When the environment ministers of the EU countries meet in Brussels today, they will discuss the Waste Shipment Regulation, the regulation of microplastics and the Commission’s proposal on the EU’s 2040 climate target. As is so often the case, however, what is not on the agenda is much more important: the Nature Restoration Law.
After the ambassadors of the member states were unable to agree on the controversial law to restore nature due to a lack of majorities on Friday, the Belgian Council Presidency postponed the final vote of the ministers indefinitely.
It cannot be ruled out that the law will be passed at one of the next ministerial meetings. And since only the approval of the countries is missing and the Council meetings run independently of the EU election cycle, there is no imminent deadline for the restoration law with regard to the upcoming European elections. However, neither the Belgians nor the Hungarians (Budapest takes over the Council Presidency in July) seem to be big fans of the law. It is therefore possible that the Nature Restoration Law will be put on the back burner after all.
Whether you think this is good news or bad news, have a good start to the new week.
“Irresponsible”, “reckless” or “danger for Europe.” The statements made by European heads of state and government about Donald Trump have recently been less than flattering. There is also no sign of anticipation in the working paper the German Institute for International and Security Affairs intends to publish this Monday. In it, foreign policy experts from 19 European countries have their say.
“Many are worried about Trump’s interest-driven, isolationist and disruptive style of government,” reads the introduction by SWP authors Claudia Major, Laura von Daniels and Nicolai von Ondarza. “But there are also voices that see common ground with Trump on foreign and security policy issues as well as in ‘identity politics’.”
The countries are particularly concerned about three areas: democracy, defense and trade. Anti-democratic forces could feel a boost from Trump’s possible election victory (“spillover”), right-wing populist politicians could feel attracted to Trump and offer him cooperation.
According to the report, the USA remains “irreplaceable” for military aid to Ukraine. However, many countries are concerned that Trump could enforce a ceasefire against the will of Ukraine and thus perhaps also against European interests (“capitulation peace”). These fears are expressed primarily in EU/NATO states with a border to Russia. How should the EU, which is dependent on US funds in NATO, behave?
The influence of the conservative Heritage Foundation on Trump is also an issue in many countries. The think tank is an ideological front organization of the Trump campaign. There is speculation as to whether, in the best-case scenario, Trump will retain the billions in aid for Ukraine but switch from grants to loans.
In the Baltic states, Norway and Poland, diplomats and politicians fear that Trump sees transatlantic relations primarily as a business relationship and could question the “value of alliances and pacts in themselves.”
The debate about the two percent target for defense spending will be fueled in the EU by a possible President Trump, according to the analysis. “While everyone agrees that the EU needs to do more, there are differences on how to achieve the target.” While Norway and Germany would try to implement increased funding for defense spending as a kind of “prevention policy” even before the NATO summit in Washington, countries such as France and Poland would hardly feel addressed. Norway wants to reach the two percent mark before the summit in order to avoid Trump’s criticism.
Trump’s expected rustic government policy could also have geopolitical repercussions in places where they were previously unsuspected. According to the SWP report, Spain is worried about the rise of right-wing populism in some South American countries and Bulgaria fears that Trump’s radical plans will cause chaos in Balkan politics. The Czech Republic is not so critical of a second Trump term; after all, it was Trump who provided Ukraine with weapons early on and sent troops to Eastern Europe.
In terms of economic and trade policy, countries expect major upheavals in Trump’s second term in office. In particular, possible US sanctions on technology exports to China are mentioned. “These factors could have far-reaching effects on global trade and investment flows.” These concerns are most frequently voiced in countries that rely on international trade, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland or Sweden.
Some European experts do see one key advantage of a renewed US presidency for Donald Trump. Trump could be a “unifying factor” for the EU. Given the major challenge that a Trump presidency poses for Europe, some internal EU differences seem almost petty.
Are you happier with the EU’s China policy today than five years ago?
Yes, because five years ago, the EU had just completed the difficult operation of presenting a new framework definition for European relations with China: the triad of partner, competitor, and systemic rival. At the time, there were many concerns whether this was not over-critical. The German government only gave pushback. The Chancellor did not even use the word systemic rivalry until the end of her term of office. There were defeatist tendencies in the European Union, along the lines of “You can’t rely on the USA with President Trump, we Europeans can’t come to a common denominator – then you just have to take what you can get from China.”
Today we see that the more critical stance was the more realistic one. This is not a minority position but is widely shared and also very clearly represented by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. Xi Jinping has not only brought about a political regression in China itself but has also struck a new, much more aggressive chord regarding China’s role in the world. If we Europeans had not set out on this path, we would be in a pretty sorry state today. The European Parliament can proudly boast of this: Thanks to our unity on China policy, we have helped ensure that several trade defense instruments really do exist today.
The past three years, in particular, have marked a clear change of course for the EU Commission. Where is still room for improvement?
We still have too much disagreement on important China policy issues, which is also reflected in reactions to proposals from the EU Commission. With regard to economic security, the Commission rightly says that we need additional strategies and measures. We will need outbound investment screening. But so far, German Economy Minister Robert Habeck has been the only one who dared to say this. There is not enough consensus between the capitals on other issues relating to relations with China.
Where do you see that?
Take the current situation in Hong Kong, for example. It passed a National Security Law, under which a person can be sentenced to 14 years in prison if they do not report a neighbor thinking about participating in a peaceful protest that the government does not like. Where are the appropriate responses to this? It would be entirely appropriate to sanction Hong Kong’s Government Executive and human rights opponent, John Lee, as the United States has done for a long time. Incidentally, China policy is not just what we do in our direct relationship with China. China policy has to consider the entire international environment.
What needs to be on the to-do list of the next EU Commission?
This agenda almost writes itself. Economic security is becoming more pressing due to China’s policy of further subsidizing overcapacity in many industrial sectors. Where is all this going? The US market is largely closed. The Japanese are also protecting themselves. We are relatively open. Jens Eskelund, President of the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, warns that this Chinese subsidy offensive threatens to partially deindustrialize Europe. That has to be taken seriously.
What else?
A second issue remains China’s relationship with Russia. China is not somewhat neutral. Without China’s active support, Russian President Vladimir Putin would not be able to wage his war the way he is waging it. China is a country that is helping Putin to destroy Europe’s security architecture. A third issue is China’s actions in its own neighborhood: in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and especially in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian-Himalayan border and China’s confrontational policy in the global environment through economic blackmail also deserve mentioning.
We cannot wait our turn, we must show solidarity to maintain an international order based on the principles of the United Nations. One weakness is that our China policy comes across more as European self-defense than as a European contribution to a positive order for the majority of international partners in the future.
What is on your personal agenda for the next few years?
I have been involved with China for more than 50 years. I will not let that go. The details of what I will do have not yet been decided. However, I have taken over the chairmanship of a new German-Taiwanese dialogue platform that the German government has set up. I will strive to strengthen civil society engagement with our Taiwanese partners. I am particularly interested in not always looking at Taiwan through the lens of cross-strait relations. It is also interesting to discuss how Taiwan deals with its own history of dictatorship, how it handles minority issues and how it facilitates social diversity – more so than other Asian countries do.
Will you also try to generate more interest in Taiwan in Berlin and Brussels so that there will be some progress towards a bilateral trade agreement?
We are currently in an interesting phase on that. Taiwan has long insisted that we need a bilateral investment agreement. We have also clearly supported this several times in the European Parliament with huge majorities. However, many companies tell us we should follow the old American principle: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The problem is not that you can’t invest. Other unresolved issues are more important. For example, I would like to see an agreement on resilient supply chains with Taiwan. I think we need to take a pragmatic approach here. The five major democratic groups in the European Parliament have managed to reach a consensus. I would like to see the same for the EU member states and the German Bundestag.
Who will succeed you as the German voice for China in Brussels and Strasbourg?
Wait and see.
Reinhard Bütikofer is a Green MEP and Chairman of the European Parliament’s China delegation. He recently became co-chair of the German-Taiwanese dialogue forum.
The liberal forces in Slovakia are breathing a sigh of relief. Ever since Putin’s friend Robert Fico won the parliamentary elections six months ago and set about overturning the western, democratic orientation of the EU and NATO country at breakneck speed, something akin to panic had spread among the opposition. But the first round of the presidential election on Saturday allowed a surprising insight.
Fico and his nationalist partners are not invulnerable. It was not their candidate, the previous parliamentary speaker Peter Pellegrini, who won the race, but his opponent from the liberal opposition, the diplomat and former foreign minister Ivan Korčok. And with a lead that should not be underestimated. According to the provisional final result, Korčok received 42.5 percent of the vote and Pellegrini 37 percent.
No more talk of depression and hopelessness, the editor-in-chief of the daily Denník N, Matúš Kostolný, wrote in a commentary on Sunday: after the parliamentary elections “many people had the feeling that a defeat would mean the end and that Fico would rule for years. Korčok’s victory is proof that it doesn’t have to be that way. Fico has not confused the whole country and there is still a chance to defeat him. Slovakia is not Fico country.”
Fico was the first to target the judicial system. He abolished the Special Court, which dealt with cases of serious corruption involving shady people close to the long-term head of government – and which also dealt with the murder of the young investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée.
Fico’s presidential candidate Pellegrini, whose Social Democratic Party is a member of the government, supports this. Just as it supports the foreign policy shift to fully back Putin and no longer support Ukraine with weapons. With Pellegrini as president, Prime Minister Fico would have the chance to govern through.
The outcome of the first round of voting was not necessarily expected, even for the two candidates who will meet again in the run-off on April 6. Pellegrini’s expression showed increasing disappointment as his initial lead from the count in rural areas diminished and he eventually had to let Korčok pass him when the results from the cities with liberal voters came in.
Korčok, on the other hand, looked very relieved, as if a big rucksack had fallen off his back. He gave the impression of being a little surprised by his own success. And to prevent himself from becoming too euphoric, he said: “The result looks hopeful. But I’m keeping my feet on the ground.”
However, Korčok is feeling an unexpectedly strong tailwind, which he wants to use at rallies in the run-up to the second ballot. Before the second round of voting, he also wants to address the voters of the governing parties. “Those who do not identify with the vulgarity and lack of culture revealed by the governing coalition,” he said.
Pellegrini announced that he would ask the candidates who had failed in the first round for support. He is relying primarily on the voters of the Hungarian minority and those of the third-placed candidate from the first round, former Justice Minister Štefan Harabin. The ultra-nationalist, for whom Putin is not the aggressor in the Ukraine conflict, achieved 11.74 percent of the vote.
Pellegrini also emphasized once again to journalists that only he knows how to defend Slovakia’s interests and warned “that Korčok will drag Slovakia into the war in Ukraine.” A completely misleading claim, especially as it is not the president who decides on the deployment of Slovakian soldiers, but only the government and parliament.
Political analysts see Pellegrini as having a slight advantage in the run-off. But for most, the Fico candidate was already the favorite for the first round. He did not live up to this role. Hans-Jörg Schmidt, Prague
Simon Harris is expected to become Ireland’s new Prime Minister. On Sunday, he was elected unopposed to succeed Leo Varadkar as leader of the ruling Fine Gael party. Harris promised to support small businesses, tackle the issue of migration and focus on law and order.
The 37-year-old Harris is currently Minister for Research and is expected to be elected as Ireland’s youngest-ever Prime Minister at the next parliamentary session on April 9th thanks to the support of the coalition partners.
He has less than a year to save the coalition from defeat in the general election. In the polls over the last three years, Sinn Fein, which supports reunification with British-ruled Northern Ireland, has been named as the favorite to lead the next government. Varadkar had surprisingly announced his resignation on Wednesday. rtr
Félix Bolaños is the most powerful man in Pedro Sánchez’s government. Since November 2023, Bolaños has been Minister for the Presidency, Justice and Parliamentary Relations. The super minister is one of the architects of the amnesty law, which aims to ensure that Catalan separatists remain unpunished for crimes such as corruption, embezzlement and terrorism. During this legislative period, he is maintaining relations with the Catalan separatists, the EU institutions and the opposition in order to achieve a reform of the Spanish justice system.
Bolaños was born in Madrid in 1975. He is the only son of a couple of emigrants who met in Munich while working in a factory. Together, they returned to Spain to open a bird and plant shop in Madrid. To finance his law studies at the Complutense University, Bolaños worked as a soccer referee and pizza delivery boy. He began his legal career at the renowned law firm Uría y Menéndez. In 2005, he moved to the Bank of Spain, where he was head of the labor law advice and legal documentation department from 2008 to 2018.
Bolaños joined the Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) at the age of 27. It is said that he had no reason to enter politics because of the money he earned as a lawyer. Nevertheless, he volunteered for the party alongside his work at the Bank of Spain. At weekends, he provided free legal advice for the PSOE in Madrid, initially supporting immigrants and then fellow party members.
Sánchez and Bolaños met at a PSOE party in 2014. Sánchez was a member of Madrid City Council at the time but had the ambition to become party leader. Bolaños offered to help Sánchez with the legal aspects and the PSOE statutes. When Sánchez was promoted to Secretary General of the PSOE in the same year, Bolaños was given a place in the PSOE’s national organizational structure. Following the motion of no confidence in Mariano Rajoy (Popular Party) in 2018, Sánchez took over as head of government and appointed Bolaños as Secretary General of the Office of the President. In this key position, in which he worked closely with Sánchez, he coordinated the work of the government.
Félix Bolaños is above all the discreet man in the Sánchez government who plans and carries out the most delicate operations. During Sánchez’s first term in office, Bolaños played a key role in the exhumation of the remains of the dictator Francisco Franco from the Valley of the Fallen, which was renamed the Valley of Cuelgamuros.
Bolaños was also responsible for the development of the PSOE’s new political organization model, which gave Sánchez almost all the power, as well as for the renewal of the PSOE-affiliated Radio Televisión Española (RTVE).
As a minister in Pedro Sánchez’s second term of office, Bolaños led the “de-judicialization” of the Catalan independence process. This aimed to strengthen the political dimension of the conflict and focus less on legal proceedings. The negotiations culminated in amendments to the penal code agreed with the separatist party Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC) in order to reform the criminal offense of embezzlement and abolish the criminal offense of sedition. Bolaños was the legal architect of the pardons for Catalan separatists in 2021.
Both the pardons for the Catalan separatists already convicted in court and the amendments to the penal code and, above all, the amnesty law were the supposed “red lines” that the socialists “never” wanted to cross. However, since Sánchez came to power in 2018, all promises have been thrown overboard in order to obtain the necessary parliamentary support to remain in the Moncloa Palace.
Bolaños euphorically congratulated himself on the amnesty law after the PSOE and Carles Puigdemont’s Junts party reached an agreement on March 7 on the changes to the law demanded by the separatist leader. He emphasized that the law would “set standards worldwide.”
In an interview with the radio station Onda Cero at the beginning of March, Bolaños admitted that the amnesty law does not enjoy the social support claimed by the government. According to a survey conducted by SocioMétrica in January of this year, 72 percent of Spaniards are against the law, including 41 percent of PSOE supporters and 51 percent of Catalans. But Bolaños claims: “With every month that Pedro Sánchez governs, there are fewer supporters of independence in Catalonia.” However, this narrative does not hold water. Neither does the alleged reconciliation with Catalonia, which the government cites as the reason for the amnesty law. Both the ERC and Junts insist that they want Catalonia to become independent after the amnesty. Isabel Cuesta
When the environment ministers of the EU countries meet in Brussels today, they will discuss the Waste Shipment Regulation, the regulation of microplastics and the Commission’s proposal on the EU’s 2040 climate target. As is so often the case, however, what is not on the agenda is much more important: the Nature Restoration Law.
After the ambassadors of the member states were unable to agree on the controversial law to restore nature due to a lack of majorities on Friday, the Belgian Council Presidency postponed the final vote of the ministers indefinitely.
It cannot be ruled out that the law will be passed at one of the next ministerial meetings. And since only the approval of the countries is missing and the Council meetings run independently of the EU election cycle, there is no imminent deadline for the restoration law with regard to the upcoming European elections. However, neither the Belgians nor the Hungarians (Budapest takes over the Council Presidency in July) seem to be big fans of the law. It is therefore possible that the Nature Restoration Law will be put on the back burner after all.
Whether you think this is good news or bad news, have a good start to the new week.
“Irresponsible”, “reckless” or “danger for Europe.” The statements made by European heads of state and government about Donald Trump have recently been less than flattering. There is also no sign of anticipation in the working paper the German Institute for International and Security Affairs intends to publish this Monday. In it, foreign policy experts from 19 European countries have their say.
“Many are worried about Trump’s interest-driven, isolationist and disruptive style of government,” reads the introduction by SWP authors Claudia Major, Laura von Daniels and Nicolai von Ondarza. “But there are also voices that see common ground with Trump on foreign and security policy issues as well as in ‘identity politics’.”
The countries are particularly concerned about three areas: democracy, defense and trade. Anti-democratic forces could feel a boost from Trump’s possible election victory (“spillover”), right-wing populist politicians could feel attracted to Trump and offer him cooperation.
According to the report, the USA remains “irreplaceable” for military aid to Ukraine. However, many countries are concerned that Trump could enforce a ceasefire against the will of Ukraine and thus perhaps also against European interests (“capitulation peace”). These fears are expressed primarily in EU/NATO states with a border to Russia. How should the EU, which is dependent on US funds in NATO, behave?
The influence of the conservative Heritage Foundation on Trump is also an issue in many countries. The think tank is an ideological front organization of the Trump campaign. There is speculation as to whether, in the best-case scenario, Trump will retain the billions in aid for Ukraine but switch from grants to loans.
In the Baltic states, Norway and Poland, diplomats and politicians fear that Trump sees transatlantic relations primarily as a business relationship and could question the “value of alliances and pacts in themselves.”
The debate about the two percent target for defense spending will be fueled in the EU by a possible President Trump, according to the analysis. “While everyone agrees that the EU needs to do more, there are differences on how to achieve the target.” While Norway and Germany would try to implement increased funding for defense spending as a kind of “prevention policy” even before the NATO summit in Washington, countries such as France and Poland would hardly feel addressed. Norway wants to reach the two percent mark before the summit in order to avoid Trump’s criticism.
Trump’s expected rustic government policy could also have geopolitical repercussions in places where they were previously unsuspected. According to the SWP report, Spain is worried about the rise of right-wing populism in some South American countries and Bulgaria fears that Trump’s radical plans will cause chaos in Balkan politics. The Czech Republic is not so critical of a second Trump term; after all, it was Trump who provided Ukraine with weapons early on and sent troops to Eastern Europe.
In terms of economic and trade policy, countries expect major upheavals in Trump’s second term in office. In particular, possible US sanctions on technology exports to China are mentioned. “These factors could have far-reaching effects on global trade and investment flows.” These concerns are most frequently voiced in countries that rely on international trade, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland or Sweden.
Some European experts do see one key advantage of a renewed US presidency for Donald Trump. Trump could be a “unifying factor” for the EU. Given the major challenge that a Trump presidency poses for Europe, some internal EU differences seem almost petty.
Are you happier with the EU’s China policy today than five years ago?
Yes, because five years ago, the EU had just completed the difficult operation of presenting a new framework definition for European relations with China: the triad of partner, competitor, and systemic rival. At the time, there were many concerns whether this was not over-critical. The German government only gave pushback. The Chancellor did not even use the word systemic rivalry until the end of her term of office. There were defeatist tendencies in the European Union, along the lines of “You can’t rely on the USA with President Trump, we Europeans can’t come to a common denominator – then you just have to take what you can get from China.”
Today we see that the more critical stance was the more realistic one. This is not a minority position but is widely shared and also very clearly represented by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. Xi Jinping has not only brought about a political regression in China itself but has also struck a new, much more aggressive chord regarding China’s role in the world. If we Europeans had not set out on this path, we would be in a pretty sorry state today. The European Parliament can proudly boast of this: Thanks to our unity on China policy, we have helped ensure that several trade defense instruments really do exist today.
The past three years, in particular, have marked a clear change of course for the EU Commission. Where is still room for improvement?
We still have too much disagreement on important China policy issues, which is also reflected in reactions to proposals from the EU Commission. With regard to economic security, the Commission rightly says that we need additional strategies and measures. We will need outbound investment screening. But so far, German Economy Minister Robert Habeck has been the only one who dared to say this. There is not enough consensus between the capitals on other issues relating to relations with China.
Where do you see that?
Take the current situation in Hong Kong, for example. It passed a National Security Law, under which a person can be sentenced to 14 years in prison if they do not report a neighbor thinking about participating in a peaceful protest that the government does not like. Where are the appropriate responses to this? It would be entirely appropriate to sanction Hong Kong’s Government Executive and human rights opponent, John Lee, as the United States has done for a long time. Incidentally, China policy is not just what we do in our direct relationship with China. China policy has to consider the entire international environment.
What needs to be on the to-do list of the next EU Commission?
This agenda almost writes itself. Economic security is becoming more pressing due to China’s policy of further subsidizing overcapacity in many industrial sectors. Where is all this going? The US market is largely closed. The Japanese are also protecting themselves. We are relatively open. Jens Eskelund, President of the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, warns that this Chinese subsidy offensive threatens to partially deindustrialize Europe. That has to be taken seriously.
What else?
A second issue remains China’s relationship with Russia. China is not somewhat neutral. Without China’s active support, Russian President Vladimir Putin would not be able to wage his war the way he is waging it. China is a country that is helping Putin to destroy Europe’s security architecture. A third issue is China’s actions in its own neighborhood: in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and especially in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian-Himalayan border and China’s confrontational policy in the global environment through economic blackmail also deserve mentioning.
We cannot wait our turn, we must show solidarity to maintain an international order based on the principles of the United Nations. One weakness is that our China policy comes across more as European self-defense than as a European contribution to a positive order for the majority of international partners in the future.
What is on your personal agenda for the next few years?
I have been involved with China for more than 50 years. I will not let that go. The details of what I will do have not yet been decided. However, I have taken over the chairmanship of a new German-Taiwanese dialogue platform that the German government has set up. I will strive to strengthen civil society engagement with our Taiwanese partners. I am particularly interested in not always looking at Taiwan through the lens of cross-strait relations. It is also interesting to discuss how Taiwan deals with its own history of dictatorship, how it handles minority issues and how it facilitates social diversity – more so than other Asian countries do.
Will you also try to generate more interest in Taiwan in Berlin and Brussels so that there will be some progress towards a bilateral trade agreement?
We are currently in an interesting phase on that. Taiwan has long insisted that we need a bilateral investment agreement. We have also clearly supported this several times in the European Parliament with huge majorities. However, many companies tell us we should follow the old American principle: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The problem is not that you can’t invest. Other unresolved issues are more important. For example, I would like to see an agreement on resilient supply chains with Taiwan. I think we need to take a pragmatic approach here. The five major democratic groups in the European Parliament have managed to reach a consensus. I would like to see the same for the EU member states and the German Bundestag.
Who will succeed you as the German voice for China in Brussels and Strasbourg?
Wait and see.
Reinhard Bütikofer is a Green MEP and Chairman of the European Parliament’s China delegation. He recently became co-chair of the German-Taiwanese dialogue forum.
The liberal forces in Slovakia are breathing a sigh of relief. Ever since Putin’s friend Robert Fico won the parliamentary elections six months ago and set about overturning the western, democratic orientation of the EU and NATO country at breakneck speed, something akin to panic had spread among the opposition. But the first round of the presidential election on Saturday allowed a surprising insight.
Fico and his nationalist partners are not invulnerable. It was not their candidate, the previous parliamentary speaker Peter Pellegrini, who won the race, but his opponent from the liberal opposition, the diplomat and former foreign minister Ivan Korčok. And with a lead that should not be underestimated. According to the provisional final result, Korčok received 42.5 percent of the vote and Pellegrini 37 percent.
No more talk of depression and hopelessness, the editor-in-chief of the daily Denník N, Matúš Kostolný, wrote in a commentary on Sunday: after the parliamentary elections “many people had the feeling that a defeat would mean the end and that Fico would rule for years. Korčok’s victory is proof that it doesn’t have to be that way. Fico has not confused the whole country and there is still a chance to defeat him. Slovakia is not Fico country.”
Fico was the first to target the judicial system. He abolished the Special Court, which dealt with cases of serious corruption involving shady people close to the long-term head of government – and which also dealt with the murder of the young investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée.
Fico’s presidential candidate Pellegrini, whose Social Democratic Party is a member of the government, supports this. Just as it supports the foreign policy shift to fully back Putin and no longer support Ukraine with weapons. With Pellegrini as president, Prime Minister Fico would have the chance to govern through.
The outcome of the first round of voting was not necessarily expected, even for the two candidates who will meet again in the run-off on April 6. Pellegrini’s expression showed increasing disappointment as his initial lead from the count in rural areas diminished and he eventually had to let Korčok pass him when the results from the cities with liberal voters came in.
Korčok, on the other hand, looked very relieved, as if a big rucksack had fallen off his back. He gave the impression of being a little surprised by his own success. And to prevent himself from becoming too euphoric, he said: “The result looks hopeful. But I’m keeping my feet on the ground.”
However, Korčok is feeling an unexpectedly strong tailwind, which he wants to use at rallies in the run-up to the second ballot. Before the second round of voting, he also wants to address the voters of the governing parties. “Those who do not identify with the vulgarity and lack of culture revealed by the governing coalition,” he said.
Pellegrini announced that he would ask the candidates who had failed in the first round for support. He is relying primarily on the voters of the Hungarian minority and those of the third-placed candidate from the first round, former Justice Minister Štefan Harabin. The ultra-nationalist, for whom Putin is not the aggressor in the Ukraine conflict, achieved 11.74 percent of the vote.
Pellegrini also emphasized once again to journalists that only he knows how to defend Slovakia’s interests and warned “that Korčok will drag Slovakia into the war in Ukraine.” A completely misleading claim, especially as it is not the president who decides on the deployment of Slovakian soldiers, but only the government and parliament.
Political analysts see Pellegrini as having a slight advantage in the run-off. But for most, the Fico candidate was already the favorite for the first round. He did not live up to this role. Hans-Jörg Schmidt, Prague
Simon Harris is expected to become Ireland’s new Prime Minister. On Sunday, he was elected unopposed to succeed Leo Varadkar as leader of the ruling Fine Gael party. Harris promised to support small businesses, tackle the issue of migration and focus on law and order.
The 37-year-old Harris is currently Minister for Research and is expected to be elected as Ireland’s youngest-ever Prime Minister at the next parliamentary session on April 9th thanks to the support of the coalition partners.
He has less than a year to save the coalition from defeat in the general election. In the polls over the last three years, Sinn Fein, which supports reunification with British-ruled Northern Ireland, has been named as the favorite to lead the next government. Varadkar had surprisingly announced his resignation on Wednesday. rtr
Félix Bolaños is the most powerful man in Pedro Sánchez’s government. Since November 2023, Bolaños has been Minister for the Presidency, Justice and Parliamentary Relations. The super minister is one of the architects of the amnesty law, which aims to ensure that Catalan separatists remain unpunished for crimes such as corruption, embezzlement and terrorism. During this legislative period, he is maintaining relations with the Catalan separatists, the EU institutions and the opposition in order to achieve a reform of the Spanish justice system.
Bolaños was born in Madrid in 1975. He is the only son of a couple of emigrants who met in Munich while working in a factory. Together, they returned to Spain to open a bird and plant shop in Madrid. To finance his law studies at the Complutense University, Bolaños worked as a soccer referee and pizza delivery boy. He began his legal career at the renowned law firm Uría y Menéndez. In 2005, he moved to the Bank of Spain, where he was head of the labor law advice and legal documentation department from 2008 to 2018.
Bolaños joined the Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) at the age of 27. It is said that he had no reason to enter politics because of the money he earned as a lawyer. Nevertheless, he volunteered for the party alongside his work at the Bank of Spain. At weekends, he provided free legal advice for the PSOE in Madrid, initially supporting immigrants and then fellow party members.
Sánchez and Bolaños met at a PSOE party in 2014. Sánchez was a member of Madrid City Council at the time but had the ambition to become party leader. Bolaños offered to help Sánchez with the legal aspects and the PSOE statutes. When Sánchez was promoted to Secretary General of the PSOE in the same year, Bolaños was given a place in the PSOE’s national organizational structure. Following the motion of no confidence in Mariano Rajoy (Popular Party) in 2018, Sánchez took over as head of government and appointed Bolaños as Secretary General of the Office of the President. In this key position, in which he worked closely with Sánchez, he coordinated the work of the government.
Félix Bolaños is above all the discreet man in the Sánchez government who plans and carries out the most delicate operations. During Sánchez’s first term in office, Bolaños played a key role in the exhumation of the remains of the dictator Francisco Franco from the Valley of the Fallen, which was renamed the Valley of Cuelgamuros.
Bolaños was also responsible for the development of the PSOE’s new political organization model, which gave Sánchez almost all the power, as well as for the renewal of the PSOE-affiliated Radio Televisión Española (RTVE).
As a minister in Pedro Sánchez’s second term of office, Bolaños led the “de-judicialization” of the Catalan independence process. This aimed to strengthen the political dimension of the conflict and focus less on legal proceedings. The negotiations culminated in amendments to the penal code agreed with the separatist party Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC) in order to reform the criminal offense of embezzlement and abolish the criminal offense of sedition. Bolaños was the legal architect of the pardons for Catalan separatists in 2021.
Both the pardons for the Catalan separatists already convicted in court and the amendments to the penal code and, above all, the amnesty law were the supposed “red lines” that the socialists “never” wanted to cross. However, since Sánchez came to power in 2018, all promises have been thrown overboard in order to obtain the necessary parliamentary support to remain in the Moncloa Palace.
Bolaños euphorically congratulated himself on the amnesty law after the PSOE and Carles Puigdemont’s Junts party reached an agreement on March 7 on the changes to the law demanded by the separatist leader. He emphasized that the law would “set standards worldwide.”
In an interview with the radio station Onda Cero at the beginning of March, Bolaños admitted that the amnesty law does not enjoy the social support claimed by the government. According to a survey conducted by SocioMétrica in January of this year, 72 percent of Spaniards are against the law, including 41 percent of PSOE supporters and 51 percent of Catalans. But Bolaños claims: “With every month that Pedro Sánchez governs, there are fewer supporters of independence in Catalonia.” However, this narrative does not hold water. Neither does the alleged reconciliation with Catalonia, which the government cites as the reason for the amnesty law. Both the ERC and Junts insist that they want Catalonia to become independent after the amnesty. Isabel Cuesta
