European corridors for the transmission of green electricity are important for the transformation of the industry. However, cost sharing has so far been a contentious issue if the line runs through several member states that do not all benefit equally from green energy. According to the amended TEN-E Regulation, the EU Commission must present guidelines on cost sharing for the grid connection of offshore wind farms by June 24.
However, the member states want to ask the Commission at the end of May to extend the cost-sharing requirements to onshore pipelines. This is stated in the second draft of the energy ministers’ conclusions from the end of April, which is available to Table.Briefings.
In the cost-sharing and the new Europe-wide cost-benefit analyses for grid expansion projects, the member states want not only economic factors to be taken into account, but also, for example, the redispatch of power plants to stabilize the grid and the adequacy of electricity generation resources. This should make individual projects more urgent.
On the initiative of the Belgian Council Presidency, the energy ministers want to call on the Commission to take action in a total of four areas:
When it comes to planning electricity grids, the nation-states are vowing to work more closely together in the future. In doing so, however, they are also rejecting centralist efforts. Joint grid planning is already mandatory and the ENTSO-E association regularly draws up a ten-year grid development plan (TYNDP) for the EU. However, only the network development plans of the national transmission system operators (TSOs) and regulatory authorities are truly binding.
Recently, there have therefore been calls for an EU institution to determine which important cross-border lines should be built. In the fall, the think tank Bruegel proposed an independent European grid operator, while Enrico Letta proposed a clean energy agency in his latest internal market report for the Council.
In contrast, the experts from the member states only emphasize “the value of combining a European approach with bottom-up coordination of national plans at regional level” in the draft Council conclusions. To date, the states have been working together in four High-Level Groups.
The North Sea Energy Cooperation (NSEC), which has had to manage without the UK since 2020, is currently repeatedly cited as a role model. The three other groups are concerned with improving the connection of the Baltic Sea states (BEMIP), the Iberian Peninsula (SWE) and the south-eastern European states (CESEC). The Pentalateral Forum, which is used intensively by Germany, does not currently have the status of a High Level Group; however, it is listed alongside the four groups in the second draft of the Council conclusions.
The Commission is to examine additional acceleration options that go beyond the simplifications of RED III. More specific is the mandate to examine the joint procurement of grid resources so that manufacturers can ramp up their capacities. So far, the Commission has only implemented something like this for gas and planned it for raw materials.
The Commission is also to “initiate a review of the framework for network charges”. Operators are repeatedly calling on regulators to approve higher returns on equity. According to Eurelectric, forward-looking investments, which are to be driven forward with the latest electricity market amendment, are not yet being implemented in all member states. Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič recently spoke out in favor of reimbursing costs for grid expansion more quickly.
The draft also refers to “the growing challenge of grid congestion at the distribution grid level“. The Commission is to take measures so that the member states can “quickly address” this problem.
If Eurelectric has its way, operators of distribution grids and offshore wind farms will in the future even help to build short connections and grid connections in the transmission grid in individual cases. They could then step in if the TSOs have no resources for years and then transfer ownership of the grid resources to them, says Secretary General Kristian Ruby.
With regard to safety aspects, the member states are calling on the Commission to revise the legislative framework, taking into account very long timeframes – including “climate risks and various unlikely but serious scenarios“, as the new version states.
The Commission is to simplify access to the Connecting Europe Facility for financing purposes. The other member states have weakened Belgium’s proposal for a new Offshore Investment Facility in that they no longer want to be prescribed a proportional budget for each sea basin.
The visit of the Chinese President to Hungary was marked by assurances of mutual friendship: “The relations between China and Hungary are now better than ever in history,” said Xi Jinping on Thursday. Earlier, he had declared during a meeting with Hungarian President Tamas Sulyok that his country was ready to elevate bilateral relations with Hungary to a high level. Looking forward to Hungary taking over the EU Council Presidency in the second half of the year, he also expressed hope that this would be an opportunity to improve relations between the European Union and China.
Hungary is the last stop on Xi Jinping’s European tour – and the most important one. After visits to France and Serbia, China’s President finally met his close ally: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Beijing’s calculation is simple and fully effective: The People’s Republic invests billions in Hungary and in return gains maximum political influence within the European Union. The workings of this are evident in the decisions made.
Potential decisions/agreements – and their implications:
This fits the trend. Chinese direct investments in the EV sector have recently soared – with a specific focus on Hungary. In 2022, CATL invested 6.7 billion euros in building a Gigafactory in Debrecen. This was followed by Chinese EV manufacturer BYD, which recently announced the construction of its first European production facility – in Szeged, Hungary. The costs amount to approximately five billion euros, creating about 8,000 to 9,000 new jobs. Now, the Great Wall Motor factory in Pécs is on the list.
Behind these billion-euro investments lies another strategic move: With such large production sites within the EU, Beijing has a solid countermeasure should the EU Commission decide in mid-July to impose anti-subsidy duties on EVs imported from China.
China’s ambitions extend far beyond a simple railway line between the capitals of Serbia and Hungary. In February, Greece announced its intention to join the project. The railway line is set to become the main transport route for Chinese and Asian goods arriving in Europe by sea. The pieces fit together strategically: The Port of Piraeus is already predominantly under Chinese control.
Xi Jinping achieves several goals with these projects: Firstly, he gives new momentum to his stalled “Belt and Road” initiative. Secondly, he pursues strategic objectives that go beyond individual projects. And lastly, Xi supports his partner Viktor Orbán, who urgently needs economic successes, especially at times when the EU is scrutinizing its payments to Hungary – keyword rule of law. Chinese investments worth billions are highly welcome.
Another point that causes deep resentment in Europe is the security cooperation between Hungary and China: Concerns range from secret Chinese police stations to potential Chinese access to EU databases.
Hungary was the first EU state to join Xi’s flagship project in 2015. After Italy withdrew last year, it is now again the only EU country participating in the BRI. Thus, Orbán was also the only EU head of state to attend the third BRI summit in Beijing last October, where he encouraged more Chinese companies to invest in Hungary. Incidentally, to attend the event, Orbán missed an extraordinary video conference of EU heads of state, which was about the Hamas attacks against Israel.
The Budapest newspaper “Nepszava” also views this development critically. In a commentary on Tuesday, it stated: “Hungary’s government is entering into (infrastructure) investments financed with Chinese loans that may never pay off, solely to spite Brussels.”
And here lies the major problem for Europe. Xi’s visit is fundamentally anti-European. Hungary plays a crucial role in this. Under Orbán, the country has become a Chinese asset within the EU, which Beijing now needs more than ever.
The general mood in Europe towards the People’s Republic has considerably soured. Risk reduction is the order of the day – as evidenced by the clear words from EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Xi Jinping earlier this week. Von der Leyen announced in Paris that Europe would not hesitate to “make tough decisions to protect its economy and security”.
In this context, Orbán is expected to help dilute overly critical EU policies – or completely block them if necessary. “The Hungarian government is China’s last true friend in the entire EU,” judges Tamas Matura, a China expert and professor at Corvinus University in Budapest. “For the Chinese, it is now very important to establish themselves in a country within the EU borders that is friendly towards the Chinese political system.”
That this is successfully happening is shown by the past: Hungary has vetoed several proposals at the EU level that would have condemned China for human rights violations or in relation to Hong Kong or Taiwan. According to research by the Budapest online portal valaszonline.hu, about 60 percent of the vetoes against Russia or China in the past six years came from Hungary. Understandably, Xi is looking forward to Hungary’s EU presidency.
According to the Dutch press, negotiations on a coalition government in the Netherlands should be concluded by next Wednesday. More precisely, the negotiators are to pave the way for the formation of an extra-parliamentary cabinet. Sources in Brussels expect this to have little impact on the reappointment of Dutch Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra.
Although he has been promised an office with a view of the Schuman traffic circle, Wopke Hoekstra will probably not try to keep the climate portfolio. “He is first and foremost a man from the world of finance and economics“, says one of our sources. “He never misses the opportunity to insert the word ‘competitiveness’ when he can”, adds another Brussels source maliciously.
Hoekstra is therefore more likely to be attracted by an economic portfolio than a climate portfolio, even if the two issues are now inextricably linked. In fact, the issue of financing the green transition is now at the top of the EU’s political agenda. A change of portfolio is all the more likely as the charismatic Spanish Environment Minister Teresa Ribera could move into the Berlaymont. She was recently named the Spanish Socialists’ lead candidate.
In Brussels, Ribera is seen as a political heavyweight and her words are likely to have a major impact on inter-institutional negotiations at European and international levels. Ribera is not only regarded as one of the best experts in international climate negotiations, but also as open, communicative and tough in negotiations. When Spain held the EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2023, she managed to reach a trilogue compromise on the highly controversial Nature Restoration Act.
For the Brussels climate bubble, Ribera’s arrival would be very welcome as her political clout could fill the void left by the departure of Frans Timmermans, the Dutch predecessor of Wopke Hoekstra. “Since the departure of Timmermans, there are actually no more political heavyweights in the Commission“, said one of our sources. Industry Commissioner Thierry Breton is primarily seen as Emmanuel Macron’s man. In France, Clément Beaune is also still in the running for Commissioner.
A political heavyweight is also needed, the Brussels sources continued, considering the current political situation: Several member states could send commissioners from the far-right camp after the European elections in June. “Just think of Italy”, added another source.
The CDU has often been at odds with Ursula von der Leyen. However, during her appearance at the CDU federal party conference on Wednesday, the EU Commission President and EPP lead candidate for the European elections finally got the delegates behind her. And she did so with harsh criticism of the AfD: “The AfD is making propaganda for Putin and spying for China ahead of the European elections”, she said, referring to the accusations against leading politicians in the party and their staff. AfD representatives ranted about the people and the fatherland, and then they “betrayed this fatherland to the autocrats. They should be ashamed of themselves!”
Von der Leyen received a lot of applause from the delegates, and party leader Friedrich Merz thanked her “for saying that so clearly”. In view of the strengthening of radical parties in Europe, the Union must preserve the legacy of European politics in the elections from June 6 to 9, he warned. Merz promised von der Leyen the full support of the CDU and CSU in the remaining weeks of the election campaign.
But where does von der Leyen herself draw the red line to the right? She once again named three conditions for cooperation after the election: A clear commitment to the rule of law, to support Ukraine and “to our Europe”. On the other hand, “Kremlin servants and those who despise democracy” are no good.
From von der Leyen’s perspective, some parties from the right-wing group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) meet these criteria, such as the Czech ODS or Giorgia Melonis Fratelli. Others, however, do not, including the Polish PiS. Von der Leyen cannot afford a blanket rejection of right-wing conservative forces if she wants to have a viable majority in the new European Parliament. However, this would give her a target in the election campaign for the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Left.
Merz, on the other hand, backed von der Leyen’s triad of criteria, which actually goes back to EPP leader Manfred Weber. For many in the CDU/CSU, von der Leyen is too headstrong and her policies too green. But at least the party leaders have more in common with the candidate than a shared interest in a good election result. They are “proud” to have only the second German Commission President after Walter Hallstein, said Merz. And CSU leader Markus Söder reported after his meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang: “The world respects Ursula von der Leyen.” Till Hoppe
European corridors for the transmission of green electricity are important for the transformation of the industry. However, cost sharing has so far been a contentious issue if the line runs through several member states that do not all benefit equally from green energy. According to the amended TEN-E Regulation, the EU Commission must present guidelines on cost sharing for the grid connection of offshore wind farms by June 24.
However, the member states want to ask the Commission at the end of May to extend the cost-sharing requirements to onshore pipelines. This is stated in the second draft of the energy ministers’ conclusions from the end of April, which is available to Table.Briefings.
In the cost-sharing and the new Europe-wide cost-benefit analyses for grid expansion projects, the member states want not only economic factors to be taken into account, but also, for example, the redispatch of power plants to stabilize the grid and the adequacy of electricity generation resources. This should make individual projects more urgent.
On the initiative of the Belgian Council Presidency, the energy ministers want to call on the Commission to take action in a total of four areas:
When it comes to planning electricity grids, the nation-states are vowing to work more closely together in the future. In doing so, however, they are also rejecting centralist efforts. Joint grid planning is already mandatory and the ENTSO-E association regularly draws up a ten-year grid development plan (TYNDP) for the EU. However, only the network development plans of the national transmission system operators (TSOs) and regulatory authorities are truly binding.
Recently, there have therefore been calls for an EU institution to determine which important cross-border lines should be built. In the fall, the think tank Bruegel proposed an independent European grid operator, while Enrico Letta proposed a clean energy agency in his latest internal market report for the Council.
In contrast, the experts from the member states only emphasize “the value of combining a European approach with bottom-up coordination of national plans at regional level” in the draft Council conclusions. To date, the states have been working together in four High-Level Groups.
The North Sea Energy Cooperation (NSEC), which has had to manage without the UK since 2020, is currently repeatedly cited as a role model. The three other groups are concerned with improving the connection of the Baltic Sea states (BEMIP), the Iberian Peninsula (SWE) and the south-eastern European states (CESEC). The Pentalateral Forum, which is used intensively by Germany, does not currently have the status of a High Level Group; however, it is listed alongside the four groups in the second draft of the Council conclusions.
The Commission is to examine additional acceleration options that go beyond the simplifications of RED III. More specific is the mandate to examine the joint procurement of grid resources so that manufacturers can ramp up their capacities. So far, the Commission has only implemented something like this for gas and planned it for raw materials.
The Commission is also to “initiate a review of the framework for network charges”. Operators are repeatedly calling on regulators to approve higher returns on equity. According to Eurelectric, forward-looking investments, which are to be driven forward with the latest electricity market amendment, are not yet being implemented in all member states. Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič recently spoke out in favor of reimbursing costs for grid expansion more quickly.
The draft also refers to “the growing challenge of grid congestion at the distribution grid level“. The Commission is to take measures so that the member states can “quickly address” this problem.
If Eurelectric has its way, operators of distribution grids and offshore wind farms will in the future even help to build short connections and grid connections in the transmission grid in individual cases. They could then step in if the TSOs have no resources for years and then transfer ownership of the grid resources to them, says Secretary General Kristian Ruby.
With regard to safety aspects, the member states are calling on the Commission to revise the legislative framework, taking into account very long timeframes – including “climate risks and various unlikely but serious scenarios“, as the new version states.
The Commission is to simplify access to the Connecting Europe Facility for financing purposes. The other member states have weakened Belgium’s proposal for a new Offshore Investment Facility in that they no longer want to be prescribed a proportional budget for each sea basin.
The visit of the Chinese President to Hungary was marked by assurances of mutual friendship: “The relations between China and Hungary are now better than ever in history,” said Xi Jinping on Thursday. Earlier, he had declared during a meeting with Hungarian President Tamas Sulyok that his country was ready to elevate bilateral relations with Hungary to a high level. Looking forward to Hungary taking over the EU Council Presidency in the second half of the year, he also expressed hope that this would be an opportunity to improve relations between the European Union and China.
Hungary is the last stop on Xi Jinping’s European tour – and the most important one. After visits to France and Serbia, China’s President finally met his close ally: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Beijing’s calculation is simple and fully effective: The People’s Republic invests billions in Hungary and in return gains maximum political influence within the European Union. The workings of this are evident in the decisions made.
Potential decisions/agreements – and their implications:
This fits the trend. Chinese direct investments in the EV sector have recently soared – with a specific focus on Hungary. In 2022, CATL invested 6.7 billion euros in building a Gigafactory in Debrecen. This was followed by Chinese EV manufacturer BYD, which recently announced the construction of its first European production facility – in Szeged, Hungary. The costs amount to approximately five billion euros, creating about 8,000 to 9,000 new jobs. Now, the Great Wall Motor factory in Pécs is on the list.
Behind these billion-euro investments lies another strategic move: With such large production sites within the EU, Beijing has a solid countermeasure should the EU Commission decide in mid-July to impose anti-subsidy duties on EVs imported from China.
China’s ambitions extend far beyond a simple railway line between the capitals of Serbia and Hungary. In February, Greece announced its intention to join the project. The railway line is set to become the main transport route for Chinese and Asian goods arriving in Europe by sea. The pieces fit together strategically: The Port of Piraeus is already predominantly under Chinese control.
Xi Jinping achieves several goals with these projects: Firstly, he gives new momentum to his stalled “Belt and Road” initiative. Secondly, he pursues strategic objectives that go beyond individual projects. And lastly, Xi supports his partner Viktor Orbán, who urgently needs economic successes, especially at times when the EU is scrutinizing its payments to Hungary – keyword rule of law. Chinese investments worth billions are highly welcome.
Another point that causes deep resentment in Europe is the security cooperation between Hungary and China: Concerns range from secret Chinese police stations to potential Chinese access to EU databases.
Hungary was the first EU state to join Xi’s flagship project in 2015. After Italy withdrew last year, it is now again the only EU country participating in the BRI. Thus, Orbán was also the only EU head of state to attend the third BRI summit in Beijing last October, where he encouraged more Chinese companies to invest in Hungary. Incidentally, to attend the event, Orbán missed an extraordinary video conference of EU heads of state, which was about the Hamas attacks against Israel.
The Budapest newspaper “Nepszava” also views this development critically. In a commentary on Tuesday, it stated: “Hungary’s government is entering into (infrastructure) investments financed with Chinese loans that may never pay off, solely to spite Brussels.”
And here lies the major problem for Europe. Xi’s visit is fundamentally anti-European. Hungary plays a crucial role in this. Under Orbán, the country has become a Chinese asset within the EU, which Beijing now needs more than ever.
The general mood in Europe towards the People’s Republic has considerably soured. Risk reduction is the order of the day – as evidenced by the clear words from EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Xi Jinping earlier this week. Von der Leyen announced in Paris that Europe would not hesitate to “make tough decisions to protect its economy and security”.
In this context, Orbán is expected to help dilute overly critical EU policies – or completely block them if necessary. “The Hungarian government is China’s last true friend in the entire EU,” judges Tamas Matura, a China expert and professor at Corvinus University in Budapest. “For the Chinese, it is now very important to establish themselves in a country within the EU borders that is friendly towards the Chinese political system.”
That this is successfully happening is shown by the past: Hungary has vetoed several proposals at the EU level that would have condemned China for human rights violations or in relation to Hong Kong or Taiwan. According to research by the Budapest online portal valaszonline.hu, about 60 percent of the vetoes against Russia or China in the past six years came from Hungary. Understandably, Xi is looking forward to Hungary’s EU presidency.
According to the Dutch press, negotiations on a coalition government in the Netherlands should be concluded by next Wednesday. More precisely, the negotiators are to pave the way for the formation of an extra-parliamentary cabinet. Sources in Brussels expect this to have little impact on the reappointment of Dutch Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra.
Although he has been promised an office with a view of the Schuman traffic circle, Wopke Hoekstra will probably not try to keep the climate portfolio. “He is first and foremost a man from the world of finance and economics“, says one of our sources. “He never misses the opportunity to insert the word ‘competitiveness’ when he can”, adds another Brussels source maliciously.
Hoekstra is therefore more likely to be attracted by an economic portfolio than a climate portfolio, even if the two issues are now inextricably linked. In fact, the issue of financing the green transition is now at the top of the EU’s political agenda. A change of portfolio is all the more likely as the charismatic Spanish Environment Minister Teresa Ribera could move into the Berlaymont. She was recently named the Spanish Socialists’ lead candidate.
In Brussels, Ribera is seen as a political heavyweight and her words are likely to have a major impact on inter-institutional negotiations at European and international levels. Ribera is not only regarded as one of the best experts in international climate negotiations, but also as open, communicative and tough in negotiations. When Spain held the EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2023, she managed to reach a trilogue compromise on the highly controversial Nature Restoration Act.
For the Brussels climate bubble, Ribera’s arrival would be very welcome as her political clout could fill the void left by the departure of Frans Timmermans, the Dutch predecessor of Wopke Hoekstra. “Since the departure of Timmermans, there are actually no more political heavyweights in the Commission“, said one of our sources. Industry Commissioner Thierry Breton is primarily seen as Emmanuel Macron’s man. In France, Clément Beaune is also still in the running for Commissioner.
A political heavyweight is also needed, the Brussels sources continued, considering the current political situation: Several member states could send commissioners from the far-right camp after the European elections in June. “Just think of Italy”, added another source.
The CDU has often been at odds with Ursula von der Leyen. However, during her appearance at the CDU federal party conference on Wednesday, the EU Commission President and EPP lead candidate for the European elections finally got the delegates behind her. And she did so with harsh criticism of the AfD: “The AfD is making propaganda for Putin and spying for China ahead of the European elections”, she said, referring to the accusations against leading politicians in the party and their staff. AfD representatives ranted about the people and the fatherland, and then they “betrayed this fatherland to the autocrats. They should be ashamed of themselves!”
Von der Leyen received a lot of applause from the delegates, and party leader Friedrich Merz thanked her “for saying that so clearly”. In view of the strengthening of radical parties in Europe, the Union must preserve the legacy of European politics in the elections from June 6 to 9, he warned. Merz promised von der Leyen the full support of the CDU and CSU in the remaining weeks of the election campaign.
But where does von der Leyen herself draw the red line to the right? She once again named three conditions for cooperation after the election: A clear commitment to the rule of law, to support Ukraine and “to our Europe”. On the other hand, “Kremlin servants and those who despise democracy” are no good.
From von der Leyen’s perspective, some parties from the right-wing group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) meet these criteria, such as the Czech ODS or Giorgia Melonis Fratelli. Others, however, do not, including the Polish PiS. Von der Leyen cannot afford a blanket rejection of right-wing conservative forces if she wants to have a viable majority in the new European Parliament. However, this would give her a target in the election campaign for the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Left.
Merz, on the other hand, backed von der Leyen’s triad of criteria, which actually goes back to EPP leader Manfred Weber. For many in the CDU/CSU, von der Leyen is too headstrong and her policies too green. But at least the party leaders have more in common with the candidate than a shared interest in a good election result. They are “proud” to have only the second German Commission President after Walter Hallstein, said Merz. And CSU leader Markus Söder reported after his meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang: “The world respects Ursula von der Leyen.” Till Hoppe
