Yesterday, the Winter Olympics in Beijing ended with a stunning closing ceremony. It was a sports festival entirely in the spirit of the political leaders: China won far more gold medals than in 2018, the panda mascot won many hearts on social media, and Beijing was able to prove to its people that China can hold an Olympic event even under Covid restrictions. But an unsettling feeling remains. Awarding the Olympics to an authoritarian regime that tramples on human rights is now widely seen as a mistake. Beijing has politicized the Olympics and also failed to deliver on its promises of sustainability, Marcel Grzanna summarizes.
Together with our partner Civey, we have surveyed the German public on their impression of the mega-event. The result is clear: The event has tarnished both the image of the Olympics and that of China. That sounds suspiciously like a lose-lose situation.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yin apparently also fears a no-win in the Ukraine crisis. At the Munich Security Conference, he mainly criticized the behavior of the United States. But when asked, he also made it clear that an invasion of Ukraine would not at all be in the interest of the People’s Republic.
Forced labor and China – a persistent issue. Recently, the US announced an import ban on products from Xinjiang that may be connected to forced labor. The EU is still lagging a bit behind in this regard. The new supply chain act, which will be introduced on Wednesday, does not include such a ban. Speaking to Amelie Richter, Bernd Lange expresses his disappointment over this in today’s interview. Ursula von der Leyen bit more off than she could chew, complains the Chair of the Trade Committee in the European Parliament. But Lange promises not to put the issue on the back burner. According to Lange, the EU supply chain law could not take effect until early 2026.
Have a pleasant week!
Mr. Lange, how disappointed are you and the European Parliament that the import ban on products from forced labor will not be included in the EU supply chain law?
First of all, we are furious that the entire legislative process took so long in the first place. There were delays, including by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. The ban on forced labor products also came later in the supply chain legislation process and has a different focus. But we would have liked to see a joint legislative package. There are, of course, still a few substantive issues to be addressed. How do you deal with the products? Is there a dialogue period? Is it really an import ban directly at the port? Or should it also be a marketing ban if these products are imported via a third country? There are actually still a few technical questions that need to be resolved. In this respect, there is a certain logic to the fact that this will now be done even more thoroughly and that there will also be an impact assessment. If this had simply been slapped together, there simply would not have been one. It would have been nicer to have done everything last year, but unfortunately, some things prevented that.
The EU Commission and Ursula von der Leyen announced the import ban in a big way. Did they perhaps bite off more than they could chew?
The import ban on products made by forced labor was not included in the Commissioner of Justice Reynders’ original plans. I talked to him about it, and the approach always ran a bit on the side. Then the question of corporate governance, in particular, came up and Internal Market Commissioner Breton got involved. Corporate governance was a big point of contention. And it is, after all, a pretty fundamental question whether you regulate obligations of a company in the objective and in which direction you regulate. And there are certainly major departures from Mr. Reynders’ original approach. “Forced labor” therefore ran a little bit alongside, and that’s where Ursula von der Leyen really bit off more than she could chew. But we all know her, how she announces many things very theatrically and lavishly, and then, in the end, the balance sheet looks a bit more meager. However, as the European Union, we have the right, compared to other legislators worldwide, to keep an eye on how a law is drafted and what its consequences are. And we have to do that carefully when it comes to the import ban on products from forced labor. However, we are not putting it on the back burner, but want to get it on the table quickly.
What are the options now for this import ban? Will it become a stand-alone law?
I assume that it will become a separate law. I could well imagine that it will then also become a so-called trade instrument, which means that we will also have to look at legal questions again. The supply chain legislation will probably become more of a directive because of the corporate governance, which I don’t think is such a good thing. Because this gives member states more options in the national implementation to give themselves more leeway and also to use certain loopholes. In this respect, I have always called for a regulation. As far as the import restrictions on forced labor are concerned, I assume that it will be a regulation that applies immediately and equally to all member states.
Do you think, then, that the intra-commission wrangling and the delays have massively diluted the Supply Chain Act?
We’ll have to see which proposal is actually on the table on February 23. It was a difficult operation because we still have 27 different national legal frameworks for this. In the beginning, I was in any case in favor of greater separating the supply chain law and corporate due diligence. But the die has been cast differently. There will probably be greater exemptions for small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU supply chain law than originally envisaged. But otherwise, I don’t anticipate there will be more dilution.
When can we expect a vote on this in the European Parliament? And when could the supply chain law then come into force?
It is a very complex piece of legislation. We have a little bit of a template for due diligence when dealing with minerals from conflict regions. We learned a little from that: We need to have relatively clear legislation. So, what are due diligence requirements, to also make it court-proof. In France, we have the problem that French legislation leaves so much room for interpretation that it is not court-proof. The requirements must be clearly defined. Then we still have to negotiate with the EU Council. And we also need the certifiers to be able to inspect it. Based on experience with conflict minerals, it all takes about five years. Now, I’m not saying that I will see the EU supply chain law coming into full effect on January 1, 2026, but that could be a time frame.
What impact do you expect this to have on trade with China?
This is not a “Lex China”, it is a general due diligence. But we must also make this a reality for products from China: In other words, we need to carry out risk assessments to determine where due diligence obligations are being violated and what can be done to get this under control. We don’t want a “cut and go” approach, that’s certainly not our approach.
So not a sudden break in trade relations, but rather an improvement in companies’ practices.
That is why we will also demand risk assessments and corresponding management plans for China. Naturally, this will be a difficult matter as far as certification is concerned. We all know that certification is no longer possible in Xinjiang. But still, the requirement is there. And if it is not possible, then it is not possible to check due diligence. This must then also be discussed with those responsible in China. China is not only a one-sided dependency for us, but there is also a dependency on European companies. This is not a one-sided power situation that would perhaps call the implementation of the Supply Chain Act into question. I don’t want to rule out potential conflicts, but we need to speak clearly with responsible parties and make it clear that we will not accept any interference in European legislation.
EU industry representatives in China argue that it is almost impossible to detect forced labor there because Chinese law does not acknowledge forced labor. What problems could arise for traders who want to export their goods to the EU?
This is exactly the problem with forced labor legislation and China. The United States, for example, has developed procedures in cooperation with the ILO and non-governmental organizations to identify forced labor and to verify it accordingly. Legislation should not be a political weapon but should be based on facts. And I believe that it doesn’t matter whether China allows forced labor to exist in law or not. The practice is the decisive factor. The individual case at companies should be evaluated and then decided.
In the trade dispute over Lithuania, the EU and China have until March 6 to begin talks as part of a WTO request. Do you expect this to resolve the conflict?
We have to see what the outcome will be. It is normal WTO procedure that there will be a dialog process first, which I also think is good. We shouldn’t pull the guns out of the basement right away. The extent to which China will be willing to do so remains to be seen. In my view, it is quite clear that WTO rules are being violated and trade measures are being used as a political weapon. That is not acceptable.
The planned instrument against economic coercion could provide a remedy for such situations in the future. The French EU Council Presidency wants to push this issue. What is the current status?
There are three legislative processes currently on the table that are intended to make us more defensible: The one on access to public procurement on a level playing field, i.e. the International Procurement Instrument IPI, the exclusion of illegal subsidization for foreign companies, and precisely the possibility to defend ourselves against coercive measures of a political nature that are, however, pushed through by economical means. These three defensive instruments are certainly a priority of the French presidency. Given the lead-up and the state of discussions, it is realistic to say that IPI could be finalized under the French EU presidency, perhaps even in March.
What are the sticking points here?
The matters of illegal subsidies, direct or indirect, to foreign companies in the domestic market, in that regard, we might have to begin negotiations with the French. The anti-coercion instrument is the most recent in terms of the legislative process. I am just finishing my report on that. I assume that we will perhaps have a position in Parliament before the summer break. We certainly won’t be able to reach an agreement on this under the French Council Presidency. But I hope that legislation will be passed as quickly as possible this year.
Last but not least: an EU trade long-standing issue, the CAI investment agreement. Is there any new progress? Is China secretly trying to push the agreement after all?
The sanctions against my colleagues in the European Parliament are still in place, so it is clear that we will not do anything now and that there will be no further work in Parliament. The agreement itself has a few positive elements. But there are also things that the EU Parliament would like to see improved anyway. But we’re not dealing with that either at the moment. It’s high up on the shelf – next to the EU-Mercosur agreement. And I don’t see anyone opening the door at the moment.
Bernd Lange has been a member of the EU Parliament since 1994, with one interruption (2005-2009). The Oldenburg native has been Chair of the Trade Committee since July 2014. Lange is also a member of the Delegation for relations with Southeast Asia and the ASEAN countries in the European Parliament.
German IOC President Thomas Bach’s positive summary of the Winter Olympics in Beijing could not hide the troubles behind the scenes over the past weeks. The diplomatic boycott by numerous democratic nations overshadowed the idea of a peaceful time-out for the world. Hardly anything of what constitutes the Olympic idea had a chance to unfold during the Covid pandemic. The sterile atmosphere of the Games, characterized by distance and isolation, was emblematic of the host country’s cold relationship with large parts of the Western world.
“Sporting events must not be a stage for propaganda events of dictatorships. But the Olympic Games in China were,” SPD human rights politician Frank Schwabe told China.Table. “In the future, there must be no more sporting events that do not have a convincing human rights, environmental and sustainability concept. If these Olympics have had any meaning, it’s that Beijing stands as a prime example of how things should not be.”
For years, China had fiercely defended the tale of the apolitical Winter Olympics. And the IOC stood faithfully by its side. Three days before the end of the sports festival, however, the masks dropped. A spokeswoman for the organizing committee BOCOG announced to the international press crowd that the island nation of Taiwan was an “inseparable part” of the People’s Republic and called evidence of systematic forced labor by Uighurs in Xinjiang a “lie.” The moment the BOCOG lost its composure taught the IOC that it had done its part.
On Friday, Bach reminded the organizers for the first time during his tenure that they should maintain neutrality. But the riposte by the former world-class fencer came years too late to credibly create the impression that the IOC actually takes its principles seriously.
The controversy surrounding the hosting of the Olympics in a country accused by numerous governments and parliaments of genocide against the Uyghurs is likely to further harm the world’s perception of the Olympics as an event bringing people together, believes Jutta Braun, a historian at the Leibniz Center for Contemporary History. “The significance of the Olympic Games will change. The dispute about the political integrity of the host country is one thing – and open societies, in particular, are increasingly asking critical questions about economic and environmental sustainability. Meanwhile, the IOC needs to explain more clearly why it is awarding the Olympics to certain places,” says Braun.
The image of the host has also suffered – at least in Germany. In an exclusive survey conducted by Civey for China.Table, an overwhelming majority of just under 60 percent stated that the Olympic Games had damaged the reputation of the People’s Republic in their eyes. Only twelve percent see an improvement in the country’s reputation.
The Olympics brand has also suffered. Over 70 percent see the Olympics tarnished. Only four percent believe that the Olympics in China has helped the brand. Improvements for both China and the Olympics are seen primarily by supporters of the left and the AfD.
Marketing strategist Markus Oelsner also believes that the hopes of the Games’ advertising partners have been dented (China.Table reported). Oelsner worked for a PR agency in Beijing in 2008, which, at the time, tried to position the host country as “cosmopolitan, colorful and hypermodern” on behalf of the Olympic organizing committee BOCOG. He suspects that “alarm bells are ringing” among marketing executives of current IOC partners. “Too quickly, the bitter taste of the Olympics is being transmitted to the brands that officially promote and demand them,” he says.
Compared to the Summer Games 14 years ago, Oelsner sees “an explosive mix of nationalistic calculations aimed at opening up new winter sports markets worth billions.” These Games, he feels, “do not do justice in any way to the wonderful country and its proud people.”
For the authoritarian ruling Communist Party, however, the Winter Games are a complete success in other respects. Particularly internally, the propaganda uses the Olympics as an instrument to strengthen its own legitimacy. While domestic media have been giving the impression that societies all over the world are crumbling under the Covid pandemic for the past two years, hosting the Olympics symbolizes to its own population an unprecedented ability to deal with crises.
The image was underlined by the parading of heads of state and government from all over the world, as well as the head of the World Health Organization (WHO). While China’s party leader has not left his own country for more than two years, signaling that he can only feel safe in China, other nations, plus the WHO, indicate that they can trust Beijing’s Covid policy.
The IOC did its part to spread the intended messages around the world. The committee had become a “prostitute of regimes that pay enough,” CDU politician Michael Brand told China.Table in an interview. SPD politician Schwabe thinks: “In particular, the behavior of the German IOC chief Thomas Bach was shameful.”
Not only did Bach conform to the Chinese government’s language regime in the case of tennis player Peng Shuai. The former world-class fencer adopted Chinese positions and assertions without a second thought in other respects as well. For example, when it comes to the sustainability of the Olympic Games.
In January, the organizing committee announced that it had achieved 99 percent of its sustainability goals and, for the first time in history, would hold carbon-neutral Games. But for all the goodwill, the numbers were pretty calculated. Carbon offsetting through the planting of trees and the supposed use of higher capacities of green electricity has its pitfalls and does not convince experts.
Nature, too, was sacrificed to China’s Olympic dream. For example, in Zhangjiakou, where trees were cut down and wildlife was scared away. But these aspects are by no means exclusive to Beijing’s Games; they are the result of the gigantism fostered by the exuberant vanity and greed of many IOC members. The Pyeongchang Games four years ago and the Sochi Games eight years ago were no better in this respect.
However, sustainability is not only desired by those who care about the climate and the environment. The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) fears that the attention of the democratic world to China’s dramatically poor human rights record could wane with the end of the Olympics. “After the last Beijing Olympics in 2008, the world looked the other way as China’s leadership cracked down on Tibetans, Uyghurs, and many others. There were no consequences for the Chinese Communist Party,” the ICT writes.
The ICT “calls on governments, international organizations, businesses, and media to keep the Chinese government accountable following this year’s Olympics.”
Wang Yi was scheduled to speak for about twenty minutes at the 58th Munich Security Conference on Saturday. The topic: China’s role in international politics. The Covid pandemic and the ongoing Olympic Games prevented China’s foreign minister from attending the conference in person. But even from faraway Beijing, Wang left no doubt about China’s position. Beijing now feels confident enough to warn the United States – and to put Russia in its place. It could be the harbinger of a new world order.
Right at the beginning of his speech, Wang takes up UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ warning that the world is facing the threat of division and confrontation. These words are by no means alarmist, Wang explains. Looking at the current developments, China comes to the same conclusion: “Certain big power is reviving the Cold War mentality and stoking confrontation between blocs. It willfully wields unilateral sanctions and undermines international rule of law,” Wang warns.
If China’s foreign minister were to pause briefly at this point in his speech, he would be sure of applause from those present at the Bayrischer Hof. It seems that the People’s Republic is completely in line with the West: Russia is deliberately fanning the flames of war with its deployment of troops on the Ukraine border.
But while Guterres and other leaders present in Munich want to bring Russia to its senses, Wang has his sights set on another country – but that only becomes clear later in his speech when he begins his list of accusations with unilateral sanctions that undermine international law.
Such superpowers think in blocs and create antagonism. They build walls with decoupling measures. They glorify their own power while simultaneously harassing other countries. “We cannot allow this to continue,” Wang demands. Absolute silence in the large conference hall follows his words. Because everyone present must have realized at that moment: China’s accusations are not directed against Russia, but the United States of America.
Wang then does what China’s politicians have been practicing for years on the international stage. They try to set their own narrative (such as “the Chinese dream”), reinterpret familiar terms (“democracy,” China.Table reported), or introduce new Chinese buzzwords into international politics, such as the “community of common destiny for mankind” 人类命运共同体 (Rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) mentioned by Wang.
It is a term that was originally coined by Hu Jintao. But Xi Jinping tried to make the concept socially acceptable on the international stage. Since 2017, Chinese diplomats have sought to include the term in UN resolutions. During the 19th CPC Party Congress, Xi called for jointly shaping the “community of common destiny for mankind” and building a world characterized by lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, and openness and inclusion.
While this sounds certainly promising, experts are wary of this concept. They believe that China is trying to convert the established international order, based on free and sovereign nations, into a union of nations whose economic dependence on China will cause them to bow to China’s political demands. Katrin Kinzelbach warns that China is trying to challenge the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the guise of the “community of common destiny”. The professor for international human rights politics at the University of Erlangen is convinced that China intends to replace internationally binding human rights conventions with an alternative normative order of Chinese design.
Meanwhile, at the Munich Security Conference, Wang Yi moved to China’s proposals on how to solve the current problems. First, he said, major powers must set a good example and live up to their responsibilities. China had already done that several times under President Xi, including by distributing Covid vaccines around the world. The Belt and Road Initiative for better infrastructure should also be seen in the context of common, global development, Wang explains. “China is working tirelessly to make globalization more open so that everyone can benefit from it.”
Secondly, new cooperation between the countries of the world was required, which should be based on mutual respect, justice, and win-win cooperation. The competitive obsession of some countries should have come to an end. No country should “repeat past mistakes of forging rivaling alliances,” Wang warns in Munich. “No country, not even a superpower, should replace international norms with its own will, still less put itself above international norms.” Openness and cooperation are needed instead of punitive tariffs, isolation, and decoupling.
After this lash out at the US, Wang then explicitly addresses Europe once again: China and Europe must work together more closely in the future, Wang appeals to the audience in Munich. In any case, China will continue to support the cohesion of the European Union, as well as the strategic autonomy it seeks. “At the same time, we hope that Europe could move forward from the ‘partner-competitor-rival’ characterization of its relations with China.” Europe should instead develop a long-term and strategic view of the world.
Wang’s lecture ends with these appeals to Europe – and China’s foreign policy expert is probably the only participant at the security conference not to say a word about the crisis between Russia and Ukraine.
However, Wolfgang Ischinger, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference, does not want to let Wang off so easily: Xi Jinping would always attach great importance to territorial integrity in his speeches, so why would China not speak out clearly against the Russian threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity?
Wang responds with a smug grin. He had expected the first question to be about Ukraine. But then they are made, clear words from Beijing: “The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries should be respected and protected,” says Wang and adds: “Ukraine is no exception.” It is a clear stop signal that China is holding up to its Russian partner in Munich.
Wang’s position is not a surprising turnaround, but becomes quite logical when closely examining the relations between China and Ukraine. These have intensified considerably since 2012: At that time, the former granary of the Soviet Union began exporting food to China on a large scale. In the meantime, the country is in a neck-and-neck race with the USA for the position of the most important grain supplier. About one-third of Ukraine’s grain now goes to China. And the more Ukraine supplies, the less dependent China becomes on supplies from the USA.
But for Beijing, Ukraine is not just an important exporter of basic foodstuffs. Its role as an arms supplier is even more important. This, in turn, suits neither Washington nor Moscow. Beijing bought its first aircraft carrier from Ukraine in 1998. So did the technology for hovercraft landing craft. They are essential for a possible invasion of Taiwan. But gas turbine engines also come from Ukraine, which is now the basis for powering China’s new Type 055 guided-missile destroyers. China would very likely not have received all this from Russia, and certainly not from Washington. In short, Ukraine is helping China become more independent of both the US and Russians. That is why China likely has no interest in Ukraine falling to Russia.
But Wang’s words also tell something else. They reveal the state of the partnership between China and Russia that is so feared in the West. When Putin traveled to Beijing a few days ago for the opening of the Winter Olympics, it seemed as if both two authoritarian superpowers couldn’t possibly grow any closer (China.Table reported). Xi and Putin signed energy contracts and even referred to each other as long-time friends. When China clearly spoke out against the expansion of NATO to the east for the first time, some thought that Beijing was giving its partner in Moscow carte blanche for the confrontation with Ukraine.
But this is not the case. That became clear this weekend at the Munich Security Conference – as did the limits of the Sino-Russian partnership: It is a rational alliance of convenience that thrives, above all, on the common rejection of a Western world order led by the United States. But while Russia primarily acts destructively and does not seem to shy away even from military force, China opts for a more delicate approach: It wants to use the existing structures to create a new order. This, too, became clear in Munich: Beijing’s warnings are mainly directed against the United States. Collaboration: Frank Sieren
On the final weekend of the Winter Olympics, China won another Olympic gold. In figure skating, Sui Wenjing and Han Cong became Olympic champions in the pairs event on Saturday. It was gold medal number eight and nine for the host country. China’s Olympic performance in Beijing is thus significantly better than at the 2018 Pyeongchang Games. Even though China was unable to score in classic winter sports such as alpine skiing, ski jumping, or biathlon, the hosts can definitely consider this medal haul a success.
Whenever Andreas Schell faces difficult situations today, he thinks back to last fall. Back then, the CEO of engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce Power Systems sprinted through the Moroccan desert, completing almost 250 kilometers in one week in an ultramarathon. “I’m still feeding off the feeling of having overcome my limits,” says Schell. The 52-year-old also needs a lot of endurance for the transformation of his company, which is backed by the traditional German Friedrichshafen-based MTU brand. Since 2014, it has been wholly owned by the British Rolls-Royce group.
When Schell moved to Lake Constance in 2017, he already looked back on a career with management positions at various international companies. “Innovative technologies have always interested me,” says the mechanical engineer. At automaker Daimler, he became involved with alternative drives at an early stage, and from 2002 on, he worked for former Daimler partner Chrysler in the United States. Later, he switched to the aviation industry.
When Rolls-Royce Power Systems made him an offer, he took it. He wanted his sons, who had grown up in the US, to experience their parents’ home country – and the MTU brand had a lot of appeal for Schell. He favors the high standards of the products, he says. Engines from MTU power large ferries, are used under harsh conditions in mining operations or secure the power supply for hospitals. “We supply system-relevant industries, so we can’t afford any failures.”
One of the most important growth markets is China. Under Schell’s leadership, the company and its more than 10,000 employees have been structured into four new business units, including one dedicated to the Chinese market. “China is tremendously important for us, not least because of the size of the country and the rapid expansion of its infrastructure,” says Schell. Chinese customers have no tolerance for long lead times. “When a new data center is built there, it often takes only a year from initiation to completion.” Accordingly, motors for emergency power supply have to be shipped quickly.
To be able to respond more flexibly, the company is stepping up on-site production. In the fall, Rolls-Royce Power Systems also formally inaugurated a new engine test stand in Suzhou. “We used to develop products for European needs and then export them to China. Today, that is no longer sufficient.” The company is also entering into joint ventures with Chinese partners. Schell believes in personal contact – before the pandemic, he traveled to China every few weeks; today, a lot of things can be done via video.
Schell expects Chinese demand for low-emission drives to increase rapidly soon. “Due to the political structures, developments there can happen very quickly. Where conventional engines are still allowed today, sustainable solutions may be mandatory tomorrow.” The company is preparing for this, for example, by researching hydrogen-powered electricity.
The company aims to cut its CO2 emissions by 35 percent by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Today, the use of MTU engines still generates huge emissions: Across the entire product value chain, they amount to more than 100 million tons per year. By comparison, Germany’s total emissions in 2021 were around 772 million metric tons. Schell now wants to transform the company. Key engine series are soon to be operational for sustainable fuels. Schell’s son, who was 13 years old at the time, also provided a key experience: When the family had just moved to Lake Constance, he asked Schell how long they were going to stay there: “You’re dealing with diesel engines,” the son explained, “that’s not going to work for much longer.” That woke him up, says Schell. Jan Wittenbrink
Have you ever felt like a superfluous light bulb (电灯泡 diàndēngpào)? Most certainly – but without realizing it. This is what the Chinese call our “fifth wheel”, i.e. someone who is actually unnecessary and only tolerated (after all, four wheels are more than enough for a car). But what does that have to do with electrical lighting?
Well, in China, too, you can do without a “plus one,” especially if you’ve already hit it off with someone else and prefer to enjoy the excitement in the privacy of your own home, that is, undisturbed in dimly-lit, romantic spots. And what is the one thing you don’t need at such a moment? Exactly, a bright spotlight by prying eyes from outside that drags the romance into the light for everyone to see. So please don’t be a light bulb and switch off at the right moment.
By the way, in China, it is not lightbulbs that glow, but bubbles. Because 电灯泡 diàndēngpào literally means “electric light bubble”. And – as a faithful reader of this column – you probably already guessed it. Light bubbles are not the only bubbles that we encounter in everyday speech in China. “Milk bubbles” are poured onto coffee (奶泡 nǎipào – milk foam), “bubble wine” into the wineglass (气泡酒 qìpàojiǔ – sparkling wine), “bubble sugar” put into your mouth (泡泡糖 pàopàotáng – chewing gum) and “tofu bubbles” in the hotpot (豆腐泡 dòufupào – pre-fried fluffy tofu balls). You can even frothily scold someone in Chinese using bubble metaphors – namely, when you call someone a “female bubble” (娘泡 niángpào) – a slang for “wimp, whiner.”
Did all the bubbles pop yet? Not by a long shot! As a matter of fact, many Chinese words can be used both as nouns and as verbs. And so 泡 pào also has the meaning “to brew, to steep”. And you can brew a lot of things in Chinese.
Not only tea (泡茶 pào chá), coffee (泡咖啡 pào kāfēi) and instant noodles (泡方便面 pào fāngbiànmiàn), but also feet (泡脚 pàojiǎo – to take a foot bath) and the rest of the body – for example, in a bath (泡澡 pàozǎo) or a hot spring (泡温泉 pào wēnquán). On the other hand, those who “brew up” (泡病假 pào bìngjià) a sick leave play hooky from work, and those who “steep mushrooms” (泡蘑菇 pào mógu) are stalling others, or playing for time.
By the way, women can also be linguistically “brewed up” in China (泡妞 pào niū – to hit on girls, to pick up women), although this clearly falls into the bragging category. So don’t get burned – for example, through clumsy use of language. A wrong pronunciation can turn an invitation to take a footbath together (reminder: 泡脚 pào jiǎo) into an invitation to pickled peppers (泡椒 pào jiāo). Either way, don’t use the wrong tone.
Verena Menzel runs the language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Yesterday, the Winter Olympics in Beijing ended with a stunning closing ceremony. It was a sports festival entirely in the spirit of the political leaders: China won far more gold medals than in 2018, the panda mascot won many hearts on social media, and Beijing was able to prove to its people that China can hold an Olympic event even under Covid restrictions. But an unsettling feeling remains. Awarding the Olympics to an authoritarian regime that tramples on human rights is now widely seen as a mistake. Beijing has politicized the Olympics and also failed to deliver on its promises of sustainability, Marcel Grzanna summarizes.
Together with our partner Civey, we have surveyed the German public on their impression of the mega-event. The result is clear: The event has tarnished both the image of the Olympics and that of China. That sounds suspiciously like a lose-lose situation.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yin apparently also fears a no-win in the Ukraine crisis. At the Munich Security Conference, he mainly criticized the behavior of the United States. But when asked, he also made it clear that an invasion of Ukraine would not at all be in the interest of the People’s Republic.
Forced labor and China – a persistent issue. Recently, the US announced an import ban on products from Xinjiang that may be connected to forced labor. The EU is still lagging a bit behind in this regard. The new supply chain act, which will be introduced on Wednesday, does not include such a ban. Speaking to Amelie Richter, Bernd Lange expresses his disappointment over this in today’s interview. Ursula von der Leyen bit more off than she could chew, complains the Chair of the Trade Committee in the European Parliament. But Lange promises not to put the issue on the back burner. According to Lange, the EU supply chain law could not take effect until early 2026.
Have a pleasant week!
Mr. Lange, how disappointed are you and the European Parliament that the import ban on products from forced labor will not be included in the EU supply chain law?
First of all, we are furious that the entire legislative process took so long in the first place. There were delays, including by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. The ban on forced labor products also came later in the supply chain legislation process and has a different focus. But we would have liked to see a joint legislative package. There are, of course, still a few substantive issues to be addressed. How do you deal with the products? Is there a dialogue period? Is it really an import ban directly at the port? Or should it also be a marketing ban if these products are imported via a third country? There are actually still a few technical questions that need to be resolved. In this respect, there is a certain logic to the fact that this will now be done even more thoroughly and that there will also be an impact assessment. If this had simply been slapped together, there simply would not have been one. It would have been nicer to have done everything last year, but unfortunately, some things prevented that.
The EU Commission and Ursula von der Leyen announced the import ban in a big way. Did they perhaps bite off more than they could chew?
The import ban on products made by forced labor was not included in the Commissioner of Justice Reynders’ original plans. I talked to him about it, and the approach always ran a bit on the side. Then the question of corporate governance, in particular, came up and Internal Market Commissioner Breton got involved. Corporate governance was a big point of contention. And it is, after all, a pretty fundamental question whether you regulate obligations of a company in the objective and in which direction you regulate. And there are certainly major departures from Mr. Reynders’ original approach. “Forced labor” therefore ran a little bit alongside, and that’s where Ursula von der Leyen really bit off more than she could chew. But we all know her, how she announces many things very theatrically and lavishly, and then, in the end, the balance sheet looks a bit more meager. However, as the European Union, we have the right, compared to other legislators worldwide, to keep an eye on how a law is drafted and what its consequences are. And we have to do that carefully when it comes to the import ban on products from forced labor. However, we are not putting it on the back burner, but want to get it on the table quickly.
What are the options now for this import ban? Will it become a stand-alone law?
I assume that it will become a separate law. I could well imagine that it will then also become a so-called trade instrument, which means that we will also have to look at legal questions again. The supply chain legislation will probably become more of a directive because of the corporate governance, which I don’t think is such a good thing. Because this gives member states more options in the national implementation to give themselves more leeway and also to use certain loopholes. In this respect, I have always called for a regulation. As far as the import restrictions on forced labor are concerned, I assume that it will be a regulation that applies immediately and equally to all member states.
Do you think, then, that the intra-commission wrangling and the delays have massively diluted the Supply Chain Act?
We’ll have to see which proposal is actually on the table on February 23. It was a difficult operation because we still have 27 different national legal frameworks for this. In the beginning, I was in any case in favor of greater separating the supply chain law and corporate due diligence. But the die has been cast differently. There will probably be greater exemptions for small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU supply chain law than originally envisaged. But otherwise, I don’t anticipate there will be more dilution.
When can we expect a vote on this in the European Parliament? And when could the supply chain law then come into force?
It is a very complex piece of legislation. We have a little bit of a template for due diligence when dealing with minerals from conflict regions. We learned a little from that: We need to have relatively clear legislation. So, what are due diligence requirements, to also make it court-proof. In France, we have the problem that French legislation leaves so much room for interpretation that it is not court-proof. The requirements must be clearly defined. Then we still have to negotiate with the EU Council. And we also need the certifiers to be able to inspect it. Based on experience with conflict minerals, it all takes about five years. Now, I’m not saying that I will see the EU supply chain law coming into full effect on January 1, 2026, but that could be a time frame.
What impact do you expect this to have on trade with China?
This is not a “Lex China”, it is a general due diligence. But we must also make this a reality for products from China: In other words, we need to carry out risk assessments to determine where due diligence obligations are being violated and what can be done to get this under control. We don’t want a “cut and go” approach, that’s certainly not our approach.
So not a sudden break in trade relations, but rather an improvement in companies’ practices.
That is why we will also demand risk assessments and corresponding management plans for China. Naturally, this will be a difficult matter as far as certification is concerned. We all know that certification is no longer possible in Xinjiang. But still, the requirement is there. And if it is not possible, then it is not possible to check due diligence. This must then also be discussed with those responsible in China. China is not only a one-sided dependency for us, but there is also a dependency on European companies. This is not a one-sided power situation that would perhaps call the implementation of the Supply Chain Act into question. I don’t want to rule out potential conflicts, but we need to speak clearly with responsible parties and make it clear that we will not accept any interference in European legislation.
EU industry representatives in China argue that it is almost impossible to detect forced labor there because Chinese law does not acknowledge forced labor. What problems could arise for traders who want to export their goods to the EU?
This is exactly the problem with forced labor legislation and China. The United States, for example, has developed procedures in cooperation with the ILO and non-governmental organizations to identify forced labor and to verify it accordingly. Legislation should not be a political weapon but should be based on facts. And I believe that it doesn’t matter whether China allows forced labor to exist in law or not. The practice is the decisive factor. The individual case at companies should be evaluated and then decided.
In the trade dispute over Lithuania, the EU and China have until March 6 to begin talks as part of a WTO request. Do you expect this to resolve the conflict?
We have to see what the outcome will be. It is normal WTO procedure that there will be a dialog process first, which I also think is good. We shouldn’t pull the guns out of the basement right away. The extent to which China will be willing to do so remains to be seen. In my view, it is quite clear that WTO rules are being violated and trade measures are being used as a political weapon. That is not acceptable.
The planned instrument against economic coercion could provide a remedy for such situations in the future. The French EU Council Presidency wants to push this issue. What is the current status?
There are three legislative processes currently on the table that are intended to make us more defensible: The one on access to public procurement on a level playing field, i.e. the International Procurement Instrument IPI, the exclusion of illegal subsidization for foreign companies, and precisely the possibility to defend ourselves against coercive measures of a political nature that are, however, pushed through by economical means. These three defensive instruments are certainly a priority of the French presidency. Given the lead-up and the state of discussions, it is realistic to say that IPI could be finalized under the French EU presidency, perhaps even in March.
What are the sticking points here?
The matters of illegal subsidies, direct or indirect, to foreign companies in the domestic market, in that regard, we might have to begin negotiations with the French. The anti-coercion instrument is the most recent in terms of the legislative process. I am just finishing my report on that. I assume that we will perhaps have a position in Parliament before the summer break. We certainly won’t be able to reach an agreement on this under the French Council Presidency. But I hope that legislation will be passed as quickly as possible this year.
Last but not least: an EU trade long-standing issue, the CAI investment agreement. Is there any new progress? Is China secretly trying to push the agreement after all?
The sanctions against my colleagues in the European Parliament are still in place, so it is clear that we will not do anything now and that there will be no further work in Parliament. The agreement itself has a few positive elements. But there are also things that the EU Parliament would like to see improved anyway. But we’re not dealing with that either at the moment. It’s high up on the shelf – next to the EU-Mercosur agreement. And I don’t see anyone opening the door at the moment.
Bernd Lange has been a member of the EU Parliament since 1994, with one interruption (2005-2009). The Oldenburg native has been Chair of the Trade Committee since July 2014. Lange is also a member of the Delegation for relations with Southeast Asia and the ASEAN countries in the European Parliament.
German IOC President Thomas Bach’s positive summary of the Winter Olympics in Beijing could not hide the troubles behind the scenes over the past weeks. The diplomatic boycott by numerous democratic nations overshadowed the idea of a peaceful time-out for the world. Hardly anything of what constitutes the Olympic idea had a chance to unfold during the Covid pandemic. The sterile atmosphere of the Games, characterized by distance and isolation, was emblematic of the host country’s cold relationship with large parts of the Western world.
“Sporting events must not be a stage for propaganda events of dictatorships. But the Olympic Games in China were,” SPD human rights politician Frank Schwabe told China.Table. “In the future, there must be no more sporting events that do not have a convincing human rights, environmental and sustainability concept. If these Olympics have had any meaning, it’s that Beijing stands as a prime example of how things should not be.”
For years, China had fiercely defended the tale of the apolitical Winter Olympics. And the IOC stood faithfully by its side. Three days before the end of the sports festival, however, the masks dropped. A spokeswoman for the organizing committee BOCOG announced to the international press crowd that the island nation of Taiwan was an “inseparable part” of the People’s Republic and called evidence of systematic forced labor by Uighurs in Xinjiang a “lie.” The moment the BOCOG lost its composure taught the IOC that it had done its part.
On Friday, Bach reminded the organizers for the first time during his tenure that they should maintain neutrality. But the riposte by the former world-class fencer came years too late to credibly create the impression that the IOC actually takes its principles seriously.
The controversy surrounding the hosting of the Olympics in a country accused by numerous governments and parliaments of genocide against the Uyghurs is likely to further harm the world’s perception of the Olympics as an event bringing people together, believes Jutta Braun, a historian at the Leibniz Center for Contemporary History. “The significance of the Olympic Games will change. The dispute about the political integrity of the host country is one thing – and open societies, in particular, are increasingly asking critical questions about economic and environmental sustainability. Meanwhile, the IOC needs to explain more clearly why it is awarding the Olympics to certain places,” says Braun.
The image of the host has also suffered – at least in Germany. In an exclusive survey conducted by Civey for China.Table, an overwhelming majority of just under 60 percent stated that the Olympic Games had damaged the reputation of the People’s Republic in their eyes. Only twelve percent see an improvement in the country’s reputation.
The Olympics brand has also suffered. Over 70 percent see the Olympics tarnished. Only four percent believe that the Olympics in China has helped the brand. Improvements for both China and the Olympics are seen primarily by supporters of the left and the AfD.
Marketing strategist Markus Oelsner also believes that the hopes of the Games’ advertising partners have been dented (China.Table reported). Oelsner worked for a PR agency in Beijing in 2008, which, at the time, tried to position the host country as “cosmopolitan, colorful and hypermodern” on behalf of the Olympic organizing committee BOCOG. He suspects that “alarm bells are ringing” among marketing executives of current IOC partners. “Too quickly, the bitter taste of the Olympics is being transmitted to the brands that officially promote and demand them,” he says.
Compared to the Summer Games 14 years ago, Oelsner sees “an explosive mix of nationalistic calculations aimed at opening up new winter sports markets worth billions.” These Games, he feels, “do not do justice in any way to the wonderful country and its proud people.”
For the authoritarian ruling Communist Party, however, the Winter Games are a complete success in other respects. Particularly internally, the propaganda uses the Olympics as an instrument to strengthen its own legitimacy. While domestic media have been giving the impression that societies all over the world are crumbling under the Covid pandemic for the past two years, hosting the Olympics symbolizes to its own population an unprecedented ability to deal with crises.
The image was underlined by the parading of heads of state and government from all over the world, as well as the head of the World Health Organization (WHO). While China’s party leader has not left his own country for more than two years, signaling that he can only feel safe in China, other nations, plus the WHO, indicate that they can trust Beijing’s Covid policy.
The IOC did its part to spread the intended messages around the world. The committee had become a “prostitute of regimes that pay enough,” CDU politician Michael Brand told China.Table in an interview. SPD politician Schwabe thinks: “In particular, the behavior of the German IOC chief Thomas Bach was shameful.”
Not only did Bach conform to the Chinese government’s language regime in the case of tennis player Peng Shuai. The former world-class fencer adopted Chinese positions and assertions without a second thought in other respects as well. For example, when it comes to the sustainability of the Olympic Games.
In January, the organizing committee announced that it had achieved 99 percent of its sustainability goals and, for the first time in history, would hold carbon-neutral Games. But for all the goodwill, the numbers were pretty calculated. Carbon offsetting through the planting of trees and the supposed use of higher capacities of green electricity has its pitfalls and does not convince experts.
Nature, too, was sacrificed to China’s Olympic dream. For example, in Zhangjiakou, where trees were cut down and wildlife was scared away. But these aspects are by no means exclusive to Beijing’s Games; they are the result of the gigantism fostered by the exuberant vanity and greed of many IOC members. The Pyeongchang Games four years ago and the Sochi Games eight years ago were no better in this respect.
However, sustainability is not only desired by those who care about the climate and the environment. The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) fears that the attention of the democratic world to China’s dramatically poor human rights record could wane with the end of the Olympics. “After the last Beijing Olympics in 2008, the world looked the other way as China’s leadership cracked down on Tibetans, Uyghurs, and many others. There were no consequences for the Chinese Communist Party,” the ICT writes.
The ICT “calls on governments, international organizations, businesses, and media to keep the Chinese government accountable following this year’s Olympics.”
Wang Yi was scheduled to speak for about twenty minutes at the 58th Munich Security Conference on Saturday. The topic: China’s role in international politics. The Covid pandemic and the ongoing Olympic Games prevented China’s foreign minister from attending the conference in person. But even from faraway Beijing, Wang left no doubt about China’s position. Beijing now feels confident enough to warn the United States – and to put Russia in its place. It could be the harbinger of a new world order.
Right at the beginning of his speech, Wang takes up UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ warning that the world is facing the threat of division and confrontation. These words are by no means alarmist, Wang explains. Looking at the current developments, China comes to the same conclusion: “Certain big power is reviving the Cold War mentality and stoking confrontation between blocs. It willfully wields unilateral sanctions and undermines international rule of law,” Wang warns.
If China’s foreign minister were to pause briefly at this point in his speech, he would be sure of applause from those present at the Bayrischer Hof. It seems that the People’s Republic is completely in line with the West: Russia is deliberately fanning the flames of war with its deployment of troops on the Ukraine border.
But while Guterres and other leaders present in Munich want to bring Russia to its senses, Wang has his sights set on another country – but that only becomes clear later in his speech when he begins his list of accusations with unilateral sanctions that undermine international law.
Such superpowers think in blocs and create antagonism. They build walls with decoupling measures. They glorify their own power while simultaneously harassing other countries. “We cannot allow this to continue,” Wang demands. Absolute silence in the large conference hall follows his words. Because everyone present must have realized at that moment: China’s accusations are not directed against Russia, but the United States of America.
Wang then does what China’s politicians have been practicing for years on the international stage. They try to set their own narrative (such as “the Chinese dream”), reinterpret familiar terms (“democracy,” China.Table reported), or introduce new Chinese buzzwords into international politics, such as the “community of common destiny for mankind” 人类命运共同体 (Rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) mentioned by Wang.
It is a term that was originally coined by Hu Jintao. But Xi Jinping tried to make the concept socially acceptable on the international stage. Since 2017, Chinese diplomats have sought to include the term in UN resolutions. During the 19th CPC Party Congress, Xi called for jointly shaping the “community of common destiny for mankind” and building a world characterized by lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, and openness and inclusion.
While this sounds certainly promising, experts are wary of this concept. They believe that China is trying to convert the established international order, based on free and sovereign nations, into a union of nations whose economic dependence on China will cause them to bow to China’s political demands. Katrin Kinzelbach warns that China is trying to challenge the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the guise of the “community of common destiny”. The professor for international human rights politics at the University of Erlangen is convinced that China intends to replace internationally binding human rights conventions with an alternative normative order of Chinese design.
Meanwhile, at the Munich Security Conference, Wang Yi moved to China’s proposals on how to solve the current problems. First, he said, major powers must set a good example and live up to their responsibilities. China had already done that several times under President Xi, including by distributing Covid vaccines around the world. The Belt and Road Initiative for better infrastructure should also be seen in the context of common, global development, Wang explains. “China is working tirelessly to make globalization more open so that everyone can benefit from it.”
Secondly, new cooperation between the countries of the world was required, which should be based on mutual respect, justice, and win-win cooperation. The competitive obsession of some countries should have come to an end. No country should “repeat past mistakes of forging rivaling alliances,” Wang warns in Munich. “No country, not even a superpower, should replace international norms with its own will, still less put itself above international norms.” Openness and cooperation are needed instead of punitive tariffs, isolation, and decoupling.
After this lash out at the US, Wang then explicitly addresses Europe once again: China and Europe must work together more closely in the future, Wang appeals to the audience in Munich. In any case, China will continue to support the cohesion of the European Union, as well as the strategic autonomy it seeks. “At the same time, we hope that Europe could move forward from the ‘partner-competitor-rival’ characterization of its relations with China.” Europe should instead develop a long-term and strategic view of the world.
Wang’s lecture ends with these appeals to Europe – and China’s foreign policy expert is probably the only participant at the security conference not to say a word about the crisis between Russia and Ukraine.
However, Wolfgang Ischinger, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference, does not want to let Wang off so easily: Xi Jinping would always attach great importance to territorial integrity in his speeches, so why would China not speak out clearly against the Russian threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity?
Wang responds with a smug grin. He had expected the first question to be about Ukraine. But then they are made, clear words from Beijing: “The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries should be respected and protected,” says Wang and adds: “Ukraine is no exception.” It is a clear stop signal that China is holding up to its Russian partner in Munich.
Wang’s position is not a surprising turnaround, but becomes quite logical when closely examining the relations between China and Ukraine. These have intensified considerably since 2012: At that time, the former granary of the Soviet Union began exporting food to China on a large scale. In the meantime, the country is in a neck-and-neck race with the USA for the position of the most important grain supplier. About one-third of Ukraine’s grain now goes to China. And the more Ukraine supplies, the less dependent China becomes on supplies from the USA.
But for Beijing, Ukraine is not just an important exporter of basic foodstuffs. Its role as an arms supplier is even more important. This, in turn, suits neither Washington nor Moscow. Beijing bought its first aircraft carrier from Ukraine in 1998. So did the technology for hovercraft landing craft. They are essential for a possible invasion of Taiwan. But gas turbine engines also come from Ukraine, which is now the basis for powering China’s new Type 055 guided-missile destroyers. China would very likely not have received all this from Russia, and certainly not from Washington. In short, Ukraine is helping China become more independent of both the US and Russians. That is why China likely has no interest in Ukraine falling to Russia.
But Wang’s words also tell something else. They reveal the state of the partnership between China and Russia that is so feared in the West. When Putin traveled to Beijing a few days ago for the opening of the Winter Olympics, it seemed as if both two authoritarian superpowers couldn’t possibly grow any closer (China.Table reported). Xi and Putin signed energy contracts and even referred to each other as long-time friends. When China clearly spoke out against the expansion of NATO to the east for the first time, some thought that Beijing was giving its partner in Moscow carte blanche for the confrontation with Ukraine.
But this is not the case. That became clear this weekend at the Munich Security Conference – as did the limits of the Sino-Russian partnership: It is a rational alliance of convenience that thrives, above all, on the common rejection of a Western world order led by the United States. But while Russia primarily acts destructively and does not seem to shy away even from military force, China opts for a more delicate approach: It wants to use the existing structures to create a new order. This, too, became clear in Munich: Beijing’s warnings are mainly directed against the United States. Collaboration: Frank Sieren
On the final weekend of the Winter Olympics, China won another Olympic gold. In figure skating, Sui Wenjing and Han Cong became Olympic champions in the pairs event on Saturday. It was gold medal number eight and nine for the host country. China’s Olympic performance in Beijing is thus significantly better than at the 2018 Pyeongchang Games. Even though China was unable to score in classic winter sports such as alpine skiing, ski jumping, or biathlon, the hosts can definitely consider this medal haul a success.
Whenever Andreas Schell faces difficult situations today, he thinks back to last fall. Back then, the CEO of engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce Power Systems sprinted through the Moroccan desert, completing almost 250 kilometers in one week in an ultramarathon. “I’m still feeding off the feeling of having overcome my limits,” says Schell. The 52-year-old also needs a lot of endurance for the transformation of his company, which is backed by the traditional German Friedrichshafen-based MTU brand. Since 2014, it has been wholly owned by the British Rolls-Royce group.
When Schell moved to Lake Constance in 2017, he already looked back on a career with management positions at various international companies. “Innovative technologies have always interested me,” says the mechanical engineer. At automaker Daimler, he became involved with alternative drives at an early stage, and from 2002 on, he worked for former Daimler partner Chrysler in the United States. Later, he switched to the aviation industry.
When Rolls-Royce Power Systems made him an offer, he took it. He wanted his sons, who had grown up in the US, to experience their parents’ home country – and the MTU brand had a lot of appeal for Schell. He favors the high standards of the products, he says. Engines from MTU power large ferries, are used under harsh conditions in mining operations or secure the power supply for hospitals. “We supply system-relevant industries, so we can’t afford any failures.”
One of the most important growth markets is China. Under Schell’s leadership, the company and its more than 10,000 employees have been structured into four new business units, including one dedicated to the Chinese market. “China is tremendously important for us, not least because of the size of the country and the rapid expansion of its infrastructure,” says Schell. Chinese customers have no tolerance for long lead times. “When a new data center is built there, it often takes only a year from initiation to completion.” Accordingly, motors for emergency power supply have to be shipped quickly.
To be able to respond more flexibly, the company is stepping up on-site production. In the fall, Rolls-Royce Power Systems also formally inaugurated a new engine test stand in Suzhou. “We used to develop products for European needs and then export them to China. Today, that is no longer sufficient.” The company is also entering into joint ventures with Chinese partners. Schell believes in personal contact – before the pandemic, he traveled to China every few weeks; today, a lot of things can be done via video.
Schell expects Chinese demand for low-emission drives to increase rapidly soon. “Due to the political structures, developments there can happen very quickly. Where conventional engines are still allowed today, sustainable solutions may be mandatory tomorrow.” The company is preparing for this, for example, by researching hydrogen-powered electricity.
The company aims to cut its CO2 emissions by 35 percent by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Today, the use of MTU engines still generates huge emissions: Across the entire product value chain, they amount to more than 100 million tons per year. By comparison, Germany’s total emissions in 2021 were around 772 million metric tons. Schell now wants to transform the company. Key engine series are soon to be operational for sustainable fuels. Schell’s son, who was 13 years old at the time, also provided a key experience: When the family had just moved to Lake Constance, he asked Schell how long they were going to stay there: “You’re dealing with diesel engines,” the son explained, “that’s not going to work for much longer.” That woke him up, says Schell. Jan Wittenbrink
Have you ever felt like a superfluous light bulb (电灯泡 diàndēngpào)? Most certainly – but without realizing it. This is what the Chinese call our “fifth wheel”, i.e. someone who is actually unnecessary and only tolerated (after all, four wheels are more than enough for a car). But what does that have to do with electrical lighting?
Well, in China, too, you can do without a “plus one,” especially if you’ve already hit it off with someone else and prefer to enjoy the excitement in the privacy of your own home, that is, undisturbed in dimly-lit, romantic spots. And what is the one thing you don’t need at such a moment? Exactly, a bright spotlight by prying eyes from outside that drags the romance into the light for everyone to see. So please don’t be a light bulb and switch off at the right moment.
By the way, in China, it is not lightbulbs that glow, but bubbles. Because 电灯泡 diàndēngpào literally means “electric light bubble”. And – as a faithful reader of this column – you probably already guessed it. Light bubbles are not the only bubbles that we encounter in everyday speech in China. “Milk bubbles” are poured onto coffee (奶泡 nǎipào – milk foam), “bubble wine” into the wineglass (气泡酒 qìpàojiǔ – sparkling wine), “bubble sugar” put into your mouth (泡泡糖 pàopàotáng – chewing gum) and “tofu bubbles” in the hotpot (豆腐泡 dòufupào – pre-fried fluffy tofu balls). You can even frothily scold someone in Chinese using bubble metaphors – namely, when you call someone a “female bubble” (娘泡 niángpào) – a slang for “wimp, whiner.”
Did all the bubbles pop yet? Not by a long shot! As a matter of fact, many Chinese words can be used both as nouns and as verbs. And so 泡 pào also has the meaning “to brew, to steep”. And you can brew a lot of things in Chinese.
Not only tea (泡茶 pào chá), coffee (泡咖啡 pào kāfēi) and instant noodles (泡方便面 pào fāngbiànmiàn), but also feet (泡脚 pàojiǎo – to take a foot bath) and the rest of the body – for example, in a bath (泡澡 pàozǎo) or a hot spring (泡温泉 pào wēnquán). On the other hand, those who “brew up” (泡病假 pào bìngjià) a sick leave play hooky from work, and those who “steep mushrooms” (泡蘑菇 pào mógu) are stalling others, or playing for time.
By the way, women can also be linguistically “brewed up” in China (泡妞 pào niū – to hit on girls, to pick up women), although this clearly falls into the bragging category. So don’t get burned – for example, through clumsy use of language. A wrong pronunciation can turn an invitation to take a footbath together (reminder: 泡脚 pào jiǎo) into an invitation to pickled peppers (泡椒 pào jiāo). Either way, don’t use the wrong tone.
Verena Menzel runs the language school New Chinese in Beijing.
