A landslide victory for Labour in the UK general election was to be expected. However, the fact that it was so clear is likely to cause long faces among the Tories. After the polls closed at 11 p.m. on Thursday, the usually very precise British exit polls showed an absolute majority for Keir Starmer’s Social Democrats.
Labour has 410 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons, almost twice as many as before. With 131 seats, the Tories have less than half as many MPs as before. The Liberal Democrats have 61 seats, Nigel Farage’s Reform UK 13 seats, and the Scottish National Party 10 seats.
While the right-wing forces made gains in the European elections a month ago, the UK appears to be moving to the left against all trends. This offers an opportunity for relations with the EU. Although Prime Minister Keir Starmer will not seek to return the UK to the EU, there could be more cooperation in individual policy areas.
This applies in particular to foreign and security policy, as cooperation is possible here independently of the EU Single Market and the United Kingdom does not have to adapt to EU rules. Cooperation should also be easier for the EU because they no longer have to deal with the Tories responsible for Brexit.
Labor therefore offers the opportunity to renew relations. A strong partnership within the Western alliances G7 and NATO could become particularly important in the event of Donald Trump’s re-election in the US. European security would then probably no longer play such a major role in the White House and Europe would have to move closer together again.
We wish you a pleasant weekend!
Ursula von der Leyen is seeking the support of the EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens. She takes time to speak extensively with the parliamentary groups and holds one-to-one meetings with MEPs. The political groups formulate their substantive demands. They make their votes in the ballot in the first week of the new European Parliament in Strasbourg from July 16 dependent on von der Leyen’s assurances that the demands will be met. Below is an overview of the demands.
EPP leader Manfred Weber has drawn up a 5-point plan with projects that the 188 future MEPs discussed with von der Leyen until Thursday afternoon.
The first section is about defense and security. “Europe must be able to defend itself and fulfill its obligations in NATO.”
The second section is about stopping illegal immigration. Not smugglers, but rather the state must decide who is admitted:
The third chapter outlines the competition strategy. The internal market and the ability to innovate are the means to improve competitiveness and expand economic relations:
The fourth chapter is about protecting the European way of life. The aim is to build bridges between generations and to protect the climate and planet for future generations:
The fifth chapter is entitled strengthening democracy in the world. In the new global environment, Europe can only defend its interests if it speaks with one voice, reacts quickly and coordinates immediately with its partners.
The Social Democrats have also compiled a paper with key demands. They are seeking a successor to NextGenerationEU to finance social, climate and industrial policy. The investment program to cushion the impact of the coronavirus crisis expires at the end of 2026. In detail, they are calling for
Among other things, they want to finance a Green Deal Industrial Act with further development of the Net-Zero Industry Act into a Buy Green and European Act. The next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF ) and the new own resources should also enable new defense spending.
In the environmental area, S&D advocates a CO2 reduction target of 90 to 95 percent for 2040 in the final version of the demands paper and adherence to the 2035 end of combustion engines and the regulation for deforestation-free supply chains.
The Social Democrats want to strengthen the rule of law through majority decisions in Article 7 proceedings. Infringement proceedings should be consistently brought before the ECJ. Respect for fundamental rights and democratic principles should be a basic condition for access to all EU funding programs.
The Renew Group will receive von der Leyen on Tuesday or Wednesday. The exact date has not yet been set. At their meeting last Tuesday, the Liberals discussed their demands for the designated new Commission President internally. The group leadership around Valérie Hayer is currently in the process of putting the consolidated list of demands on paper. From the Liberals’ point of view, these are conditions that von der Leyen must take up if she wants to be elected for a second term of office with the votes of the Renew MEPs.
According to those involved, the demands relate to the institutional structure as well as to points of content:
The Greens have not yet written a paper with their demands. In talks with von der Leyen, however, they have made it clear what their priorities are:
The EU’s announcement to impose extra tariffs on Chinese EVs comes at an increasingly volatile time. The German automotive industry is more nervous than ever, while the EU and China accuse each other of being unwilling to compromise. Both sides stress that they are trying to negotiate a solution, but their positions are still far apart.
The extra tariffs will come into force on the night of Thursday to Friday, initially on a provisional basis. Manufacturers will not have to pay between 17.4 and 37.6 percent rates until November. After recalculations, the initial figure of 38.1 percent has been slightly reduced. The slightly lower maximum rate will apply to manufacturers who have refused to cooperate with the EU investigators.
The Chinese regard the European tariffs – and the indiscriminate US tariffs of 100 percent on Chinese EVs – as an unfair attack on China’s rise. In turn, China’s own support for the fledgling electric car industry is seen as an environmental policy instrument.
Trade expert Cui Fan from the University of International Business and Economics told the propaganda newspaper China Daily that achieving the green transition would take 20 to 30 years longer with market forces alone than under the influence of targeted subsidies and that the global green transformation cannot afford such a slow shift.
The EU’s demand to reduce subsidies also completely contradicts China’s industrial policy logic. The latter is based on many other criteria than exports to Europe, including environmental and modernization goals, as well as supporting the job market and the development of structurally weak regions.
The subsidies are so deeply embedded in the system that they cannot be switched off or turned down at the flick of a switch. One important reason for the low prices is the uncoordinated subsidization of local suppliers in the provinces, who make their own decisions. On top of this came a dramatic downturn as a result of the increasingly severe property crisis.
On the other hand, the EU Commission sees the Chinese promotion of its car industry as unfair subsidies with the aim of dominating foreign markets. After initial talks between Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis and Trade Minister Wang Wentao, the positions are still far apart. Dombrovskis explained that his own investigation was so balanced that a retaliation would be pointless. However, on Thursday, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced an anti-dumping investigation into the EU’s toluidine class of chemicals.
The Chinese Ministry of Commerce left all options open on Thursday. “We hope that the EU can work with China in the same direction to push for progress in consultations as soon as possible and reach a solution acceptable to both sides,” a ministry spokesperson said, adding that the four-month window should be used to advance the consultation process.
German car manufacturers like Volkswagen once again opposed the extra tariffs on Thursday. VW believes that the adverse effects of this decision outweigh the positive effects for the European and especially the German car industry. Instead, the company welcomes the competition and considers it essential to boost the EV market.
The Federation of German Industries (BDI) issued a convoluted statement on Thursday in an attempt to integrate the diverse interests of its member companies and its own assessment of the situation into one position. “Provisional countervailing duties are not a contradiction to negotiations,” said BDI Managing Director Tanja Goenner. “The Commission’s negotiating line should reflect the diversity of interests in the EU.” In other words, in Germany’s interests, it should not be too tough and uncompromising in the negotiations. However: “The BDI advocates minimizing the market-distorting effects of state industrial policy and countering unfair trade practices.”
Meanwhile, economists confirm the perception that, by international standards, China subsidizes in a manner that significantly distorts the market. Tariffs are generally seen as a means of protecting the EU market from this.
In a calculation published on Thursday, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), the Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO), and the Supply Chain Intelligence Institute Austria (ASCII) estimate that the measure could reduce vehicle imports from China by 42 percent. The main beneficiaries would be EU brands, whose sales could increase accordingly.
In fact, China’s exports are rising sharply. From January to May, EV exports to all parts of the world grew by almost 14 percent to over half a million vehicles, as the latest figures from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers show. This is in line with the EU’s assessment that the low sales figures to date should not obscure the fact that exports of these low-cost products could increase like an avalanche in the absence of trade measures.
The German car industry’s opposition has many reasons. Unlike the EU leadership and many economists who look at the overall geopolitical and macroeconomic picture, corporate executives focus on business performance. The dependency on China remains very high here.
In addition, many German brands also manufacture in China for Europe and vice versa. This means they are acutely vulnerable to tariffs.
Both Mercedes and BMW report that around 80 percent of their cars for the Chinese market are produced locally in China, while 20 percent are shipped from Europe. This mainly includes their premium models, such as the BMW 8 Series and 7 Series. At Volkswagen, these are Porsche, Bentley and Lamborghini cars. All of these exports to China would be affected by retaliation from the People’s Republic.
But even the current EU tariffs are not leaving all European suppliers unscathed:
Volkswagen and Mercedes, on the other hand, (largely) avoid shipping from China to the EU.
The controversial tariffs are added to the ten percent that the EU levies on imports from all WTO countries with which it does not have a free trade agreement. The tariff rates are:
The providers who have cooperated with the EU and now have to pay 20.8 percent include:
The details and language arrangements will be worked on until the last minute. It is clear that the package to Ukraine at the NATO summit in Washington will consist of four different parts. The core will be financial assurances that the alliance partners want to make to Kyiv. Outgoing Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg originally wanted to pledge €100 billion in military aid to Ukraine over several years. However, the 32 member states were unable to agree on this, partly because – according to Brussels – budget decisions in many member states cannot be made over several years without the national parliaments.
Instead, it has been agreed that support amounting to at least €40 billion will only be pledged within the next year. This corresponds to the level of aid since the start of the Russian war of aggression two and a half years ago. What happens after that will be discussed at the 2025 summit. Nevertheless, the final declaration should make it clear that NATO also intends to provide the necessary assistance beyond that. And for as long as this is necessary.
The exact form of burden sharing is still being negotiated. Including which support is included and which is not. From a German perspective, bilateral support and aid provided within the framework of the EU will be included. Berlin has promised €8 billion for this year, which roughly corresponds to the share that Germany has to contribute.
There are uncertainties concerning domestic political developments in relevant member states, above all the USA: A second term in office for Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump could call into question the continuity of aid to Ukraine. The ex-president recently emphasized that he could stop the war in Ukraine within a very short time.
The second major part of the Ukraine package – the “NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine” (NSATU) – must also be seen against this backdrop. This is intended to transfer the US-led ad hoc format for coordinating aid to Ukraine to the NATO structure and thus ensure that a new US president cannot stop the aid without further ado. At the Alliance’s headquarters, there is talk of “Trump-proofing” in this context. Whether the calculation will work out is debatable. France is an additional uncertainty factor. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National has already threatened to pull out of the integrated military command again in the past.
In addition, NATO wants to appoint a special envoy in Kyiv who can evaluate Ukraine’s needs on the ground like a kind of ambassador and oversee NATO’s initiatives. It is not yet known who will take on this role. The member states are trying to find an official with experience in Ukraine for the job.
The fourth part of the package is the language used concerning Ukraine’s future membership of the alliance. The topic is both sensitive and symbolically important. At last year’s NATO summit in Vilnius, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy vented his disappointment over the lack of an invitation via social media and temporarily jeopardized the summit harmony. Similar discord is to be avoided at all costs this time.
Selensky himself, who is also expected in Washington, is also involved in managing expectations this time. The aim is not to fall “behind Bucharest and Vilnius” in terms of language. At the summit in Bucharest in 2008, Ukraine was offered the prospect of accession for the first time. And in Vilnius 2023, the “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) was canceled as a preliminary stage.
However, the most important thing for the NATO states is still that Ukraine receives the weapons systems it needs to defend its country as quickly as possible. For this reason, further security agreements are likely to be concluded in Washington in parallel with the package. With a view to their own defense readiness and the problems with the procurement of ammunition, for example, the NATO partners also want to commit to expanding the production of armaments.
The plan is for the member states to regularly submit national defense industry plans. Ukraine can already hope for more Patriot air defense systems from its alliance partners at the summit. Whether there will actually be seven, as requested by Kyiv, or possibly only six, is one of the few open questions that the heads of government are still dealing with in the last few meters before the summit. The aim is to avoid too many points of contention on the ground. After all, they want to send an image of unity to Moscow at all costs.
The United Kingdom has voted. And the British seem to have slowly come to terms with the political tsunami that began in 2016 with the Brexit referendum – even if the country is still struggling with the consequences.
On the other side of the Channel, France is currently experiencing its Brexit moment. The question is whether French voters will give the Rassemblement National (RN) an absolute majority on Sunday. If the RN passes the 289-seat threshold, party leader Jordan Bardella will become prime minister and head a government with ministers from the far right. Like Brexit, this new government will trigger a political tsunami in France – and in Europe.
In the Council, the member states usually decide by qualified majority: If at least four member states representing 35% of the EU population join together to vote against legislative proposals or abstain, they form a blocking minority. And this is exactly what could soon happen more frequently with an RN government. “The governments led by the far-right in the EU would reach the blocking minority with France”, notes MEP and former chair of the Environment Committee Pascal Canfin. The votes of the governments of Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and France together make up 35.7 percent of the EU population.
When French Minister for European Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot was questioned on this topic by French senators at a hearing at the end of June, he brushed this danger aside. “It doesn’t take a nationalist party to form a blocking minority, because we have already formed them before to prevent texts that were against French interests”, he remarked.
The consensus in Paris and Brussels is that there will be a political showdown in Paris, especially if President Emmanuel Macron has to work with an RN government. “The prime minister and the government play a very important role in French European policy”, said a French diplomat. It is not only made in the Élysée Palace.
France’s European policy is de facto managed by the General Secretariat for European Affairs – the authority that steers the country’s European policy at the inter-ministerial level. It is also managed by the French Permanent Representation in Brussels, which has a leading role in technical and diplomatic negotiations in the Council. Both bodies are primarily controlled by the government and not directly by the Élysée Palace.
If the RN comes to power, the adoption of the EU budget for the next seven years will cause serious tensions. “Negotiations on the multiannual financial framework for the period 2028 to 2034 will be more complicated than usual, as the EU is faced with a large number of spending requests”, observes Eulalia Rubio, senior researcher for European economic affairs at the Jacques Delors Institute. The RN is calling for the French contribution to the EU budget to be cut by “two to three billion” euros. France’s net contribution amounts to around nine billion euros per year.
Should the RN come to power and make the demand a reality, the negotiations will become even more complicated, as the budget is adopted unanimously, which gives all states the right to veto. Rubio expects that an RN government will oppose any additional demands on the EU budget – be it for defense spending, support for Ukraine, or the financing of electricity grids. “The new political orientation in France could significantly diminish Europe’s fiscal ambitions”, Rubio concludes.
A landslide victory for Labour in the UK general election was to be expected. However, the fact that it was so clear is likely to cause long faces among the Tories. After the polls closed at 11 p.m. on Thursday, the usually very precise British exit polls showed an absolute majority for Keir Starmer’s Social Democrats.
Labour has 410 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons, almost twice as many as before. With 131 seats, the Tories have less than half as many MPs as before. The Liberal Democrats have 61 seats, Nigel Farage’s Reform UK 13 seats, and the Scottish National Party 10 seats.
While the right-wing forces made gains in the European elections a month ago, the UK appears to be moving to the left against all trends. This offers an opportunity for relations with the EU. Although Prime Minister Keir Starmer will not seek to return the UK to the EU, there could be more cooperation in individual policy areas.
This applies in particular to foreign and security policy, as cooperation is possible here independently of the EU Single Market and the United Kingdom does not have to adapt to EU rules. Cooperation should also be easier for the EU because they no longer have to deal with the Tories responsible for Brexit.
Labor therefore offers the opportunity to renew relations. A strong partnership within the Western alliances G7 and NATO could become particularly important in the event of Donald Trump’s re-election in the US. European security would then probably no longer play such a major role in the White House and Europe would have to move closer together again.
We wish you a pleasant weekend!
Ursula von der Leyen is seeking the support of the EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens. She takes time to speak extensively with the parliamentary groups and holds one-to-one meetings with MEPs. The political groups formulate their substantive demands. They make their votes in the ballot in the first week of the new European Parliament in Strasbourg from July 16 dependent on von der Leyen’s assurances that the demands will be met. Below is an overview of the demands.
EPP leader Manfred Weber has drawn up a 5-point plan with projects that the 188 future MEPs discussed with von der Leyen until Thursday afternoon.
The first section is about defense and security. “Europe must be able to defend itself and fulfill its obligations in NATO.”
The second section is about stopping illegal immigration. Not smugglers, but rather the state must decide who is admitted:
The third chapter outlines the competition strategy. The internal market and the ability to innovate are the means to improve competitiveness and expand economic relations:
The fourth chapter is about protecting the European way of life. The aim is to build bridges between generations and to protect the climate and planet for future generations:
The fifth chapter is entitled strengthening democracy in the world. In the new global environment, Europe can only defend its interests if it speaks with one voice, reacts quickly and coordinates immediately with its partners.
The Social Democrats have also compiled a paper with key demands. They are seeking a successor to NextGenerationEU to finance social, climate and industrial policy. The investment program to cushion the impact of the coronavirus crisis expires at the end of 2026. In detail, they are calling for
Among other things, they want to finance a Green Deal Industrial Act with further development of the Net-Zero Industry Act into a Buy Green and European Act. The next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF ) and the new own resources should also enable new defense spending.
In the environmental area, S&D advocates a CO2 reduction target of 90 to 95 percent for 2040 in the final version of the demands paper and adherence to the 2035 end of combustion engines and the regulation for deforestation-free supply chains.
The Social Democrats want to strengthen the rule of law through majority decisions in Article 7 proceedings. Infringement proceedings should be consistently brought before the ECJ. Respect for fundamental rights and democratic principles should be a basic condition for access to all EU funding programs.
The Renew Group will receive von der Leyen on Tuesday or Wednesday. The exact date has not yet been set. At their meeting last Tuesday, the Liberals discussed their demands for the designated new Commission President internally. The group leadership around Valérie Hayer is currently in the process of putting the consolidated list of demands on paper. From the Liberals’ point of view, these are conditions that von der Leyen must take up if she wants to be elected for a second term of office with the votes of the Renew MEPs.
According to those involved, the demands relate to the institutional structure as well as to points of content:
The Greens have not yet written a paper with their demands. In talks with von der Leyen, however, they have made it clear what their priorities are:
The EU’s announcement to impose extra tariffs on Chinese EVs comes at an increasingly volatile time. The German automotive industry is more nervous than ever, while the EU and China accuse each other of being unwilling to compromise. Both sides stress that they are trying to negotiate a solution, but their positions are still far apart.
The extra tariffs will come into force on the night of Thursday to Friday, initially on a provisional basis. Manufacturers will not have to pay between 17.4 and 37.6 percent rates until November. After recalculations, the initial figure of 38.1 percent has been slightly reduced. The slightly lower maximum rate will apply to manufacturers who have refused to cooperate with the EU investigators.
The Chinese regard the European tariffs – and the indiscriminate US tariffs of 100 percent on Chinese EVs – as an unfair attack on China’s rise. In turn, China’s own support for the fledgling electric car industry is seen as an environmental policy instrument.
Trade expert Cui Fan from the University of International Business and Economics told the propaganda newspaper China Daily that achieving the green transition would take 20 to 30 years longer with market forces alone than under the influence of targeted subsidies and that the global green transformation cannot afford such a slow shift.
The EU’s demand to reduce subsidies also completely contradicts China’s industrial policy logic. The latter is based on many other criteria than exports to Europe, including environmental and modernization goals, as well as supporting the job market and the development of structurally weak regions.
The subsidies are so deeply embedded in the system that they cannot be switched off or turned down at the flick of a switch. One important reason for the low prices is the uncoordinated subsidization of local suppliers in the provinces, who make their own decisions. On top of this came a dramatic downturn as a result of the increasingly severe property crisis.
On the other hand, the EU Commission sees the Chinese promotion of its car industry as unfair subsidies with the aim of dominating foreign markets. After initial talks between Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis and Trade Minister Wang Wentao, the positions are still far apart. Dombrovskis explained that his own investigation was so balanced that a retaliation would be pointless. However, on Thursday, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced an anti-dumping investigation into the EU’s toluidine class of chemicals.
The Chinese Ministry of Commerce left all options open on Thursday. “We hope that the EU can work with China in the same direction to push for progress in consultations as soon as possible and reach a solution acceptable to both sides,” a ministry spokesperson said, adding that the four-month window should be used to advance the consultation process.
German car manufacturers like Volkswagen once again opposed the extra tariffs on Thursday. VW believes that the adverse effects of this decision outweigh the positive effects for the European and especially the German car industry. Instead, the company welcomes the competition and considers it essential to boost the EV market.
The Federation of German Industries (BDI) issued a convoluted statement on Thursday in an attempt to integrate the diverse interests of its member companies and its own assessment of the situation into one position. “Provisional countervailing duties are not a contradiction to negotiations,” said BDI Managing Director Tanja Goenner. “The Commission’s negotiating line should reflect the diversity of interests in the EU.” In other words, in Germany’s interests, it should not be too tough and uncompromising in the negotiations. However: “The BDI advocates minimizing the market-distorting effects of state industrial policy and countering unfair trade practices.”
Meanwhile, economists confirm the perception that, by international standards, China subsidizes in a manner that significantly distorts the market. Tariffs are generally seen as a means of protecting the EU market from this.
In a calculation published on Thursday, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), the Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO), and the Supply Chain Intelligence Institute Austria (ASCII) estimate that the measure could reduce vehicle imports from China by 42 percent. The main beneficiaries would be EU brands, whose sales could increase accordingly.
In fact, China’s exports are rising sharply. From January to May, EV exports to all parts of the world grew by almost 14 percent to over half a million vehicles, as the latest figures from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers show. This is in line with the EU’s assessment that the low sales figures to date should not obscure the fact that exports of these low-cost products could increase like an avalanche in the absence of trade measures.
The German car industry’s opposition has many reasons. Unlike the EU leadership and many economists who look at the overall geopolitical and macroeconomic picture, corporate executives focus on business performance. The dependency on China remains very high here.
In addition, many German brands also manufacture in China for Europe and vice versa. This means they are acutely vulnerable to tariffs.
Both Mercedes and BMW report that around 80 percent of their cars for the Chinese market are produced locally in China, while 20 percent are shipped from Europe. This mainly includes their premium models, such as the BMW 8 Series and 7 Series. At Volkswagen, these are Porsche, Bentley and Lamborghini cars. All of these exports to China would be affected by retaliation from the People’s Republic.
But even the current EU tariffs are not leaving all European suppliers unscathed:
Volkswagen and Mercedes, on the other hand, (largely) avoid shipping from China to the EU.
The controversial tariffs are added to the ten percent that the EU levies on imports from all WTO countries with which it does not have a free trade agreement. The tariff rates are:
The providers who have cooperated with the EU and now have to pay 20.8 percent include:
The details and language arrangements will be worked on until the last minute. It is clear that the package to Ukraine at the NATO summit in Washington will consist of four different parts. The core will be financial assurances that the alliance partners want to make to Kyiv. Outgoing Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg originally wanted to pledge €100 billion in military aid to Ukraine over several years. However, the 32 member states were unable to agree on this, partly because – according to Brussels – budget decisions in many member states cannot be made over several years without the national parliaments.
Instead, it has been agreed that support amounting to at least €40 billion will only be pledged within the next year. This corresponds to the level of aid since the start of the Russian war of aggression two and a half years ago. What happens after that will be discussed at the 2025 summit. Nevertheless, the final declaration should make it clear that NATO also intends to provide the necessary assistance beyond that. And for as long as this is necessary.
The exact form of burden sharing is still being negotiated. Including which support is included and which is not. From a German perspective, bilateral support and aid provided within the framework of the EU will be included. Berlin has promised €8 billion for this year, which roughly corresponds to the share that Germany has to contribute.
There are uncertainties concerning domestic political developments in relevant member states, above all the USA: A second term in office for Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump could call into question the continuity of aid to Ukraine. The ex-president recently emphasized that he could stop the war in Ukraine within a very short time.
The second major part of the Ukraine package – the “NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine” (NSATU) – must also be seen against this backdrop. This is intended to transfer the US-led ad hoc format for coordinating aid to Ukraine to the NATO structure and thus ensure that a new US president cannot stop the aid without further ado. At the Alliance’s headquarters, there is talk of “Trump-proofing” in this context. Whether the calculation will work out is debatable. France is an additional uncertainty factor. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National has already threatened to pull out of the integrated military command again in the past.
In addition, NATO wants to appoint a special envoy in Kyiv who can evaluate Ukraine’s needs on the ground like a kind of ambassador and oversee NATO’s initiatives. It is not yet known who will take on this role. The member states are trying to find an official with experience in Ukraine for the job.
The fourth part of the package is the language used concerning Ukraine’s future membership of the alliance. The topic is both sensitive and symbolically important. At last year’s NATO summit in Vilnius, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy vented his disappointment over the lack of an invitation via social media and temporarily jeopardized the summit harmony. Similar discord is to be avoided at all costs this time.
Selensky himself, who is also expected in Washington, is also involved in managing expectations this time. The aim is not to fall “behind Bucharest and Vilnius” in terms of language. At the summit in Bucharest in 2008, Ukraine was offered the prospect of accession for the first time. And in Vilnius 2023, the “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) was canceled as a preliminary stage.
However, the most important thing for the NATO states is still that Ukraine receives the weapons systems it needs to defend its country as quickly as possible. For this reason, further security agreements are likely to be concluded in Washington in parallel with the package. With a view to their own defense readiness and the problems with the procurement of ammunition, for example, the NATO partners also want to commit to expanding the production of armaments.
The plan is for the member states to regularly submit national defense industry plans. Ukraine can already hope for more Patriot air defense systems from its alliance partners at the summit. Whether there will actually be seven, as requested by Kyiv, or possibly only six, is one of the few open questions that the heads of government are still dealing with in the last few meters before the summit. The aim is to avoid too many points of contention on the ground. After all, they want to send an image of unity to Moscow at all costs.
The United Kingdom has voted. And the British seem to have slowly come to terms with the political tsunami that began in 2016 with the Brexit referendum – even if the country is still struggling with the consequences.
On the other side of the Channel, France is currently experiencing its Brexit moment. The question is whether French voters will give the Rassemblement National (RN) an absolute majority on Sunday. If the RN passes the 289-seat threshold, party leader Jordan Bardella will become prime minister and head a government with ministers from the far right. Like Brexit, this new government will trigger a political tsunami in France – and in Europe.
In the Council, the member states usually decide by qualified majority: If at least four member states representing 35% of the EU population join together to vote against legislative proposals or abstain, they form a blocking minority. And this is exactly what could soon happen more frequently with an RN government. “The governments led by the far-right in the EU would reach the blocking minority with France”, notes MEP and former chair of the Environment Committee Pascal Canfin. The votes of the governments of Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and France together make up 35.7 percent of the EU population.
When French Minister for European Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot was questioned on this topic by French senators at a hearing at the end of June, he brushed this danger aside. “It doesn’t take a nationalist party to form a blocking minority, because we have already formed them before to prevent texts that were against French interests”, he remarked.
The consensus in Paris and Brussels is that there will be a political showdown in Paris, especially if President Emmanuel Macron has to work with an RN government. “The prime minister and the government play a very important role in French European policy”, said a French diplomat. It is not only made in the Élysée Palace.
France’s European policy is de facto managed by the General Secretariat for European Affairs – the authority that steers the country’s European policy at the inter-ministerial level. It is also managed by the French Permanent Representation in Brussels, which has a leading role in technical and diplomatic negotiations in the Council. Both bodies are primarily controlled by the government and not directly by the Élysée Palace.
If the RN comes to power, the adoption of the EU budget for the next seven years will cause serious tensions. “Negotiations on the multiannual financial framework for the period 2028 to 2034 will be more complicated than usual, as the EU is faced with a large number of spending requests”, observes Eulalia Rubio, senior researcher for European economic affairs at the Jacques Delors Institute. The RN is calling for the French contribution to the EU budget to be cut by “two to three billion” euros. France’s net contribution amounts to around nine billion euros per year.
Should the RN come to power and make the demand a reality, the negotiations will become even more complicated, as the budget is adopted unanimously, which gives all states the right to veto. Rubio expects that an RN government will oppose any additional demands on the EU budget – be it for defense spending, support for Ukraine, or the financing of electricity grids. “The new political orientation in France could significantly diminish Europe’s fiscal ambitions”, Rubio concludes.
