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For China observers, a plenum of the Central Committee is like a small celebration every year. The word alone confirms that we are still dealing with a system whose structures were once shaped by Lenin. For all intransparency of China’s political processes, this at least provides some safe guessing. When the CC convenes to make significant decisions, then significant decisions are to be expected. And things kick off again on Monday, with the sixth and final plenum of the current CC. Michael Radunski analyses which signals might already give away China’s ideological direction. And it doesn’t make Xi Jinping seem not particularly modest.
As Xi consolidates his power, the country’s former pro-business agenda is to some extent falling by the wayside. Local German companies are feeling this more and more, as a survey by the Chamber of Commerce shows. There is nothing left of the optimism of the spring. Rather than the economy brightening up, a perfect storm is brewing. Problems with supply chains, logistics, Covid, power supply, and rising prices continue to deteriorate each other in a vicious circle, analyses Amelie Richter.
Meanwhile, the government is trying to tackle a pressing problem of Chinese citizens, namely high real estate prices. The plan is to use an instrument that has long been known in Germany: property tax. However, the introduction of a new burden on millions of homeowners is a delicate legal, organizational, and propaganda operation, and one that needs to be well-prepared. Our team in Beijing gives you an overview of the state of the debate.
Next week will be historic. And not just figuratively, but literally. Because when the 6th plenum of the 19th Central Committee convenes in Beijing on Monday, the 370 delegates will adopt, among other things, a “historic resolution.” What exactly President Xi Jinping’s resolution will include is not yet known, but Chinese media have been reporting for days that it is to celebrate “the great successes and historic achievements of the party in its 100-year struggle.”
The 6th Plenum proceeding from November 8th to 11 would certainly be a fitting occasion for an announcement of epic proportions. In China, the gatherings of the respective Central Committees in office are numbered consecutively. The 3rd Plenum and the 6th Plenum usually receive special attention: While special reform projects are announced at the 3rd Plenum, far-reaching fundamental decisions are made at the 6th Plenum as the final meeting before the Party Congress, which will have effects for decades to come. And it is supposed to be another “historic resolution” this time.
Xi has many plans. Resolutions that bear the label of a “historic resolution” are very rare and stand out from the flood of party pronouncements. In 100 years of party history, there have only been two such resolutions:
The same level with Mao and Deng already clearly shows how President Xi Jinping sees himself.
But such resolutions not only have a high symbolic value, but they are also an important instrument in Chinese politics. At its core, they fulfill two practical functions: First, they are used to evaluating past events. With the “historical resolution” Xi thus claims interpretive sovereignty over history. He decides how past events are to be assessed, what is good and what is bad for the Chinese people. On the other hand, the leadership always sets the future path for the party and the country with such resolutions.
The “historic resolutions” of Mao and Deng followed this very pattern. They were characterized by critical retrospection and ideological foresight. In 1945 Mao called for a “Rectification Movement”, which basically meant one thing: settling scores with his inner-party opponents. They were forced to acknowledge their own mistakes through harsh self-criticism. In the end, Mao stood as the undisputed leader of party and nation.
Deng Xiaoping’s historic revolution went in the exact opposite direction. He resorted to this means in 1981 to come to terms with the mistakes of the Mao era, especially with the Cultural Revolution and its consequences. In doing so, Deng successfully introduced a fine distinction between Mao’s achievements – especially around the founding of the People’s Republic – and Mao’s mistakes, which Deng located primarily in the years prior to Mao’s death. In prudence, Deng then laid the ideological groundwork for his subsequent policy of opening up and reform.
A critical view on the past – be it Mao’s Cultural Revolution or even the events of the Tiananmen Square in 1989 – probably won’t be included in Xi’s “historical resolution”. On the contrary. It will mainly be set around praise and self-praise, writes rogue party historian Deng Yuwen on Yibao.
A look at the Politburo’s latest report, issued in mid-October, gives an idea of the tone in which the resolution will be announced. It says: “The CPC has led all ethnic groups of the country in making remarkable achievements over the past 100 years in the history of human development” China’s people had been subjugated and tyrannized. But now they have risen up. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the country is on the path toward common prosperity and spiritual and national rejuvenation. In short, the 100 years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1921 have been a success story, and Xi Jinping is the right man for China.
It is clear what Xi wants to achieve at the 6th Plenum: By proclaiming a “historic resolution”, he is once again underlining his prominent position in Chinese history. It puts him on a par with Mao and Deng. At the least. For Xi is striving to surpass the two party icons by establishing a hierarchy of Chinese leaders at the 6th Plenum. Then, only he and Mao will be at the top. Deng Xiaoping will follow at some distance, then Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. If Xi has his way, it will be possible to divide the history of the Communist Party into three periods from now on: The first phase under Mao, then a less important interim period, and finally, the Xi era. The great reformer Deng Xiaoping thus becomes a mere episode.
This clear hierarchy is important for Xi for two reasons: his leadership style and his goals. Xi’s leadership style represents a clear departure from Deng Xiaoping, after all. It was Deng who, after the turmoils of the Mao era, including the famine and the Cultural Revolution, warned strongly against allowing a single person to become so powerful ever again. In China’s political culture, the cult of personality ended. Before Xi, the terms of Chinese presidents were limited to two periods of five years each. Xi has cashed in on both.
And Xi is also following in Mao’s footsteps when it comes to his measures. Many observers are convinced that Xi is currently imposing nothing less than a kind of Cultural Revolution 2.0 on the country. Initially, extremely harsh action was taken against corrupt and otherwise loathed cadres; a great many observers spoke of a “cleansing” of party ranks in reference to the Mao era. China’s economy (crackdown on large tech corporations) and education (new curricula at schools and universities, bans of private education providers) are also being completely restructured. All coupled with a strong re-ideologization of society (towards old values, away from foreign countries).
A few weeks ago, influential blogger Li Guangman (李光满) illustrated just how widely these events are being perceived, even within China, with his essay “Everyone Can Sense That a Profound Transformation is Underway!” (每个人都能感受到，一场深刻的变革正在进行.) Li first published the essay on his WeChat account, but his lines were quickly picked up by state news agency Xinhua, the newspaper People’s Daily, and television channel CCTV. In it, Li praises that vulgar, money-obsessed individuals are finally getting what they deserve – much like a revolution. The idea of Xi’s revolution is to change a society focused on money and profit into a community that once again focuses on its people and the common good. It is a return to the true intentions (初心) and quintessence (本质) of the Chinese Communist Party and true Chinese socialism.
It is these ideas and slogans that Xi Jinping wants to use to determine China’s policy for years to come – and which will in all likelihood also shape the “historic resolution” at the 6th Plenum.
But why is there still a need for a “historic resolution”? One often-heard reason is that, as strong as Xi Jinping may appear to the outside world, both his leadership style and his substantive goals are controversial within China. But cracks rarely appear in the outwardly often monolith-like structure of the CP. But they do exist: doubts, discontent, occasional discord, and sometimes even criticism. Like Zhang Weiying (张维迎), for example. The Peking University economics professor questioned the concept of “common prosperity” in early September. The approach contradicts the principles of a market economy and could even result in “common poverty.”
And this is why Xi’s “historic resolution” at the 6th Plenum will revolve around three things:
Power and resource shortages, unclear economic policy guidelines, and travel restrictions have massively impacted the economic expectations of German companies in China. Only 37 percent of the German companies surveyed in the People’s Republic now expect an improvement – compared to 69 percent back in spring 2021. This is the result of a survey by the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) and the Chamber of Foreign Trade (AHK), which was presented on Thursday.
At the same time, the number of companies that expect the business environment in China to deteriorate over the next twelve months quadrupled: Whereas in the spring the figure was just five percent, 21 percent of the companies surveyed now expect their business to deteriorate in autumn. According to DIHK Head of Foreign Trade, Volker Treier, this assessment also has an impact on future investments: “German companies’ investment plans are on the rise, except in China.”
The economic upturn still expected in spring thus does not appear to materialize in the end, the “AHK World Business Outlook” states. “In autumn 2020 and spring 2021, the expectations of companies in China had still been far above the global average.” However, in the DIHK’s view, the global economic environment is also generally becoming “more uncomfortable”, as Treier said. Supply chain problems in particular are coming to a head.
According to the survey, 69 percent of companies in China complained about problems in their supply chains or logistics as a result of the Covid pandemic. Industrial and construction companies were particularly affected by supply chain disruptions and their results. In addition to increased demand on one hand, and insufficient production capacities on the other, companies see shipping problems – especially due to a lack of containers and freight capacities on ships, as well as production downtimes at suppliers, according to the survey.
In light of the challenges in international business, 54 percent of companies worldwide now want to adapt their supply chains accordingly, as Treier explained. Of these companies, 72 percent were looking for new suppliers, while 32 percent were planning to change or shorten their supply routes. Treier called it striking that 15 percent of the companies wanted to relocate their production or parts of their production to new locations. The report did not provide details of the corresponding responses in China.
However, there are shifts out of China and into the Indo-Pacific region, Treier said. “Malaysia and India are becoming more attractive.” At the same time, however, an expansion of German companies’ supply chains in China is also an issue. One reason for this is local content regulations, i.e. the requirement to source a minimum proportion of parts domestically.
The topics of decoupling and localization of supply chains play a major role in China, according to the head of the AHK in Beijing, Jens Hildebrandt. According to Hildebrandt, the nationalization of Chinese supply chains is the main source of uncertainty. In addition, vaguely worded economic policy initiatives such as “Common Prosperity” (China.Table reported) left companies wondering, Hildebrandt said. According to the survey, 45 percent of the companies cited economic policy framework conditions as the greatest business risk.
The outlook in the People’s Republic is also clouded by raw material and power-supply bottlenecks, Hildebrandt explained. The power bottlenecks are now better coordinated. It has been observed that demand has fueled the production of coal, and electricity rates have been adjusted (China.Table reported). Hildebrandt nevertheless expects the impacts of power and commodity shortages will be felt till the spring of next year. High commodity prices are the biggest business risk for 61 percent of companies in China, according to the survey.
Another important point is the impact of the Covid pandemic: 85 percent of companies in China are affected by travel restrictions. Hildebrandt expects continued travel restrictions throughout 2022.
The “AHK World Business Outlook” is based on a regular DIHK survey of member companies of the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad, delegations, and representative offices. The current survey collected feedback from more than 3,200 German companies worldwide in autumn 2021. According to the survey, 41 percent of the responding companies are from the industrial and construction sector, 37 percent from the service sector and another 22 percent are trading companies.
China was responsible for more than 30 percent of global CO2 emissions in 2020, according to new figures released Thursday night. Between 2019 and 2020, China’s share of global emissions rose by two percentage points. However, this was tied to the Covid pandemic. As a result of the prolonged lockdown in Western states, emissions in these states dropped significantly. Climate scientists assume that this Covid effect on emissions was only short-term. For the year 2021, CO2 emissions in the US and Europe are expected to rise.
Converted to the population, greenhouse gas emissions in China averaged 7.4 tons per capita and were thus only just behind those of Germany (7.7 tons per capita). US Americans emitted an average of over 14 tons of CO2 per year in 2020. However, these figures should also be treated with caution. This is because about a tenth of greenhouse gas emitted in China is due to the high export surplus and is thus indirectly caused abroad. Nevertheless, China remains one of the most important players at the climate conference currently held in Glasgow.
However, China refused to sign a treaty of 22 countries against the financing of fossil fuel projects. This puts Beijing in the company of South Korea, Japan, and Spain, which also consider the requirements too far-reaching. The agreement came about at the instigation of British Energy Minister Greg Hands. It provides for a complete phase-out of investments in the production or use of coal, gas, and oil by 2022. However, the document is not binding. Moreover, it only concerns new plans; financing for ongoing projects remains unaffected. Still, Hands trusts the pact to redirect $15 billion in public funds from dirty to clean projects. nib/fin
Ever since business people from all over the world are drawn to China – in the wake of Beijing’s reform and policy of opening-up – training courses on intercultural behavior to avoid gaffes have been booming. The correct way of handing over business cards is right at the top of the list of etiquette issues at consulting companies. After all, the People’s Republic follows ancient traditions. The only truth to this is that business cards were first used in China more than 2,000 years ago, but modern-day name and business cards and how to present or receive them were copied by the Chinese from Europeans and Japanese. Only since the digitalization of business cards has Beijing once again taken the lead.
Two very specific traditional name cards played a role in global political events 121 years ago. They contributed to the sense of humiliation of the Chinese Empire. At issue was how the German commander-in-chief of the Allied intervention forces that stopped the Boxer Rebellion handled it. Alfred Graf von Waldersee kept the court’s highest-ranking envoys, Li Hongzhang and Prince Qing, waiting for a long time before deigning to receive them, even though both had announced themselves with their business cards in perfect form.
Even more provocatively, Empress Dowager Cixi’s emissaries had to pay him their respects at Beijing’s imperial garden and lake complex Zhongnanhai (中南海), for that was where Waldersee had set up his headquarters. He lived in the Ziguangge (紫光阁), the more than 200-year-old “purple radiant pavilion”. The buildings next door housed his German entourage.
It was November 15, 1900. “At 3 in the afternoon, we were graced with a historic moment,” wrote Oberstallmeister Fedor von Rauch in his diary: “The chief was expecting the two Chinese dignitaries… They may have found it hard to offer their reverential greeting to the German field marshal in the chambers of their sovereign. The audience lasted about an hour and a half.”
The imperial court had appointed Li Hongzhang “envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary for the purpose of restoring peace between China and foreign powers.” Prince Qing assisted. Waldersee, however, was not willing to meet with them until “after weeks of negotiation, they were comfortable in addressing a written audience request to him,” von Rauch reported. Both mandarins had their visit announced in the traditional Chinese manner and sent him their visiting cards in advance.
In the estate of Captain von Schönberg, I discovered the name cards of Li and Prince Qing. They had written them with three characters, each in black ink from top to bottom, and brushed them on oblong red paper. The cards of other representatives of allied troops from eight countries, be it from the Japanese, Russians, Americans, or French, looked quite different. They were already printed in square formats on thin white paper, just as we know them today. In the UK, the Oscar Friedheim company, founded in 1884, was able to produce up to 100,000 individual cards a day by 1889. Their card cutting and engraving machines came from Germany.
It was not Europe that learned from China when it comes to handling the modern “Mingpian” (名片) business card, as many China etiquette books want us to believe. It was the other way around: The Chinese copied the European format, the bilingualism of the card, and their printing technique. From the Japanese, they learned how to use it. The Japanese had adopted the characters for the term “mingci” (名刺) from ancient Chinese, but they were the ones to conceive a perfectly formed ritual for them. It begins with holding the flat card between the thumb and index finger of both hands, and then handing it to the other person with a bow.
China was a quick study. In 2018, the Beijing daily called the mass distribution of name cards in the People’s Republic today an important “tool for social contact” (“社会交往的重要工具”). Used for more than 2,000 years in China, nobles from distant principalities or kingdoms who visited higher-ranking rulers would enclose with their gifts and tributes platelets made of bamboo or wood called ye (谒). On them were the names of the bearers, and often details of their rank and their origin. Later dynasties used silk, cloth, and, from the Ming period onwards, paper.
Modern printed cards appeared en masse with the economic boom after the Cultural Revolution in China in 1978. At first, the customers of Beijing’s small-scale printers despaired. They did not know any foreign languages and could not type foreign names without error. Only copying and scanning techniques solved the stubborn problem.
The IT revolution helped China catch up and even pioneer the electronic business card of today. Especially after WeChat emerged in 2011 and the digital business card replaced the printed name card. According to recent data, more than 230 million Chinese used business cards from 2011 to 2021, including more than 50 million only digitally via apps, WeChat, and QR codes since 2017. In metropolises such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen, the printed card is dying out.
Half a century after Waldersee made his brief guest appearance at Zhongnanhai, China’s Communists moved into the former Park of Emperors on June 15, 1949, even before they proclaimed their People’s Republic. Mao Zedong made Zhongnanhai the seat of the party and also lived there privately. The people have since called the heavily guarded area west of the imperial palace the “new forbidden city.”
In its Purple Palace (Ziguange), China’s leadership nowadays sometimes receives illustrious foreign guests. It does not like to be reminded of the imperial pre-inhabitants. Still, even less of the time when a German commander-in-chief resided here and emissaries of the imperial house had to hand in their visiting cards to him. These were not the only things the Germans took with them when they left. They are also said to have taken all kinds of other art treasures.
Fog in Tianjin. Or rather clouds? In any case, the roof of the Tianjin World Financial Center sticks out of the white soup. From the drone’s bird’s eye view, it looks like a ship in a sea of white waves. At 337 meters, the “Jin Tower” is high enough to provide a view from its highest floors as if from an airplane.
For China observers, a plenum of the Central Committee is like a small celebration every year. The word alone confirms that we are still dealing with a system whose structures were once shaped by Lenin. For all intransparency of China’s political processes, this at least provides some safe guessing. When the CC convenes to make significant decisions, then significant decisions are to be expected. And things kick off again on Monday, with the sixth and final plenum of the current CC. Michael Radunski analyses which signals might already give away China’s ideological direction. And it doesn’t make Xi Jinping seem not particularly modest.
As Xi consolidates his power, the country’s former pro-business agenda is to some extent falling by the wayside. Local German companies are feeling this more and more, as a survey by the Chamber of Commerce shows. There is nothing left of the optimism of the spring. Rather than the economy brightening up, a perfect storm is brewing. Problems with supply chains, logistics, Covid, power supply, and rising prices continue to deteriorate each other in a vicious circle, analyses Amelie Richter.
Meanwhile, the government is trying to tackle a pressing problem of Chinese citizens, namely high real estate prices. The plan is to use an instrument that has long been known in Germany: property tax. However, the introduction of a new burden on millions of homeowners is a delicate legal, organizational, and propaganda operation, and one that needs to be well-prepared. Our team in Beijing gives you an overview of the state of the debate.
Next week will be historic. And not just figuratively, but literally. Because when the 6th plenum of the 19th Central Committee convenes in Beijing on Monday, the 370 delegates will adopt, among other things, a “historic resolution.” What exactly President Xi Jinping’s resolution will include is not yet known, but Chinese media have been reporting for days that it is to celebrate “the great successes and historic achievements of the party in its 100-year struggle.”
The 6th Plenum proceeding from November 8th to 11 would certainly be a fitting occasion for an announcement of epic proportions. In China, the gatherings of the respective Central Committees in office are numbered consecutively. The 3rd Plenum and the 6th Plenum usually receive special attention: While special reform projects are announced at the 3rd Plenum, far-reaching fundamental decisions are made at the 6th Plenum as the final meeting before the Party Congress, which will have effects for decades to come. And it is supposed to be another “historic resolution” this time.
Xi has many plans. Resolutions that bear the label of a “historic resolution” are very rare and stand out from the flood of party pronouncements. In 100 years of party history, there have only been two such resolutions:
The same level with Mao and Deng already clearly shows how President Xi Jinping sees himself.
But such resolutions not only have a high symbolic value, but they are also an important instrument in Chinese politics. At its core, they fulfill two practical functions: First, they are used to evaluating past events. With the “historical resolution” Xi thus claims interpretive sovereignty over history. He decides how past events are to be assessed, what is good and what is bad for the Chinese people. On the other hand, the leadership always sets the future path for the party and the country with such resolutions.
The “historic resolutions” of Mao and Deng followed this very pattern. They were characterized by critical retrospection and ideological foresight. In 1945 Mao called for a “Rectification Movement”, which basically meant one thing: settling scores with his inner-party opponents. They were forced to acknowledge their own mistakes through harsh self-criticism. In the end, Mao stood as the undisputed leader of party and nation.
Deng Xiaoping’s historic revolution went in the exact opposite direction. He resorted to this means in 1981 to come to terms with the mistakes of the Mao era, especially with the Cultural Revolution and its consequences. In doing so, Deng successfully introduced a fine distinction between Mao’s achievements – especially around the founding of the People’s Republic – and Mao’s mistakes, which Deng located primarily in the years prior to Mao’s death. In prudence, Deng then laid the ideological groundwork for his subsequent policy of opening up and reform.
A critical view on the past – be it Mao’s Cultural Revolution or even the events of the Tiananmen Square in 1989 – probably won’t be included in Xi’s “historical resolution”. On the contrary. It will mainly be set around praise and self-praise, writes rogue party historian Deng Yuwen on Yibao.
A look at the Politburo’s latest report, issued in mid-October, gives an idea of the tone in which the resolution will be announced. It says: “The CPC has led all ethnic groups of the country in making remarkable achievements over the past 100 years in the history of human development” China’s people had been subjugated and tyrannized. But now they have risen up. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the country is on the path toward common prosperity and spiritual and national rejuvenation. In short, the 100 years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1921 have been a success story, and Xi Jinping is the right man for China.
It is clear what Xi wants to achieve at the 6th Plenum: By proclaiming a “historic resolution”, he is once again underlining his prominent position in Chinese history. It puts him on a par with Mao and Deng. At the least. For Xi is striving to surpass the two party icons by establishing a hierarchy of Chinese leaders at the 6th Plenum. Then, only he and Mao will be at the top. Deng Xiaoping will follow at some distance, then Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. If Xi has his way, it will be possible to divide the history of the Communist Party into three periods from now on: The first phase under Mao, then a less important interim period, and finally, the Xi era. The great reformer Deng Xiaoping thus becomes a mere episode.
This clear hierarchy is important for Xi for two reasons: his leadership style and his goals. Xi’s leadership style represents a clear departure from Deng Xiaoping, after all. It was Deng who, after the turmoils of the Mao era, including the famine and the Cultural Revolution, warned strongly against allowing a single person to become so powerful ever again. In China’s political culture, the cult of personality ended. Before Xi, the terms of Chinese presidents were limited to two periods of five years each. Xi has cashed in on both.
And Xi is also following in Mao’s footsteps when it comes to his measures. Many observers are convinced that Xi is currently imposing nothing less than a kind of Cultural Revolution 2.0 on the country. Initially, extremely harsh action was taken against corrupt and otherwise loathed cadres; a great many observers spoke of a “cleansing” of party ranks in reference to the Mao era. China’s economy (crackdown on large tech corporations) and education (new curricula at schools and universities, bans of private education providers) are also being completely restructured. All coupled with a strong re-ideologization of society (towards old values, away from foreign countries).
A few weeks ago, influential blogger Li Guangman (李光满) illustrated just how widely these events are being perceived, even within China, with his essay “Everyone Can Sense That a Profound Transformation is Underway!” (每个人都能感受到，一场深刻的变革正在进行.) Li first published the essay on his WeChat account, but his lines were quickly picked up by state news agency Xinhua, the newspaper People’s Daily, and television channel CCTV. In it, Li praises that vulgar, money-obsessed individuals are finally getting what they deserve – much like a revolution. The idea of Xi’s revolution is to change a society focused on money and profit into a community that once again focuses on its people and the common good. It is a return to the true intentions (初心) and quintessence (本质) of the Chinese Communist Party and true Chinese socialism.
It is these ideas and slogans that Xi Jinping wants to use to determine China’s policy for years to come – and which will in all likelihood also shape the “historic resolution” at the 6th Plenum.
But why is there still a need for a “historic resolution”? One often-heard reason is that, as strong as Xi Jinping may appear to the outside world, both his leadership style and his substantive goals are controversial within China. But cracks rarely appear in the outwardly often monolith-like structure of the CP. But they do exist: doubts, discontent, occasional discord, and sometimes even criticism. Like Zhang Weiying (张维迎), for example. The Peking University economics professor questioned the concept of “common prosperity” in early September. The approach contradicts the principles of a market economy and could even result in “common poverty.”
And this is why Xi’s “historic resolution” at the 6th Plenum will revolve around three things:
Power and resource shortages, unclear economic policy guidelines, and travel restrictions have massively impacted the economic expectations of German companies in China. Only 37 percent of the German companies surveyed in the People’s Republic now expect an improvement – compared to 69 percent back in spring 2021. This is the result of a survey by the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) and the Chamber of Foreign Trade (AHK), which was presented on Thursday.
At the same time, the number of companies that expect the business environment in China to deteriorate over the next twelve months quadrupled: Whereas in the spring the figure was just five percent, 21 percent of the companies surveyed now expect their business to deteriorate in autumn. According to DIHK Head of Foreign Trade, Volker Treier, this assessment also has an impact on future investments: “German companies’ investment plans are on the rise, except in China.”
The economic upturn still expected in spring thus does not appear to materialize in the end, the “AHK World Business Outlook” states. “In autumn 2020 and spring 2021, the expectations of companies in China had still been far above the global average.” However, in the DIHK’s view, the global economic environment is also generally becoming “more uncomfortable”, as Treier said. Supply chain problems in particular are coming to a head.
According to the survey, 69 percent of companies in China complained about problems in their supply chains or logistics as a result of the Covid pandemic. Industrial and construction companies were particularly affected by supply chain disruptions and their results. In addition to increased demand on one hand, and insufficient production capacities on the other, companies see shipping problems – especially due to a lack of containers and freight capacities on ships, as well as production downtimes at suppliers, according to the survey.
In light of the challenges in international business, 54 percent of companies worldwide now want to adapt their supply chains accordingly, as Treier explained. Of these companies, 72 percent were looking for new suppliers, while 32 percent were planning to change or shorten their supply routes. Treier called it striking that 15 percent of the companies wanted to relocate their production or parts of their production to new locations. The report did not provide details of the corresponding responses in China.
However, there are shifts out of China and into the Indo-Pacific region, Treier said. “Malaysia and India are becoming more attractive.” At the same time, however, an expansion of German companies’ supply chains in China is also an issue. One reason for this is local content regulations, i.e. the requirement to source a minimum proportion of parts domestically.
The topics of decoupling and localization of supply chains play a major role in China, according to the head of the AHK in Beijing, Jens Hildebrandt. According to Hildebrandt, the nationalization of Chinese supply chains is the main source of uncertainty. In addition, vaguely worded economic policy initiatives such as “Common Prosperity” (China.Table reported) left companies wondering, Hildebrandt said. According to the survey, 45 percent of the companies cited economic policy framework conditions as the greatest business risk.
The outlook in the People’s Republic is also clouded by raw material and power-supply bottlenecks, Hildebrandt explained. The power bottlenecks are now better coordinated. It has been observed that demand has fueled the production of coal, and electricity rates have been adjusted (China.Table reported). Hildebrandt nevertheless expects the impacts of power and commodity shortages will be felt till the spring of next year. High commodity prices are the biggest business risk for 61 percent of companies in China, according to the survey.
Another important point is the impact of the Covid pandemic: 85 percent of companies in China are affected by travel restrictions. Hildebrandt expects continued travel restrictions throughout 2022.
The “AHK World Business Outlook” is based on a regular DIHK survey of member companies of the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad, delegations, and representative offices. The current survey collected feedback from more than 3,200 German companies worldwide in autumn 2021. According to the survey, 41 percent of the responding companies are from the industrial and construction sector, 37 percent from the service sector and another 22 percent are trading companies.
China was responsible for more than 30 percent of global CO2 emissions in 2020, according to new figures released Thursday night. Between 2019 and 2020, China’s share of global emissions rose by two percentage points. However, this was tied to the Covid pandemic. As a result of the prolonged lockdown in Western states, emissions in these states dropped significantly. Climate scientists assume that this Covid effect on emissions was only short-term. For the year 2021, CO2 emissions in the US and Europe are expected to rise.
Converted to the population, greenhouse gas emissions in China averaged 7.4 tons per capita and were thus only just behind those of Germany (7.7 tons per capita). US Americans emitted an average of over 14 tons of CO2 per year in 2020. However, these figures should also be treated with caution. This is because about a tenth of greenhouse gas emitted in China is due to the high export surplus and is thus indirectly caused abroad. Nevertheless, China remains one of the most important players at the climate conference currently held in Glasgow.
However, China refused to sign a treaty of 22 countries against the financing of fossil fuel projects. This puts Beijing in the company of South Korea, Japan, and Spain, which also consider the requirements too far-reaching. The agreement came about at the instigation of British Energy Minister Greg Hands. It provides for a complete phase-out of investments in the production or use of coal, gas, and oil by 2022. However, the document is not binding. Moreover, it only concerns new plans; financing for ongoing projects remains unaffected. Still, Hands trusts the pact to redirect $15 billion in public funds from dirty to clean projects. nib/fin
Ever since business people from all over the world are drawn to China – in the wake of Beijing’s reform and policy of opening-up – training courses on intercultural behavior to avoid gaffes have been booming. The correct way of handing over business cards is right at the top of the list of etiquette issues at consulting companies. After all, the People’s Republic follows ancient traditions. The only truth to this is that business cards were first used in China more than 2,000 years ago, but modern-day name and business cards and how to present or receive them were copied by the Chinese from Europeans and Japanese. Only since the digitalization of business cards has Beijing once again taken the lead.
Two very specific traditional name cards played a role in global political events 121 years ago. They contributed to the sense of humiliation of the Chinese Empire. At issue was how the German commander-in-chief of the Allied intervention forces that stopped the Boxer Rebellion handled it. Alfred Graf von Waldersee kept the court’s highest-ranking envoys, Li Hongzhang and Prince Qing, waiting for a long time before deigning to receive them, even though both had announced themselves with their business cards in perfect form.
Even more provocatively, Empress Dowager Cixi’s emissaries had to pay him their respects at Beijing’s imperial garden and lake complex Zhongnanhai (中南海), for that was where Waldersee had set up his headquarters. He lived in the Ziguangge (紫光阁), the more than 200-year-old “purple radiant pavilion”. The buildings next door housed his German entourage.
It was November 15, 1900. “At 3 in the afternoon, we were graced with a historic moment,” wrote Oberstallmeister Fedor von Rauch in his diary: “The chief was expecting the two Chinese dignitaries… They may have found it hard to offer their reverential greeting to the German field marshal in the chambers of their sovereign. The audience lasted about an hour and a half.”
The imperial court had appointed Li Hongzhang “envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary for the purpose of restoring peace between China and foreign powers.” Prince Qing assisted. Waldersee, however, was not willing to meet with them until “after weeks of negotiation, they were comfortable in addressing a written audience request to him,” von Rauch reported. Both mandarins had their visit announced in the traditional Chinese manner and sent him their visiting cards in advance.
In the estate of Captain von Schönberg, I discovered the name cards of Li and Prince Qing. They had written them with three characters, each in black ink from top to bottom, and brushed them on oblong red paper. The cards of other representatives of allied troops from eight countries, be it from the Japanese, Russians, Americans, or French, looked quite different. They were already printed in square formats on thin white paper, just as we know them today. In the UK, the Oscar Friedheim company, founded in 1884, was able to produce up to 100,000 individual cards a day by 1889. Their card cutting and engraving machines came from Germany.
It was not Europe that learned from China when it comes to handling the modern “Mingpian” (名片) business card, as many China etiquette books want us to believe. It was the other way around: The Chinese copied the European format, the bilingualism of the card, and their printing technique. From the Japanese, they learned how to use it. The Japanese had adopted the characters for the term “mingci” (名刺) from ancient Chinese, but they were the ones to conceive a perfectly formed ritual for them. It begins with holding the flat card between the thumb and index finger of both hands, and then handing it to the other person with a bow.
China was a quick study. In 2018, the Beijing daily called the mass distribution of name cards in the People’s Republic today an important “tool for social contact” (“社会交往的重要工具”). Used for more than 2,000 years in China, nobles from distant principalities or kingdoms who visited higher-ranking rulers would enclose with their gifts and tributes platelets made of bamboo or wood called ye (谒). On them were the names of the bearers, and often details of their rank and their origin. Later dynasties used silk, cloth, and, from the Ming period onwards, paper.
Modern printed cards appeared en masse with the economic boom after the Cultural Revolution in China in 1978. At first, the customers of Beijing’s small-scale printers despaired. They did not know any foreign languages and could not type foreign names without error. Only copying and scanning techniques solved the stubborn problem.
The IT revolution helped China catch up and even pioneer the electronic business card of today. Especially after WeChat emerged in 2011 and the digital business card replaced the printed name card. According to recent data, more than 230 million Chinese used business cards from 2011 to 2021, including more than 50 million only digitally via apps, WeChat, and QR codes since 2017. In metropolises such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen, the printed card is dying out.
Half a century after Waldersee made his brief guest appearance at Zhongnanhai, China’s Communists moved into the former Park of Emperors on June 15, 1949, even before they proclaimed their People’s Republic. Mao Zedong made Zhongnanhai the seat of the party and also lived there privately. The people have since called the heavily guarded area west of the imperial palace the “new forbidden city.”
In its Purple Palace (Ziguange), China’s leadership nowadays sometimes receives illustrious foreign guests. It does not like to be reminded of the imperial pre-inhabitants. Still, even less of the time when a German commander-in-chief resided here and emissaries of the imperial house had to hand in their visiting cards to him. These were not the only things the Germans took with them when they left. They are also said to have taken all kinds of other art treasures.
Fog in Tianjin. Or rather clouds? In any case, the roof of the Tianjin World Financial Center sticks out of the white soup. From the drone’s bird’s eye view, it looks like a ship in a sea of white waves. At 337 meters, the “Jin Tower” is high enough to provide a view from its highest floors as if from an airplane.