The building of the European Parliament, named after Belgian EU visionary and NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak, which houses the plenary chamber in Brussels, has aged poorly. Despite being occupied only in 1993, it has been in need of demolition for over ten years. The security measures in the building, originally planned as a congress center, are so inadequate that even Martin Schulz (SPD) during his time as President of the Parliament expressed concerns during visits by high-ranking dignitaries.
The influential office where the President of the Parliament and the Vice Presidents gather decided before Christmas to renovate the building. This decision shelved the plans for a new construction. Previously, an international architectural competition had been conducted for this purpose. The renovation is estimated to cost 450 million euros, averaging slightly over 5,300 euros per square meter for a total area of 84,653 square meters. Construction is scheduled to begin in mid-2027 and be completed by the end of 2031. A hopeful wish is that everything may be finished even earlier, by July 2030, in time for the 200th anniversary of the Kingdom of Belgium.
On Wednesday, the Budget Committee will give its opinion on the renovation plans. While the outcome is not binding for the Secretary-General, who would have to initiate the project, rejection by the budgetary authorities would be a significant burden. It is rumored that the Socialists have serious reservations, while the Greens and Leftists are still considering. The Christian Democrats and Conservatives are in favor. Supporters argue that the project would quickly pay for itself through savings on heating costs. The emissions of CO2 for the required concrete would be offset by saved energy after four years. If construction had begun eight years ago, as once planned, energy costs of 100 million euros would have been saved. It remains to be seen how the budgetary authorities will decide in their own interest.
It was a struggle at the highest levels of government: Just before the vote in Brussels on Friday afternoon, the traffic light coalition managed to settle its dispute over CO2 fleet limits for trucks. This paved the way for the adoption of the new regulations by the EU ambassadors of the member states (see today’s News section).
Transport Minister Volker Wissing had previously questioned the compromise negotiated by the Council and the European Parliament: The day before the vote, originally scheduled for last Wednesday, he withdrew his approval to push for the inclusion of synthetic fuels. CDU MEP Jens Giesecke speaks of “political suicide“.
Such sudden maneuvers by the most populous member state in Brussels have become more frequent lately. And they are causing increasing damage. In the coalition government, the SPD, Greens and FDP rarely find common ground. The consequences are also felt by EU partners: The approval of European laws is evidently “being drawn into German election rhetoric,” says SPD MEP René Repasi.
The responsibility for these braking maneuvers can usually be clearly attributed to FDP ministers.
The actions of the Liberals are causing irritation among the coalition partners in Berlin: “The FDP does not understand the basic rules of government action,” says a senior government official. The chairman of the European Affairs Committee in the Bundestag, Anton Hofreiter (Greens), criticizes: “Regularly blocking compromises negotiated between governments, the Commission and the European Parliament is fundamentally anti-European.” Such an FDP is “no longer a pro-European party”.
Deputy FDP parliamentary group leader Michael Link rejects this: “You do the EU and the idea of European integration a disservice if you try to push through directives that are clearly restrictive and overly bureaucratic, especially for smaller companies,” he says with regard to the supply chains directive.
The disunity of the coalition has consequences for Germany’s reputation and influence in Brussels. “Currently, the federal government is acting irresponsibly and damaging the EU’s ability to act and Germany’s credibility in Europe,” says the president of the European Movement Germany, Linn Selle.
In the Council, the willingness to accommodate the German government is declining. Although the vote on the CO2 limits for trucks was postponed by two days, said the Belgian presidency of the Council last week. However, they will “not take into account the sensitivities of a government party in a member state.”
The other member states are somewhat accustomed to the coalition governments in Berlin sometimes struggling with forming opinions. The term “German Vote” has long been established for resulting abstentions.
New and more problematic are the abrupt changes of course shortly before the formally planned adoption of the informally agreed legislative proposals, says Nicolai von Ondarza, research group leader at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “This weakens Germany’s reliability and the EU institutions’ ability to act.” It would be more effective and credible if the desired changes were introduced early in the process.
This is what the traffic light parties in the coalition agreement also aimed for. However, in the initial phase, they often failed to implement the good intentions. The problem now lies less in the voting processes at the working level. The participating ministries had fairly quietly agreed on a common position on the truck fleet limits. Until Minister Wissing intervened.
An agreement has been reached after a marathon session on reforming EU debt rules. Until 2 a.m. on Saturday morning, representatives from the Council, Parliament and Commission, including Belgian Finance Minister Vincent Van Peteghem, negotiated. In essence, the Council’s position prevailed. The so-called “safety lines“, which Christian Lindner had secured in Council negotiations, remain untouched.
Despite the uncompromising stance of the Belgian Council presidency until earlier this week, the Council made a concession to Parliament on Friday. This creates a small additional scope for public investments.
The negotiating teams agreed that expenses incurred under national co-financing of EU programs should not count towards net expenditure. Net expenditure is the key fiscal metric in the new debt rules. Expenses not included there provide greater leeway for additional investments or other expenses.
In a document prepared by the European Commission to assist trilogue negotiations, the Commission assesses the effect of this exception as fundamentally positive. “Member states will have stronger incentives to ensure rapid implementation of Union programs and fewer incentives to cut investment expenditure during an economic downturn”, the text, seen by Table.Media, states.
However, the Commission notes that data on national co-financing are not systematically collected. This will initially complicate the calculation of the additional expenditure scope but should be a surmountable problem.
It is clear that the additional leeway created will remain very limited at least temporarily. National co-financing of EU programs currently exists only for cohesion programs. Although precise EU-wide figures on national co-financing are lacking, the Commission estimates the figure at around a hundred billion euros for the period of the multiannual financial framework from 2021 to 2027.
According to the agreement between the Commission and the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Germany has planned national co-financing of 21.7 billion euros over this seven-year period. So, under the new EU debt rules, Germany would have additional flexibility of around three billion euros per year. This is less than one percent of the German federal budget. In Germany, this new flexibility remains largely theoretical as the debt brake is stricter than the EU debt rules.
For countries with a relatively significant cohesion budget, the new flexibility is slightly greater, but even there, the additional scope is limited. However, the clause opens up room for better economic governance in future budgets. If, in the coming years, it turns out that the EU is investing too little due to strict debt rules, but there is a lack of political will to invest more at the EU level, the clause could perhaps serve as a stopgap solution.
A future European financial framework could then rely more on national co-financing of EU programs. A low EU participation rate would preserve the scarce EU budget. Instead, the money would come from member states not restricted by EU debt rules for these investments. European coordination would be ensured by tying investments to EU programs.
For this stopgap solution to work, however, the EU’s multiannual financial framework would need to be significantly adjusted, which is politically highly challenging.
Despite this small success for Parliament, the text remains clearly dominated by the Council’s position. Philippe Lamberts, the Green group leader, who was present as shadow rapporteur during the negotiations, said that Parliament had been railroaded. “Parliament capitulated on the hard core of the reform in exchange for some cosmetic improvements in the text,” he said in a video message on X.
Lamberts called the decision “collective economic suicide“. Under the newly agreed rules, the EU will not be able to invest enough in green transformation, competitiveness, defense, and social cohesion.
Parliament’s co-rapporteur Esther de Lange (EPP) sees it diametrically differently: “We have ensured that the new fiscal rules are sensible and credible while also leaving room for necessary investments,” she wrote on X.
For the new debt rules to take effect, the political agreement must now be confirmed by Parliament and the EU Council.
In the USA, particularly in Silicon Valley, novel small nuclear reactors have long been hyped, intended to be easily mass-produced in the future. Drawn by international tech allure and European calls for technological openness, the EU now also seeks to place greater emphasis on the future hope of SMRs. On Feb. 9, the Commission launched a new industry alliance for Small Modular Reactors.
“We want to bring all stakeholders together to strengthen the European position in the emerging SMR market,” said Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson when introducing the new EU climate target for 2040. It’s now the Commission’s eleventh industry alliance. Similar alliances already exist for hydrogen and batteries, as well as for raw materials and Industry 4.0.
The kickoff event for the SMR Alliance is scheduled for March 2. By the first quarter of 2025, the alliance’s action plan should be in place. The Commission has already defined ten work packages in the project description, including:
There are already preliminary results from the alliance’s pre-partnership phase, as evident from the closing documents of the workstreams.
According to the Commission, the first SMR projects are expected to be “implemented” by the early 2030s. This push was advocated by countries like France and the Czech Republic. The French nuclear industry has joined forces in the “Nuward” project to develop an SMR by the end of the decade, supported by Emmanuel Macron’s economic program “France 2030”.
Nuclear expert Walter Tromm from KIT considers this realistic. Framatome aims to develop a small version of an established light-water reactor. “Small” in the nuclear industry typically means reactors with a capacity of up to 300 megawatts (MW).
“While it’s possible to build such an SMR by 2030 if desired and with the necessary funding, I see so-called AMRs – Advanced Modular Reactors – coming later,” says Tromm. In Canada, American and Japanese manufacturers GE and Hitachi aim to complete a similar SMR as early as 2028. Construction of the Chinese reactor Linglong One is already well advanced.
However, safety issues in Europe still need to be addressed, which always require research effort in nuclear energy. Euratom expects results on the certification and safety assessment of SMR light-water reactors by 2035. European research results on concepts for advanced modular reactors are not expected until after 2035.
Environmental organizations see the smaller size of these SMRs as a disadvantage rather than a strength. “In terms of the individual kilowatt-hour, the construction costs for SMRs are higher than for large nuclear power plants,” writes the European Environmental Bureau (EEB).
The cancellation of a project by the company Nuscale in Idaho in November caused a stir. The costs for the 460 MW reactor had recently increased significantly – according to an analysis by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) to over $119 per megawatt-hour when subsidies from the IRA are included. This is multiples of the production costs of wind and solar plants.
Therefore, the EEB sees SMRs as a “dangerous distraction for the climate”. Campaigner Davide Sabbadin says, “Every euro spent on nuclear projects could help replace fossil fuels faster and cheaper if invested instead in renewable energy, networks, and energy storage.” The Commission already sees a largely CO2-free power supply possible by 2040 with renewable energies, as demonstrated by its initial proposal for the EU’s new climate target.
FDP climate policy politician Lukas Köhler sees the cost issue differently: “The fact that the lack of profitability of a project today says nothing about the future is shown particularly by the extremely decreased costs for wind and solar energy in recent decades.”
CDU energy policy politician Jens Spahn argues with the costs of storage and power lines that renewables entail. “The idea that wind and sun don’t send a bill is a fairy tale. We should be wise for the future and diversify technologically“.
According to Spahn, the federal government should support the EU’s efforts on SMRs: “Germany should join the global nuclear alliance founded at the last climate conference under the leadership of the USA. Even if we no longer operate nuclear power plants ourselves, we should support nuclear energy as a component for the global transition to climate-neutral energy supply.”
KIT expert Tromm sees potential for cost reduction due to the special construction method of small reactors. “In concept, it’s borrowed from the aircraft industry. Large parts are manufactured serially in factories and assembled on-site.” Developers now need to demonstrate that this method is more cost-effective than building large reactors.
The second advantage of SMRs, according to Tromm, is safety: “The safety standard is further increased.” Even if power supply fails, they remain safe. The release of radioactive materials to the outside is almost impossible.
This makes SMRs suitable for new applications. Finland wants to use SMRs to supply the capital Helsinki with heat and is planning the plants close to the city. Despite all the safety measures, this might not be possible with large reactors, says Tromm.
This makes SMRs suitable for new applications. Finland intends to supply the capital Helsinki with heat using SMRs and plans to place the plants near the city. With large reactors, this might not be done despite all safety measures, says Tromm.
There is also the question of whether SMRs fit into an energy system that is largely based on fluctuating renewable energies. The scientist says reactors could reduce their output by 20 percent quickly if needed. However, going beyond that would put greater strain on materials.
Tromm sees a potential conflict, especially in the choice between SMRs and gas power plants operated with hydrogen. So far, the energy system is designed to produce hydrogen when there is plenty of green electricity in the grid and to convert it back into electricity during lulls. Whether this is compatible with a large number of small reactors needs thorough analysis.
EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis and Canadian Trade Minister Mary Ng met in Brussels on Friday to make two new agreements. These are intended to clarify that investment protection claims cannot obstruct legitimate regulatory projects and to ease SMEs’ access to investment protection.
In particular, the joint statement on investment protection aims to reassure those member states concerned that investor protection in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) overly complicates state regulation. Critics fear that if foreign investors can demand compensation in response to regulations, this undermines democratic decision-making.
The joint statement on investment protection does not alter the text of the CETA agreement but provides a more precise interpretation of how the investment protection chapter should be interpreted judicially.
In particular, the principle of fair and equitable treatment of investors and claims based on indirect expropriation will be interpreted less favorably to investors. “In the past, the principles of fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation have been interpreted very expansively by investment protection tribunals,” explained an EU official. This possibility is now being restricted.
Furthermore, in their statement, Canada and the EU reaffirm the right to state regulation, especially regarding climate action. In the future, investment protection tribunals will also have to give greater weight to international climate protection commitments such as the Paris Agreement.
However, sovereignty and climate protection seem to be only secondary concerns for the EU Commission. While securing assurance from Canada through this statement that Canadian investors will not obstruct European regulations, the EU Commission simultaneously criticizes Canadian regulations.
In 2022, Canada introduced a tax on cars costing more than $100,000 Canadian dollars. Because this applies to many European cars, the EU Commission criticizes this tax, which it deems “discriminatory”. However, member states are unlikely to be bothered by this minor hypocrisy, especially since the suggestion for the joint statement did not originate from the Commission.
The joint statement was announced by the EU Commission in the summer of 2022 at the request of the German federal government to help persuade the government and parliament to ratify CETA.
The EU Commission hopes that the statement will now also persuade the remaining member states to fully ratify the free trade agreement. Only then will the investment protection chapter, along with the joint statements on investment protection, come into force. Ten member states – including France, Poland and Italy – have not yet ratified CETA.
Since 2017, CETA has been provisionally applied. Nevertheless, Dombrovskis and Ng draw a positive conclusion. Trade in goods has grown by 66 percent, and trade in services by more than 62 percent. According to Dombrovskis, more than 2,500 SMEs have started exporting to Canada since then.
A second new agreement between the EU and Canada is also tailored to SMEs: Small and medium-sized enterprises are to have better access to investment protection. Currently, it is very expensive for companies to bring investment protection claims, which is why usually only large corporations can afford it.
For CETA investment protection, shorter deadlines and a limit on the number of pages in court documents are intended to reduce costs. In addition, claims are to be handled by a single judge instead of the previously stipulated three-judge panel. “Lawyers are particularly expensive,” said an EU official, arguing that the new requirements primarily target legal costs.
This week, the EU Commission also launched a website aimed at better informing investors about their investment protection options. The two additional agreements are currently undergoing legal clarification and should then be adopted by the EU and Canada in writing within the next few months.
It’s a cry from the heart. Greens and socialists, “stop the nonsense, come together“, demanded former Green MEP José Bové last month. He came to Bordeaux to support socialist MEP Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D). Glucksmann was officially appointed as the lead candidate for the joint list of the Socialist Party and Place publique, the political movement he co-founded at the end of 2018.
He now joins other French politicians who have been officially appointed as lead candidates for their parties: François-Xavier Bellamy for the conservative Les Républicains, Jordan Bardella for the right-wing populist Rassemblement National, Marion Maréchal for the far-right Reconquête!, Marie Toussaint for the Greens, Léon Deffontaines for the Communist Party (PCF) and Manon Aubry for the left-wing alliance La France insoumise (LFI). The candidates for Renaissance, the French branch of Renew, have not yet been announced.
The Socialist Party clearly favors the prominent Glucksmann. The 46-year-old has always advocated strongly pro-European positions. Over the past five years, he has further distinguished himself politically in the European Parliament through his advocacy for the Uyghurs in China and his unwavering support for Ukraine.
The son of philosopher André Glucksmann and partner of journalist Léa Salamé is rhetorically skilled and adept at handling the media. It is, therefore, logical that he is viewed as a threat by his competitors on the left. Léon Deffontaines, lead candidate for the French Communist Party, accuses him of “embodying social democracy, which has always managed to align very well with the liberal model”, while La France insoumise, through its deputy François Ruffin, accuses him of being “disconnected”.
However, the criticism is particularly sharp from the French Greens. They are vying for the same electorate as Glucksmann. Polls show their lead candidate, Marie Toussaint, neck and neck with Glucksmann at around ten percent of the vote. Consequently, Toussaint is already positioning herself against her competitor. At a congress of the French Greens in northern France in January of this year, Toussaint emphasized her humble origins – her grandfather was a miner. At the same time, she pointed out the family background of her main competitor on the left, who comes from a privileged Parisian milieu. In France, Glucksmann suffers from his image as a “Parisian”. He is trying to counteract this by promising to be “everywhere” in France.
The invitation to create a joint list was rejected by the National Secretary of the French Greens, Marine Tondelier. “We will not campaign with Carole Delga and her A69 in Occitania, Alain Rousset, who supports the megabasins in Nouvelle-Aquitaine, or Loïg Chesnais-Girard, who promotes agribusiness in Brittany,” said Tondelier. She was referring to the large-scale projects supported by the three socialist regional presidents, which are considered environmentally unfriendly.
However, this does not prevent the PS/Place publique list from continuing to reach out. “We prefer dialogue with leftist forces, especially with the Greens,” said MEP Christophe Clergeau. He expresses the “desire” of the Socialist Party and Place publique to collaborate with other leftist forces “to counterbalance the extreme right“. Clergeau further promised, “Elections are a form of competition. We prefer respect and do not attack other leftist forces.” Whether this outstretched hand from the Left will be accepted by their left-green competitors remains open.
In a similar vein to Glucksmann, his supporter Bové had previously struck. “I will not understand if on June 9 there is no ballot in the ballot box that brings together all these left-wing and ecological sensibilities,” said the politician, who in 1999 dismantled a McDonald’s with farmers from his region. In a country where eating a steak is akin to a political battle, Bové has become the embodiment of the fight against “junk food”, industrially processed food, and the entire agribusiness chain. Having him by his side is a real asset for Raphaël Glucksmann.
The fact that Green politician Bové supports Glucksmann, the candidate of the Left, rather than the candidate of the French Greens, MEP Marie Toussaint, has caused serious gnashing of teeth in her party. Especially since another prominent Green, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, an icon of May 1968, has joined Raphaël Glucksmann. After initially supporting Emmanuel Macron, Cohn-Bendit broke with the French President. He now hopes to create a “hopeful dynamic” with Glucksmann’s support.
A hopeful dynamic? At the moment, Glucksmann is credited with about ten percent of the vote in the European elections. This means that the PS/Place publique list can hope to send about ten candidates to the European Parliament. Among the first ten candidates are Glucksmann, as well as Aurore Lalucq, Nora Mebarek and Christophe Clergeau. For PS leader Olivier Faure, Glucksmann is the ideal candidate and “the politician with the most followers on Instagram”. French voters are called upon to elect 81 of the total 720 members of the European Parliament.
The building of the European Parliament, named after Belgian EU visionary and NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak, which houses the plenary chamber in Brussels, has aged poorly. Despite being occupied only in 1993, it has been in need of demolition for over ten years. The security measures in the building, originally planned as a congress center, are so inadequate that even Martin Schulz (SPD) during his time as President of the Parliament expressed concerns during visits by high-ranking dignitaries.
The influential office where the President of the Parliament and the Vice Presidents gather decided before Christmas to renovate the building. This decision shelved the plans for a new construction. Previously, an international architectural competition had been conducted for this purpose. The renovation is estimated to cost 450 million euros, averaging slightly over 5,300 euros per square meter for a total area of 84,653 square meters. Construction is scheduled to begin in mid-2027 and be completed by the end of 2031. A hopeful wish is that everything may be finished even earlier, by July 2030, in time for the 200th anniversary of the Kingdom of Belgium.
On Wednesday, the Budget Committee will give its opinion on the renovation plans. While the outcome is not binding for the Secretary-General, who would have to initiate the project, rejection by the budgetary authorities would be a significant burden. It is rumored that the Socialists have serious reservations, while the Greens and Leftists are still considering. The Christian Democrats and Conservatives are in favor. Supporters argue that the project would quickly pay for itself through savings on heating costs. The emissions of CO2 for the required concrete would be offset by saved energy after four years. If construction had begun eight years ago, as once planned, energy costs of 100 million euros would have been saved. It remains to be seen how the budgetary authorities will decide in their own interest.
It was a struggle at the highest levels of government: Just before the vote in Brussels on Friday afternoon, the traffic light coalition managed to settle its dispute over CO2 fleet limits for trucks. This paved the way for the adoption of the new regulations by the EU ambassadors of the member states (see today’s News section).
Transport Minister Volker Wissing had previously questioned the compromise negotiated by the Council and the European Parliament: The day before the vote, originally scheduled for last Wednesday, he withdrew his approval to push for the inclusion of synthetic fuels. CDU MEP Jens Giesecke speaks of “political suicide“.
Such sudden maneuvers by the most populous member state in Brussels have become more frequent lately. And they are causing increasing damage. In the coalition government, the SPD, Greens and FDP rarely find common ground. The consequences are also felt by EU partners: The approval of European laws is evidently “being drawn into German election rhetoric,” says SPD MEP René Repasi.
The responsibility for these braking maneuvers can usually be clearly attributed to FDP ministers.
The actions of the Liberals are causing irritation among the coalition partners in Berlin: “The FDP does not understand the basic rules of government action,” says a senior government official. The chairman of the European Affairs Committee in the Bundestag, Anton Hofreiter (Greens), criticizes: “Regularly blocking compromises negotiated between governments, the Commission and the European Parliament is fundamentally anti-European.” Such an FDP is “no longer a pro-European party”.
Deputy FDP parliamentary group leader Michael Link rejects this: “You do the EU and the idea of European integration a disservice if you try to push through directives that are clearly restrictive and overly bureaucratic, especially for smaller companies,” he says with regard to the supply chains directive.
The disunity of the coalition has consequences for Germany’s reputation and influence in Brussels. “Currently, the federal government is acting irresponsibly and damaging the EU’s ability to act and Germany’s credibility in Europe,” says the president of the European Movement Germany, Linn Selle.
In the Council, the willingness to accommodate the German government is declining. Although the vote on the CO2 limits for trucks was postponed by two days, said the Belgian presidency of the Council last week. However, they will “not take into account the sensitivities of a government party in a member state.”
The other member states are somewhat accustomed to the coalition governments in Berlin sometimes struggling with forming opinions. The term “German Vote” has long been established for resulting abstentions.
New and more problematic are the abrupt changes of course shortly before the formally planned adoption of the informally agreed legislative proposals, says Nicolai von Ondarza, research group leader at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “This weakens Germany’s reliability and the EU institutions’ ability to act.” It would be more effective and credible if the desired changes were introduced early in the process.
This is what the traffic light parties in the coalition agreement also aimed for. However, in the initial phase, they often failed to implement the good intentions. The problem now lies less in the voting processes at the working level. The participating ministries had fairly quietly agreed on a common position on the truck fleet limits. Until Minister Wissing intervened.
An agreement has been reached after a marathon session on reforming EU debt rules. Until 2 a.m. on Saturday morning, representatives from the Council, Parliament and Commission, including Belgian Finance Minister Vincent Van Peteghem, negotiated. In essence, the Council’s position prevailed. The so-called “safety lines“, which Christian Lindner had secured in Council negotiations, remain untouched.
Despite the uncompromising stance of the Belgian Council presidency until earlier this week, the Council made a concession to Parliament on Friday. This creates a small additional scope for public investments.
The negotiating teams agreed that expenses incurred under national co-financing of EU programs should not count towards net expenditure. Net expenditure is the key fiscal metric in the new debt rules. Expenses not included there provide greater leeway for additional investments or other expenses.
In a document prepared by the European Commission to assist trilogue negotiations, the Commission assesses the effect of this exception as fundamentally positive. “Member states will have stronger incentives to ensure rapid implementation of Union programs and fewer incentives to cut investment expenditure during an economic downturn”, the text, seen by Table.Media, states.
However, the Commission notes that data on national co-financing are not systematically collected. This will initially complicate the calculation of the additional expenditure scope but should be a surmountable problem.
It is clear that the additional leeway created will remain very limited at least temporarily. National co-financing of EU programs currently exists only for cohesion programs. Although precise EU-wide figures on national co-financing are lacking, the Commission estimates the figure at around a hundred billion euros for the period of the multiannual financial framework from 2021 to 2027.
According to the agreement between the Commission and the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Germany has planned national co-financing of 21.7 billion euros over this seven-year period. So, under the new EU debt rules, Germany would have additional flexibility of around three billion euros per year. This is less than one percent of the German federal budget. In Germany, this new flexibility remains largely theoretical as the debt brake is stricter than the EU debt rules.
For countries with a relatively significant cohesion budget, the new flexibility is slightly greater, but even there, the additional scope is limited. However, the clause opens up room for better economic governance in future budgets. If, in the coming years, it turns out that the EU is investing too little due to strict debt rules, but there is a lack of political will to invest more at the EU level, the clause could perhaps serve as a stopgap solution.
A future European financial framework could then rely more on national co-financing of EU programs. A low EU participation rate would preserve the scarce EU budget. Instead, the money would come from member states not restricted by EU debt rules for these investments. European coordination would be ensured by tying investments to EU programs.
For this stopgap solution to work, however, the EU’s multiannual financial framework would need to be significantly adjusted, which is politically highly challenging.
Despite this small success for Parliament, the text remains clearly dominated by the Council’s position. Philippe Lamberts, the Green group leader, who was present as shadow rapporteur during the negotiations, said that Parliament had been railroaded. “Parliament capitulated on the hard core of the reform in exchange for some cosmetic improvements in the text,” he said in a video message on X.
Lamberts called the decision “collective economic suicide“. Under the newly agreed rules, the EU will not be able to invest enough in green transformation, competitiveness, defense, and social cohesion.
Parliament’s co-rapporteur Esther de Lange (EPP) sees it diametrically differently: “We have ensured that the new fiscal rules are sensible and credible while also leaving room for necessary investments,” she wrote on X.
For the new debt rules to take effect, the political agreement must now be confirmed by Parliament and the EU Council.
In the USA, particularly in Silicon Valley, novel small nuclear reactors have long been hyped, intended to be easily mass-produced in the future. Drawn by international tech allure and European calls for technological openness, the EU now also seeks to place greater emphasis on the future hope of SMRs. On Feb. 9, the Commission launched a new industry alliance for Small Modular Reactors.
“We want to bring all stakeholders together to strengthen the European position in the emerging SMR market,” said Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson when introducing the new EU climate target for 2040. It’s now the Commission’s eleventh industry alliance. Similar alliances already exist for hydrogen and batteries, as well as for raw materials and Industry 4.0.
The kickoff event for the SMR Alliance is scheduled for March 2. By the first quarter of 2025, the alliance’s action plan should be in place. The Commission has already defined ten work packages in the project description, including:
There are already preliminary results from the alliance’s pre-partnership phase, as evident from the closing documents of the workstreams.
According to the Commission, the first SMR projects are expected to be “implemented” by the early 2030s. This push was advocated by countries like France and the Czech Republic. The French nuclear industry has joined forces in the “Nuward” project to develop an SMR by the end of the decade, supported by Emmanuel Macron’s economic program “France 2030”.
Nuclear expert Walter Tromm from KIT considers this realistic. Framatome aims to develop a small version of an established light-water reactor. “Small” in the nuclear industry typically means reactors with a capacity of up to 300 megawatts (MW).
“While it’s possible to build such an SMR by 2030 if desired and with the necessary funding, I see so-called AMRs – Advanced Modular Reactors – coming later,” says Tromm. In Canada, American and Japanese manufacturers GE and Hitachi aim to complete a similar SMR as early as 2028. Construction of the Chinese reactor Linglong One is already well advanced.
However, safety issues in Europe still need to be addressed, which always require research effort in nuclear energy. Euratom expects results on the certification and safety assessment of SMR light-water reactors by 2035. European research results on concepts for advanced modular reactors are not expected until after 2035.
Environmental organizations see the smaller size of these SMRs as a disadvantage rather than a strength. “In terms of the individual kilowatt-hour, the construction costs for SMRs are higher than for large nuclear power plants,” writes the European Environmental Bureau (EEB).
The cancellation of a project by the company Nuscale in Idaho in November caused a stir. The costs for the 460 MW reactor had recently increased significantly – according to an analysis by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) to over $119 per megawatt-hour when subsidies from the IRA are included. This is multiples of the production costs of wind and solar plants.
Therefore, the EEB sees SMRs as a “dangerous distraction for the climate”. Campaigner Davide Sabbadin says, “Every euro spent on nuclear projects could help replace fossil fuels faster and cheaper if invested instead in renewable energy, networks, and energy storage.” The Commission already sees a largely CO2-free power supply possible by 2040 with renewable energies, as demonstrated by its initial proposal for the EU’s new climate target.
FDP climate policy politician Lukas Köhler sees the cost issue differently: “The fact that the lack of profitability of a project today says nothing about the future is shown particularly by the extremely decreased costs for wind and solar energy in recent decades.”
CDU energy policy politician Jens Spahn argues with the costs of storage and power lines that renewables entail. “The idea that wind and sun don’t send a bill is a fairy tale. We should be wise for the future and diversify technologically“.
According to Spahn, the federal government should support the EU’s efforts on SMRs: “Germany should join the global nuclear alliance founded at the last climate conference under the leadership of the USA. Even if we no longer operate nuclear power plants ourselves, we should support nuclear energy as a component for the global transition to climate-neutral energy supply.”
KIT expert Tromm sees potential for cost reduction due to the special construction method of small reactors. “In concept, it’s borrowed from the aircraft industry. Large parts are manufactured serially in factories and assembled on-site.” Developers now need to demonstrate that this method is more cost-effective than building large reactors.
The second advantage of SMRs, according to Tromm, is safety: “The safety standard is further increased.” Even if power supply fails, they remain safe. The release of radioactive materials to the outside is almost impossible.
This makes SMRs suitable for new applications. Finland wants to use SMRs to supply the capital Helsinki with heat and is planning the plants close to the city. Despite all the safety measures, this might not be possible with large reactors, says Tromm.
This makes SMRs suitable for new applications. Finland intends to supply the capital Helsinki with heat using SMRs and plans to place the plants near the city. With large reactors, this might not be done despite all safety measures, says Tromm.
There is also the question of whether SMRs fit into an energy system that is largely based on fluctuating renewable energies. The scientist says reactors could reduce their output by 20 percent quickly if needed. However, going beyond that would put greater strain on materials.
Tromm sees a potential conflict, especially in the choice between SMRs and gas power plants operated with hydrogen. So far, the energy system is designed to produce hydrogen when there is plenty of green electricity in the grid and to convert it back into electricity during lulls. Whether this is compatible with a large number of small reactors needs thorough analysis.
EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis and Canadian Trade Minister Mary Ng met in Brussels on Friday to make two new agreements. These are intended to clarify that investment protection claims cannot obstruct legitimate regulatory projects and to ease SMEs’ access to investment protection.
In particular, the joint statement on investment protection aims to reassure those member states concerned that investor protection in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) overly complicates state regulation. Critics fear that if foreign investors can demand compensation in response to regulations, this undermines democratic decision-making.
The joint statement on investment protection does not alter the text of the CETA agreement but provides a more precise interpretation of how the investment protection chapter should be interpreted judicially.
In particular, the principle of fair and equitable treatment of investors and claims based on indirect expropriation will be interpreted less favorably to investors. “In the past, the principles of fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation have been interpreted very expansively by investment protection tribunals,” explained an EU official. This possibility is now being restricted.
Furthermore, in their statement, Canada and the EU reaffirm the right to state regulation, especially regarding climate action. In the future, investment protection tribunals will also have to give greater weight to international climate protection commitments such as the Paris Agreement.
However, sovereignty and climate protection seem to be only secondary concerns for the EU Commission. While securing assurance from Canada through this statement that Canadian investors will not obstruct European regulations, the EU Commission simultaneously criticizes Canadian regulations.
In 2022, Canada introduced a tax on cars costing more than $100,000 Canadian dollars. Because this applies to many European cars, the EU Commission criticizes this tax, which it deems “discriminatory”. However, member states are unlikely to be bothered by this minor hypocrisy, especially since the suggestion for the joint statement did not originate from the Commission.
The joint statement was announced by the EU Commission in the summer of 2022 at the request of the German federal government to help persuade the government and parliament to ratify CETA.
The EU Commission hopes that the statement will now also persuade the remaining member states to fully ratify the free trade agreement. Only then will the investment protection chapter, along with the joint statements on investment protection, come into force. Ten member states – including France, Poland and Italy – have not yet ratified CETA.
Since 2017, CETA has been provisionally applied. Nevertheless, Dombrovskis and Ng draw a positive conclusion. Trade in goods has grown by 66 percent, and trade in services by more than 62 percent. According to Dombrovskis, more than 2,500 SMEs have started exporting to Canada since then.
A second new agreement between the EU and Canada is also tailored to SMEs: Small and medium-sized enterprises are to have better access to investment protection. Currently, it is very expensive for companies to bring investment protection claims, which is why usually only large corporations can afford it.
For CETA investment protection, shorter deadlines and a limit on the number of pages in court documents are intended to reduce costs. In addition, claims are to be handled by a single judge instead of the previously stipulated three-judge panel. “Lawyers are particularly expensive,” said an EU official, arguing that the new requirements primarily target legal costs.
This week, the EU Commission also launched a website aimed at better informing investors about their investment protection options. The two additional agreements are currently undergoing legal clarification and should then be adopted by the EU and Canada in writing within the next few months.
It’s a cry from the heart. Greens and socialists, “stop the nonsense, come together“, demanded former Green MEP José Bové last month. He came to Bordeaux to support socialist MEP Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D). Glucksmann was officially appointed as the lead candidate for the joint list of the Socialist Party and Place publique, the political movement he co-founded at the end of 2018.
He now joins other French politicians who have been officially appointed as lead candidates for their parties: François-Xavier Bellamy for the conservative Les Républicains, Jordan Bardella for the right-wing populist Rassemblement National, Marion Maréchal for the far-right Reconquête!, Marie Toussaint for the Greens, Léon Deffontaines for the Communist Party (PCF) and Manon Aubry for the left-wing alliance La France insoumise (LFI). The candidates for Renaissance, the French branch of Renew, have not yet been announced.
The Socialist Party clearly favors the prominent Glucksmann. The 46-year-old has always advocated strongly pro-European positions. Over the past five years, he has further distinguished himself politically in the European Parliament through his advocacy for the Uyghurs in China and his unwavering support for Ukraine.
The son of philosopher André Glucksmann and partner of journalist Léa Salamé is rhetorically skilled and adept at handling the media. It is, therefore, logical that he is viewed as a threat by his competitors on the left. Léon Deffontaines, lead candidate for the French Communist Party, accuses him of “embodying social democracy, which has always managed to align very well with the liberal model”, while La France insoumise, through its deputy François Ruffin, accuses him of being “disconnected”.
However, the criticism is particularly sharp from the French Greens. They are vying for the same electorate as Glucksmann. Polls show their lead candidate, Marie Toussaint, neck and neck with Glucksmann at around ten percent of the vote. Consequently, Toussaint is already positioning herself against her competitor. At a congress of the French Greens in northern France in January of this year, Toussaint emphasized her humble origins – her grandfather was a miner. At the same time, she pointed out the family background of her main competitor on the left, who comes from a privileged Parisian milieu. In France, Glucksmann suffers from his image as a “Parisian”. He is trying to counteract this by promising to be “everywhere” in France.
The invitation to create a joint list was rejected by the National Secretary of the French Greens, Marine Tondelier. “We will not campaign with Carole Delga and her A69 in Occitania, Alain Rousset, who supports the megabasins in Nouvelle-Aquitaine, or Loïg Chesnais-Girard, who promotes agribusiness in Brittany,” said Tondelier. She was referring to the large-scale projects supported by the three socialist regional presidents, which are considered environmentally unfriendly.
However, this does not prevent the PS/Place publique list from continuing to reach out. “We prefer dialogue with leftist forces, especially with the Greens,” said MEP Christophe Clergeau. He expresses the “desire” of the Socialist Party and Place publique to collaborate with other leftist forces “to counterbalance the extreme right“. Clergeau further promised, “Elections are a form of competition. We prefer respect and do not attack other leftist forces.” Whether this outstretched hand from the Left will be accepted by their left-green competitors remains open.
In a similar vein to Glucksmann, his supporter Bové had previously struck. “I will not understand if on June 9 there is no ballot in the ballot box that brings together all these left-wing and ecological sensibilities,” said the politician, who in 1999 dismantled a McDonald’s with farmers from his region. In a country where eating a steak is akin to a political battle, Bové has become the embodiment of the fight against “junk food”, industrially processed food, and the entire agribusiness chain. Having him by his side is a real asset for Raphaël Glucksmann.
The fact that Green politician Bové supports Glucksmann, the candidate of the Left, rather than the candidate of the French Greens, MEP Marie Toussaint, has caused serious gnashing of teeth in her party. Especially since another prominent Green, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, an icon of May 1968, has joined Raphaël Glucksmann. After initially supporting Emmanuel Macron, Cohn-Bendit broke with the French President. He now hopes to create a “hopeful dynamic” with Glucksmann’s support.
A hopeful dynamic? At the moment, Glucksmann is credited with about ten percent of the vote in the European elections. This means that the PS/Place publique list can hope to send about ten candidates to the European Parliament. Among the first ten candidates are Glucksmann, as well as Aurore Lalucq, Nora Mebarek and Christophe Clergeau. For PS leader Olivier Faure, Glucksmann is the ideal candidate and “the politician with the most followers on Instagram”. French voters are called upon to elect 81 of the total 720 members of the European Parliament.
