Today, Ursula von der Leyen is appearing at the CDU presidium – but as the current EU Commission President, not (yet) as the top candidate for the 2024 European elections. Nevertheless, there is a high probability von der Leyen will enter the ring again. On the one hand, because she is reportedly pushing for it; on the other, because her party, the CDU, would very likely support her, analyze Stefan Braun and Markus Grabitz.
Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez currently receives little support from his left-wing alliance. Instead, Yolanda Díaz wants to become the country’s first female prime minister in the parliamentary elections in December. However, a right-wing bloc is ahead in the polls, as Isabel Cuesta Camacho reports.
The meeting of G7 climate and environment ministers failed to make any significant progress on the global coal phase-out. Nor did it put a stop to new investments in gas infrastructure, despite the high expectations for the meeting in Sapporo, Japan. Environmentalists criticize the outcome. Read more in the news section.
The new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina could also mean little progress in the long term. Among other things, the time frame for implementation is missing. With the agreement, the EU has placed itself in the role of a power broker, writes Marina Vulović of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in her position paper. Success also depends on whether the EU and its partners can exert pressure to keep to the agreements.
Have a good start to the week.
When Ursula von der Leyen joins the leadership of the CDU on Monday, it will be a meeting between a politician and a party leader who actually know each other very well and yet have remained quite strangers. They have put up with each other for almost two decades, benefited from, and yet rarely really warmed up to each other. On the one hand, there is von der Leyen, who is brisk, self-confident, and often independent to the point of disloyalty; on the other, there is the CDU, for whom some of von der Leyen’s policies have happened too quickly, and too idiosyncratically.
And yet, one question will not be at issue in the coming weeks and months: whether the CDU leadership around Friedrich Merz will support a top candidate Ursula von der Leyen and her possible second term as Commission President. Even if this relationship is not characterized by political love, it is supported by an overriding sense of reason. And that means: It is virtually impossible that her own party could stab her in the back if she runs for office.
And not because CDU leader Friedrich Merz and Ursula von der Leyen are particularly close politically. Both come from very different places in the party, even if Merz always tries to appear modern – and von der Leyen leads a more conservative life on certain social issues than her image would suggest. But the two have one thing in common: they want to change politics and developments from the top, to sometimes stand in the storm, and fight for their own convictions. In this respect, they were and still are the antithesis of Angela Merkel.
Regarding why the CDU supports von der Leyen, it is even more important what the alternative would be. Neither the CDU nor Germany is likely to have another chance to have a German politician at the helm of the Commission in Brussels for another five years. This opportunity outweighs much, if not all, of what could stand between the party and the head of the Commission.
In Brussels, the constellation between the party friends and the politician is no different. The Christian Democratic Party family and, in particular, the German CDU/CSU group in the European Parliament also have a distanced relationship with the German. This became clear at the very beginning when she only very narrowly received the required majority in a secret ballot in the European Parliament in the summer of 2019 and EPP deputies probably refused to vote for her.
Things did not get any better in the course of the election period. CDU/CSU members resent that she showed so little interest in the demands of the German chemical and automotive industries and agriculture in the Green Deal. Instead, she sometimes cooperated with the Greens.
And the relationship with Manfred Weber, the leader of the largest group in the Strasbourg Parliament with 175 members? It, too, has remained rather cold. In Weber’s case, wounded pride may have played a role. The Lower Bavarian had emerged from the European elections as the victorious top candidate but was prevented from becoming Commission President by France’s President Emmanuel Macron.
For a while, Weber, who has also been EPP party leader since 2022, even “blinked” against von der Leyen, who sits with him qua office in the EPP presidency. Weber brought the young and ambitious Parliamentary President Roberta Metsola into the conversation as the next top candidate of the Christian Democrats. But in doing so, he had probably overplayed his hand. CDU leader Friedrich Merz and Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Christian Democrats’ longest-serving head of government and a “buddy” of Weber’s, then publicly blew the whistle on him. What is more: they signaled their initial support for von der Leyen.
She has not indicated in Brussels whether she wants to try again and is available for a second term. But her reticence is, above all, a matter of calculation. She wants to come clean as late as possible and to continue pursuing her agenda as a non-partisan Commission President. Relations with China, trade policy with the US, digitization – she wants to achieve something on these issues above all before she makes her decision on her political future public.
She knows: as soon as she publicly declines to run for office, she would be a “lame duck” without much assertiveness. As soon as she throws her hat into the ring, as seems likely, everything she says will be interpreted in terms of the election campaign.
One thing is clear: Von der Leyen does not have to commit herself for months. While the CDU’s European list will be elected in Baden-Wuerttemberg as early as mid-May, von der Leyen’s home association of Lower Saxony, where she may seek candidacy for the European Parliament, will not have its turn until very late in the fall. All this means: For now, she will be coming exclusively in her role as Commission President to the CDU committees on Monday.
It is quite possible that the Berlin and Brussels sentiments will be discussed there on the sidelines. It is also possible that there will be some critical voices on the Green Deal. But the chance to keep her as a contact person in the most important position in Brussels is likely to override all that.
A large bloc of leftist parties, Unidas Podemos (UP), brought and keeps Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in power. But in the run-up to this December’s general elections, the left-wing alliance led by the Podemos party is breaking apart. The current second Vice President, Yolanda Díaz, wants to become Spain’s first female prime minister with the Sumar platform she has newly founded. Díaz is thus parting ways with Podemos while rallying the other members of the left-wing alliance around her.
The split in the left-wing parties is drawing votes from the Socialists (PSOE) and Podemos. The latter had made a meteoric rise on the political stage in 2015 but is now on its way to irrelevance. Podemos’ populist course, both in its early days and as Sánchez’s current government partner, has fueled the political debate.
The 51-year-old labor lawyer Yolanda Díaz began her political career in her home region of Galicia in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). She first came to national prominence in 2020, when she joined the government as labor minister – one of the five ministries UP demanded as a condition for supporting Sánchez’s inauguration. Immediately in 2021, the first swing in the governing coalition occurred when Pablo Iglesias, founder and then leader of Podemos, resigned as Vice President. A position that was also Iglesias’s condition for his support for Sánchez. It was Iglesias himself who then appointed Díaz as his successor at the head of the left-wing alliance UP.
Díaz’s current public role is leading to a tense struggle between Podemos and Sumar to reshape the left parties that keep Sánchez in power. The emergence of Sumar raises the question of how this will affect the survival of Podemos and the alternative left as a whole. According to recent polls, the conservative Partido Popular (PP) would win the next parliamentary elections.
According to the Sigma Dos poll published last Monday for the Spanish newspaper El Mundo, the PP would receive up to 30.5 percent of the vote, which would be 135 seats. With the 40 to 41 deputies that the right-wing Vox party would receive with 13.9 percent of the vote, the right-wing bloc could achieve an absolute majority of 176 deputies.
For its part, the grand alliance of the political left would still not have enough momentum to win the elections and form the government again. The PSOE would have 91 seats with 22.8 percent of the vote. If she contested separately, Sumar would have 35, and Podemos would have eight seats.
Since 2015, Spain has held four general elections: in 2015, 2016, and twice in 2019. In 2015, the newly formed Podemos party entered the political arena with 20 percent of the vote, behind the PP and PSOE, which received 28 and 22 percent of the vote at the time. Podemos managed to become the third political force with a populist discourse about “the people” and its goal of wresting power from the “corrupt elite.”
As it was impossible to form a government, elections were called again in 2016. The PP won with 33 percent of the vote and Mariano Rajoy was confirmed as president with a simple majority. However, Rajoy was ousted in 2018 by a motion of no confidence initiated by Sánchez. This led to new elections in April 2019, which the PSOE won with 28 percent of the vote. However, since Sánchez did not want to pact with the UP left-wing alliance, elections were called again in November 2019.
Since 2016, Podemos founder Iglesias has sought both a grand coalition of the political left and the vice presidency. Sánchez, who had initially refused to enter into a pact with Iglesias and his left-wing alliance because he “could not sleep peacefully if he governed with Podemos ministers,” eventually changed his mind. In January 2020, the “Frankenstein” coalition of Unidas Podemos, separatists, nationalists, and the PSOE was formed.
In these three years of the current legislature, Podemos has proven to be a difficult government partner. One of the tensest moments between the PSOE and Podemos arose from the debate over the so-called “only yes means yes law” by Equality Minister Irene Montero – Iglesias’ partner. The law’s entry into force in November 2022 has resulted in more than 800 reduced sentences and more than 70 redundancies of sex offenders.
The law was flawed from the start, but Montero refused to admit it. In March, the PSOE – with the support of the PP and against Podemos – finally initiated a process to reform the law. This led Podemos to directly label its government partner as “fascist.”
Díaz is strategically holding back in the face of tensions between PSOE and Podemos by not supporting her Podemos partners who brought her into the government. At the launch of her Sumar platform in early April, Díaz repeated almost like a mantra: “I want to be the first female President of Spain.”
The EU is optimistic about the implementation, as the new agreement between Serbia and Kosovo will provide the official framework for further EU accession negotiations between the two countries. The Balkans are a bit more skeptical, as nothing has been signed and EU accession efforts in the region have been stagnant for years, which is not a convincing incentive to implement the agreement. The “carrot” was the “donors’ conference” to be held 150 days after the deal was approved. The “stick” was the stalemate in the EU accession process, which had existed for years anyway.
In the agreement, Serbia commits to de facto recognition of Kosovo’s statehood features, such as documents and national symbols, and Kosovo to implement the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (AGSM). Since these are unpopular options, the agreement was probably the most the EU could achieve at the time. The basic idea of the agreement is constructive, but the implementation annex is somewhat awkwardly worded – it lacks an implementation period for specific requirements.
The lack of specification of the timeframe for implementation or the sequence of steps to be implemented by both sides, as well as the lack of signature, could hinder the implementation process significantly. This means the obligation to implement the agreement arises only from the two countries’ EU accession process, not from international law, and it remains to be seen whether the EU can enforce implementation. At the moment, both sides are reluctant to take the first step in the process for fear the other side might stop implementation if it is the first to get what it wants.
It is also noteworthy that the EU has taken on the role of a power broker with this agreement, presenting the two sides with a non-negotiable agreement and pushing for its implementation by also chairing the joint monitoring committee. This is due to the changed geopolitical context since Russia’s attack on Ukraine.
In order to avoid having to engage diplomatically on two fronts, but still minimize Russia’s potential influence in the Balkans, the EU and US prioritize normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo to finally stabilize the Balkans. This non-negotiable approach has led to a “lack of ownership” by both Serbia and Kosovo – both view the agreement with skepticism and question the EU’s role as a power broker.
Moreover, the question arises whether the EU has succeeded in minimizing Russia’s potential for interference with the new deal. The answer: rather not. As long as Serbia questions Kosovo’s status, this will always be a lever for cooperation between Serbia and Russia. Moreover, further aggravation of the situation in northern Kosovo can be expected.
Many had hoped for more from this agreement. Mainly because of the expected destabilization in northern Kosovo in view of the municipal elections on April 23, which the largest Serbian party in Kosovo (Srpska Lista – SL) will boycott. The local elections in the four northern municipalities with a Serb majority were already postponed once in the context of the 2022/2023 winter clashes when Serbs withdrew from Kosovo’s institutions, obstructed the local elections, and set up roadblocks. There were several reasons for this, including the Pristina government’s longstanding refusal to establish the AGSM.
Although the roadblocks were lifted in early January 2023, Serbs have not returned to municipal institutions to date and the SL has not stood for the April 2023 municipal elections. This would mean that the four northern municipalities could have Kosovo Albanian mayors, which would make the election results legal but not legitimate in the eyes of the Serbs living there. If the elections take place, there will almost certainly be voter intimidation or renewed clashes.
It would be easier to be optimistic about the future of the new agreement were it not for the recurring crises in northern Kosovo. The agreement’s success thus depends on the international community’s ability to exert pressure: on Serbia, which can bring about the integration of Serbs in northern Kosovo; and on Kosovo, which should finally implement the AGSM.
Today, Ursula von der Leyen is appearing at the CDU presidium – but as the current EU Commission President, not (yet) as the top candidate for the 2024 European elections. Nevertheless, there is a high probability von der Leyen will enter the ring again. On the one hand, because she is reportedly pushing for it; on the other, because her party, the CDU, would very likely support her, analyze Stefan Braun and Markus Grabitz.
Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez currently receives little support from his left-wing alliance. Instead, Yolanda Díaz wants to become the country’s first female prime minister in the parliamentary elections in December. However, a right-wing bloc is ahead in the polls, as Isabel Cuesta Camacho reports.
The meeting of G7 climate and environment ministers failed to make any significant progress on the global coal phase-out. Nor did it put a stop to new investments in gas infrastructure, despite the high expectations for the meeting in Sapporo, Japan. Environmentalists criticize the outcome. Read more in the news section.
The new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina could also mean little progress in the long term. Among other things, the time frame for implementation is missing. With the agreement, the EU has placed itself in the role of a power broker, writes Marina Vulović of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in her position paper. Success also depends on whether the EU and its partners can exert pressure to keep to the agreements.
Have a good start to the week.
When Ursula von der Leyen joins the leadership of the CDU on Monday, it will be a meeting between a politician and a party leader who actually know each other very well and yet have remained quite strangers. They have put up with each other for almost two decades, benefited from, and yet rarely really warmed up to each other. On the one hand, there is von der Leyen, who is brisk, self-confident, and often independent to the point of disloyalty; on the other, there is the CDU, for whom some of von der Leyen’s policies have happened too quickly, and too idiosyncratically.
And yet, one question will not be at issue in the coming weeks and months: whether the CDU leadership around Friedrich Merz will support a top candidate Ursula von der Leyen and her possible second term as Commission President. Even if this relationship is not characterized by political love, it is supported by an overriding sense of reason. And that means: It is virtually impossible that her own party could stab her in the back if she runs for office.
And not because CDU leader Friedrich Merz and Ursula von der Leyen are particularly close politically. Both come from very different places in the party, even if Merz always tries to appear modern – and von der Leyen leads a more conservative life on certain social issues than her image would suggest. But the two have one thing in common: they want to change politics and developments from the top, to sometimes stand in the storm, and fight for their own convictions. In this respect, they were and still are the antithesis of Angela Merkel.
Regarding why the CDU supports von der Leyen, it is even more important what the alternative would be. Neither the CDU nor Germany is likely to have another chance to have a German politician at the helm of the Commission in Brussels for another five years. This opportunity outweighs much, if not all, of what could stand between the party and the head of the Commission.
In Brussels, the constellation between the party friends and the politician is no different. The Christian Democratic Party family and, in particular, the German CDU/CSU group in the European Parliament also have a distanced relationship with the German. This became clear at the very beginning when she only very narrowly received the required majority in a secret ballot in the European Parliament in the summer of 2019 and EPP deputies probably refused to vote for her.
Things did not get any better in the course of the election period. CDU/CSU members resent that she showed so little interest in the demands of the German chemical and automotive industries and agriculture in the Green Deal. Instead, she sometimes cooperated with the Greens.
And the relationship with Manfred Weber, the leader of the largest group in the Strasbourg Parliament with 175 members? It, too, has remained rather cold. In Weber’s case, wounded pride may have played a role. The Lower Bavarian had emerged from the European elections as the victorious top candidate but was prevented from becoming Commission President by France’s President Emmanuel Macron.
For a while, Weber, who has also been EPP party leader since 2022, even “blinked” against von der Leyen, who sits with him qua office in the EPP presidency. Weber brought the young and ambitious Parliamentary President Roberta Metsola into the conversation as the next top candidate of the Christian Democrats. But in doing so, he had probably overplayed his hand. CDU leader Friedrich Merz and Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Christian Democrats’ longest-serving head of government and a “buddy” of Weber’s, then publicly blew the whistle on him. What is more: they signaled their initial support for von der Leyen.
She has not indicated in Brussels whether she wants to try again and is available for a second term. But her reticence is, above all, a matter of calculation. She wants to come clean as late as possible and to continue pursuing her agenda as a non-partisan Commission President. Relations with China, trade policy with the US, digitization – she wants to achieve something on these issues above all before she makes her decision on her political future public.
She knows: as soon as she publicly declines to run for office, she would be a “lame duck” without much assertiveness. As soon as she throws her hat into the ring, as seems likely, everything she says will be interpreted in terms of the election campaign.
One thing is clear: Von der Leyen does not have to commit herself for months. While the CDU’s European list will be elected in Baden-Wuerttemberg as early as mid-May, von der Leyen’s home association of Lower Saxony, where she may seek candidacy for the European Parliament, will not have its turn until very late in the fall. All this means: For now, she will be coming exclusively in her role as Commission President to the CDU committees on Monday.
It is quite possible that the Berlin and Brussels sentiments will be discussed there on the sidelines. It is also possible that there will be some critical voices on the Green Deal. But the chance to keep her as a contact person in the most important position in Brussels is likely to override all that.
A large bloc of leftist parties, Unidas Podemos (UP), brought and keeps Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in power. But in the run-up to this December’s general elections, the left-wing alliance led by the Podemos party is breaking apart. The current second Vice President, Yolanda Díaz, wants to become Spain’s first female prime minister with the Sumar platform she has newly founded. Díaz is thus parting ways with Podemos while rallying the other members of the left-wing alliance around her.
The split in the left-wing parties is drawing votes from the Socialists (PSOE) and Podemos. The latter had made a meteoric rise on the political stage in 2015 but is now on its way to irrelevance. Podemos’ populist course, both in its early days and as Sánchez’s current government partner, has fueled the political debate.
The 51-year-old labor lawyer Yolanda Díaz began her political career in her home region of Galicia in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). She first came to national prominence in 2020, when she joined the government as labor minister – one of the five ministries UP demanded as a condition for supporting Sánchez’s inauguration. Immediately in 2021, the first swing in the governing coalition occurred when Pablo Iglesias, founder and then leader of Podemos, resigned as Vice President. A position that was also Iglesias’s condition for his support for Sánchez. It was Iglesias himself who then appointed Díaz as his successor at the head of the left-wing alliance UP.
Díaz’s current public role is leading to a tense struggle between Podemos and Sumar to reshape the left parties that keep Sánchez in power. The emergence of Sumar raises the question of how this will affect the survival of Podemos and the alternative left as a whole. According to recent polls, the conservative Partido Popular (PP) would win the next parliamentary elections.
According to the Sigma Dos poll published last Monday for the Spanish newspaper El Mundo, the PP would receive up to 30.5 percent of the vote, which would be 135 seats. With the 40 to 41 deputies that the right-wing Vox party would receive with 13.9 percent of the vote, the right-wing bloc could achieve an absolute majority of 176 deputies.
For its part, the grand alliance of the political left would still not have enough momentum to win the elections and form the government again. The PSOE would have 91 seats with 22.8 percent of the vote. If she contested separately, Sumar would have 35, and Podemos would have eight seats.
Since 2015, Spain has held four general elections: in 2015, 2016, and twice in 2019. In 2015, the newly formed Podemos party entered the political arena with 20 percent of the vote, behind the PP and PSOE, which received 28 and 22 percent of the vote at the time. Podemos managed to become the third political force with a populist discourse about “the people” and its goal of wresting power from the “corrupt elite.”
As it was impossible to form a government, elections were called again in 2016. The PP won with 33 percent of the vote and Mariano Rajoy was confirmed as president with a simple majority. However, Rajoy was ousted in 2018 by a motion of no confidence initiated by Sánchez. This led to new elections in April 2019, which the PSOE won with 28 percent of the vote. However, since Sánchez did not want to pact with the UP left-wing alliance, elections were called again in November 2019.
Since 2016, Podemos founder Iglesias has sought both a grand coalition of the political left and the vice presidency. Sánchez, who had initially refused to enter into a pact with Iglesias and his left-wing alliance because he “could not sleep peacefully if he governed with Podemos ministers,” eventually changed his mind. In January 2020, the “Frankenstein” coalition of Unidas Podemos, separatists, nationalists, and the PSOE was formed.
In these three years of the current legislature, Podemos has proven to be a difficult government partner. One of the tensest moments between the PSOE and Podemos arose from the debate over the so-called “only yes means yes law” by Equality Minister Irene Montero – Iglesias’ partner. The law’s entry into force in November 2022 has resulted in more than 800 reduced sentences and more than 70 redundancies of sex offenders.
The law was flawed from the start, but Montero refused to admit it. In March, the PSOE – with the support of the PP and against Podemos – finally initiated a process to reform the law. This led Podemos to directly label its government partner as “fascist.”
Díaz is strategically holding back in the face of tensions between PSOE and Podemos by not supporting her Podemos partners who brought her into the government. At the launch of her Sumar platform in early April, Díaz repeated almost like a mantra: “I want to be the first female President of Spain.”
The EU is optimistic about the implementation, as the new agreement between Serbia and Kosovo will provide the official framework for further EU accession negotiations between the two countries. The Balkans are a bit more skeptical, as nothing has been signed and EU accession efforts in the region have been stagnant for years, which is not a convincing incentive to implement the agreement. The “carrot” was the “donors’ conference” to be held 150 days after the deal was approved. The “stick” was the stalemate in the EU accession process, which had existed for years anyway.
In the agreement, Serbia commits to de facto recognition of Kosovo’s statehood features, such as documents and national symbols, and Kosovo to implement the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (AGSM). Since these are unpopular options, the agreement was probably the most the EU could achieve at the time. The basic idea of the agreement is constructive, but the implementation annex is somewhat awkwardly worded – it lacks an implementation period for specific requirements.
The lack of specification of the timeframe for implementation or the sequence of steps to be implemented by both sides, as well as the lack of signature, could hinder the implementation process significantly. This means the obligation to implement the agreement arises only from the two countries’ EU accession process, not from international law, and it remains to be seen whether the EU can enforce implementation. At the moment, both sides are reluctant to take the first step in the process for fear the other side might stop implementation if it is the first to get what it wants.
It is also noteworthy that the EU has taken on the role of a power broker with this agreement, presenting the two sides with a non-negotiable agreement and pushing for its implementation by also chairing the joint monitoring committee. This is due to the changed geopolitical context since Russia’s attack on Ukraine.
In order to avoid having to engage diplomatically on two fronts, but still minimize Russia’s potential influence in the Balkans, the EU and US prioritize normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo to finally stabilize the Balkans. This non-negotiable approach has led to a “lack of ownership” by both Serbia and Kosovo – both view the agreement with skepticism and question the EU’s role as a power broker.
Moreover, the question arises whether the EU has succeeded in minimizing Russia’s potential for interference with the new deal. The answer: rather not. As long as Serbia questions Kosovo’s status, this will always be a lever for cooperation between Serbia and Russia. Moreover, further aggravation of the situation in northern Kosovo can be expected.
Many had hoped for more from this agreement. Mainly because of the expected destabilization in northern Kosovo in view of the municipal elections on April 23, which the largest Serbian party in Kosovo (Srpska Lista – SL) will boycott. The local elections in the four northern municipalities with a Serb majority were already postponed once in the context of the 2022/2023 winter clashes when Serbs withdrew from Kosovo’s institutions, obstructed the local elections, and set up roadblocks. There were several reasons for this, including the Pristina government’s longstanding refusal to establish the AGSM.
Although the roadblocks were lifted in early January 2023, Serbs have not returned to municipal institutions to date and the SL has not stood for the April 2023 municipal elections. This would mean that the four northern municipalities could have Kosovo Albanian mayors, which would make the election results legal but not legitimate in the eyes of the Serbs living there. If the elections take place, there will almost certainly be voter intimidation or renewed clashes.
It would be easier to be optimistic about the future of the new agreement were it not for the recurring crises in northern Kosovo. The agreement’s success thus depends on the international community’s ability to exert pressure: on Serbia, which can bring about the integration of Serbs in northern Kosovo; and on Kosovo, which should finally implement the AGSM.
