The EU is increasing the pressure on the Russian financial system: Tonight, the member states initiated the exclusion of seven banks from the Swift payment information system, including the second-largest bank VTB. Spared for the time being are Sberbank, the largest institution, and Gazprombank, through which a large proportion of energy deliveries are made.
The invasion of Ukraine is obviously not going as Putin had imagined. But Ukraine is unlikely to win the war. Where do things go from here? Falk Steiner plays out six scenarios for the country’s future. Some are much more likely than others, but what they all have in common is that they are also likely to lead to unstable conditions in the region in the long term.
Even Ukraine’s possible accession to the EU is uncertain. The European Parliament wants to grant Kiev candidate status, and several eastern member states also favor accession. But Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has now backtracked on her proposal. For the Commission and the Council, the desire for accession is a problem, analyzes Eric Bonse. This has to do with the domestic political situation in Ukraine, but also with older EU accession candidates.
Against the backdrop of the war, the EU and Germany are in a hurry to make themselves independent of gas from Russia and to push ahead with the energy transition. But this could lead to new dependencies, as Nico Beckert points out using solar energy as an example: The entire solar supply chain is dominated by China. Europe now wants to become more independent in this sector, as do the US and India. “It certainly won’t be easy,” is one expert’s assessment.
The following scenarios have one thing in common: They are unlikely to lead to permanently stable and politically and economically reliable framework conditions – neither in Ukraine nor in the Russian Federation or Belarus. They are all speculative assumptions.
With the symbolic fall of Kiev, Ukraine becomes a headless state. The current leadership, if still alive, goes into exile. Moscow installs a government in Kiev that is staffed with compliant politicians, for example, from the circle of former President Viktor Yanukovych, who was deposed in the course of the Maidan protests and, in his view, never resigned legitimately. Western services mention Yevgeny Muraev more frequently. In reality, the Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who counts Vladimir Putin among his friends, is likely to become a powerful man, perhaps the most powerful.
In this scenario, Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts will directly fall to the Russian Federation, possibly also all oblasts east and south of the Dnieper. It is even conceivable that Kiev could become a divided city to the west (rump state of Ukraine) and east of the Dnieper (Russia). As a rump state bordering four EU states, the rest of Ukraine is hardly economically viable without any significant industry of its own. Ukrainian culture and language would again take a back seat to Russian in the eastern part, as in Soviet times.
Due to expected flight movements and lack of return, Ukraine would also lose a massive workforce and the young elite as well as entrepreneurs. In this scenario, assets and investments stored in other Western countries are unlikely to return to Ukraine. As a potential investor and exploiter of Ukrainian resources, China is in a special situation as long as sanctions continue.
Belarus is integrated into the Russian Federation even more closely, and Russian nuclear weapons are permanently stationed there. The parts of Ukraine annexed by Russia are incorporated into the territory of the Russian Federation as formally autonomous republics.
The bloc confrontation between Russia and its allies and the Western allies remains permanent, provocations determine the coexistence, the danger of war increases. The EU states are massively arming themselves militarily and strategically pursuing the path of energy independence from Russia at a high cost. Meanwhile, Russia’s economic performance is plummeting, and a further increase in internal repression is destroying any hope of a democratic government in Moscow that is willing to compromise in the foreseeable future.
Related to scenario 1. The pressure on the population in Ukraine and the political decision-makers responsible for them is enormous. The Ukrainian leadership is forced to accept a dictatorial peace from the Russian side to avoid further victims. As a result, Ukraine will formally remain independent, but in real terms, it will become a vassal state like Belarus. Russia would only accept a compliant leadership; again, this could happen with politicians like Muraev or Medvedchuk.
The current government is going into exile, which is also the path taken by significant portions of the country’s previous economic and political elite. Migration movements of large parts of the younger normal population are also likely.
Ukraine becomes a de facto involuntary partner of Russia and is annexed to Russian territory in parts: Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A stable bloc confrontation between Russia and its affiliated republics and Western allies remains for years. The EU states are massively rearming militarily and continue to pursue the path of energy independence from Russia at a high cost.
Related to scenarios 1 and 2. Devastating Russian military attacks on the major cities break Ukraine’s will to resist. The previous leadership declares no formal surrender. After the capture of the major cities, the normal military command structure of the Ukrainian army ceases to exist.
Their members, parts of the 300,000 reservists as well as sympathizers, then form partisan cells with which they act against the Russian occupiers and carry out numerous smaller attacks on troops in the country and acts of sabotage. No Russian soldier is safe on the territory of Ukraine. Russia responds with anti-terrorist measures like those in Daghestan and Chechnya, provoking renewed backlash.
For years, Ukraine will be a troubled state with high costs for the civilian population and poor living conditions. Sanctions against Russia are maintained for the time being, and Russia becomes more and more economically dependent on China. At the same time, the performance of the Russian economy is falling further and further behind.
In the context of a peace agreement between the Russian and Ukrainian governments, with Russian military advantage and troops deep in the country, Ukraine’s territorial integrity cannot be preserved. In addition to the annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts will also be subject to votes – hardly controllable in their implementation – on whether the population wants to belong to Ukraine or the Russian Federation.
Ukraine becomes formally neutral and non-aligned and acts as a hinge between East and West (“finlandization“). Ukraine’s western perspective would be completely ended in terms of defense policy, and accession to the EU would be almost as likely to be ruled out.
In this scenario, a partial lifting of sanctions is possible under certain conditions and trade with Russia and Ukraine is possible again, at least in the medium term. Nevertheless, the attractiveness of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine as investment locations and trading partners is massively limited. The EU states are rearming militarily and continuing along the path of energy independence, albeit at a slower pace and on a smaller scale, and at a lower cost.
Faced with unbearable images of war for the Western public, troops from neighboring Western countries march into the western part of Ukraine at the invitation of the elected Ukrainian government and establish a humanitarian protection zone without engaging Russian troops.
Ukraine becomes a country divided in two along the demarcation lines, one part under Western influence with the seat of government in Lviv, one part under Russian control. Massive flight movements from the eastern parts of the country to the western part accompany this development.
In this scenario, a direct confrontation between NATO countries and Russia and Belarus is possible at any time.
Sanctions and losses, as well as mass desertions and emerging unrest among the Russian elite and population move the government in Moscow to rethink and withdraw from all Ukrainian territories, except for the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and Crimea. It has been shown that it is ready to protect Luhansk and Donetsk from the aggressors at any time. Unlike the West, Moscow is not pursuing a regime-change policy, the Kremlin explains.
Vladimir Putin replaces Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and large parts of the general staff. Russia’s economy is severely damaged, and Putin’s political survival is only made possible by even greater domestic harshness. The army is further modernized within the limits of its possibilities, and Russia becomes a completely dependent energy supplier to China.
In the medium term, Vladimir Putin, who will turn 70 in October, will be replaced from within his own circle of power.
For Brussels, the debate comes at an inopportune time: After Ukraine first demanded weapons for war and then sanctions against Russia, President Volodimir Zelenskiy now also wants EU membership on a fast-track basis. In a video address broadcast to the European Parliament from embattled Kiev, Zelenskiy called for his country’s “equal” membership in the EU.
The emotional appeal fell on fertile ground among MEPs. In a non-binding resolution, MEPs called on the European institutions to “work towards granting the country EU candidate status“. Until then, the “integration of Ukraine into the EU single market” should be pursued.
But the accession request is a problem for the Commission and the Council. On Monday, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signaled support for Zelenskiy in principle but then rowed back again: “We still have a long way to go,” she said in the parliamentary debate. So far, Ukraine is bound to the EU only by an association agreement.
Council President Charles Michel also expressed restraint. The application for membership is a difficult issue, but it is being seriously examined, Michel said. The Council will “not be able to shirk its responsibility”. So far, the 27 member states are divided. While eight Eastern European states have already spoken out in favor of accession, skepticism prevails in Western Europe.
There are many reasons for this. For example, the association agreement concluded in the face of fierce Russian resistance has so far failed to produce the desired results. Ukraine is increasingly aligning itself with Europe, but the agreed reforms in the economy, politics, and the judiciary have made only slow progress, if any. An SWP study published shortly before the war drew a critical balance of the first two years of Zelenskiy’s presidency: Given the foreign policy situation, the rapidly growing domestic instability was “worrying.”
On the other hand, EU enlargement is a long and complicated process. A lightning accession “according to a new special procedure” (Zelenskiy) is not envisaged. According to Article 49 of the EU Treaty, in principle any European state can apply for membership, provided it respects core EU values such as democracy and the rule of law. But there are strict requirements for the opening of accession negotiations.
In addition, EU enlargement has stalled. The last accession – Croatia in 2013 – was not a roaring success. Currently, five states are already on the waiting list – in addition to Turkey, these are the Western Balkan countries of Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, and Northern Macedonia. With regard to the Western Balkans, France, in particular, is putting on the brakes. Germany is also reluctant regarding Turkey’s accession, and talks are on hold.
Special treatment for Ukraine would inevitably upset the “old” candidates. It could lead to destabilization in the Balkans or a new “big bang” like the last one in 2004, i.e., a big wave of accessions. However, the EU is not prepared for this. Since the Brexit, it has been busy consolidating; the reforms promised after the UK’s exit are making only slow progress.
The president of the conservative EPP group, Manfred Weber, called for more reform zeal in the debate on Ukraine. The ongoing conference on EU reform and the associated citizens’ forums must be decisively pushed forward. The EU must seize the “Kiev moment” and also expand cooperation with the United States, for example, through a new free trade agreement.
Von der Leyen promised humanitarian aid amounting to €500 million. The funds from the EU budget are to be used both inside Ukraine and for refugees. They are in addition to another €500 million the EU plans to use to procure weapons of war for the embattled country. The money from the so-called Peace Facility had only been released on Monday.
For decades, Russia reliably ensured Germany’s power supply. This could soon come to an end. Partly in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the German government and the EU want to massively expand renewable energies. In reaction to Putin’s war, German Minister of Finance Christian Lindner even referred to renewables as freedom energies in the German Bundestag. But the solar industry is dominated by China. Are Germany and the EU slipping from one dependency to the next? And how will the prices for solar modules develop if two economic areas as large as the EU and China expand their solar power simultaneously?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows how risky gas dependency is. That is why the German government now wants to speed up the expansion of renewables even more. According to the next eco-electricity amendment, renewable energies are to cover “almost all” of the country’s power demand by as early as 2035. Solar power plays an important role in this. By 2030, it is to provide 200 gigawatts of capacity – a fourfold increase on the current figure.
The EU will also soon present a new energy strategy. According to insiders, fossil fuels are to be cut by 40 percent by 2030 with renewables being expanded at a faster pace. In addition, further investments in renewables are to be made. An EU strategy to accelerate the expansion of solar power is expected to be announced in June.
But when it comes to the expansion of solar power, the EU and Germany are at risk of becoming even more dependent on China. This is because the entire solar supply chain is dominated by the People’s Republic. Worldwide, three out of four solar modules and 83 percent of solar cells are manufactured in China. As for the raw material polysilicon, the country dominates 77 percent of the world market. The EU Commission recently cautioned against excessive dependence. EU countries produce only 0.4 percent of global solar cells and only two to three percent of modules.
This Chinese dominance is causing great concern for the EU. Supplies from China account for 63 percent of European photovoltaic imports. The solar industry could end up in a situation where it is no longer possible to switch to other suppliers, the EU cautions. The commission warns of “strategic dependence that could, in turn, hamper the EU’s future deployment of solar technologies,” according to a recent report. The EU fears that shortages could result in China serving only its domestic market. “Chinese authorities have tools at their disposal to establish a preference for supply of the domestic market, even in the absence of formal export restrictions,” according to the EU Commission’s assessment.
Today, dependence on China already appears to be having a negative impact on solar expansion. “Country-specific events can severely hamper, delay, or worst case altogether stop the import and subsequent necessary deployment of solar technologies in the EU,” according to the EU Commission. These issues, along with rising prices for raw materials and power, as well as for transportation and logistics, are said to be the reason that 20-25 percent of planned solar projects in the EU in 2021 have either been postponed or canceled altogether.
For this reason, the EU wants to reduce its dependence on China. European manufacturers intend to increase annual production in all segments of the supply chain – from polysilicon to wafers, solar cells, and modules – to 20 gigawatts by 2025. Given the major expansion targets set by the EU and Germany, however, that is merely a drop in the ocean. And the EU complains that the industry is missing the 20-gigawatt target. It could only be achieved for polysilicon, as industry data show.
The EU Commission proposes that member states should simplify and streamline approval processes for the installation of new solar farms. That would give European solar manufacturers “further certainty when upscaling production capacities,” the commission states. In addition, states could provide financial support to the industry. Internationally, the EU wants to provide a “level playing field”. Specifically, this means that subsidies from other states should not distort the international market for solar products.
The expansion goals for European solar power could lead to a price explosion. Especially since China also has ambitious expansion goals. The People’s Republic will most likely install more than 100 gigawatts of new photovoltaic capacity in the current year alone – almost half of the global expansion forecast for this year. In the People’s Republic, the cost of building solar farms rose last year for the first time in 15 years. However, industry experts believe that the price increase will only last for a short time. The reason is the high polysilicon price. However, China has massively expanded production of the raw material for solar plants.
Accordingly, experts do not expect a shortage. On the contrary. “The production capacities newly announced and currently under construction in China are so massive that, in all likelihood, there will be an oversupply of polysilicon by 2024 at the latest,” says Johannes Bernreuter, a polysilicon expert from the consulting firm Bernreuter Research. Despite the rising demand, prices for solar modules and systems will soon fall again, says Bernreuter.
The industry expert adds that it also remains to be seen whether the efforts of the EU, the US, and India to reduce their dependence on China will be successful. “It certainly won’t be easy,” Bernreuters believes. In the short term, the goal is hardly achievable. BloombergNEF’s experts also report that it will take a long time for new “solar plants” outside China to reach a significant production scale: “Manufacturers will likely be wary of expanding into an oversupplied market in the absence of solid and guaranteed demand for solar products at premium prices.”
“The main objective of this directive is to reduce the negative environmental impacts in the life cycle of products,” reads the draft published by French news portal Contexte on Tuesday. The new eco-design directive is intended to contribute to the European industrial strategy.
It replaces the 2005 directive of the same name. Initially, the focus was on energy efficiency and energy-related products – from washing machines and windows to smartphones. The implementing regulations of 2018/19 already added some requirements, such as the stocking of spare parts and the dismantlability of household appliances. The new Ecodesign Directive is now to introduce further criteria for a circular economy. It is thus also an important building block for securing the EU’s supply of raw materials.
However, the new legislation also extends the scope to almost all products traded in the EU. The only exceptions are medical devices, food and animal feed, live animals and plants, and individual groups such as construction materials, which are subject to more specific regulations.
Article 5 of the Ecodesign Directive now lists 14 requirements that the Commission will specify in delegated acts, including:
As an alternative to precise provisions in implementing regulations, voluntary commitments by industry are to continue to be permitted for individual product groups.
In the future, all product information should be easily available via digital product passports – not only for consumers but also for repair and recycling companies. A code or similar data carrier on the product or in the instructions for use that leads to the digitally stored information will probably suffice for this purpose.
With new disclosure rules, the Commission also wants to take action against the mass sorting out of unsold or exchanged goods. This practice is particularly controversial in online retail. According to Article 19, companies are now to report annually on how many consumer products they dispose of, recover energy from, recycle or reuse, and for what reasons. This obligation will not apply to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for the time being. However, according to the draft, the Commission will be authorized to adopt a separate legal act for SMEs.
In addition, companies will no longer be allowed to deliberately destroy unsold consumer goods. The Commission is even to be empowered to completely prohibit companies from destroying unsold consumer products. Exceptions are possible, for example, if there are safety or health concerns.
During a car ride from his home in Bonn to Frankfurt, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff finds time for a conversation. The connection is bumpy in the Siebengebirge, but the FDP politician’s sentences are unmistakable. The 55-year-old’s agenda has been dominated for some time by the crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Now war is a reality – and Lambsdorff, a convinced European, is experiencing turbulent times.
He uses his many years of experience as a diplomat, security, and foreign policy expert to organize the processes of international politics behind the scenes for the FDP. At the same time, he wants to explain to the public what is actually happening here: That the European peace order, which is based on international law, national sovereignty, and the protection of the territorial integrity of even smaller and weaker countries, is up for grabs because of Russia’s aggression.
“This suffering right on our doorstep is terrible,” he says about Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression in the middle of Europe. The Russian president’s fear is really not about NATO, which has never been a threat to Russia. Instead, he says, it’s about the Russian president “fearing democracy and our free way of life”. This has direct implications for the status of Russia’s power elite, with Putin at the helm.
Lambsdorff sees communicating Germany’s foreign policy in clear, understandable language as one of his core tasks: “I learned how to explain complex issues understandably early on from my uncle Otto. Former German Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff is one of his political role models, along with CDU politician Kurt Biedenkopf and former EU Commission President Jacques Delors.
Lambsdorff spent his school years in Hamburg, Bonn, and Brussels and did student exchanges in Oxford and Toulouse. After his undergraduate studies in history, politics, and public law, he completed his master’s degree at Georgetown University in Washington. He then trained as a diplomat and worked at the State Department. In 2004, Lambsdorff was elected to the European Parliament, where he became vice president in 2014. Finally, in 2017, he successfully ran for the Bundestag.
Lambsdorff is driven by the desire for Europe to stick together – and to resolve conflicts at the conference table rather than militarily. “Despite all its flaws, I consider the EU to be one of the most successful peace projects.” The fact that war is being waged in Europe has actually become unimaginable for the current generation. People in Germany are also so agitated precisely because “many have often derided the commitment to freedom and peace, to the EU and NATO, as hollow pathos”, he says.
Now we have to realize that without freedom and peace everything else is worth nothing. In this context, the EU and NATO are precisely about “securing freedom and peace internally and defending them externally” together with friends.
Despite the critical situation in view of the conflict with Russia, Lambsdorff is confident about the reaction of the West, especially the EU: “Russia’s aggressive policy has strengthened cohesion,” he says. In addition, the realization is gaining ground that the commitment to liberal values must also go hand in hand with a strengthening of the Bundeswehr and an increase in Germany’s self-defense ability. For Germany, this is one of the key lessons to be learned from the conflict.
Lambsdorff, therefore, sees himself confirmed in many of the things he has long fought for politically. Still, he is not satisfied, he says: “No one can be satisfied when there is war in Europe.” Adrian Meyer
The EU is increasing the pressure on the Russian financial system: Tonight, the member states initiated the exclusion of seven banks from the Swift payment information system, including the second-largest bank VTB. Spared for the time being are Sberbank, the largest institution, and Gazprombank, through which a large proportion of energy deliveries are made.
The invasion of Ukraine is obviously not going as Putin had imagined. But Ukraine is unlikely to win the war. Where do things go from here? Falk Steiner plays out six scenarios for the country’s future. Some are much more likely than others, but what they all have in common is that they are also likely to lead to unstable conditions in the region in the long term.
Even Ukraine’s possible accession to the EU is uncertain. The European Parliament wants to grant Kiev candidate status, and several eastern member states also favor accession. But Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has now backtracked on her proposal. For the Commission and the Council, the desire for accession is a problem, analyzes Eric Bonse. This has to do with the domestic political situation in Ukraine, but also with older EU accession candidates.
Against the backdrop of the war, the EU and Germany are in a hurry to make themselves independent of gas from Russia and to push ahead with the energy transition. But this could lead to new dependencies, as Nico Beckert points out using solar energy as an example: The entire solar supply chain is dominated by China. Europe now wants to become more independent in this sector, as do the US and India. “It certainly won’t be easy,” is one expert’s assessment.
The following scenarios have one thing in common: They are unlikely to lead to permanently stable and politically and economically reliable framework conditions – neither in Ukraine nor in the Russian Federation or Belarus. They are all speculative assumptions.
With the symbolic fall of Kiev, Ukraine becomes a headless state. The current leadership, if still alive, goes into exile. Moscow installs a government in Kiev that is staffed with compliant politicians, for example, from the circle of former President Viktor Yanukovych, who was deposed in the course of the Maidan protests and, in his view, never resigned legitimately. Western services mention Yevgeny Muraev more frequently. In reality, the Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who counts Vladimir Putin among his friends, is likely to become a powerful man, perhaps the most powerful.
In this scenario, Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts will directly fall to the Russian Federation, possibly also all oblasts east and south of the Dnieper. It is even conceivable that Kiev could become a divided city to the west (rump state of Ukraine) and east of the Dnieper (Russia). As a rump state bordering four EU states, the rest of Ukraine is hardly economically viable without any significant industry of its own. Ukrainian culture and language would again take a back seat to Russian in the eastern part, as in Soviet times.
Due to expected flight movements and lack of return, Ukraine would also lose a massive workforce and the young elite as well as entrepreneurs. In this scenario, assets and investments stored in other Western countries are unlikely to return to Ukraine. As a potential investor and exploiter of Ukrainian resources, China is in a special situation as long as sanctions continue.
Belarus is integrated into the Russian Federation even more closely, and Russian nuclear weapons are permanently stationed there. The parts of Ukraine annexed by Russia are incorporated into the territory of the Russian Federation as formally autonomous republics.
The bloc confrontation between Russia and its allies and the Western allies remains permanent, provocations determine the coexistence, the danger of war increases. The EU states are massively arming themselves militarily and strategically pursuing the path of energy independence from Russia at a high cost. Meanwhile, Russia’s economic performance is plummeting, and a further increase in internal repression is destroying any hope of a democratic government in Moscow that is willing to compromise in the foreseeable future.
Related to scenario 1. The pressure on the population in Ukraine and the political decision-makers responsible for them is enormous. The Ukrainian leadership is forced to accept a dictatorial peace from the Russian side to avoid further victims. As a result, Ukraine will formally remain independent, but in real terms, it will become a vassal state like Belarus. Russia would only accept a compliant leadership; again, this could happen with politicians like Muraev or Medvedchuk.
The current government is going into exile, which is also the path taken by significant portions of the country’s previous economic and political elite. Migration movements of large parts of the younger normal population are also likely.
Ukraine becomes a de facto involuntary partner of Russia and is annexed to Russian territory in parts: Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A stable bloc confrontation between Russia and its affiliated republics and Western allies remains for years. The EU states are massively rearming militarily and continue to pursue the path of energy independence from Russia at a high cost.
Related to scenarios 1 and 2. Devastating Russian military attacks on the major cities break Ukraine’s will to resist. The previous leadership declares no formal surrender. After the capture of the major cities, the normal military command structure of the Ukrainian army ceases to exist.
Their members, parts of the 300,000 reservists as well as sympathizers, then form partisan cells with which they act against the Russian occupiers and carry out numerous smaller attacks on troops in the country and acts of sabotage. No Russian soldier is safe on the territory of Ukraine. Russia responds with anti-terrorist measures like those in Daghestan and Chechnya, provoking renewed backlash.
For years, Ukraine will be a troubled state with high costs for the civilian population and poor living conditions. Sanctions against Russia are maintained for the time being, and Russia becomes more and more economically dependent on China. At the same time, the performance of the Russian economy is falling further and further behind.
In the context of a peace agreement between the Russian and Ukrainian governments, with Russian military advantage and troops deep in the country, Ukraine’s territorial integrity cannot be preserved. In addition to the annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts will also be subject to votes – hardly controllable in their implementation – on whether the population wants to belong to Ukraine or the Russian Federation.
Ukraine becomes formally neutral and non-aligned and acts as a hinge between East and West (“finlandization“). Ukraine’s western perspective would be completely ended in terms of defense policy, and accession to the EU would be almost as likely to be ruled out.
In this scenario, a partial lifting of sanctions is possible under certain conditions and trade with Russia and Ukraine is possible again, at least in the medium term. Nevertheless, the attractiveness of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine as investment locations and trading partners is massively limited. The EU states are rearming militarily and continuing along the path of energy independence, albeit at a slower pace and on a smaller scale, and at a lower cost.
Faced with unbearable images of war for the Western public, troops from neighboring Western countries march into the western part of Ukraine at the invitation of the elected Ukrainian government and establish a humanitarian protection zone without engaging Russian troops.
Ukraine becomes a country divided in two along the demarcation lines, one part under Western influence with the seat of government in Lviv, one part under Russian control. Massive flight movements from the eastern parts of the country to the western part accompany this development.
In this scenario, a direct confrontation between NATO countries and Russia and Belarus is possible at any time.
Sanctions and losses, as well as mass desertions and emerging unrest among the Russian elite and population move the government in Moscow to rethink and withdraw from all Ukrainian territories, except for the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and Crimea. It has been shown that it is ready to protect Luhansk and Donetsk from the aggressors at any time. Unlike the West, Moscow is not pursuing a regime-change policy, the Kremlin explains.
Vladimir Putin replaces Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and large parts of the general staff. Russia’s economy is severely damaged, and Putin’s political survival is only made possible by even greater domestic harshness. The army is further modernized within the limits of its possibilities, and Russia becomes a completely dependent energy supplier to China.
In the medium term, Vladimir Putin, who will turn 70 in October, will be replaced from within his own circle of power.
For Brussels, the debate comes at an inopportune time: After Ukraine first demanded weapons for war and then sanctions against Russia, President Volodimir Zelenskiy now also wants EU membership on a fast-track basis. In a video address broadcast to the European Parliament from embattled Kiev, Zelenskiy called for his country’s “equal” membership in the EU.
The emotional appeal fell on fertile ground among MEPs. In a non-binding resolution, MEPs called on the European institutions to “work towards granting the country EU candidate status“. Until then, the “integration of Ukraine into the EU single market” should be pursued.
But the accession request is a problem for the Commission and the Council. On Monday, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signaled support for Zelenskiy in principle but then rowed back again: “We still have a long way to go,” she said in the parliamentary debate. So far, Ukraine is bound to the EU only by an association agreement.
Council President Charles Michel also expressed restraint. The application for membership is a difficult issue, but it is being seriously examined, Michel said. The Council will “not be able to shirk its responsibility”. So far, the 27 member states are divided. While eight Eastern European states have already spoken out in favor of accession, skepticism prevails in Western Europe.
There are many reasons for this. For example, the association agreement concluded in the face of fierce Russian resistance has so far failed to produce the desired results. Ukraine is increasingly aligning itself with Europe, but the agreed reforms in the economy, politics, and the judiciary have made only slow progress, if any. An SWP study published shortly before the war drew a critical balance of the first two years of Zelenskiy’s presidency: Given the foreign policy situation, the rapidly growing domestic instability was “worrying.”
On the other hand, EU enlargement is a long and complicated process. A lightning accession “according to a new special procedure” (Zelenskiy) is not envisaged. According to Article 49 of the EU Treaty, in principle any European state can apply for membership, provided it respects core EU values such as democracy and the rule of law. But there are strict requirements for the opening of accession negotiations.
In addition, EU enlargement has stalled. The last accession – Croatia in 2013 – was not a roaring success. Currently, five states are already on the waiting list – in addition to Turkey, these are the Western Balkan countries of Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, and Northern Macedonia. With regard to the Western Balkans, France, in particular, is putting on the brakes. Germany is also reluctant regarding Turkey’s accession, and talks are on hold.
Special treatment for Ukraine would inevitably upset the “old” candidates. It could lead to destabilization in the Balkans or a new “big bang” like the last one in 2004, i.e., a big wave of accessions. However, the EU is not prepared for this. Since the Brexit, it has been busy consolidating; the reforms promised after the UK’s exit are making only slow progress.
The president of the conservative EPP group, Manfred Weber, called for more reform zeal in the debate on Ukraine. The ongoing conference on EU reform and the associated citizens’ forums must be decisively pushed forward. The EU must seize the “Kiev moment” and also expand cooperation with the United States, for example, through a new free trade agreement.
Von der Leyen promised humanitarian aid amounting to €500 million. The funds from the EU budget are to be used both inside Ukraine and for refugees. They are in addition to another €500 million the EU plans to use to procure weapons of war for the embattled country. The money from the so-called Peace Facility had only been released on Monday.
For decades, Russia reliably ensured Germany’s power supply. This could soon come to an end. Partly in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the German government and the EU want to massively expand renewable energies. In reaction to Putin’s war, German Minister of Finance Christian Lindner even referred to renewables as freedom energies in the German Bundestag. But the solar industry is dominated by China. Are Germany and the EU slipping from one dependency to the next? And how will the prices for solar modules develop if two economic areas as large as the EU and China expand their solar power simultaneously?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows how risky gas dependency is. That is why the German government now wants to speed up the expansion of renewables even more. According to the next eco-electricity amendment, renewable energies are to cover “almost all” of the country’s power demand by as early as 2035. Solar power plays an important role in this. By 2030, it is to provide 200 gigawatts of capacity – a fourfold increase on the current figure.
The EU will also soon present a new energy strategy. According to insiders, fossil fuels are to be cut by 40 percent by 2030 with renewables being expanded at a faster pace. In addition, further investments in renewables are to be made. An EU strategy to accelerate the expansion of solar power is expected to be announced in June.
But when it comes to the expansion of solar power, the EU and Germany are at risk of becoming even more dependent on China. This is because the entire solar supply chain is dominated by the People’s Republic. Worldwide, three out of four solar modules and 83 percent of solar cells are manufactured in China. As for the raw material polysilicon, the country dominates 77 percent of the world market. The EU Commission recently cautioned against excessive dependence. EU countries produce only 0.4 percent of global solar cells and only two to three percent of modules.
This Chinese dominance is causing great concern for the EU. Supplies from China account for 63 percent of European photovoltaic imports. The solar industry could end up in a situation where it is no longer possible to switch to other suppliers, the EU cautions. The commission warns of “strategic dependence that could, in turn, hamper the EU’s future deployment of solar technologies,” according to a recent report. The EU fears that shortages could result in China serving only its domestic market. “Chinese authorities have tools at their disposal to establish a preference for supply of the domestic market, even in the absence of formal export restrictions,” according to the EU Commission’s assessment.
Today, dependence on China already appears to be having a negative impact on solar expansion. “Country-specific events can severely hamper, delay, or worst case altogether stop the import and subsequent necessary deployment of solar technologies in the EU,” according to the EU Commission. These issues, along with rising prices for raw materials and power, as well as for transportation and logistics, are said to be the reason that 20-25 percent of planned solar projects in the EU in 2021 have either been postponed or canceled altogether.
For this reason, the EU wants to reduce its dependence on China. European manufacturers intend to increase annual production in all segments of the supply chain – from polysilicon to wafers, solar cells, and modules – to 20 gigawatts by 2025. Given the major expansion targets set by the EU and Germany, however, that is merely a drop in the ocean. And the EU complains that the industry is missing the 20-gigawatt target. It could only be achieved for polysilicon, as industry data show.
The EU Commission proposes that member states should simplify and streamline approval processes for the installation of new solar farms. That would give European solar manufacturers “further certainty when upscaling production capacities,” the commission states. In addition, states could provide financial support to the industry. Internationally, the EU wants to provide a “level playing field”. Specifically, this means that subsidies from other states should not distort the international market for solar products.
The expansion goals for European solar power could lead to a price explosion. Especially since China also has ambitious expansion goals. The People’s Republic will most likely install more than 100 gigawatts of new photovoltaic capacity in the current year alone – almost half of the global expansion forecast for this year. In the People’s Republic, the cost of building solar farms rose last year for the first time in 15 years. However, industry experts believe that the price increase will only last for a short time. The reason is the high polysilicon price. However, China has massively expanded production of the raw material for solar plants.
Accordingly, experts do not expect a shortage. On the contrary. “The production capacities newly announced and currently under construction in China are so massive that, in all likelihood, there will be an oversupply of polysilicon by 2024 at the latest,” says Johannes Bernreuter, a polysilicon expert from the consulting firm Bernreuter Research. Despite the rising demand, prices for solar modules and systems will soon fall again, says Bernreuter.
The industry expert adds that it also remains to be seen whether the efforts of the EU, the US, and India to reduce their dependence on China will be successful. “It certainly won’t be easy,” Bernreuters believes. In the short term, the goal is hardly achievable. BloombergNEF’s experts also report that it will take a long time for new “solar plants” outside China to reach a significant production scale: “Manufacturers will likely be wary of expanding into an oversupplied market in the absence of solid and guaranteed demand for solar products at premium prices.”
“The main objective of this directive is to reduce the negative environmental impacts in the life cycle of products,” reads the draft published by French news portal Contexte on Tuesday. The new eco-design directive is intended to contribute to the European industrial strategy.
It replaces the 2005 directive of the same name. Initially, the focus was on energy efficiency and energy-related products – from washing machines and windows to smartphones. The implementing regulations of 2018/19 already added some requirements, such as the stocking of spare parts and the dismantlability of household appliances. The new Ecodesign Directive is now to introduce further criteria for a circular economy. It is thus also an important building block for securing the EU’s supply of raw materials.
However, the new legislation also extends the scope to almost all products traded in the EU. The only exceptions are medical devices, food and animal feed, live animals and plants, and individual groups such as construction materials, which are subject to more specific regulations.
Article 5 of the Ecodesign Directive now lists 14 requirements that the Commission will specify in delegated acts, including:
As an alternative to precise provisions in implementing regulations, voluntary commitments by industry are to continue to be permitted for individual product groups.
In the future, all product information should be easily available via digital product passports – not only for consumers but also for repair and recycling companies. A code or similar data carrier on the product or in the instructions for use that leads to the digitally stored information will probably suffice for this purpose.
With new disclosure rules, the Commission also wants to take action against the mass sorting out of unsold or exchanged goods. This practice is particularly controversial in online retail. According to Article 19, companies are now to report annually on how many consumer products they dispose of, recover energy from, recycle or reuse, and for what reasons. This obligation will not apply to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for the time being. However, according to the draft, the Commission will be authorized to adopt a separate legal act for SMEs.
In addition, companies will no longer be allowed to deliberately destroy unsold consumer goods. The Commission is even to be empowered to completely prohibit companies from destroying unsold consumer products. Exceptions are possible, for example, if there are safety or health concerns.
During a car ride from his home in Bonn to Frankfurt, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff finds time for a conversation. The connection is bumpy in the Siebengebirge, but the FDP politician’s sentences are unmistakable. The 55-year-old’s agenda has been dominated for some time by the crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Now war is a reality – and Lambsdorff, a convinced European, is experiencing turbulent times.
He uses his many years of experience as a diplomat, security, and foreign policy expert to organize the processes of international politics behind the scenes for the FDP. At the same time, he wants to explain to the public what is actually happening here: That the European peace order, which is based on international law, national sovereignty, and the protection of the territorial integrity of even smaller and weaker countries, is up for grabs because of Russia’s aggression.
“This suffering right on our doorstep is terrible,” he says about Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression in the middle of Europe. The Russian president’s fear is really not about NATO, which has never been a threat to Russia. Instead, he says, it’s about the Russian president “fearing democracy and our free way of life”. This has direct implications for the status of Russia’s power elite, with Putin at the helm.
Lambsdorff sees communicating Germany’s foreign policy in clear, understandable language as one of his core tasks: “I learned how to explain complex issues understandably early on from my uncle Otto. Former German Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff is one of his political role models, along with CDU politician Kurt Biedenkopf and former EU Commission President Jacques Delors.
Lambsdorff spent his school years in Hamburg, Bonn, and Brussels and did student exchanges in Oxford and Toulouse. After his undergraduate studies in history, politics, and public law, he completed his master’s degree at Georgetown University in Washington. He then trained as a diplomat and worked at the State Department. In 2004, Lambsdorff was elected to the European Parliament, where he became vice president in 2014. Finally, in 2017, he successfully ran for the Bundestag.
Lambsdorff is driven by the desire for Europe to stick together – and to resolve conflicts at the conference table rather than militarily. “Despite all its flaws, I consider the EU to be one of the most successful peace projects.” The fact that war is being waged in Europe has actually become unimaginable for the current generation. People in Germany are also so agitated precisely because “many have often derided the commitment to freedom and peace, to the EU and NATO, as hollow pathos”, he says.
Now we have to realize that without freedom and peace everything else is worth nothing. In this context, the EU and NATO are precisely about “securing freedom and peace internally and defending them externally” together with friends.
Despite the critical situation in view of the conflict with Russia, Lambsdorff is confident about the reaction of the West, especially the EU: “Russia’s aggressive policy has strengthened cohesion,” he says. In addition, the realization is gaining ground that the commitment to liberal values must also go hand in hand with a strengthening of the Bundeswehr and an increase in Germany’s self-defense ability. For Germany, this is one of the key lessons to be learned from the conflict.
Lambsdorff, therefore, sees himself confirmed in many of the things he has long fought for politically. Still, he is not satisfied, he says: “No one can be satisfied when there is war in Europe.” Adrian Meyer
