It was postponed for months, and now the Third Plenum of the Central Committee has ended. The counting has already begun: How often have the words “reform,” “development” or national security been mentioned? On Thursday, observers at home and abroad tried to deduce anything about the CCP’s future priorities from the meager communiqué. Does the frequent emphasis on national security indicate more control? The German economy will greatly depend on whether power politics or economic growth is the future focus. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has analyzed the outcome of the important planning conference and at least recognizes the Chinese leadership’s interest in not letting the economy crash completely. Read his analysis to find out what else he found out.
“I don’t see the point. Africans will be your friends only when you give them money.” Or: “Has the government forgotten how many poor people China has?” This is how the Chinese public comments on China’s development aid on social media. Quite a contrast to the Western perception, which accuses China of luring poorer countries into a debt trap. Yes – which one is it? One thing is clear: China gives a lot – almost 80 billion euros annually. One of our authors from China looks at the social debate and the political goals that the aid is pursuing.
German research faces a dilemma: German universities seek exchange with international partners and students. However, no one wants to cooperate with organizations that support military developments in China. But how can scientists weigh up the risks and opportunities of scientific cooperation? It’s difficult – but important. Universities and researchers “have to be very careful” in all research fields that expand China’s military or surveillance potential, says Yannick Ringot from the HNC³ network in an interview with Table.Briefings. This initiative, to which the University of Hamburg belongs, pools China expertise in the Hanseatic city. Marcel Grzanna’s analysis shows what stricter screening procedures look like at various universities.
China’s position in the Ukraine war has triggered a rethink in German academia. Ever since numerous pieces of evidence have emerged that Beijing is providing military support to its close friend and strategic partner Vladimir Putin, a number of collaborations between German universities and research institutes and Chinese institutions have been cast in a different light.
“The war in Ukraine has changed perceptions. We cannot deny that there is a rivalry alongside the partnership with China,” says Yannick Ringot, coordinator of the Hamburg Network on Compliance in Cooperation with China HNC³ at the University of Hamburg.
There is still a considerable need for knowledge and instructions in areas where an extensive exchange with Chinese partners was largely approved without hesitation just a few years ago. Scientists are faced with the dilemma of having to weigh up the risks and opportunities of cooperation. Ringot told Table Briefings that “researchers and universities have to be very careful” in all research fields that expand China’s military or surveillance potential.
The HNC³ network is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and pools the China expertise of nine academic institutions in Hamburg. The central player in the network is the University of Hamburg. Earlier than others, it started to look closer at who it works with. The usual review of international cooperation requests was significantly intensified at the end of 2020. Since then, requests have been undergoing an in-depth review process.
The implementation of this detailed evaluation resulted from the “dynamic global political situation,” from which a systemic rivalry between democracies and autocracies has increasingly crystallized. “Our universities have a social responsibility. They cannot be allowed to help arm the Chinese military,” says Ringot. The procedure has already been adjusted in detail several times to increasingly take account of the risk potential. The frequent readjustments are symbolic of the deficits that existed in the examinations at German universities just a few years ago.
Also because it is not always easy to say “no.” China offers generous research project funding, well-trained guest scientists and partner institutions with state-of-the-art equipment. For many years, the opportunities for cooperation outweighed the potential threats to Germany’s sovereignty, national security and freedom of research. But that has changed since.
“We are seeing a much greater awareness and concern, particularly in export control,” says Alicia Hennig, a business ethicist specializing in China from the International University Institute (IHI) Zittau at TU Dresden. This became clear at the German Federal Working Group on Export Controls and Science, where around 130 representatives from universities and research institutions debated how to deal with the risks and consequences of cooperation in mid-June. Hennig herself worked as a lecturer at a Chinese university for five years before she was no longer willing to abide by ideological boundaries in teaching out of consideration for her hosts, and left the country.
Within the working group, however, Hennig recognized “a lot of frustration that the German government does not play a central role in risk assessment for universities.” In its position paper on research safety in March 2024, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) announced plans to “actively support the review and (continued) development of corresponding guidelines and instruments by the scientific community” as part of its responsibilities. Despite this, universities are still forced to make the final decision.
The problem here is that many academics have little or no China expertise. They evaluate risks based on their personal values and experiences. They can neither classify the individual backgrounds of Chinese scientists nor identify the ties between partner institutions and the state arms industry or surveillance programs.
The University of Hamburg wants to close these gaps. Its in-depth examination procedure is not country-specific. Requests from other countries are also closely scrutinized, especially if they have autocratic structures. Nevertheless, requests for cooperation with Chinese partners initiate most of the procedures.
The vast majority of the approximately 20 procedures examined to date involve STEM subjects. Most of them have been given the green light. In one case, however, an ongoing collaboration was terminated. The third-party-funded project in question focussed on machine learning and AI. When the application for the third phase began, several open and critical questions emerged, which, after extensive debate and consideration, spoke against a continuation.
The procedure takes time: After a classification based on the country list of the Academic Freedom Index (AFI), a subject-related classification by research areas with increased risk or export control relevance is performed, if necessary. If the criteria of the German Federal Office for Export Control also indicate a high risk, the review goes into detail. The university then obtains information from project managers and the assessments of a handful of departments, coordinates them with each other, holds consultations and finally drafts a proposal for the presidential board. This is where the final decision is made whether or not a cooperation will be established.
The TU Munich has also become cautious. “In recent years, we have noticed a high level of sensitivity as well as an increased need for consultation among our researchers with regard to international collaborations,” the university explains. China is a particular focus here. As part of its Global Engagement Principles developed in 2022, TU Darmstadt has set up a “China Roundtable,” which provides researchers with specific information and recommendations. On the one hand, this is intended to contribute to further awareness raising. On the other hand, the aim is to create opportunities for the best possible organization of scientific cooperation. In general, the guiding questions of the German Rectors’ Conference on cooperation with Chinese partners are used as a basis.
At the Free University of Berlin, an awareness-raising process is also being driven forward, primarily by the international and legal departments. An in-depth review process has been in a test phase since the beginning of the year. So far, applications for third-party funding have only received a recommendation or, “in the case of certain countries such as China,” the university administration has been able to request a review on its part. In addition, the Free University has set up a China advisory board to advise university management on cooperation with China.
Applications for third-party funding with China are reviewed by the international department – particularly by the country officers – after consultation with the research department. Here, too, the key questions are: Is there a risk of encroachment on academic freedom or violations of export control law?
Currently, the Free University’s research database lists six ongoing collaborations with China, all of which are fully funded by the European Union (Horizon), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the German Research Foundation (DFG) or other international organizations. In addition, there are two long-term projects with partial Chinese funding – the Center for German Studies, supported by Peking University, the Free University, and Humboldt University, which is funded by the DAAD and the three partners. China also funds the University’s Confucius Institute, “which operates separately from university teaching and primarily offers language courses and cultural events,” a statement from the university said.
These examples show that parts of the scientific community in Germany are no longer willing to accept Chinese cooperation inquiries at any price. Have the risks been averted? Not by a long shot, says business ethicist Hennig. “There has been significant progress in some areas of German academia. In other areas, it is still very difficult or there is a lack of will to counter the risks with suitable mechanisms.”
In its first communiqué after the end of the Third Plenum, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China set out a timetable for the next interim economic targets. In addition, the public learns for the first time about the whereabouts of the deposed ministers, Qin Gang and Li Shangfu. The announcement also provides an initial indication of Xi Jinping’s priorities for the coming years.
Incidentally, these dates indicate that Xi will probably not step down after his current third term of office. In 2029, he will already be in his fourth, and he is explicitly named as the leader under whose guidance the goals are to be achieved. Longer documents are expected on Friday, which will provide details, in particular, what goals are targeted.
The Central Committee is the most powerful body of the Communist Party and the sole ruling body in China. It only convenes seven times in a five-year period and sometimes makes far-reaching decisions. The Third Plenum of the Central Committee traditionally focuses on economic planning. The plenary session ended on Thursday. 264 members participated.
According to the document, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang has resigned from the Central Committee. This suggests a friendly treatment of the ousted senior official: He was given the opportunity to resign instead of being expelled. As a loyal follower of Xi, he is apparently treated a little more gently even after he has fallen from grace.
Qin had been promoted to minister in record time and was obviously part of Xi’s inner circle. Qin Gang met with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock twice, once in Beijing and once in Berlin. At the time, the frosty tone between the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Minister was particularly striking. Qin was well known in the West, as he had previously been spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to the USA.
While Qin was given the opportunity to resign, the general and ex-defense minister Li Shangfu was ousted from the Central Committee. Li’s promotion to minister in 2023 is said to have been thanks to his predecessor Wei Fenghe. Wei was also recently charged with corruption.
Unlike Qin, whose transgressions are still unknown today, there was probably nothing left to gloss over. Especially as it is Xi’s intention to keep the military clean. Moreover, Li was probably not part of his inner circle. He was only defense minister for half a year.
On Thursday, observers at home and abroad tried to deduce something about the CCP’s future priorities from the vague communiqué. Some point out that development still comes first in the formula of “ensuring development and security.” Others interpret the frequent emphasis on national security as focusing on more control.
The question of whether power politics or economic growth comes first in China is also of great importance to the German economy. They want open markets, deregulation and an economic policy with as little national focus as possible, in which foreign players can assume a crucial role.
However, a policy of military strengthening is aimed more at becoming autonomous, i.e., able to do everything itself and as independent as possible from foreign countries. In the field of technology, for example, the Made in China 2025 program had this effect. It was a program to rapidly develop key industries such as robotics and electric cars. China almost no longer needs foreign countries here.
The documents surrounding a Third Plenum generally indicate both, depending on where one’s own preferences lie: a liberal economic program or even tighter rein over all areas. The overall picture that emerges from Thursday’s announcement is more of a continuation of existing policy:
The overall picture that emerges: The power-political instrumentalization of the economy (instead of prosperity as an end in itself) continues, but there is great interest in not letting the economy crash completely.
According to a survey, the sentiment of German companies in the Asia-Pacific region has improved significantly. The companies surveyed are particularly optimistic about economic development and their business prospects in the area. The exception, however, is Greater China. Optimism there remains subdued, according to a special analysis of the AHK World Business Outlook for the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad (AHK) on behalf of the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK). It is available exclusively to Table.Briefings. Around 660 German member companies in the Asia-Pacific region were interviewed for the survey.
“This positive development strengthens our local companies and also gives the German economy a boost. The region remains one of the most important destinations for business diversification,” said Volker Treier, DIHK Head of Foreign Trade, referring to the analysis. The survey shows that German companies’ investment intentions have increased or remained the same in many places in the Asia-Pacific region. The only noticeable reluctance to invest was in Hong Kong, Singapore and New Zealand.
The situation is different in Japan: “More and more German companies are setting up or expanding important units there, as Japan plays a central role in their China+1 strategy,” says Treier. Companies in India, the Philippines and Vietnam are particularly optimistic about economic development.
While employment plans in Hong Kong and China are negative, most other AHK locations in Asia-Pacific are expecting new jobs. The Philippines, Japan, and Malaysia, in particular, are expected to see an increase in employment.
The survey shows that diversification remains a challenge: The focus in Hong Kong and Malaysia is on expanding the supplier network, while companies in Singapore, Vietnam and Taiwan are tapping into new sales markets. Around four out of five companies (84 percent) face obstacles in their diversification efforts. The respondents cite problems in the search for suitable new suppliers or business partners as examples of this. Regulatory requirements and high costs also represented hurdles. ari
Nothing is hanging here, but that’s what they’re called anyway: the Hanging Gardens at the Hangzhou International Expo Center. The top floor of the exhibition building is home to a green area of around 65,000 square meters, including watercourses and trees. Perfect for a short break after an hour-long visit to the trade fair. The hanging gardens are based on one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World: the Hanging Gardens of Semiramis. The elaborate garden complex is said to have been located in Babylon in Mesopotamia, in present-day Iraq.
It was postponed for months, and now the Third Plenum of the Central Committee has ended. The counting has already begun: How often have the words “reform,” “development” or national security been mentioned? On Thursday, observers at home and abroad tried to deduce anything about the CCP’s future priorities from the meager communiqué. Does the frequent emphasis on national security indicate more control? The German economy will greatly depend on whether power politics or economic growth is the future focus. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has analyzed the outcome of the important planning conference and at least recognizes the Chinese leadership’s interest in not letting the economy crash completely. Read his analysis to find out what else he found out.
“I don’t see the point. Africans will be your friends only when you give them money.” Or: “Has the government forgotten how many poor people China has?” This is how the Chinese public comments on China’s development aid on social media. Quite a contrast to the Western perception, which accuses China of luring poorer countries into a debt trap. Yes – which one is it? One thing is clear: China gives a lot – almost 80 billion euros annually. One of our authors from China looks at the social debate and the political goals that the aid is pursuing.
German research faces a dilemma: German universities seek exchange with international partners and students. However, no one wants to cooperate with organizations that support military developments in China. But how can scientists weigh up the risks and opportunities of scientific cooperation? It’s difficult – but important. Universities and researchers “have to be very careful” in all research fields that expand China’s military or surveillance potential, says Yannick Ringot from the HNC³ network in an interview with Table.Briefings. This initiative, to which the University of Hamburg belongs, pools China expertise in the Hanseatic city. Marcel Grzanna’s analysis shows what stricter screening procedures look like at various universities.
China’s position in the Ukraine war has triggered a rethink in German academia. Ever since numerous pieces of evidence have emerged that Beijing is providing military support to its close friend and strategic partner Vladimir Putin, a number of collaborations between German universities and research institutes and Chinese institutions have been cast in a different light.
“The war in Ukraine has changed perceptions. We cannot deny that there is a rivalry alongside the partnership with China,” says Yannick Ringot, coordinator of the Hamburg Network on Compliance in Cooperation with China HNC³ at the University of Hamburg.
There is still a considerable need for knowledge and instructions in areas where an extensive exchange with Chinese partners was largely approved without hesitation just a few years ago. Scientists are faced with the dilemma of having to weigh up the risks and opportunities of cooperation. Ringot told Table Briefings that “researchers and universities have to be very careful” in all research fields that expand China’s military or surveillance potential.
The HNC³ network is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and pools the China expertise of nine academic institutions in Hamburg. The central player in the network is the University of Hamburg. Earlier than others, it started to look closer at who it works with. The usual review of international cooperation requests was significantly intensified at the end of 2020. Since then, requests have been undergoing an in-depth review process.
The implementation of this detailed evaluation resulted from the “dynamic global political situation,” from which a systemic rivalry between democracies and autocracies has increasingly crystallized. “Our universities have a social responsibility. They cannot be allowed to help arm the Chinese military,” says Ringot. The procedure has already been adjusted in detail several times to increasingly take account of the risk potential. The frequent readjustments are symbolic of the deficits that existed in the examinations at German universities just a few years ago.
Also because it is not always easy to say “no.” China offers generous research project funding, well-trained guest scientists and partner institutions with state-of-the-art equipment. For many years, the opportunities for cooperation outweighed the potential threats to Germany’s sovereignty, national security and freedom of research. But that has changed since.
“We are seeing a much greater awareness and concern, particularly in export control,” says Alicia Hennig, a business ethicist specializing in China from the International University Institute (IHI) Zittau at TU Dresden. This became clear at the German Federal Working Group on Export Controls and Science, where around 130 representatives from universities and research institutions debated how to deal with the risks and consequences of cooperation in mid-June. Hennig herself worked as a lecturer at a Chinese university for five years before she was no longer willing to abide by ideological boundaries in teaching out of consideration for her hosts, and left the country.
Within the working group, however, Hennig recognized “a lot of frustration that the German government does not play a central role in risk assessment for universities.” In its position paper on research safety in March 2024, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) announced plans to “actively support the review and (continued) development of corresponding guidelines and instruments by the scientific community” as part of its responsibilities. Despite this, universities are still forced to make the final decision.
The problem here is that many academics have little or no China expertise. They evaluate risks based on their personal values and experiences. They can neither classify the individual backgrounds of Chinese scientists nor identify the ties between partner institutions and the state arms industry or surveillance programs.
The University of Hamburg wants to close these gaps. Its in-depth examination procedure is not country-specific. Requests from other countries are also closely scrutinized, especially if they have autocratic structures. Nevertheless, requests for cooperation with Chinese partners initiate most of the procedures.
The vast majority of the approximately 20 procedures examined to date involve STEM subjects. Most of them have been given the green light. In one case, however, an ongoing collaboration was terminated. The third-party-funded project in question focussed on machine learning and AI. When the application for the third phase began, several open and critical questions emerged, which, after extensive debate and consideration, spoke against a continuation.
The procedure takes time: After a classification based on the country list of the Academic Freedom Index (AFI), a subject-related classification by research areas with increased risk or export control relevance is performed, if necessary. If the criteria of the German Federal Office for Export Control also indicate a high risk, the review goes into detail. The university then obtains information from project managers and the assessments of a handful of departments, coordinates them with each other, holds consultations and finally drafts a proposal for the presidential board. This is where the final decision is made whether or not a cooperation will be established.
The TU Munich has also become cautious. “In recent years, we have noticed a high level of sensitivity as well as an increased need for consultation among our researchers with regard to international collaborations,” the university explains. China is a particular focus here. As part of its Global Engagement Principles developed in 2022, TU Darmstadt has set up a “China Roundtable,” which provides researchers with specific information and recommendations. On the one hand, this is intended to contribute to further awareness raising. On the other hand, the aim is to create opportunities for the best possible organization of scientific cooperation. In general, the guiding questions of the German Rectors’ Conference on cooperation with Chinese partners are used as a basis.
At the Free University of Berlin, an awareness-raising process is also being driven forward, primarily by the international and legal departments. An in-depth review process has been in a test phase since the beginning of the year. So far, applications for third-party funding have only received a recommendation or, “in the case of certain countries such as China,” the university administration has been able to request a review on its part. In addition, the Free University has set up a China advisory board to advise university management on cooperation with China.
Applications for third-party funding with China are reviewed by the international department – particularly by the country officers – after consultation with the research department. Here, too, the key questions are: Is there a risk of encroachment on academic freedom or violations of export control law?
Currently, the Free University’s research database lists six ongoing collaborations with China, all of which are fully funded by the European Union (Horizon), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the German Research Foundation (DFG) or other international organizations. In addition, there are two long-term projects with partial Chinese funding – the Center for German Studies, supported by Peking University, the Free University, and Humboldt University, which is funded by the DAAD and the three partners. China also funds the University’s Confucius Institute, “which operates separately from university teaching and primarily offers language courses and cultural events,” a statement from the university said.
These examples show that parts of the scientific community in Germany are no longer willing to accept Chinese cooperation inquiries at any price. Have the risks been averted? Not by a long shot, says business ethicist Hennig. “There has been significant progress in some areas of German academia. In other areas, it is still very difficult or there is a lack of will to counter the risks with suitable mechanisms.”
In its first communiqué after the end of the Third Plenum, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China set out a timetable for the next interim economic targets. In addition, the public learns for the first time about the whereabouts of the deposed ministers, Qin Gang and Li Shangfu. The announcement also provides an initial indication of Xi Jinping’s priorities for the coming years.
Incidentally, these dates indicate that Xi will probably not step down after his current third term of office. In 2029, he will already be in his fourth, and he is explicitly named as the leader under whose guidance the goals are to be achieved. Longer documents are expected on Friday, which will provide details, in particular, what goals are targeted.
The Central Committee is the most powerful body of the Communist Party and the sole ruling body in China. It only convenes seven times in a five-year period and sometimes makes far-reaching decisions. The Third Plenum of the Central Committee traditionally focuses on economic planning. The plenary session ended on Thursday. 264 members participated.
According to the document, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang has resigned from the Central Committee. This suggests a friendly treatment of the ousted senior official: He was given the opportunity to resign instead of being expelled. As a loyal follower of Xi, he is apparently treated a little more gently even after he has fallen from grace.
Qin had been promoted to minister in record time and was obviously part of Xi’s inner circle. Qin Gang met with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock twice, once in Beijing and once in Berlin. At the time, the frosty tone between the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Minister was particularly striking. Qin was well known in the West, as he had previously been spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to the USA.
While Qin was given the opportunity to resign, the general and ex-defense minister Li Shangfu was ousted from the Central Committee. Li’s promotion to minister in 2023 is said to have been thanks to his predecessor Wei Fenghe. Wei was also recently charged with corruption.
Unlike Qin, whose transgressions are still unknown today, there was probably nothing left to gloss over. Especially as it is Xi’s intention to keep the military clean. Moreover, Li was probably not part of his inner circle. He was only defense minister for half a year.
On Thursday, observers at home and abroad tried to deduce something about the CCP’s future priorities from the vague communiqué. Some point out that development still comes first in the formula of “ensuring development and security.” Others interpret the frequent emphasis on national security as focusing on more control.
The question of whether power politics or economic growth comes first in China is also of great importance to the German economy. They want open markets, deregulation and an economic policy with as little national focus as possible, in which foreign players can assume a crucial role.
However, a policy of military strengthening is aimed more at becoming autonomous, i.e., able to do everything itself and as independent as possible from foreign countries. In the field of technology, for example, the Made in China 2025 program had this effect. It was a program to rapidly develop key industries such as robotics and electric cars. China almost no longer needs foreign countries here.
The documents surrounding a Third Plenum generally indicate both, depending on where one’s own preferences lie: a liberal economic program or even tighter rein over all areas. The overall picture that emerges from Thursday’s announcement is more of a continuation of existing policy:
The overall picture that emerges: The power-political instrumentalization of the economy (instead of prosperity as an end in itself) continues, but there is great interest in not letting the economy crash completely.
According to a survey, the sentiment of German companies in the Asia-Pacific region has improved significantly. The companies surveyed are particularly optimistic about economic development and their business prospects in the area. The exception, however, is Greater China. Optimism there remains subdued, according to a special analysis of the AHK World Business Outlook for the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad (AHK) on behalf of the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK). It is available exclusively to Table.Briefings. Around 660 German member companies in the Asia-Pacific region were interviewed for the survey.
“This positive development strengthens our local companies and also gives the German economy a boost. The region remains one of the most important destinations for business diversification,” said Volker Treier, DIHK Head of Foreign Trade, referring to the analysis. The survey shows that German companies’ investment intentions have increased or remained the same in many places in the Asia-Pacific region. The only noticeable reluctance to invest was in Hong Kong, Singapore and New Zealand.
The situation is different in Japan: “More and more German companies are setting up or expanding important units there, as Japan plays a central role in their China+1 strategy,” says Treier. Companies in India, the Philippines and Vietnam are particularly optimistic about economic development.
While employment plans in Hong Kong and China are negative, most other AHK locations in Asia-Pacific are expecting new jobs. The Philippines, Japan, and Malaysia, in particular, are expected to see an increase in employment.
The survey shows that diversification remains a challenge: The focus in Hong Kong and Malaysia is on expanding the supplier network, while companies in Singapore, Vietnam and Taiwan are tapping into new sales markets. Around four out of five companies (84 percent) face obstacles in their diversification efforts. The respondents cite problems in the search for suitable new suppliers or business partners as examples of this. Regulatory requirements and high costs also represented hurdles. ari
Nothing is hanging here, but that’s what they’re called anyway: the Hanging Gardens at the Hangzhou International Expo Center. The top floor of the exhibition building is home to a green area of around 65,000 square meters, including watercourses and trees. Perfect for a short break after an hour-long visit to the trade fair. The hanging gardens are based on one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World: the Hanging Gardens of Semiramis. The elaborate garden complex is said to have been located in Babylon in Mesopotamia, in present-day Iraq.
