Nothing works without chips. The delivery problems of the Taiwanese suppliers are therefore hurting the entire industry, including in Germany. But the knot will be broken again. Because an arms race with semiconductor investments is currently brewing between the major economies. China is investing almost adventurous sums of billions in order to catch up with the world leaders in this field and to become independent of the Taiwanese and Americans. At the same time, however, they are also pumping subsidies into the industry, writes Frank Sieren. Sooner or later there will be plenty of chips for everyone. However, this year will not be that far yet.
Slovenia holds the EU Council presidency for six months – and is setting its own course. Refreshingly Zen-like, the government there ignores the whole complicated knot surrounding the trade war, CAI and sanctions. It generally finds China rather unimportant and has largely kicked the issue off the agenda. Instead, Slovenia is seeking a rapprochement with the US. That’s a pleasingly self-confident stance from a country that has fewer inhabitants than many a district in China’s metropolises.
One scene remains in the memory of participants at an event in 2014: When the President of Slovenia, Borut Pahor, spoke to diplomats, he named Japan and India as the most important partners in Asia. The Chinese ambassador at the time then left the room without a word.
The anecdote says a lot about the relationship between the Central European EU state and the People’s Republic. Because in the past Ljubljana has shown a conspicuous lack of interest in China. Today the economic partner is more present than it was just a few years ago, but Slovenia hasn’t bothered to adopt a clear stance on China. Since last week the country with a population of two million now holds the EU Council presidency – and at least wants to talk about the People’s Republic, if not with it.
A special EU summit is scheduled for 6 October, Prime Minister Janez Janša announced at the start of his country’s EU Council presidency. The debate on China will focus on trade and the future strategic relationship with Beijing. The talks are to take place behind closed doors and Chinese President Xi Jinping has not been invited, Janša said.
During the presentation of the presidential agenda yesterday in the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the People’s Republic was only mentioned once in an aside. In his speech to the MEPs, however, Janša stressed that the community of states must become more autonomous, for example in the production of semiconductors or medical products. In the Presidency’s official programme , China is mentioned only twice: once in the announcement of the special summit and once in connection with more cooperation on environmental issues ahead of the 26th UN Climate Change Conference.
Relations with the People’s Republic are not a top priority for the presidency of the former Yugoslav republic. And the presidency of the Balkan state holds other challenges in store for Brussels: For the right-wing nationalist head of government Janša is not too particular about the rule of law and other European values. Among other things he has been criticised for obstructing the work of the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office by blocking the deployment of two Slovenian prosecutors. Janša is also accused of attacks on press freedom and civil society and of supporting Hungary’s controversial law restricting information on homosexuality.
The EU Council Presidency’s to-do list also includes perennial issues such as EU enlargement, economic recovery after the Corona pandemic and the Green Deal. In the coming week, the EU Commission will present several legislative proposals of its “Fit for 55” climate package. In August, Brussels will be less productive anyway, due to the summer break, and September will be dominated by the German federal election and its impact on Brussels. Observers also expect that the next EU presidency – France takes over in January 2022 – will already be looking over the Slovenians’ shoulders and ensure that major political decisions are postponed until next year.
As far as China is concerned, there is one open construction site in particular: the CAI investment agreement is still frozen. Although technical work on the agreement is continuing, work on the deal is still suspended in the European Parliament because sanctions against European politicians, academics and think tanks are still in force.
Experts therefore do not expect much progress on CAI and sanctions under the Slovenian presidency. At the very least, this is very unlikely, says Slovenian political scientist and China expert Nina Pejič. Slovenia is more likely to leave far-reaching policy decisions to the following presidency, Pejič predicts in an interview with China.Table. The Slovenian government is still generally uncertain about China.
Incentives for a more Beijing-oriented foreign policy are rather few in Slovenia, compared to other neighbours in the region, Pejič explains. “There was also no big mask diplomacy here during the Corona pandemic,” the researcher says. The hope of the current Slovenian government, she says, is still to intensify transatlantic relations. A globally noted example of Slovenia’s desire to please Washington above all else was a now-infamous tweet by Janša: He took to Twitter in November to become the first European head of government to congratulate Donald Trump on his supposed re-election, claiming that the media was “denying the facts.” That alone made it clear, Pejič said, “There is a clear focus on the US. “
Ljubljana also made a special guest gift during the visit of then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last August: Janša and Pompeo signed a joint declaration on 5G network security – the US had thus gained another partner for its coalition against Huawei. But whether the Chinese tech giant will now really be excluded from the rollout of the 5G network in Slovenia is still open, says Pejič. A final decision has not yet been made.
As for the Slovenian government’s political approach to the People’s Republic, the political scientist names one word: “pragmatic.” According to Pejič, Janša, who has been active on the political stage for more than 30 years, has changed his orientation towards Beijing several times: In the 1990s, as a member of parliament, he co-founded a Slovenian-Taiwanese friendship association. When he became prime minister, however, he spoke out as a representative of the one-China policy during a visit to Beijing. In 2011 he visited Taiwan again as leader of the opposition with a delegation. Most recently, however, Janša warned publicly in EU circles against the rise of China and demanded that limits be set for Beijing, says Pejič.
China is not really a present topic of conversation in the country – even for research. Pejič speaks of a lack of “understanding of and interest in China”. This is also due to the fact that Slovenia is neither a major recipient of Chinese direct investment in the region, nor has it derived any other extraordinary benefits from economic relations with the People’s Republic.
For despite the constantly growing trade with China, its share in Slovenia’s total foreign trade has remained very limited, explains Slovenian economist Marjan Svetličič. In 2019, the Balkan state exported goods worth around 265 million euros to China, which corresponds to just three percent of total exports to third countries. In return, goods worth more than one billion euros were imported to Slovenia from the People’s Republic in the same period, he said. And the trade deficit continues to grow, Svetličič writes. Slovenia’s trade structure with China is very similar to the country’s general export structure, he says. The most important goods in bilateral trade are electrical machinery and accessories, road vehicles and pharmaceutical products.
One of the crucial starting points for bilateral cooperation is the international seaport in Koper, explains Svetličič. The multi-purpose port, with the largest container terminal on the northern Adriatic and the second largest car terminal in the Mediterranean, offers the best access to European markets in logistical terms. Its importance has increased significantly since the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as the Northern Adriatic is a terminus of the maritime Silk Road, he said. The Port of Koper has direct weekly connections with China through two alliances. One of them, The Ocean Alliance, also includes Cosco. The port formally became part of the BRI in 2018, Svetličič writes. Since then, the total turnover of goods to and from China has been steadily increasing. In the summer of 2020 alone, the operator Luka Koper recorded one million tonnes of transhipped goods from or to the People’s Republic.
The port of Koper is humming – but the mood between Slovenia and China is still not at its best. The fact that Slovenia joined the US’s anti-Huawei initiative was not the best basis for talks with China, says economist Svetličič with an eye to the EU Council presidency. And then there’s another major point of contention between Brussels and Beijing: human rights violations in China. Svetličič believes that criticism of these violations coming from Slovenia has less force. After all, freedom of the press and civil rights are also restricted on a daily basis in the EU country. In the debate with China this is definitely a disadvantage when it comes to credibility.
“Over the past 100 years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has united and led the Chinese people to write the most glorious chapter in the millennia-long history of the Chinese nation,” President Xi Jinping said in a speech at the CCP’s centennial celebration, highlighting the party’s role as the engine of China’s success as well as economic advancement. But the CCP’s economic record is actually mixed, and even those who are aware of it often overlook the fact that the party’s successes and failures are based on the same economic fundamentals.
Xi is right to state that under the leadership of the CCP, China has made the “historic leap” from being one of the world’s poorest countries with “relatively backward productive forces” to a middle-income country and the world’s second-largest economy. He concealed, however, that this record is marred by colossal failures, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), which led to the greatest famine in human history, or the decades of strict family planning laws that contributed to an escalating demographic crisis.
Because the CCP is capable of effectively mobilizing resources, the Party was able to provide public goods on a large scale, which in turn helped to drive development. In particular, the Party invested heavily in public health and education from the early 1950s. As a result, China managed to achieve one of the most rapid increases ever in life expectancy at birth, from 35 to 40 years in 1949 to 77.3 years today. Enrollment rates also soared. At the primary level from 20 to nearly 100 percent and at the secondary level from six to 88 percent. Literacy rates registered an increase from 20 percent in 1949 to 97 percent today.
In the post-1978 reform era, the state also invested in transportation and renewable energy. Between 1988 and 2019, the length of China’s entire expressway network increased sixfold; they now surpass the interstate highways in the United States in total length.
In addition, China has built 50 third-generation nuclear power plants and six to eight new reactors are approved each year. Recently, the construction of an ultra-high voltage grid was also announced. These efforts are guided by the ambitious commitment to cover a quarter of China’s primary energy consumption by wind, solar and hydropower by 2035.
This ability to mobilize resources for investment in public goods on such a large scale is one of the CCP’s greatest strengths. The party has the political power to impose economic policies for the benefit of overall growthin areas where private investment would be suboptimal.
Healthcare, education, renewable energy and infrastructure undoubtedly contribute to economic growth and create significant social value. However, the people who pay for them are not always those who benefit from these achievements. While educated and healthy people are more economically productive, parents do not necessarily reap the rewards of the investments they make. Renewable energy sources benefit future generations but hurt local economies now dependent on coal. Highways benefit newly connected populations, but farmers lose their livelihoods as their land is claimed for new roads.
These are textbook examples of how the divergence between private and social value can lead to suboptimal investment. Without government intervention, there is not enough investment. But while private interests can prevail in some countries, in China the CP has the power to enforce its strategic choices. And while decisive political leadership often promotes progress, the scale and intensity of policy implementation in China means that if policymakers back the wrong horse, the consequences can prove disastrous.
This occurred during the Great Leap Forward, when peasants were forced to farm without financial compensation or private property rights as part of the collectivization of agriculture. The distorted incentives made it difficult to maintain production on the one hand and to track regional production and capacity on the other. The ensuing great famine in China resulted in 22-45 million deaths in just two years. The economy stagnated, with China experiencing zero or negative annual growth for the next two decades.
Chinas Familienplanungspolitik droht ein weiteres gravierendes Problem heraufzubeschwören. Zum Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Volksrepublik im Jahr 1949 lag die Einwohnerzahl des Landes bei 540 Millionen. Daraufhin setzte die KPCh eine geburtenfördernde Politik um, wie etwa die Einschränkung des Zugangs zu Verhütungsmitteln, und die Bevölkerung wuchs bis 1971 auf 841 Millionen an.
But shortly after the famine, the CCP decided to curtail the pro-birth policy. The extreme one-child policy then lasted from 1979 to 2016, during which time the population continued to rise and now stands at 1.4 billion. However, the one-child policy resulted in a significant increase in the old-age dependency ratio and the gender distribution shows a pronounced male preponderance.
The implementation of the CCP’s Great Leap Forward and family planning policies-as well as its investments in health, education, renewable energy, or physical infrastructure-relied on the party’s ability to drive grassroots mobilization, persuade supporters, and coerce laggards. Yet there is a key difference in terms of economic fundamentals.
The greatest benefits from agricultural production and pro-birth policies are derived by those individuals who also pay for them; social and private values thus show great similarity. If the interests of the individual are aligned with societal needs, there is no need for government intervention. However, when challenges to implementation arise – such as estimates of how much a farmer should produce or how many children a family should have – these interventions are not only unhelpful, but also exceedingly costly.
In his 100th anniversary speech, Xi comprehensively addressed the Party’s future plans and its goal of “building China into a great, modern, socialist country in every respect” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic. To succeed in this endeavor, the CCP will have to use its political power to enforce economic policies. It is to be hoped, however, that it will exercise its power wisely, focusing on public goods whose social value is much higher than their private value, and leaving the rest to the Chinese people.
Nancy Qian is a professor at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management and founding director of the China Econ Lab and the China Lab at NorthwesternUniversity. Translated from the English by Helga Klinger-Groier.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021.
www.project-syndicate.org
“Smiling Angel” is the name of the young Chinese river dolphin swimming here with its mother. Unfortunately, not in the Yangzi River, where this species actually belongs, but in the Wuhan Hydrological Institute. The mother was brought here from Lake Poyang 14 years ago because the dolphins’ survival in their actual habitat was in danger due to environmental changes. She is the first female river dolphin to give birth to a cub in captivity.
Nothing works without chips. The delivery problems of the Taiwanese suppliers are therefore hurting the entire industry, including in Germany. But the knot will be broken again. Because an arms race with semiconductor investments is currently brewing between the major economies. China is investing almost adventurous sums of billions in order to catch up with the world leaders in this field and to become independent of the Taiwanese and Americans. At the same time, however, they are also pumping subsidies into the industry, writes Frank Sieren. Sooner or later there will be plenty of chips for everyone. However, this year will not be that far yet.
Slovenia holds the EU Council presidency for six months – and is setting its own course. Refreshingly Zen-like, the government there ignores the whole complicated knot surrounding the trade war, CAI and sanctions. It generally finds China rather unimportant and has largely kicked the issue off the agenda. Instead, Slovenia is seeking a rapprochement with the US. That’s a pleasingly self-confident stance from a country that has fewer inhabitants than many a district in China’s metropolises.
One scene remains in the memory of participants at an event in 2014: When the President of Slovenia, Borut Pahor, spoke to diplomats, he named Japan and India as the most important partners in Asia. The Chinese ambassador at the time then left the room without a word.
The anecdote says a lot about the relationship between the Central European EU state and the People’s Republic. Because in the past Ljubljana has shown a conspicuous lack of interest in China. Today the economic partner is more present than it was just a few years ago, but Slovenia hasn’t bothered to adopt a clear stance on China. Since last week the country with a population of two million now holds the EU Council presidency – and at least wants to talk about the People’s Republic, if not with it.
A special EU summit is scheduled for 6 October, Prime Minister Janez Janša announced at the start of his country’s EU Council presidency. The debate on China will focus on trade and the future strategic relationship with Beijing. The talks are to take place behind closed doors and Chinese President Xi Jinping has not been invited, Janša said.
During the presentation of the presidential agenda yesterday in the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the People’s Republic was only mentioned once in an aside. In his speech to the MEPs, however, Janša stressed that the community of states must become more autonomous, for example in the production of semiconductors or medical products. In the Presidency’s official programme , China is mentioned only twice: once in the announcement of the special summit and once in connection with more cooperation on environmental issues ahead of the 26th UN Climate Change Conference.
Relations with the People’s Republic are not a top priority for the presidency of the former Yugoslav republic. And the presidency of the Balkan state holds other challenges in store for Brussels: For the right-wing nationalist head of government Janša is not too particular about the rule of law and other European values. Among other things he has been criticised for obstructing the work of the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office by blocking the deployment of two Slovenian prosecutors. Janša is also accused of attacks on press freedom and civil society and of supporting Hungary’s controversial law restricting information on homosexuality.
The EU Council Presidency’s to-do list also includes perennial issues such as EU enlargement, economic recovery after the Corona pandemic and the Green Deal. In the coming week, the EU Commission will present several legislative proposals of its “Fit for 55” climate package. In August, Brussels will be less productive anyway, due to the summer break, and September will be dominated by the German federal election and its impact on Brussels. Observers also expect that the next EU presidency – France takes over in January 2022 – will already be looking over the Slovenians’ shoulders and ensure that major political decisions are postponed until next year.
As far as China is concerned, there is one open construction site in particular: the CAI investment agreement is still frozen. Although technical work on the agreement is continuing, work on the deal is still suspended in the European Parliament because sanctions against European politicians, academics and think tanks are still in force.
Experts therefore do not expect much progress on CAI and sanctions under the Slovenian presidency. At the very least, this is very unlikely, says Slovenian political scientist and China expert Nina Pejič. Slovenia is more likely to leave far-reaching policy decisions to the following presidency, Pejič predicts in an interview with China.Table. The Slovenian government is still generally uncertain about China.
Incentives for a more Beijing-oriented foreign policy are rather few in Slovenia, compared to other neighbours in the region, Pejič explains. “There was also no big mask diplomacy here during the Corona pandemic,” the researcher says. The hope of the current Slovenian government, she says, is still to intensify transatlantic relations. A globally noted example of Slovenia’s desire to please Washington above all else was a now-infamous tweet by Janša: He took to Twitter in November to become the first European head of government to congratulate Donald Trump on his supposed re-election, claiming that the media was “denying the facts.” That alone made it clear, Pejič said, “There is a clear focus on the US. “
Ljubljana also made a special guest gift during the visit of then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last August: Janša and Pompeo signed a joint declaration on 5G network security – the US had thus gained another partner for its coalition against Huawei. But whether the Chinese tech giant will now really be excluded from the rollout of the 5G network in Slovenia is still open, says Pejič. A final decision has not yet been made.
As for the Slovenian government’s political approach to the People’s Republic, the political scientist names one word: “pragmatic.” According to Pejič, Janša, who has been active on the political stage for more than 30 years, has changed his orientation towards Beijing several times: In the 1990s, as a member of parliament, he co-founded a Slovenian-Taiwanese friendship association. When he became prime minister, however, he spoke out as a representative of the one-China policy during a visit to Beijing. In 2011 he visited Taiwan again as leader of the opposition with a delegation. Most recently, however, Janša warned publicly in EU circles against the rise of China and demanded that limits be set for Beijing, says Pejič.
China is not really a present topic of conversation in the country – even for research. Pejič speaks of a lack of “understanding of and interest in China”. This is also due to the fact that Slovenia is neither a major recipient of Chinese direct investment in the region, nor has it derived any other extraordinary benefits from economic relations with the People’s Republic.
For despite the constantly growing trade with China, its share in Slovenia’s total foreign trade has remained very limited, explains Slovenian economist Marjan Svetličič. In 2019, the Balkan state exported goods worth around 265 million euros to China, which corresponds to just three percent of total exports to third countries. In return, goods worth more than one billion euros were imported to Slovenia from the People’s Republic in the same period, he said. And the trade deficit continues to grow, Svetličič writes. Slovenia’s trade structure with China is very similar to the country’s general export structure, he says. The most important goods in bilateral trade are electrical machinery and accessories, road vehicles and pharmaceutical products.
One of the crucial starting points for bilateral cooperation is the international seaport in Koper, explains Svetličič. The multi-purpose port, with the largest container terminal on the northern Adriatic and the second largest car terminal in the Mediterranean, offers the best access to European markets in logistical terms. Its importance has increased significantly since the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as the Northern Adriatic is a terminus of the maritime Silk Road, he said. The Port of Koper has direct weekly connections with China through two alliances. One of them, The Ocean Alliance, also includes Cosco. The port formally became part of the BRI in 2018, Svetličič writes. Since then, the total turnover of goods to and from China has been steadily increasing. In the summer of 2020 alone, the operator Luka Koper recorded one million tonnes of transhipped goods from or to the People’s Republic.
The port of Koper is humming – but the mood between Slovenia and China is still not at its best. The fact that Slovenia joined the US’s anti-Huawei initiative was not the best basis for talks with China, says economist Svetličič with an eye to the EU Council presidency. And then there’s another major point of contention between Brussels and Beijing: human rights violations in China. Svetličič believes that criticism of these violations coming from Slovenia has less force. After all, freedom of the press and civil rights are also restricted on a daily basis in the EU country. In the debate with China this is definitely a disadvantage when it comes to credibility.
“Over the past 100 years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has united and led the Chinese people to write the most glorious chapter in the millennia-long history of the Chinese nation,” President Xi Jinping said in a speech at the CCP’s centennial celebration, highlighting the party’s role as the engine of China’s success as well as economic advancement. But the CCP’s economic record is actually mixed, and even those who are aware of it often overlook the fact that the party’s successes and failures are based on the same economic fundamentals.
Xi is right to state that under the leadership of the CCP, China has made the “historic leap” from being one of the world’s poorest countries with “relatively backward productive forces” to a middle-income country and the world’s second-largest economy. He concealed, however, that this record is marred by colossal failures, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), which led to the greatest famine in human history, or the decades of strict family planning laws that contributed to an escalating demographic crisis.
Because the CCP is capable of effectively mobilizing resources, the Party was able to provide public goods on a large scale, which in turn helped to drive development. In particular, the Party invested heavily in public health and education from the early 1950s. As a result, China managed to achieve one of the most rapid increases ever in life expectancy at birth, from 35 to 40 years in 1949 to 77.3 years today. Enrollment rates also soared. At the primary level from 20 to nearly 100 percent and at the secondary level from six to 88 percent. Literacy rates registered an increase from 20 percent in 1949 to 97 percent today.
In the post-1978 reform era, the state also invested in transportation and renewable energy. Between 1988 and 2019, the length of China’s entire expressway network increased sixfold; they now surpass the interstate highways in the United States in total length.
In addition, China has built 50 third-generation nuclear power plants and six to eight new reactors are approved each year. Recently, the construction of an ultra-high voltage grid was also announced. These efforts are guided by the ambitious commitment to cover a quarter of China’s primary energy consumption by wind, solar and hydropower by 2035.
This ability to mobilize resources for investment in public goods on such a large scale is one of the CCP’s greatest strengths. The party has the political power to impose economic policies for the benefit of overall growthin areas where private investment would be suboptimal.
Healthcare, education, renewable energy and infrastructure undoubtedly contribute to economic growth and create significant social value. However, the people who pay for them are not always those who benefit from these achievements. While educated and healthy people are more economically productive, parents do not necessarily reap the rewards of the investments they make. Renewable energy sources benefit future generations but hurt local economies now dependent on coal. Highways benefit newly connected populations, but farmers lose their livelihoods as their land is claimed for new roads.
These are textbook examples of how the divergence between private and social value can lead to suboptimal investment. Without government intervention, there is not enough investment. But while private interests can prevail in some countries, in China the CP has the power to enforce its strategic choices. And while decisive political leadership often promotes progress, the scale and intensity of policy implementation in China means that if policymakers back the wrong horse, the consequences can prove disastrous.
This occurred during the Great Leap Forward, when peasants were forced to farm without financial compensation or private property rights as part of the collectivization of agriculture. The distorted incentives made it difficult to maintain production on the one hand and to track regional production and capacity on the other. The ensuing great famine in China resulted in 22-45 million deaths in just two years. The economy stagnated, with China experiencing zero or negative annual growth for the next two decades.
Chinas Familienplanungspolitik droht ein weiteres gravierendes Problem heraufzubeschwören. Zum Zeitpunkt der Gründung der Volksrepublik im Jahr 1949 lag die Einwohnerzahl des Landes bei 540 Millionen. Daraufhin setzte die KPCh eine geburtenfördernde Politik um, wie etwa die Einschränkung des Zugangs zu Verhütungsmitteln, und die Bevölkerung wuchs bis 1971 auf 841 Millionen an.
But shortly after the famine, the CCP decided to curtail the pro-birth policy. The extreme one-child policy then lasted from 1979 to 2016, during which time the population continued to rise and now stands at 1.4 billion. However, the one-child policy resulted in a significant increase in the old-age dependency ratio and the gender distribution shows a pronounced male preponderance.
The implementation of the CCP’s Great Leap Forward and family planning policies-as well as its investments in health, education, renewable energy, or physical infrastructure-relied on the party’s ability to drive grassroots mobilization, persuade supporters, and coerce laggards. Yet there is a key difference in terms of economic fundamentals.
The greatest benefits from agricultural production and pro-birth policies are derived by those individuals who also pay for them; social and private values thus show great similarity. If the interests of the individual are aligned with societal needs, there is no need for government intervention. However, when challenges to implementation arise – such as estimates of how much a farmer should produce or how many children a family should have – these interventions are not only unhelpful, but also exceedingly costly.
In his 100th anniversary speech, Xi comprehensively addressed the Party’s future plans and its goal of “building China into a great, modern, socialist country in every respect” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic. To succeed in this endeavor, the CCP will have to use its political power to enforce economic policies. It is to be hoped, however, that it will exercise its power wisely, focusing on public goods whose social value is much higher than their private value, and leaving the rest to the Chinese people.
Nancy Qian is a professor at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management and founding director of the China Econ Lab and the China Lab at NorthwesternUniversity. Translated from the English by Helga Klinger-Groier.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021.
www.project-syndicate.org
“Smiling Angel” is the name of the young Chinese river dolphin swimming here with its mother. Unfortunately, not in the Yangzi River, where this species actually belongs, but in the Wuhan Hydrological Institute. The mother was brought here from Lake Poyang 14 years ago because the dolphins’ survival in their actual habitat was in danger due to environmental changes. She is the first female river dolphin to give birth to a cub in captivity.
