporate headquarters. On the one hand, they want to stay in China; after all, the huge market is simply too important for their own business. On the other hand, they also want to diversify, given the increasing geopolitical tensions. And for many, that “plus 1” is: Vietnam.
But now 66-year-old Tô Lâm has been elected as the new president – and this could pose a problem for the overly attractive diversification strategy. Because: Tô Lâm seems to be behind the so-called “Tiergarten kidnapping.”
In his role as security minister, he allegedly gave the order to kidnap the former Vietnamese politician and former CEO Trinh Xuan Thanh from Berlin’s Tiergarten Park in 2017. At least, that is what the ruling of the Berlin Court of Appeal says. The German government considered the incident to be a violation of German sovereignty. Several Vietnamese diplomats were expelled and the “strategic partnership” with Vietnam was suspended.
Yet everything had been going so well so far – for Germany, for German companies, and, last but not least, for Vietnam. “Vietnam is the biggest beneficiary in Southeast Asia in the context of the China plus 1 trend,” Florian Feyerabend told Table.Briefings. “As part of a strategy of diversification and de-risking, the country has become particularly interesting for German companies,” the Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Hanoi explained. However, Feyerabend emphasizes: “Vietnam is not an alternative to China, but rather a complement to the economic activities in China.”
No wonder, because Vietnam has German companies much to offer. KAS Director Feyerabend cites three main reasons:
Vietnam also has enormous deposits of rare earths, which are used in the production of, for example, microchips. This treasure trove of raw materials also makes the country interesting for international investors seeking to make their supply chains less dependent on China.
It is no surprise, then, that Vietnam also plays a vital role in the rivalry between China and the United States. Both US President Joe Biden and China’s head of state Xi Jinping visited Vietnam in 2023. Vietnam’s proximity to China is apparent – geographically, but also ideologically: both are communist one-party systems ruled authoritatively by the respective Communist Party.
This is where the most important bond lies, explains Huynh Tam Sang from the Vietnam National University in Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese Ministry of Public Affairs adopted many strategies from the Chinese party cadres, especially in counter-terrorism and riot control. “In January, Tô Lâm asked the Chinese Ministry of Public Security for theoretical and practical advice on how the Communist Party could maintain complete control,” Huynh told Table.Briefings.
There are also close economic ties. Joint railroad projects have led to flourishing cross-border trade. But Beijing is also pursuing another strategy: It wants to use Vietnam to circumvent Western countries’ growing trade barriers and punitive tariffs. Accordingly, Vietnam – and Mexico – have recently overtaken the United States as the main destinations for Chinese manufacturing and logistics projects. According to Chinese customs data, China’s exports of computer parts alone more than tripled between 2017 and 2023.
Yet this proximity also has its downsides. As a former ally of the Soviet Union, Vietnam was enemies with China in the 1970s and 1980s. Even today, the population still harbors reservations about its large neighbor to the north. Specifically, there is a conflict over territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The USA is trying to exploit this rift. Although once a bitter enemy in the Vietnam War, Washington has long since become an important security policy partner. During Joe Biden’s visit, the two countries signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the purposes of peace, cooperation, and sustainable development.”
Vietnam follows a so-called bamboo policy: stable and firmly rooted, yet extremely flexible and pliable between China and the USA. Germany has also taken advantage of this so far: Vietnam has become a popular alternative economic hub.
In order to keep it that way, the German government should quickly seek dialogue with Hanoi to resolve the problems. As the new president, Tô Lâm has mainly representative tasks, but experts believe he has far greater ambitions. A swift solution would then also be entirely in line with the government’s own long-term China strategy.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
In late 2023, Ku Chung-Hwa received a call from the head of Taiwan’s representative office in Germany, Representative Shieh Jhy-Wey. He asked if he was interested in co-chairing a newly created Taiwanese-German dialog platform. Ku didn’t think twice and agreed.
The dialog platform was officially launched soon afterward, in December 2023, by the foreign missions of both countries. The German Federal Foreign Office proclaimed the goal of “promoting a lively civil society exchange.”
Ku Chung-Hwa began organizing the platform’s first meeting in Berlin in May of this year together with German co-chair Reinhard Buetikofer. It was not the first contact with Germany for the emeritus professor of sociology from National Chengchi University in Taipei: He had lived here for almost eight years from 1981 – first for a degree course in Regensburg, then for his PhD in Heidelberg. His research at the time focused on the work of sociologist Max Weber; during his time in Heidelberg, Ku also translated an introductory work on Weber’s theories into Chinese.
Now, almost forty years later, he made his way to Berlin with a delegation of twelve members. Among them were researchers with ties to Germany, MPs from the three major parties in Taiwan and a journalist from Taiwan’s renowned Commonwealth Magazine. They spent a day and a half discussing issues such as the resilience of democracy, sustainable economic transformation and the digital society with the German delegates.
What can Germany and Taiwan learn from each other? Ku Chung-Hwa recalls his student days in Germany. Even back then, he very much appreciated the objectivity of the political debate in Germany: “You can discuss a lot of things rationally,” something he would like to see even more of in Taiwan.
Germany, in turn, could learn from Taiwan’s resilience, its ability to economically and politically assert itself over the decades despite all external adversity. The diversity and strength of the social movements in Taiwan could also offer inspiration for Germany.
Ku Chung-Hwa speaks from experience: When he went to Germany, the final years of the then Kuomintang (KMT) dictatorship were dawning. When he returned to Taiwan at the end of the 1980s, the last KMT dictator, Chiang Ching-kuo, had died a few days earlier. Subsequently, Ku’s research focused on the role of civil society organizations in democratization processes – and he became part of various social movements. In the 1990s, he and other lecturers fought for the liberalization of universities in Taiwan. In 2007, Ku founded the Citizen Congress Watch (公民監督國會聯盟).
Overall, Ku is optimistic about democracy in Taiwan and cooperation with Germany. “Democracy has largely become a consensus in Taiwan – we have political disputes, but very few people question democracy itself.” Ku sees the greatest value of the German-Taiwanese dialog platform in the framework created for a continuous exchange on an equal footing – with political support from both foreign ministries. The first two years were “an experiment,” but he believes the format already represents a breakthrough for German-Taiwanese relations.
In May 2025, the German delegation will come to Taiwan for the first time and, according to Ku’s information, will discuss environmental and climate issues, among other things. According to plans, most of the delegates from the first year will stay, with Reinhard Buetikofer and Ku Chung-Hwa continuing to chair the delegation. For Ku personally, it is also good news: “I finally have the opportunity to return the favor for the hospitality I received during my time in Germany.” Leonardo Pape
China’s Singles’ Day in the fall is one of the biggest e-commerce festivals in the world. In October 2023, online retailers turned over more than 1,100 billion yuan at the discount event, the equivalent of around 146 billion euros. So it’s no wonder that one shopping festival a year is not enough. On Tuesday, the 618 Shopping Festival, named after the date June 18, took place. Online retailers and logistics companies have to spend months preparing for these major events resulting in billions of orders. Here, workers at a food company in the city of Jinhua, Zhejiang province, pack goods for shipping.
This week, Germany’s Economy Minister starts his four-day visit to South Korea and China. Robert Habeck will have a different focus than Chancellor Olaf Scholz during his visit to the People’s Republic in April, writes Finn Mayer-Kuckuk, who will accompany Habeck on his trip. Habeck is a staunch supporter of de-risking – which he demonstrates by making his first stop in South Korea.
After all, South Korea represents an economic alternative to China and can also serve as a model of a successful industrial policy for Germany. The delegation of entrepreneurs from mid-sized companies – which Habeck, unlike the German Chancellor, favors more than large corporations – will be watching this with interest.
Just two weeks before this trip, Habeck had sparked concerns among many companies with his proposed moratorium on the German Supply Chain Act. After all, many companies, including smaller ones, have long been planning for this. The solar industry must be particularly vigilant: Xinjiang is one of the strongholds of the Chinese solar industry. That is why German solar companies must consider not only the general human rights and environmental standards, but also the oppression of the Uyghurs and the allegations of extensive forced labor programs in the region. Christiane Kuehl has looked into how the companies deal with this.
Many companies are increasingly considering investing in Vietnam as part of their diversification strategy or have already done so. The country’s new president, Tô Lâm, could give them second thoughts – after all, he seems to be behind the so-called “Tiergarten kidnapping.” Michael Radunski analyzes what exactly he has to do with it and what this means for the German perception of the country he now rules.
Robert Habeck will travel to South Korea and China from Thursday to Sunday. The visit is in line with the German government’s China strategy from July last year. The aim is to bring its idea of risk minimization to life.
This means that the German Economy Minister will presumably have a different focus than Chancellor Scholz in April, who largely ignored the China strategy. While Olaf Scholz has tended to work towards more investment in China in the interests of the Dax board members, Habeck will likely focus on a better distribution of risks, in other words, de-risking.
Habeck’s delegation will tend to include more entrepreneurs from medium-sized companies than large corporations. According to news agency reports, the delegation includes representatives from the solar company Enpal and the metal processing group Schoder, as both companies announced on Tuesday. Insiders say that the Vice-Chancellor will also be accompanied by representatives of the automotive supplier Voss and the biopharmaceutical supplier Sartorius. While Voss initially declined to comment, Sartorius – the only DAX-listed company on the Minister’s trip – confirmed the information.
Habeck is a staunch proponent of de-risking, which he primarily understands as reducing economic risk. This is why the first stop in South Korea is characterized by the aim of creating economic alternatives to China in line with the China strategy. South Korea can also serve as a role model for a successful industrial policy. South Korea has many things that Germany would also like in its efforts to minimize dependencies – above all, its own state-of-the-art chip industry.
Above all, however, South Korea has often been at odds with China. As a result, the government in Seoul has been trying to reduce dependencies and arm its government against geopolitical upheavals for much longer than Germany. Germany can still learn something from this. Despite minor trade disagreements, the South Korean part is expected to be very amicable.
However, the talks in Beijing will not be easy: The German Economy Minister will travel to Beijing amid a looming trade conflict, while geopolitical concerns have recently increased due to China’s close ties with Russia. Added to this is the formation of a North Korean-Chinese axis with Chinese approval.
But the Minister’s visit will mainly be about trade. The big sticking point for China is the looming corrective tariffs imposed by the EU on Chinese EVs. The Chinese leadership will attempt a tactic with Habeck that it has already successfully pulled off with Emmanuel Macron and many other European guests: The representative of a large EU member state will be wooed to use him to further their own interests.
Because China is trying to bypass and ignore the EU wherever it can. It is not in Beijing’s interest to upgrade the EU by taking it seriously. This would only strengthen a potential major rival on the international stage. It is easier to get the EU member states individually to represent Chinese interests in Europe: divide and conquer.
Habeck will also be presented with China’s wishes. The Chinese want to see the EU’s extra tariffs on Chinese EVs disappear. Brussels aims to offset unfair advantages from Chinese subsidies with differentiated tariffs in order to create a level playing field for European manufacturers who do not receive direct subsidies. However, China – itself a world champion in market distortion – loudly cries protectionism. The German industry is now responding to the implicit threat of a trade war by adopting China’s concerns and arguing that the provisional tariffs should not become permanent after November. China has already made it clear that things could get unpleasant if push comes to shove.
This situation puts Habeck in a dilemma. He is known to be particularly sympathetic to companies’ concerns at the moment. After the poor election and opinion poll results of recent months, he does not want to be suspected of only supporting green projects instead of the interests of the entire economy. But now Habeck has to weigh up what he should think of the German car manufacturers’ demands for reversing the decision to impose extra tariffs., for example. He could pledge German support for Chinese demands in Beijing. However, he could also conclude that the German economy is effectively a victim of blackmail and unwilling to give up the EU’s protection.
The obvious thing to do is compromise and choose the middle way. In this case, Habeck would not position himself clearly for or against the tariffs vis-à-vis the Chinese side in Beijing. If Habeck were to enter into a dialogue at all, which is actually the prerogative of the EU negotiators, he could say that although the tariffs are objectively justified, Germany does not want a trade war and is willing to compromise for this overarching reason – if China clearly makes concessions to the EU. Then, everything would depend on what China offers in return.
Habeck must be careful not to be tricked by fine-sounding formulas of cooperation, friendship, open markets, world peace and a win-win situation. Experience has shown that China is good at reeling in Western politicians and pulling the wool over their eyes.
On his first trip to China as minister, Habeck has a challenging program ahead of him that touches on the current trade conflicts, the overall geopolitical situation, market opportunities, and the future viability of the German economy. He must stand up to Beijing without putting the ailing German car manufacturers in even more trouble.
Companies that buy from China have long been in the process of adapting their supply chains to the German Supply Chain Act (LkSG). Even Economy Minister Habeck’s proposal to suspend the law for two years did not change that. One of the sectors that is particularly affected by the new regulations is the solar industry. In addition to general human rights and environmental standards, it must also consider the oppression of the Uyghurs and the allegations of extensive forced labor programs in Xinjiang. The region is one of the strongholds of the Chinese solar industry.
There have been repeated studies in the past that identified forced labor in the supply chains of Western solar companies. According to a 2021 study by the British Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, 90 Chinese and international solar companies were affected by forced labor somewhere in their supply chain. At that time, all Chinese polysilicon manufacturers in Xinjiang were also involved in forced labor programs or were supplied by raw material companies engaged in it.
The planned regulation to ban products manufactured using forced labor from the EU internal market is currently passing through the EU institutions. The Parliament finally confirmed this ban in May. Now, the EU Council and the individual EU states still have to approve the plan. The US has long prohibited the import of products from Xinjiang unless forced labor can be explicitly excluded. As a result, experts had feared a split in export flows, with solar products with Xinjiang content ending up permanently in the EU or the UK. The upcoming EU ban is intended to prevent this.
China dominates the sector’s global supply chains – down to the complete solar system. Manufacturers buy preliminary products in China, installers usually buy entire systems. EU solar companies have to set up new supply chains for these purchases entirely outside Xinjiang – and all of this has to be certified. After all, independent human rights audits are not possible in Xinjiang.
The German Solar Industry Association (BSW-Solar) regularly informs its member companies about “current standards and certification options”, says Managing Director Carsten Koernig. “For example, in cooperation with member companies, we have developed updates to supply contracts that are intended to exclude the use of forced labor in supply chains,” Koernig told Table.Briefings. The Association condemns all forms of human rights violations and considers “more responsibility and more transparency in the value chain to be expressly warranted.”
One company that claims to be buying exclusively from outside Xinjiang is the Berlin-based solar system company Enpal. “We source 100 percent of our wafer cells and other preliminary products from three provinces: Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. We can be 100 percent certain that no forced labor is involved,” says Henning Rath, Chief Supply Chain Manager at Enpal. “These are completely normal, highly automated factories, to be honest, with a standard that is significantly higher than we currently see in Europe.”
According to Rath, Enpal sources a large share of the polysilicon it needs from Yunnan. His team travels there regularly to ensure everything is traceable and transparent for Enpal. Rath estimates that Xinjiang currently accounts for around 30 to 40 percent of Chinese polysilicon. “This means that everything that is produced in Xinjiang remains in the domestic market. What is exported actually comes from other provinces.”
Enpal has been buying directly from China since 2021 and has audited every supplier itself since then, with its own people from Rath’s team in Shenzhen. “We are the buyer, we want to know where it comes from – because we are responsible for it according to the LkSG.”
Rath says that Chinese companies that insist on the freedom to supply products from Xinjiang for Enpal products fail the audit. “We no longer actively work with these companies.” These companies are the majority. “But there are companies that have specialized in setting themselves up properly for international markets because they have understood that this can definitely offer added value. And we work well with them.”
Alongside electric cars and batteries, the solar industry is one of the “New Three” emerging industries that Beijing hopes to develop into an export hit. This makes a separate supply chain for exports to the West definitely worthwhile. No one says so openly, says Rath. “But there is a clear instruction from Beijing that says: ‘Build an export-barrier-free supply chain!’” Therefore, Chinese solar companies are increasingly setting up production facilities far from Xinjiang. Anhui’s capital Hefei, for example, has built up a large cluster of solar companies, many of which manufacture for export.
The effectiveness of due diligence in the supply chain requires “transparency and, more importantly, trust,” says Joseph Negrine from the Australian National University. “The ethical sourcing of materials and labor in the solar industry requires importing companies to have traceable supply chains and exporting companies to be transparent about labor conditions.” Enpal, for example, requests information such as labor contracts, wage statements, insurance and employee accommodation.
All this is a challenging task. This is why companies are now thinking about setting up joint ventures in Europe with their Chinese suppliers, as Rath explains, who will be traveling to China with Habeck as Enpal’s representative. “The idea is to establish the core technology of photovoltaics with large production capacities in Europe,” says Rath. The company has been in talks with technology partners in China for about a year. Up to four partners from the EU and China are involved in the plans for each production step – polysilicon, wafers, cells and modules.
Basically, Vietnam is the answer to the German government’s China strategy. The Southeast Asian country is an obvious choice as a diversification location. If Germany really wants to reduce its excessive dependence on China, Vietnam is the obvious partner.
“China plus 1” is the mantra in many German corporate headquarters. On the one hand, they want to stay in China; after all, the huge market is simply too important for their own business. On the other hand, they also want to diversify, given the increasing geopolitical tensions. And for many, that “plus 1” is: Vietnam.
But now 66-year-old Tô Lâm has been elected as the new president – and this could pose a problem for the overly attractive diversification strategy. Because: Tô Lâm seems to be behind the so-called “Tiergarten kidnapping.”
In his role as security minister, he allegedly gave the order to kidnap the former Vietnamese politician and former CEO Trinh Xuan Thanh from Berlin’s Tiergarten Park in 2017. At least, that is what the ruling of the Berlin Court of Appeal says. The German government considered the incident to be a violation of German sovereignty. Several Vietnamese diplomats were expelled and the “strategic partnership” with Vietnam was suspended.
Yet everything had been going so well so far – for Germany, for German companies, and, last but not least, for Vietnam. “Vietnam is the biggest beneficiary in Southeast Asia in the context of the China plus 1 trend,” Florian Feyerabend told Table.Briefings. “As part of a strategy of diversification and de-risking, the country has become particularly interesting for German companies,” the Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Hanoi explained. However, Feyerabend emphasizes: “Vietnam is not an alternative to China, but rather a complement to the economic activities in China.”
No wonder, because Vietnam has German companies much to offer. KAS Director Feyerabend cites three main reasons:
Vietnam also has enormous deposits of rare earths, which are used in the production of, for example, microchips. This treasure trove of raw materials also makes the country interesting for international investors seeking to make their supply chains less dependent on China.
It is no surprise, then, that Vietnam also plays a vital role in the rivalry between China and the United States. Both US President Joe Biden and China’s head of state Xi Jinping visited Vietnam in 2023. Vietnam’s proximity to China is apparent – geographically, but also ideologically: both are communist one-party systems ruled authoritatively by the respective Communist Party.
This is where the most important bond lies, explains Huynh Tam Sang from the Vietnam National University in Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese Ministry of Public Affairs adopted many strategies from the Chinese party cadres, especially in counter-terrorism and riot control. “In January, Tô Lâm asked the Chinese Ministry of Public Security for theoretical and practical advice on how the Communist Party could maintain complete control,” Huynh told Table.Briefings.
There are also close economic ties. Joint railroad projects have led to flourishing cross-border trade. But Beijing is also pursuing another strategy: It wants to use Vietnam to circumvent Western countries’ growing trade barriers and punitive tariffs. Accordingly, Vietnam – and Mexico – have recently overtaken the United States as the main destinations for Chinese manufacturing and logistics projects. According to Chinese customs data, China’s exports of computer parts alone more than tripled between 2017 and 2023.
Yet this proximity also has its downsides. As a former ally of the Soviet Union, Vietnam was enemies with China in the 1970s and 1980s. Even today, the population still harbors reservations about its large neighbor to the north. Specifically, there is a conflict over territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The USA is trying to exploit this rift. Although once a bitter enemy in the Vietnam War, Washington has long since become an important security policy partner. During Joe Biden’s visit, the two countries signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the purposes of peace, cooperation, and sustainable development.”
Vietnam follows a so-called bamboo policy: stable and firmly rooted, yet extremely flexible and pliable between China and the USA. Germany has also taken advantage of this so far: Vietnam has become a popular alternative economic hub.
In order to keep it that way, the German government should quickly seek dialogue with Hanoi to resolve the problems. As the new president, Tô Lâm has mainly representative tasks, but experts believe he has far greater ambitions. A swift solution would then also be entirely in line with the government’s own long-term China strategy.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
In late 2023, Ku Chung-Hwa received a call from the head of Taiwan’s representative office in Germany, Representative Shieh Jhy-Wey. He asked if he was interested in co-chairing a newly created Taiwanese-German dialog platform. Ku didn’t think twice and agreed.
The dialog platform was officially launched soon afterward, in December 2023, by the foreign missions of both countries. The German Federal Foreign Office proclaimed the goal of “promoting a lively civil society exchange.”
Ku Chung-Hwa began organizing the platform’s first meeting in Berlin in May of this year together with German co-chair Reinhard Buetikofer. It was not the first contact with Germany for the emeritus professor of sociology from National Chengchi University in Taipei: He had lived here for almost eight years from 1981 – first for a degree course in Regensburg, then for his PhD in Heidelberg. His research at the time focused on the work of sociologist Max Weber; during his time in Heidelberg, Ku also translated an introductory work on Weber’s theories into Chinese.
Now, almost forty years later, he made his way to Berlin with a delegation of twelve members. Among them were researchers with ties to Germany, MPs from the three major parties in Taiwan and a journalist from Taiwan’s renowned Commonwealth Magazine. They spent a day and a half discussing issues such as the resilience of democracy, sustainable economic transformation and the digital society with the German delegates.
What can Germany and Taiwan learn from each other? Ku Chung-Hwa recalls his student days in Germany. Even back then, he very much appreciated the objectivity of the political debate in Germany: “You can discuss a lot of things rationally,” something he would like to see even more of in Taiwan.
Germany, in turn, could learn from Taiwan’s resilience, its ability to economically and politically assert itself over the decades despite all external adversity. The diversity and strength of the social movements in Taiwan could also offer inspiration for Germany.
Ku Chung-Hwa speaks from experience: When he went to Germany, the final years of the then Kuomintang (KMT) dictatorship were dawning. When he returned to Taiwan at the end of the 1980s, the last KMT dictator, Chiang Ching-kuo, had died a few days earlier. Subsequently, Ku’s research focused on the role of civil society organizations in democratization processes – and he became part of various social movements. In the 1990s, he and other lecturers fought for the liberalization of universities in Taiwan. In 2007, Ku founded the Citizen Congress Watch (公民監督國會聯盟).
Overall, Ku is optimistic about democracy in Taiwan and cooperation with Germany. “Democracy has largely become a consensus in Taiwan – we have political disputes, but very few people question democracy itself.” Ku sees the greatest value of the German-Taiwanese dialog platform in the framework created for a continuous exchange on an equal footing – with political support from both foreign ministries. The first two years were “an experiment,” but he believes the format already represents a breakthrough for German-Taiwanese relations.
In May 2025, the German delegation will come to Taiwan for the first time and, according to Ku’s information, will discuss environmental and climate issues, among other things. According to plans, most of the delegates from the first year will stay, with Reinhard Buetikofer and Ku Chung-Hwa continuing to chair the delegation. For Ku personally, it is also good news: “I finally have the opportunity to return the favor for the hospitality I received during my time in Germany.” Leonardo Pape
China’s Singles’ Day in the fall is one of the biggest e-commerce festivals in the world. In October 2023, online retailers turned over more than 1,100 billion yuan at the discount event, the equivalent of around 146 billion euros. So it’s no wonder that one shopping festival a year is not enough. On Tuesday, the 618 Shopping Festival, named after the date June 18, took place. Online retailers and logistics companies have to spend months preparing for these major events resulting in billions of orders. Here, workers at a food company in the city of Jinhua, Zhejiang province, pack goods for shipping.