This is the 100th issue of China.Table. This means we are still a very young product but slowly leaving the start-up phase behind us. We are proud to have gained notoriety in business and China circles so quickly, but we also rely on your help: Tell us how we can continue to improve! I look forward to receiving your e-mails at china@table.media.
In these 100 issues, the positioning of the EU and its members on China has been one of the dominant themes. We are now receiving mixed signals from Hungary. Voters are increasingly dissatisfied with Prime Minister Orbán’s China-friendly course. The latter must now find a compromise that doesn’t make him appear too China-savvy, as Amelie Richter reports. For Orbán, this would be a return to his roots. As an opposition politician, he used to rehearse the uprising against China.
Meanwhile, an uprising of a very different kind is emerging in China itself. The younger generation is fed up with the self-exploitation that parents and companies expect of them. No wonder. In the tumultuous upward phase of the past decades, diligence was practically synonymous with success. Meanwhile, the job market and opportunities for advancement are behaving much more unfairly and tenaciously. Young people no longer know what they are supposed to be working for, as Ning Wang reports.
The planned EU vaccination certificate is expected to make traveling within the European Union easier again as early as July 1. This week, the members of the European Parliament approved the corresponding draft legislation by a large majority. This means only the formal approval of the EU states is needed before the regulation can apply for twelve months. Just in time for the start of the holiday season.
The free Covid certificate is intended to provide information about currently taken tests and passed Covid infection using a QR code. Test certificates and vaccination documents are thus to be standardized throughout the EU. The certificate will state which vaccine the holder has received and whether it is one or two doses. Some EU countries have already reopened their borders to vaccinated persons from third countries, such as France and Greece.
Travelers from China, however, will most likely be left out in the cold in many EU countries – because the Chinese vaccines currently do not have the approval of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Under this approach, people who have been administered Sinovac or Sinopharm are not considered vaccinated in the EU. The Sinovac vaccine has emergency approval from the World Health Organization (WHO) (China.Table reported), and the EMA has a review underway. It is considered quite possible that Sinovac will eventually get the approval. Sinopharm, however, is still far away from this.
The Green MEP and pharmacist Jutta Paulus stresses that safety comes first in the decision: “As long as there is no assessment by the EMA, I think it is a risk to exempt people who have been vaccinated with a vaccine that has not yet been approved from the quarantine or testing obligation.” She says the pandemic is far from over and the outbreak of new sources of infection must be prevented at all costs. The basis for decisions to exempt from quarantine or compulsory testing must always be the most up-to-date scientific evidence, Paul told China.Table. “That’s why it’s right that only those vaccines are considered by the certificate that have also been tested for safety and efficacy by the EMA as part of its rigorous review process.”
However: The EU certificate is neither a travel document nor a prerequisite. And, as so often within the European Union, there are exceptions. Because the EU requirements can be supplemented individually by the member states. In addition to vaccines with EMA approval, such as BioNTech/Pfizer or Moderna, states can also individually recognize Sinopharm and Sinovac. This is currently already the case in Greece and Cyprus, for example. In Hungary, too, the recognition of vaccination with the Chinese vaccines is very likely – because the country’s population is also immunized with Sinopharm. And so a patchwork for travelers from China (and Hungarians vaccinated with Sinopharm) is created, which could possibly lead – should entry from the People’s Republic become possible – to Chinese tourists flying to Budapest rather than Paris.
In Germany, recognition of the Chinese vaccines is still in the stars. In response to a question from China.Table, the Federal Ministry of Health said there was a possibility that other vaccines would be recognized in addition to those approved by the EMA, for example, if they had WHO emergency approval. However, a decision would be made “in the light of the progress of scientific knowledge,” for example, on efficacy or side effects. The prerequisite is that a comparable proof of quality, efficacy, and safety is ensured for the vaccines with WHO emergency recommendation as for vaccines with EMA approval.
It is still unclear whether the EU certificate system can also be linked to digital certificates from third countries in the future. The Commission is trying to ensure the certificate’s compatibility with systems in countries outside the EU, the Brussels authority said. It also hopes the EU certificate could “serve as a model for other certificates” currently being developed in other parts of the world. The regulation allows the Commission to recognize by decision certificates issued to EU citizens and their family members by non-EU countries, provided these certificates “meet the quality standards and are compatible with the EU trust framework.” In the People’s Republic, there are currently no facilitations for vaccinated people – so the proof at the border is obsolete, and the mandatory quarantine remains.
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán raises his right hand in salute. He is wearing a uniform with red collar patches, and on his left upper arm is a red armband with the word “Fidesz”, the name of his party. The fictitious Orbán in Mao’s look is the motif of a protest poster. It is deliberately intended to be reminiscent of the propaganda posters of the CP in China.
A young man carried the protest sign with Orbán in a Mao Zedong outfit through Budapest last weekend. He protested against the government’s plan to build a branch of Shanghai’s Fudan University in the Hungarian capital. An educational institution controlled by the CP in the middle of the EU, paid for by the host country – that went too far for the demonstrators.
The demonstration, which attracted attention across Europe and was attended by more than ten thousand participants, apparently made at least a little impression on the Prime Minister’s official residence, who quickly dispatched an appeaser: The university was not even in the planning phase, Orbán’s Chief of Staff Gergely Gulyas stressed in an interview with the conservative weekly magazine Mandiner. He raised the possibility of a referendum on the multi-million project. As soon as the framework conditions are known, a referendum could be held in Budapest, Gulyas assured.
Under Fidesz’s leadership, Hungary has become one of the most China-friendly countries in the EU. Will there be a change of heart? “It seems that the government has re-evaluated its position, as even its own voters have severe reservations about the Fudan campus in Budapest,” says Tamás Matura, a professor at Budapest’s Corvinus University and founder of the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies, in an interview with China.Table. But he thinks it is less likely that Orbán and his party will really change their minds regarding the Fudan offshoot: “I think they will certainly go ahead with the project if they win next year’s elections.”
Political scientist Matura can see some good in the supposed election campaign maneuver: “The controversy over the planned Fudan campus in Budapest has finally made China and bilateral relations a mainstream political issue in Hungary.” In the past, the general public did not pay too much attention to China-related issues, Matura said. “Today, all sectors of society understand what is at stake.” The opposition, too, has understood that pro-China policies offer “sufficient political capital” to attack the Orbán government, he said. Matura is sure that it can rally its supporters and convince undecided voters.
Yet the relations between the two countries go back a long way. Their economies have been interwoven on a personal level for decades. With more than 30,000 Chinese living in the Hungarian capital, Budapest now has the largest Chinese community in Europe after Paris and London. This development dates back to the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. At the time, Hungary was the only European country that did not require Chinese to have a visa when entering the country.
Many thousands of migrant workers from the eastern Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian came to Hungary with large checked bags full of mostly cheap consumer goods. Cheap goods were produced en masse in these provinces at that time. The migrants initially sold them on Heroes’ Square and the surrounding streets, and later on Józsefvárosi Piac, the Euro Square, of all places.
Most of these traders saw Hungary only as a stopover to move on to Western Europe. At the height of this wave of arrivals, 50,000 Chinese lived in the Hungarian capital. Many of them stayed. They opened shops and restaurants in the Monori Center in the Kőbánya district, for example. The corner is still considered the Chinatown of Budapest.
A second wave of Chinese emigrants to Budapest occurred between 2013 and 2017, but this time under completely different circumstances. Those who invested between €250,000 and €400,000 from the People’s Republic received a permanent residence permit. Many of these immigrants bought pretty houses on the Buda Hills or apartments in the posh alleys of Budapest.
Whether Chinese immigrants are popular in Budapest was not questioned anymore. But rather the Hungarian public’s opinion on the state of China. According to a survey conducted by Sinophone Borderlands in the autumn of 2020, citizens have very different attitudes towards China than their government: Overall, almost 50 percent of Hungarian respondents had a negative or very negative opinion of China, while only around 25 percent had a positive or very positive opinion. People in Hungary thus have a more negative view of China than those in Poland, Slovakia, Italy or Spain.
And even the current Prime Minister was considered anything but a friend of China in his early years. His Fidesz party, now sharply right-wing conservative, was anti-communist during its time in opposition – and thus also opposed the People’s Republic of China. Orbán even received the Dalai Lama in the Hungarian parliament. “There were well-known members of the party, who later also became ministers, who waved the Tibet flag in front of the Chinese embassy in Budapest,” Matura recalls.
In comparison, it was surprising that Orbán traveled to Beijing in 2009 to establish the CP-Fidesz alliance. The change in attitude was driven above all by economic interests, says the scholar. Budapest needed to find new economic partners and sources of investment. In the phase of the Eurozone crisis, opening up to the East was a legitimate idea and, in a way, somewhat reduced dependence on the EU market, says Matura.
And the plan worked: Relations with Beijing went well. In 2011 Budapest was the first host of what was then a new format of talks between China and several Eastern and Central European states, now known as “17+1.” After Lithuania announced its exit, there are still “16+1.”
To understand the Hungarian government’s current approach, it is also necessary to look at its foreign policy in general, explains Matura – because Beijing is not the only illiberal regime Orbán is flirting with. “His foreign policy approach is based on getting all the major powers interested in Hungary,” he says, adding that Orbán is also doing a “peacock dance” to impress Russia and Brazil under President Bolsonaro, as well as the US when it was still ruled by Donald Trump.
But ideology also plays a role. “We hear the same narrative today as in the 1960s and 1970s: that the West is close to collapse and China, or Eurasia, is the future.” Orbán himself often speaks with genuine admiration about the Chinese economic system.
The Hungarian Prime Minister also likes to use his relations with Beijing as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the EU – at least superficially. Because: “When it comes to money, especially when Germany is involved, Hungary always takes the German position,” says Matura. He says that is why the upcoming federal election is also important for Hungary’s approach to China. “If the next government in Germany is less pro-China, Hungary might also change its approach.”
Recently, Berlin’s influence has also been relied on elsewhere: For weeks, Hungary blocked a statement by the EU states on electoral reform in Hong Kong. A weak form of statement, a so-called “conclusion,” was planned. Observers in Brussels briefly hoped the German government might be able to change Orbán’s mind. Matura, however, did not count on it. The EU’s statements, unlike sanctions, are generally seen as relatively toothless by the Hungarian government.
However, a change in the voting process, which German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also pushed for this week, could put Hungary in a tight spot and influence relations with China. The approach, which Maas also put forward, envisages only a simple majority for votes in the EU Council of Ministers and no unanimity.
The veto of a single EU state would not matter then. “As a small member state, Hungary would no longer have the power to block statements or conclusions. For Beijing, Hungary could then become less interesting, said political expert Matura. After much back and forth, the European External Action Service now found an elegant but less impressive solution for the Hong Kong conclusion blocked by Hungary: The statement published on Wednesday was only in the name of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. Amelie Richter, Felix Lee
It’s that time again. Millions of university graduates of the so-called Generation Z are being flushed into the job market in China’s cities. Although their degrees alone give them a very good chance of finding a job, not all of them will get the job they long for. More and more young Chinese see the pressure to perform at universities as unrealistic. Even the best grades no longer guarantee a smooth start to a career.
According to a survey by the Development Research Foundation and Zhaopin, one of China’s largest job platforms, more than 26 percent of 2020 graduates still haven’t found a job. They graduated when the country was only regaining its footing after months of quarantine. Businesses were still reluctant to hire job starters because of the uncertainty. The government wanted to help – but had few effective tools at its disposal: After massive “hiring programs” imposed on state-owned, as well as private companies, the percentage of 16- to 24-year-olds out of work stood at 14 percent.
Zhang Chenggang, Director of the Research Center for New Employment Patterns at the Capital University of Economics, fears that such government intervention will worsen the situation. According to Zhang, the danger is that the policy gives graduates the illusion that higher degrees, such as a diploma, will provide them with better opportunities in the job market and especially in government institutions. Thus, the demand for government jobs has increased dramatically, as in an uncertain work environment, the prospect of becoming a permanent civil servant seemed very attractive to many. In 2019, nearly one million people had taken the civil service exam, qualifying them for a civil service job. This year, 1.57 million applicants took the exam.
The outlook is not encouraging this year either, despite relatively good control of the Covid pandemic in the country. For the first time, more than nine million young people are graduating from college, according to calculations by the Ministry of Education in Beijing. The outlook is no better for competition in the coming years, with more than ten million graduates already expected in 2022. While tough competition in the labor market has been the main reason why school drills have been part of everyday life since childhood, job prospects are now becoming less attractive for graduates.
Attitudes towards work have significantly changed, especially among Generation Z. This is because those born between 1995 and 2003 are becoming more selective. They are rebelling against what the economy demands of them. Their grievance is represented by the formula “996”: working from 9 am to 9 pm 6 days a week. Twelve-hour days – this has long since ceased to apply only to factory workers who assemble phones for Foxconn for the global market. China’s technology industry also considers it “glorious” for its employees to serve long working days. The 72-hour week has become the rule.
Particularly in the startups that provide services to the ecosystems of tech companies like Tencent, Alibaba, meal delivery company Meituan, social media app Bytedance, or e-commerce platforms like JD.com, 80-100 hour weeks tend to be the norm for employees. With the Covid pandemic and home office has come the 007 phenomena. The formula “0-0-7” stands for: Midnight to midnight 7 days a week. In other words, work around the clock.
Beijing’s focus on making the nation a technology leader by 2025 has led to more pressure being exerted on companies than ever before. Global competition in the technology sector is being played out on the backs of workers. This is the extension of the concept of China as the world’s workbench for the service and technology sectors.
A certain sense of jadedness is developing among Generation Z. They know that good grades are not the door opener for promising jobs. The booming tech industry, which is increasingly revealing the dark side of the logic of growth through its inhumane working hours, is losing its appeal not least because of the incidents of workers being exhausted to death but also because it is similarly exploitative and inhumane as factory work, which Generation Z wants to escape by studying.
Recently, discussions on social platforms have been on and off, showing a little insight into the minds of Gen Z. For a few weeks now, the term “lying flat” (躺平) has been used more and more often to protest against unfair conditions. This is no longer solely about working conditions. Instead, the focus is on a broad critique of society, in which it seems futile for many people to try hard in college, jobs and education because opportunities are unequally distributed anyway. A recent poll on China’s Twitter-like platform, Weibo, shows that 61 percent of the 241,000 participants welcome the trend.
“In today’s society, our every move is monitored, and our every action is criticized. Is there a more rebellious act than simply ‘lying flat’? Someone summed it up as ‘possibly the quietest and most helpless act of resistance in the history of human civilization,’” said Liao Zenghu, author and editor, in a post on the phenomenon.
“Lying flat” is a trend expressed in part by Generation Z’s preference to find a job in the country’s smaller cities rather than move to expensive metropolises and slave away on the hamster wheel. The “lying flat” movement is a reaction to “neijuan”(内卷). A term meant to express the tension of being constantly exposed to a highly competitive environment.
The party, meanwhile, is less than enthusiastic: The attitude of younger people makes it frown at how the country will rise to become a technology leader and economic power in the years ahead when the ambitions of the young no longer overlap too much with those of the party. It already senses the seeds of an existential crisis in the trend toward work-life balance and has had posts created on the Communist Youth League’s Weibo channel advocating “hard work.”
The Japanese Ministry of Education has announced an official investigation into the 14 Confucius Institutes in the country. The agency wants to investigate suspicions about whether the institutions are being used by the Chinese government for propaganda purposes and may be collaborating with the country’s intelligence services, the Nikkei agency reported. The host Japanese universities that house the Confucius Institutes have been asked to disclose details of the cooperation. The universities must provide information about the institutes’ involvement in research projects, the sources of their funding, and the number of students participating in each.
Confucius Institutes are presented as promotional institutions for language and cultural exchange by the Chinese side but are suspected of primarily pursuing the state interests of the People’s Republic with their work and influencing the formation of public opinion in the host countries in favor of the authoritarian regime. In Germany, too, the intentions of the rapid expansion of Confucius sites have been the subject of increased discussion for a while now, especially after it became known that Chinese state money was funding a professorship at the Free University of Berlin to the tune of €500,000.
Confucius Institutes are subordinate to the Center for Language Education and Cooperation, also known as Hanban, which, in turn, is accused of having close ties to the Chinese Ministry of Education. There are already more than 500 sites in some 160 countries worldwide. Most of them are in South Korea (22), where last week a group of activists demonstrated against the institutes in front of the Chinese embassy. In Germany, there are 19 branches so far. The majority of them are located at public universities. grz
Tech company Apple is reportedly negotiating with battery giants CATL and BYD to supply batteries to advance its iCar project. According to Reuters, several insiders have reported talks at an “early stage.” According to the report, a prerequisite for Apple to cooperate is that the two Chinese companies build production facilities in the US. Automakers there are increasingly insisting on supporting local battery production. White House economic adviser Jared Bernstein confirmed to Reuters that Apple’s terms are “completely consistent with what the president has talked about in terms of onshoring supply chains.”
However, CATL, which already supplies Tesla with batteries, is not yet ready to invest in the US – the political uncertainties are too great, as Reuters reports. Only at the beginning of the year did Apple spread the rumors about an EV manufactured under its brand. At that time, it was about possible cooperation with Hyundai and Kia. niw
The ban remained pure theory because the US government is taking it back before it came into force: US President Joe Biden has withdrawn the sanctions against the communication apps WeChat and TikTok. These had been imposed by his predecessor Donald Trump. However, the authorities will examine possible risks to “national security and the American people” by foreign apps in all the more detail, as the White House explained on Wednesday. The Department of Commerce is now developing criteria by which threats to data protection can be identified.
Last year Trump tried to declare the apps illegal and ban them from US app stores. The justification: They endangered US security interests; the real reason: He wanted to attack China from a new flank in the trade war. However, courts blocked the implementation of the administrative order because of doubts about its legality. Biden now wants to find a stable legal basis for controlling foreign apps. fin
China is preparing for further disputes with the US and EU by changing its law. “Meanwhile, we believe it is necessary for the country to have specific laws to counter foreign sanctions so that we have a legal basis for taking countermeasures,” government spokesman Wang Wenbin said on Thursday. In the meantime, state broadcaster CCTV reported that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress had already passed the law. It aims to defend the state against “unilateral and discriminatory” sanctions. Details of the amendment were still vague.
Hong Kong’s delegate to the National People’s Congress, Tam Yiu-chung, said that the new law could freeze or seize property or assets of individuals, according to a report in the South China Morning Post. It is also possible that institutions will be prevented from conducting transactions with certain individuals or organizations. According to Tam, the rejection of visa applications or the prohibition of entry into the People’s Republic is also included in the new law. In the case of visa holders, the authorities could declare the documents invalid, he added. Individuals, their spouses, their relatives, or organizations for which they work, among others, could be hit by punitive measures.
China is in a spiral of increasingly punitive measures with the US and the European Union. The EU started by imposing an entry ban on those allegedly responsible for human rights violations against Uyghurs. China retaliated with travel restrictions against numerous EU parliamentarians and European institutions. The country has been in a protracted trade war with the US since the first days of Donald Trump’s presidency. fin/ari
Beijing protested strongly when the pathogen spreading from Wuhan was initially called “the Chinese virus.” The name stigmatized the citizens of the People’s Republic. The World Health Organization (WHO) then named the pathogen Sars-CoV-2. In the meantime, it even declined the Greek alphabet to conceal the geographical origin of all mutations. Instead of British, Brazilian, South African or Indian variants, it now has to be politically correct: Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta. China is fine with that. It got its way: Nothing in the name of the virus any longer suggests a possible Chinese origin. For Beijing, this is a political issue.
Yet the People’s Republic is not so squeamish when it comes to infections that originate in other places. It calls Ebola the virus named after a river in Congo, or “African swine fever” for the deadly disease that infected and ravaged China’s pig herd in 2019. Just last Monday, the Global Times reported that the People’s Republic had defeated “African Swine Fever” (ASF) after two years, but the name ASF has survived in China, while the term “Chinese virus” disappeared globally under pressure from Beijing. The Congo, or Africa as a whole, simply does not have a lobby or as much influence as China’s government.
Internally, Beijing has no scruples about stigmatizing others. It likes to expose them to ridicule with animal names to rob them of dignity and self-respect. Mao drew fully from the dictionary of inhuman denunciations for his Cultural Revolution. He had his opponents demonized as “cattle devils and snake spirits” (牛鬼蛇神) or as “chameleons or vermin.” (变色龙,小爬虫). His Red Guards shouted as a battle cry, “Smash their dog heads” (砸烂狗头).
Has the cultural nation of China learned from this? Apparently not. Even President Xi Jinping is reaching into the dustbin of barbaric comparisons. In January 2013, two months after taking office as party leader, he ordered the Central Committee’s anti-corruption agency to “clean up” the party, military and state apparatus. He mobilized a hunt, bypassing the judiciary, for actual or perceived corrupt top officials (the so-called Tigers). At the same time, they were also to clean up among lower-ranking party and state officials (the flies). A year later, the third persecutee in the group was all corrupt officials and corporate executives who had absconded abroad as economic fugitives with fortunes (the foxes). Xi coined the catchphrases for his campaign, in which he also dumped his political opponents: beating tigers (打老虎), swatting flies (拍苍蝇), and hunting foxes (猎狐).
According to China’s newly published party history, Xi has hunted down 440 high-ranking comrades as tigers in the first five years of his rule, many of whom were sentenced to life in prison. Among them were 43 members of the 18th Party Congress alone, who once helped elect Xi as CP chief. According to the report, the flies caught so far even number in the millions.
In July 2014, the hunt for the “foxes” was added. Xinhua published a tally of the international manhunt. By June 2020, 7831 economic fugitives from dozens of countries had been extradited to China, including 2075 former party officials. Beijing would have recovered nearly €3 billion.
Unlike in the Covid case, there is no public discussion about the stigmatization of those prosecuted within China. The arbitrary anti-corruption campaign is accompanied by a large number of suicides by which the accused evade arrest. The China Daily once dismissed such suicides cynically. “They weigh lighter than a feather.”
Animal names such as wolf, lion or dragon, on the other hand, have positive connotations in political China. Since 2018, Beijing’s diplomats and foreign ministry spokespeople have taken pleasure in making headlines as “wolf warriors” when they aggressively defend China’s offensive foreign policy in tone and content. The name – first raised by bloggers – derives from the Chinese hit movie Wolf Warrior 2, in which a Rambo-like soldier hero frees Chinese hostages abroad. Since the term “wolf warrior” sparked global alienation, however, Beijing turned the tables and accused Western media of inventing the word.
It is undisputed that party leader Xi likes to compare China to the mighty lion or mystical dragon for the benefit of his own nation. In 2014, he wooed Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India: “The Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant” should join hands to establish a “fairer and more reasonable international order.”
Xi took the cake in his speech celebrating 50 years of diplomatic relations with France. In Paris in March 2014, he asserted that no one needs to fear the People’s Republic: “The lion China has already woken up, but it is a peaceful, friendly, and civilized lion.” Xi was alluding to a bon mot allegedly attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte. The Corsican, when asked for advice on how to deal with a China resisting foreign countries, is said to have once pointed to the world map and said, “There lies a sleeping lion. Let him sleep. If he wakes up, he may shake the world.” According to another version, Napoleon is said to have said “dragon.”
Foreign critics interpreted the image of the peaceful and civilized predator as a hidden warning. Beijing could change tunes if it didn’t get its way. Where on earth would there be such a thing as a friendly lion? Unless China saw itself as a domesticated zoo and circus lion. Or even as a paper tiger. But that’s certainly not what Xi, who loves animal imagery so much, meant.
Su Mang, the former Editor-in-Chief of the fashion magazine Harper’s Bazaar China, has triggered a shitstorm with a statement on television. She said that one had to spend at least ¥650 (the equivalent of €85) a day on food and that she could not live on less. Appalled by Su’s comment, many Internet users pointed out that most people in the country have less than ¥30 (€4) available for their meals every day.
This is the 100th issue of China.Table. This means we are still a very young product but slowly leaving the start-up phase behind us. We are proud to have gained notoriety in business and China circles so quickly, but we also rely on your help: Tell us how we can continue to improve! I look forward to receiving your e-mails at china@table.media.
In these 100 issues, the positioning of the EU and its members on China has been one of the dominant themes. We are now receiving mixed signals from Hungary. Voters are increasingly dissatisfied with Prime Minister Orbán’s China-friendly course. The latter must now find a compromise that doesn’t make him appear too China-savvy, as Amelie Richter reports. For Orbán, this would be a return to his roots. As an opposition politician, he used to rehearse the uprising against China.
Meanwhile, an uprising of a very different kind is emerging in China itself. The younger generation is fed up with the self-exploitation that parents and companies expect of them. No wonder. In the tumultuous upward phase of the past decades, diligence was practically synonymous with success. Meanwhile, the job market and opportunities for advancement are behaving much more unfairly and tenaciously. Young people no longer know what they are supposed to be working for, as Ning Wang reports.
The planned EU vaccination certificate is expected to make traveling within the European Union easier again as early as July 1. This week, the members of the European Parliament approved the corresponding draft legislation by a large majority. This means only the formal approval of the EU states is needed before the regulation can apply for twelve months. Just in time for the start of the holiday season.
The free Covid certificate is intended to provide information about currently taken tests and passed Covid infection using a QR code. Test certificates and vaccination documents are thus to be standardized throughout the EU. The certificate will state which vaccine the holder has received and whether it is one or two doses. Some EU countries have already reopened their borders to vaccinated persons from third countries, such as France and Greece.
Travelers from China, however, will most likely be left out in the cold in many EU countries – because the Chinese vaccines currently do not have the approval of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Under this approach, people who have been administered Sinovac or Sinopharm are not considered vaccinated in the EU. The Sinovac vaccine has emergency approval from the World Health Organization (WHO) (China.Table reported), and the EMA has a review underway. It is considered quite possible that Sinovac will eventually get the approval. Sinopharm, however, is still far away from this.
The Green MEP and pharmacist Jutta Paulus stresses that safety comes first in the decision: “As long as there is no assessment by the EMA, I think it is a risk to exempt people who have been vaccinated with a vaccine that has not yet been approved from the quarantine or testing obligation.” She says the pandemic is far from over and the outbreak of new sources of infection must be prevented at all costs. The basis for decisions to exempt from quarantine or compulsory testing must always be the most up-to-date scientific evidence, Paul told China.Table. “That’s why it’s right that only those vaccines are considered by the certificate that have also been tested for safety and efficacy by the EMA as part of its rigorous review process.”
However: The EU certificate is neither a travel document nor a prerequisite. And, as so often within the European Union, there are exceptions. Because the EU requirements can be supplemented individually by the member states. In addition to vaccines with EMA approval, such as BioNTech/Pfizer or Moderna, states can also individually recognize Sinopharm and Sinovac. This is currently already the case in Greece and Cyprus, for example. In Hungary, too, the recognition of vaccination with the Chinese vaccines is very likely – because the country’s population is also immunized with Sinopharm. And so a patchwork for travelers from China (and Hungarians vaccinated with Sinopharm) is created, which could possibly lead – should entry from the People’s Republic become possible – to Chinese tourists flying to Budapest rather than Paris.
In Germany, recognition of the Chinese vaccines is still in the stars. In response to a question from China.Table, the Federal Ministry of Health said there was a possibility that other vaccines would be recognized in addition to those approved by the EMA, for example, if they had WHO emergency approval. However, a decision would be made “in the light of the progress of scientific knowledge,” for example, on efficacy or side effects. The prerequisite is that a comparable proof of quality, efficacy, and safety is ensured for the vaccines with WHO emergency recommendation as for vaccines with EMA approval.
It is still unclear whether the EU certificate system can also be linked to digital certificates from third countries in the future. The Commission is trying to ensure the certificate’s compatibility with systems in countries outside the EU, the Brussels authority said. It also hopes the EU certificate could “serve as a model for other certificates” currently being developed in other parts of the world. The regulation allows the Commission to recognize by decision certificates issued to EU citizens and their family members by non-EU countries, provided these certificates “meet the quality standards and are compatible with the EU trust framework.” In the People’s Republic, there are currently no facilitations for vaccinated people – so the proof at the border is obsolete, and the mandatory quarantine remains.
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán raises his right hand in salute. He is wearing a uniform with red collar patches, and on his left upper arm is a red armband with the word “Fidesz”, the name of his party. The fictitious Orbán in Mao’s look is the motif of a protest poster. It is deliberately intended to be reminiscent of the propaganda posters of the CP in China.
A young man carried the protest sign with Orbán in a Mao Zedong outfit through Budapest last weekend. He protested against the government’s plan to build a branch of Shanghai’s Fudan University in the Hungarian capital. An educational institution controlled by the CP in the middle of the EU, paid for by the host country – that went too far for the demonstrators.
The demonstration, which attracted attention across Europe and was attended by more than ten thousand participants, apparently made at least a little impression on the Prime Minister’s official residence, who quickly dispatched an appeaser: The university was not even in the planning phase, Orbán’s Chief of Staff Gergely Gulyas stressed in an interview with the conservative weekly magazine Mandiner. He raised the possibility of a referendum on the multi-million project. As soon as the framework conditions are known, a referendum could be held in Budapest, Gulyas assured.
Under Fidesz’s leadership, Hungary has become one of the most China-friendly countries in the EU. Will there be a change of heart? “It seems that the government has re-evaluated its position, as even its own voters have severe reservations about the Fudan campus in Budapest,” says Tamás Matura, a professor at Budapest’s Corvinus University and founder of the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies, in an interview with China.Table. But he thinks it is less likely that Orbán and his party will really change their minds regarding the Fudan offshoot: “I think they will certainly go ahead with the project if they win next year’s elections.”
Political scientist Matura can see some good in the supposed election campaign maneuver: “The controversy over the planned Fudan campus in Budapest has finally made China and bilateral relations a mainstream political issue in Hungary.” In the past, the general public did not pay too much attention to China-related issues, Matura said. “Today, all sectors of society understand what is at stake.” The opposition, too, has understood that pro-China policies offer “sufficient political capital” to attack the Orbán government, he said. Matura is sure that it can rally its supporters and convince undecided voters.
Yet the relations between the two countries go back a long way. Their economies have been interwoven on a personal level for decades. With more than 30,000 Chinese living in the Hungarian capital, Budapest now has the largest Chinese community in Europe after Paris and London. This development dates back to the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. At the time, Hungary was the only European country that did not require Chinese to have a visa when entering the country.
Many thousands of migrant workers from the eastern Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian came to Hungary with large checked bags full of mostly cheap consumer goods. Cheap goods were produced en masse in these provinces at that time. The migrants initially sold them on Heroes’ Square and the surrounding streets, and later on Józsefvárosi Piac, the Euro Square, of all places.
Most of these traders saw Hungary only as a stopover to move on to Western Europe. At the height of this wave of arrivals, 50,000 Chinese lived in the Hungarian capital. Many of them stayed. They opened shops and restaurants in the Monori Center in the Kőbánya district, for example. The corner is still considered the Chinatown of Budapest.
A second wave of Chinese emigrants to Budapest occurred between 2013 and 2017, but this time under completely different circumstances. Those who invested between €250,000 and €400,000 from the People’s Republic received a permanent residence permit. Many of these immigrants bought pretty houses on the Buda Hills or apartments in the posh alleys of Budapest.
Whether Chinese immigrants are popular in Budapest was not questioned anymore. But rather the Hungarian public’s opinion on the state of China. According to a survey conducted by Sinophone Borderlands in the autumn of 2020, citizens have very different attitudes towards China than their government: Overall, almost 50 percent of Hungarian respondents had a negative or very negative opinion of China, while only around 25 percent had a positive or very positive opinion. People in Hungary thus have a more negative view of China than those in Poland, Slovakia, Italy or Spain.
And even the current Prime Minister was considered anything but a friend of China in his early years. His Fidesz party, now sharply right-wing conservative, was anti-communist during its time in opposition – and thus also opposed the People’s Republic of China. Orbán even received the Dalai Lama in the Hungarian parliament. “There were well-known members of the party, who later also became ministers, who waved the Tibet flag in front of the Chinese embassy in Budapest,” Matura recalls.
In comparison, it was surprising that Orbán traveled to Beijing in 2009 to establish the CP-Fidesz alliance. The change in attitude was driven above all by economic interests, says the scholar. Budapest needed to find new economic partners and sources of investment. In the phase of the Eurozone crisis, opening up to the East was a legitimate idea and, in a way, somewhat reduced dependence on the EU market, says Matura.
And the plan worked: Relations with Beijing went well. In 2011 Budapest was the first host of what was then a new format of talks between China and several Eastern and Central European states, now known as “17+1.” After Lithuania announced its exit, there are still “16+1.”
To understand the Hungarian government’s current approach, it is also necessary to look at its foreign policy in general, explains Matura – because Beijing is not the only illiberal regime Orbán is flirting with. “His foreign policy approach is based on getting all the major powers interested in Hungary,” he says, adding that Orbán is also doing a “peacock dance” to impress Russia and Brazil under President Bolsonaro, as well as the US when it was still ruled by Donald Trump.
But ideology also plays a role. “We hear the same narrative today as in the 1960s and 1970s: that the West is close to collapse and China, or Eurasia, is the future.” Orbán himself often speaks with genuine admiration about the Chinese economic system.
The Hungarian Prime Minister also likes to use his relations with Beijing as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the EU – at least superficially. Because: “When it comes to money, especially when Germany is involved, Hungary always takes the German position,” says Matura. He says that is why the upcoming federal election is also important for Hungary’s approach to China. “If the next government in Germany is less pro-China, Hungary might also change its approach.”
Recently, Berlin’s influence has also been relied on elsewhere: For weeks, Hungary blocked a statement by the EU states on electoral reform in Hong Kong. A weak form of statement, a so-called “conclusion,” was planned. Observers in Brussels briefly hoped the German government might be able to change Orbán’s mind. Matura, however, did not count on it. The EU’s statements, unlike sanctions, are generally seen as relatively toothless by the Hungarian government.
However, a change in the voting process, which German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also pushed for this week, could put Hungary in a tight spot and influence relations with China. The approach, which Maas also put forward, envisages only a simple majority for votes in the EU Council of Ministers and no unanimity.
The veto of a single EU state would not matter then. “As a small member state, Hungary would no longer have the power to block statements or conclusions. For Beijing, Hungary could then become less interesting, said political expert Matura. After much back and forth, the European External Action Service now found an elegant but less impressive solution for the Hong Kong conclusion blocked by Hungary: The statement published on Wednesday was only in the name of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. Amelie Richter, Felix Lee
It’s that time again. Millions of university graduates of the so-called Generation Z are being flushed into the job market in China’s cities. Although their degrees alone give them a very good chance of finding a job, not all of them will get the job they long for. More and more young Chinese see the pressure to perform at universities as unrealistic. Even the best grades no longer guarantee a smooth start to a career.
According to a survey by the Development Research Foundation and Zhaopin, one of China’s largest job platforms, more than 26 percent of 2020 graduates still haven’t found a job. They graduated when the country was only regaining its footing after months of quarantine. Businesses were still reluctant to hire job starters because of the uncertainty. The government wanted to help – but had few effective tools at its disposal: After massive “hiring programs” imposed on state-owned, as well as private companies, the percentage of 16- to 24-year-olds out of work stood at 14 percent.
Zhang Chenggang, Director of the Research Center for New Employment Patterns at the Capital University of Economics, fears that such government intervention will worsen the situation. According to Zhang, the danger is that the policy gives graduates the illusion that higher degrees, such as a diploma, will provide them with better opportunities in the job market and especially in government institutions. Thus, the demand for government jobs has increased dramatically, as in an uncertain work environment, the prospect of becoming a permanent civil servant seemed very attractive to many. In 2019, nearly one million people had taken the civil service exam, qualifying them for a civil service job. This year, 1.57 million applicants took the exam.
The outlook is not encouraging this year either, despite relatively good control of the Covid pandemic in the country. For the first time, more than nine million young people are graduating from college, according to calculations by the Ministry of Education in Beijing. The outlook is no better for competition in the coming years, with more than ten million graduates already expected in 2022. While tough competition in the labor market has been the main reason why school drills have been part of everyday life since childhood, job prospects are now becoming less attractive for graduates.
Attitudes towards work have significantly changed, especially among Generation Z. This is because those born between 1995 and 2003 are becoming more selective. They are rebelling against what the economy demands of them. Their grievance is represented by the formula “996”: working from 9 am to 9 pm 6 days a week. Twelve-hour days – this has long since ceased to apply only to factory workers who assemble phones for Foxconn for the global market. China’s technology industry also considers it “glorious” for its employees to serve long working days. The 72-hour week has become the rule.
Particularly in the startups that provide services to the ecosystems of tech companies like Tencent, Alibaba, meal delivery company Meituan, social media app Bytedance, or e-commerce platforms like JD.com, 80-100 hour weeks tend to be the norm for employees. With the Covid pandemic and home office has come the 007 phenomena. The formula “0-0-7” stands for: Midnight to midnight 7 days a week. In other words, work around the clock.
Beijing’s focus on making the nation a technology leader by 2025 has led to more pressure being exerted on companies than ever before. Global competition in the technology sector is being played out on the backs of workers. This is the extension of the concept of China as the world’s workbench for the service and technology sectors.
A certain sense of jadedness is developing among Generation Z. They know that good grades are not the door opener for promising jobs. The booming tech industry, which is increasingly revealing the dark side of the logic of growth through its inhumane working hours, is losing its appeal not least because of the incidents of workers being exhausted to death but also because it is similarly exploitative and inhumane as factory work, which Generation Z wants to escape by studying.
Recently, discussions on social platforms have been on and off, showing a little insight into the minds of Gen Z. For a few weeks now, the term “lying flat” (躺平) has been used more and more often to protest against unfair conditions. This is no longer solely about working conditions. Instead, the focus is on a broad critique of society, in which it seems futile for many people to try hard in college, jobs and education because opportunities are unequally distributed anyway. A recent poll on China’s Twitter-like platform, Weibo, shows that 61 percent of the 241,000 participants welcome the trend.
“In today’s society, our every move is monitored, and our every action is criticized. Is there a more rebellious act than simply ‘lying flat’? Someone summed it up as ‘possibly the quietest and most helpless act of resistance in the history of human civilization,’” said Liao Zenghu, author and editor, in a post on the phenomenon.
“Lying flat” is a trend expressed in part by Generation Z’s preference to find a job in the country’s smaller cities rather than move to expensive metropolises and slave away on the hamster wheel. The “lying flat” movement is a reaction to “neijuan”(内卷). A term meant to express the tension of being constantly exposed to a highly competitive environment.
The party, meanwhile, is less than enthusiastic: The attitude of younger people makes it frown at how the country will rise to become a technology leader and economic power in the years ahead when the ambitions of the young no longer overlap too much with those of the party. It already senses the seeds of an existential crisis in the trend toward work-life balance and has had posts created on the Communist Youth League’s Weibo channel advocating “hard work.”
The Japanese Ministry of Education has announced an official investigation into the 14 Confucius Institutes in the country. The agency wants to investigate suspicions about whether the institutions are being used by the Chinese government for propaganda purposes and may be collaborating with the country’s intelligence services, the Nikkei agency reported. The host Japanese universities that house the Confucius Institutes have been asked to disclose details of the cooperation. The universities must provide information about the institutes’ involvement in research projects, the sources of their funding, and the number of students participating in each.
Confucius Institutes are presented as promotional institutions for language and cultural exchange by the Chinese side but are suspected of primarily pursuing the state interests of the People’s Republic with their work and influencing the formation of public opinion in the host countries in favor of the authoritarian regime. In Germany, too, the intentions of the rapid expansion of Confucius sites have been the subject of increased discussion for a while now, especially after it became known that Chinese state money was funding a professorship at the Free University of Berlin to the tune of €500,000.
Confucius Institutes are subordinate to the Center for Language Education and Cooperation, also known as Hanban, which, in turn, is accused of having close ties to the Chinese Ministry of Education. There are already more than 500 sites in some 160 countries worldwide. Most of them are in South Korea (22), where last week a group of activists demonstrated against the institutes in front of the Chinese embassy. In Germany, there are 19 branches so far. The majority of them are located at public universities. grz
Tech company Apple is reportedly negotiating with battery giants CATL and BYD to supply batteries to advance its iCar project. According to Reuters, several insiders have reported talks at an “early stage.” According to the report, a prerequisite for Apple to cooperate is that the two Chinese companies build production facilities in the US. Automakers there are increasingly insisting on supporting local battery production. White House economic adviser Jared Bernstein confirmed to Reuters that Apple’s terms are “completely consistent with what the president has talked about in terms of onshoring supply chains.”
However, CATL, which already supplies Tesla with batteries, is not yet ready to invest in the US – the political uncertainties are too great, as Reuters reports. Only at the beginning of the year did Apple spread the rumors about an EV manufactured under its brand. At that time, it was about possible cooperation with Hyundai and Kia. niw
The ban remained pure theory because the US government is taking it back before it came into force: US President Joe Biden has withdrawn the sanctions against the communication apps WeChat and TikTok. These had been imposed by his predecessor Donald Trump. However, the authorities will examine possible risks to “national security and the American people” by foreign apps in all the more detail, as the White House explained on Wednesday. The Department of Commerce is now developing criteria by which threats to data protection can be identified.
Last year Trump tried to declare the apps illegal and ban them from US app stores. The justification: They endangered US security interests; the real reason: He wanted to attack China from a new flank in the trade war. However, courts blocked the implementation of the administrative order because of doubts about its legality. Biden now wants to find a stable legal basis for controlling foreign apps. fin
China is preparing for further disputes with the US and EU by changing its law. “Meanwhile, we believe it is necessary for the country to have specific laws to counter foreign sanctions so that we have a legal basis for taking countermeasures,” government spokesman Wang Wenbin said on Thursday. In the meantime, state broadcaster CCTV reported that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress had already passed the law. It aims to defend the state against “unilateral and discriminatory” sanctions. Details of the amendment were still vague.
Hong Kong’s delegate to the National People’s Congress, Tam Yiu-chung, said that the new law could freeze or seize property or assets of individuals, according to a report in the South China Morning Post. It is also possible that institutions will be prevented from conducting transactions with certain individuals or organizations. According to Tam, the rejection of visa applications or the prohibition of entry into the People’s Republic is also included in the new law. In the case of visa holders, the authorities could declare the documents invalid, he added. Individuals, their spouses, their relatives, or organizations for which they work, among others, could be hit by punitive measures.
China is in a spiral of increasingly punitive measures with the US and the European Union. The EU started by imposing an entry ban on those allegedly responsible for human rights violations against Uyghurs. China retaliated with travel restrictions against numerous EU parliamentarians and European institutions. The country has been in a protracted trade war with the US since the first days of Donald Trump’s presidency. fin/ari
Beijing protested strongly when the pathogen spreading from Wuhan was initially called “the Chinese virus.” The name stigmatized the citizens of the People’s Republic. The World Health Organization (WHO) then named the pathogen Sars-CoV-2. In the meantime, it even declined the Greek alphabet to conceal the geographical origin of all mutations. Instead of British, Brazilian, South African or Indian variants, it now has to be politically correct: Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta. China is fine with that. It got its way: Nothing in the name of the virus any longer suggests a possible Chinese origin. For Beijing, this is a political issue.
Yet the People’s Republic is not so squeamish when it comes to infections that originate in other places. It calls Ebola the virus named after a river in Congo, or “African swine fever” for the deadly disease that infected and ravaged China’s pig herd in 2019. Just last Monday, the Global Times reported that the People’s Republic had defeated “African Swine Fever” (ASF) after two years, but the name ASF has survived in China, while the term “Chinese virus” disappeared globally under pressure from Beijing. The Congo, or Africa as a whole, simply does not have a lobby or as much influence as China’s government.
Internally, Beijing has no scruples about stigmatizing others. It likes to expose them to ridicule with animal names to rob them of dignity and self-respect. Mao drew fully from the dictionary of inhuman denunciations for his Cultural Revolution. He had his opponents demonized as “cattle devils and snake spirits” (牛鬼蛇神) or as “chameleons or vermin.” (变色龙,小爬虫). His Red Guards shouted as a battle cry, “Smash their dog heads” (砸烂狗头).
Has the cultural nation of China learned from this? Apparently not. Even President Xi Jinping is reaching into the dustbin of barbaric comparisons. In January 2013, two months after taking office as party leader, he ordered the Central Committee’s anti-corruption agency to “clean up” the party, military and state apparatus. He mobilized a hunt, bypassing the judiciary, for actual or perceived corrupt top officials (the so-called Tigers). At the same time, they were also to clean up among lower-ranking party and state officials (the flies). A year later, the third persecutee in the group was all corrupt officials and corporate executives who had absconded abroad as economic fugitives with fortunes (the foxes). Xi coined the catchphrases for his campaign, in which he also dumped his political opponents: beating tigers (打老虎), swatting flies (拍苍蝇), and hunting foxes (猎狐).
According to China’s newly published party history, Xi has hunted down 440 high-ranking comrades as tigers in the first five years of his rule, many of whom were sentenced to life in prison. Among them were 43 members of the 18th Party Congress alone, who once helped elect Xi as CP chief. According to the report, the flies caught so far even number in the millions.
In July 2014, the hunt for the “foxes” was added. Xinhua published a tally of the international manhunt. By June 2020, 7831 economic fugitives from dozens of countries had been extradited to China, including 2075 former party officials. Beijing would have recovered nearly €3 billion.
Unlike in the Covid case, there is no public discussion about the stigmatization of those prosecuted within China. The arbitrary anti-corruption campaign is accompanied by a large number of suicides by which the accused evade arrest. The China Daily once dismissed such suicides cynically. “They weigh lighter than a feather.”
Animal names such as wolf, lion or dragon, on the other hand, have positive connotations in political China. Since 2018, Beijing’s diplomats and foreign ministry spokespeople have taken pleasure in making headlines as “wolf warriors” when they aggressively defend China’s offensive foreign policy in tone and content. The name – first raised by bloggers – derives from the Chinese hit movie Wolf Warrior 2, in which a Rambo-like soldier hero frees Chinese hostages abroad. Since the term “wolf warrior” sparked global alienation, however, Beijing turned the tables and accused Western media of inventing the word.
It is undisputed that party leader Xi likes to compare China to the mighty lion or mystical dragon for the benefit of his own nation. In 2014, he wooed Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India: “The Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant” should join hands to establish a “fairer and more reasonable international order.”
Xi took the cake in his speech celebrating 50 years of diplomatic relations with France. In Paris in March 2014, he asserted that no one needs to fear the People’s Republic: “The lion China has already woken up, but it is a peaceful, friendly, and civilized lion.” Xi was alluding to a bon mot allegedly attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte. The Corsican, when asked for advice on how to deal with a China resisting foreign countries, is said to have once pointed to the world map and said, “There lies a sleeping lion. Let him sleep. If he wakes up, he may shake the world.” According to another version, Napoleon is said to have said “dragon.”
Foreign critics interpreted the image of the peaceful and civilized predator as a hidden warning. Beijing could change tunes if it didn’t get its way. Where on earth would there be such a thing as a friendly lion? Unless China saw itself as a domesticated zoo and circus lion. Or even as a paper tiger. But that’s certainly not what Xi, who loves animal imagery so much, meant.
Su Mang, the former Editor-in-Chief of the fashion magazine Harper’s Bazaar China, has triggered a shitstorm with a statement on television. She said that one had to spend at least ¥650 (the equivalent of €85) a day on food and that she could not live on less. Appalled by Su’s comment, many Internet users pointed out that most people in the country have less than ¥30 (€4) available for their meals every day.