Frans Timmermans is leaving Brussels. Even though there had been speculation about this for months, it was the news of the day in EU circles yesterday. The Commission Vice-President wants to do it again at the national level and become Prime Minister of the Netherlands. Regardless of whether he wins or loses the election, he will probably turn his back on the EU Commission as early as mid-August, when the red-green alliance officially selects its candidate. My colleague Till Hoppe and I have analyzed what Timmermans’ departure means for Brussels.
For the Green Deal, Timmermans’ planned move to The Hague is a great loss, as he was considered the doer and defender of the EU climate and environment package. And with the election in Spain, supporters may soon lose another pillar of support in the Council. Claire Stam writes in her column, how an election victory by Spain’s conservative People’s Party (PP) could affect the Green Deal.
Find out what Alberto Núñez Feijóo – the PP’s possible election winner – stands for in the piece by my colleague Isabel Cuesta Camacho.
Enjoy the read and have a relaxing weekend
“This morning I told the Labour and Green Left parties that I would love to be a candidate to lead them in the next elections,” Frans Timmermans said Thursday. This makes official what had been rumored since the end of last year and had become concrete since the resignation of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte two weeks ago. Timmermans is turning his back on Brussels and wants to succeed Rutte.
This is tantamount to Timmermans’ early end as the EU’s Green Deal chief and executive vice president of the Commission. Not effective immediately, however. Officially, the two alliance parties do not intend to nominate their top candidate until mid-August. So until then, the Green Deal commissioner can and will remain in Brussels.
A spokesman also clarified this on Thursday, saying that the candidacy was initially hypothetical and subject to an internal party process. A Commission spokesman also clarified this on Thursday: The candidacy is initially hypothetical and subject to an internal party process. Until that process is completed, it will not impact Timmermans’ availability as a member of the collegium and the continuation of his work as executive vice president for the Green Deal, the spokesman said.
Some regret Timmermans’ departure from Brussels. Green MEP Michael Bloss, for instance, commented that the EU Commission was losing the visionary builder of the Green Deal, whose achievements were historic. Dutch Social Democrat Mohammed Chahim said Timmermans was what the Netherlands needed: “Leadership and vision to make the Netherlands greener and more social.”
Others cannot wait for Timmermans to leave Brussels finally. “He will not be missed. We are counting on Dutch voters to treat him the way he deserves,” tweeted Italian Lega politician Matteo Salvini. Peter Liese, environmental spokesman for the EPP, told Politico that Timmermans’ departure is good for climate action. He said Timmermans’ provocative nature had complicated the matter with the Nature Restoration Law. Timmermans’ party colleague Dennis Radtke wrote: “There is probably no one who has done so much damage in Europe in recent years and who cared so little about jobs and social equality.”
The question of who will succeed Timmermans by the end of the legislature in the fall of 2024 is not a simple one. First of all, the Dutch government will propose a new commissioner and the outgoing cabinet will have to accept the proposal. However, this person will unlikely become a Commission vice-president or take over the Green Deal portfolio. It is up to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to decide who will be in charge of which portfolio.
There is speculation in EU circles that the Green Deal will be taken over either by Italian Commissioner for Economy, Paolo Gentiloni, or by Maroš Šefčovič, Vice President for Interinstitutional Relations. The latter was previously Energy Commissioner, which is why he is considered suitable for the post.
It also remains to be seen how significant the political weakness will be in the last year of the Von der Leyen Commission. Not only is Timmermans about to leave, but the Commission’s second Executive Vice President, Margrethe Vestager, also wants to leave Brussels to take over the management of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxembourg. There is a danger that the Commission will be a lame duck in several areas between now and the European elections in 2024.
Timmermans will undoubtedly leave a big gap in the Green Deal. However, the main legislative proposals of the Fit for 55 package have already been negotiated. At present, the dossiers on nature conservation and agriculture in particular, such as the Nature Restoration Law, the Industrial Emissions Directive, the Pesticides Regulation and the regulation of new genome editing, are still in the trilogue.
Timmermans also distinguished himself on nature conservation legislation and repeatedly intervened in the debate, especially at the political level, for example, when the Nature Restoration Law was at risk of failing in Parliament. However, Timmermans is not responsible for the farm-to-fork and biodiversity strategies, but the Commissioner for the Environment and Agriculture, Virginijus Sinkevičius. The loss of Timmermans would be politically significant, but in terms of content, it would be bearable for the EU Commission.
Alberto Núñez Feijóo has often beaten his political rivals at the ballot box. Four times he won the regional elections in Galicia with an absolute majority and was thus President of the northwestern region for 13 years, from 2009 to 2022. This time, Feijóo also wants to win with an absolute majority as the candidate of the Partido Popular (PP) in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Polls see him winning next Sunday’s elections with around 34 percent of the vote and up to 145 seats. For an absolute majority of 176 seats, however, he would need the far-right Vox party.
“I’m not going to say I will pact with Vox because I don’t want to pact with Vox,” Feijóo said this week in an interview with the newspaper La Voz de Galicia. Feijóo claims four red lines that separate him and his conservative Popular Party from Vox: “respect for the Constitution, the status of the autonomous regions, the problem of violence against women and the position on climate change. In short, the issues that make up my political biography.”
Nevertheless, Feijóo has given the PP regional councils the green light to work with Vox. The pacts between PP and Vox in regions such as Valencia and Extremadura raise the question of how Feijóo will proceed should he need Vox to form a government.
The 62-year-old has a conservative profile similar to that of former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (PP), who is also from Galicia: He wants a strong state, but preferably without tax increases. Thus, he promises to end the “economic populism” of Pedro Sánchez’s coalition government. This would include lowering income tax for those earning less than €40,000 gross per year and abolishing the special taxes that Sánchez had imposed on large fortunes, banks and energy companies. Feijóo also wants to win the political center back since this legislative period has polarized Spain toward the extremes of left and right.
Feijóo – the maternal surname by which he is known – was born on September 10, 1961, in the small village of Os Peares, Galicia. He is married to businesswoman Eva Cárdenas, with whom he has a six-year-old son. A good Galician, he maintains close ties with his homeland (apego ao terruño), an inner belonging to the geography and its people.
Three rivers cross in his home village. Due to the special location of the Ribeira Sacra, a wine-growing region, the village belongs to four municipalities, two provinces and two dioceses, so there are four mayors for the current population of about 60. “That’s why we built so many bridges here, to understand each other, to unite what the rivers had separated,” Feijóo says. At the age of eleven, he was sent to boarding school in the city of León. This was followed by studies at the Faculty of Law in Santiago de Compostela.
Originally, Feijóo did not want to be a politician but a judge, but when his father became unemployed, he applied for positions in the regional administration. He obtained various posts in the Galician Ministries of Housing and Health. From 1996 to 2000, he was President of the National Institute of Health (Insalud) and Secretary General in the Spanish Ministry of Health. From 2000 to 2003, he headed the Post Office. In 2006, he took over the leadership of the PP in Galicia. In April 2022, he became party leader at the national level.
So far, Feijóo has not been responsible for any major scandals. However, in 2013, a photo of him and drug trafficker Marcial Dorado was circulated. The photo from 1995 shows Feijóo on Dorado’s yacht, who was a tobacco smuggler at the time. This photo has now been brought out again in the election campaign to prevent Feijóo’s election victory.
July 24-25, 2023
Informal ministerial meeting on consumer issues, industry and internal market
Topics: New Consumer Agenda 2020-2025 (current situation and future perspectives), Next steps towards sustainable consumption, Open strategic autonomy as a cornerstone of the EU (an opportunity for industrial development and a new impetus for the internal market). Provisional agenda
July 25, 2023; 10 a.m.
Council of the EU: Agriculture and Fisheries
Topics: Exchange of views on the regulation on the sustainable use of plant protection products (study to complement the impact assessment), information from the Commission on the Fifth Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the African Union and the European Union (Rome, June 30, 2023), presentation by the Commission on the regulations on the production and marketing of plant and forest reproductive material. Provisional agenda
July 27-28, 2023
Informal Ministerial Meeting Health
Topics: Paving the way to the European Health Union, Improving mental health in the EU, Measures to build an open strategic autonomy for the EU in the field of medicines and medical devices. Provisional agenda
July 27-28, 2023
Informal ministerial meeting on competitiveness (research)
Topics: The role of science diplomacy, Presentation of the IFMIF DONES project, Second Strategic Plan for Horizon Europe (2025-27). Provisional agenda
The news overshadowed the meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels: Russia was not only blocking the extension of the grain agreement but bombing Odessa and the grain silos there for the third night in a row. Josep Borrell spoke on Thursday of a “barbaric attitude” by Moscow. New evidence for the EU foreign affairs envoy that Ukraine needs longer-term aid: “We need a stable instrument because Ukraine will need support not month by month, but a structural and continued support.”
Borrell presented a paper to the roundtable that envisages increasing the Peace Facility by €20 billion. €5 billion are to be mobilized in annual tranches from 2024 to 2027. This is to finance the expansion of the military training program for the Ukrainian armed forces. Previous plans envisaged training 30,000 soldiers in various EU states. The goal should soon be reached. However, the EU money will also be used to finance additional air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets, expected to be delivered to Ukraine early next year.
Ukraine needs security guarantees, and large-scale financial aid must be closely interlinked with support from NATO and the G7 countries, said Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. Ukraine’s right to self-defense must also be ensured with funding for military equipment, she said. An initial debate based on Borrell’s proposal was planned. For some ministers, however, the discussion came too soon, all the more so because Hungary has recently blocked significantly smaller increases in the Peace Facility.
Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg said the EU will continue to provide solidarity support to Ukraine, but to what extent and how it will be financed is not yet clear. The chief diplomat questioned whether the net contributors in the EU will free up new funds for this. He said this could also be done through normal reallocations at the mid-term review in the fall, as not all funds in the long-standing budget have been exhausted yet: “We will talk behind closed doors, reach an agreement and then go public.”
Another important item on the agenda was Turkey and a possible new dynamic after the re-election of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. At the meeting, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner and the EU Commission urged to seize the opportunity and approach Turkey with offers.
Ankara’s wish list includes not only a restart of accession negotiations but also the modernization of the Customs Union and the old demand for visa liberalization. The round of foreign ministers took a more skeptical view of Borrell’s push for Turkey. Baerbock stressed that the EU has clear processes for its accession procedures. She said the procedure with Turkey is frozen for a reason. She said there had been backward steps instead of progress in crucial chapters such as the rule of law. But it was important to remain in dialogue with each other, she said. Luxembourg’s Jean Asselborn expressed a similar view.
Sweden had promised to lobby the EU for Turkey’s European agenda as part of an agreement with a view to NATO membership. The discussions between Sweden and Turkey are of no concern to the EU, Schallenberg said: “I don’t see the need for any concession within the EU.” He added that the rationale for putting the accession negotiations on hold has not changed. With a view to visa liberalization, the EU had set 72 conditions and these had not been met. sti
Member States are only sporadically fulfilling their obligation to make the recipients of funds from the Reconstruction Fund (RRF) public. Only 14 out of 27 member states have published the largest recipients. Among the countries that have not published are:
Monika Hohlmeier (CSU), head of the Budgetary Control Committee, criticized this in a letter to Vice Commission President Valdis Dombrovskis and Finance Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni: “We expect to receive the lists of all member states as soon as possible.” The letter is available to Table.Media. The fund has €724 billion in grants and loans available to member states. States must publish a list of the 100 largest recipients every six months.
Hohlmeier also points out that two member states to which so far no funds can be disbursed are already publishing lists of recipients. “To our surprise, Poland and Hungary published lists even though they received neither funds from pre-financing nor a regular installment.” Because of the rule of law cases against Poland and Hungary, the disbursement of €23 billion in grants and €11 billion in loans to Warsaw and nearly €6 billion in grants to Budapest is blocked.
Poland published a list of recipients, Hungary already published two. “Can you explain to us how the listed recipients have already received the funds from the RRF?”, Hohlmeier asks the Commission. She said the Commission should make clear to Parliament what criteria Member States should use to compile lists of recipients.
In addition to the implementation of the Next Generation EU program, the Commission and member states are also struggling with increased financing costs. For example, interest rates on ten-year EU bonds have risen from 0.09 percent in June 2021 to 3.2 percent in May 2023, slightly more than German bunds, for example. When the program was launched, however, the Commission had expected only a “gradual rise in interest rates to 1.15 percent,” according to a letter from Budget Commissioner Johannes Hahn to Markus Ferber, the spokesman for the EPP in the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.
Hahn recently put the additional financial requirement for this at €18.9 billion during the revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework. Among the member states, however, there is resistance to paying for this additional burden. “The interest charges for the Covid Fund have literally exploded compared to the Commission’s forecasts – this is already becoming a problem for the EU’s ability to act,” says Ferber.
The CSU politician fears further interest rate hikes due to the strained financial situation in some member states. In April, rating agency Fitch downgraded France’s long-term debt from AA to AA- and subsequently also downgraded the credit rating of the European Financial Stabilization Facility (EFSF), the predecessor of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). “When a major EU member state like France is downgraded, this almost inevitably has consequences for the credit rating of EU bonds in the long term,” Ferber warns.
Hahn disagrees: In his letter, he assures “that France’s downgrade has no impact on its EU rating.” The liabilities are solidly backed by the EU budget and the EU’s resources, he says. The EFSF is “less robust” because of its lower capital base, he said. The Commission would not speculate on the impact of a hypothetical downgrade of EU bonds. mgr/tho
On Thursday, the Council gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate a Critical Minerals Agreement (CMA) with the US. The agreement aims to strengthen supply chains for critical raw materials and mitigate some of the negative impacts of the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) on the EU industry.
“The Critical Minerals Agreement will play a key role in diversifying international supply chains for critical minerals,” said Spanish Industry and Trade Minister Héctor Gómez Hernández. “It will also help strengthen our cooperation on the green transformation.” He said the agreement will grant the EU equivalent status to US FTA partners for purposes of the Clean Vehicle Credit under the IRA.
According to the negotiation guidelines, the CMA should:
In doing so, the agreement should be in line with World Trade Organization (WHO) rules and with the goals of the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the European Battery Alliance, he said.
Once the mandate has been adopted, the Commission can begin formal negotiations with the USA. Once these have been concluded, the agreement must be adopted by the Council and Parliament. leo
Diplomats of the German EU embassy appeal in a diplomatic correspondence to the German government to settle its dispute on the Euro 7 emission standard. Otherwise, they say, it will not be in a position to help determine the Council’s position on this important dossier for the auto industry. Following a meeting of Permanent Representatives (Coreper 1) on Wednesday, the German EU embassy pointed out to the German government that work on the dossier was now entering a decisive phase.
The general orientation is scheduled for the Competitiveness Council on Sept. 25, and Coreper 1 is to prepare the orientation on Sept. 13-15. Accordingly, only two weeks remained for final deliberations on the text after the summer break. The German EU embassy writes that German concerns should thus be conveyed as soon as possible, before the summer break and before a still-awaited compromise proposal from the Spanish Council presidency.
In the round table at Wednesday’s meeting, almost every member state had expressed its opinion on Euro 7, only Germany remained without a word for lack of instructions. To date, the environment and transport ministries have been unable to reach an agreement. The Spanish Council Presidency expressly regretted that Germany had not yet contributed to this dossier.
The state of negotiations between the member states was summarized by a representative of the Council Presidency at the meeting: Only the Commission’s proposals on tires, brakes and durability were undisputed. No majority for the Commission proposal was foreseeable with regard to the exhaust limits for passenger cars and vans.
As far as limit values and test conditions for heavy commercial vehicles are concerned, there are major differences between the various positions. Discussions at the working level on the deadlines for entry into force are still needed. mgr
On Thursday, the EU Commission gave state aid approval to what the BMWK says is Germany’s biggest decarbonization project to date. ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe is to receive €2 billion from the federal government and the state of North Rhine-Westphalia to convert a blast furnace line in Duisburg to direct reduction.
Of this, €550 million will go toward the construction of the direct reduction plant and two sponge iron melter units. The remaining sum of €1.45 billion is a “conditional payment” for the use of green hydrogen, which can already be paid out in advance, according to the BMWK. “The conditional payment mechanism will cover, during the first ten years of operation […], the additional costs of procuring and using renewable hydrogen instead of low-carbon hydrogen,” the Commission writes.
According to the company, commissioning is scheduled to start at the end of 2026 – initially still with natural gas, as a spokeswoman explained. From 2027, the first quantities of hydrogen would be used. “Depending on availability and economic viability,” it will be a mix of blue and green hydrogen, she said. From 2029, only hydrogen is to be used – 143,000 tons annually – and from 2037, only green hydrogen. The annual carbon savings are expected to be up to 3.5 million tons.
As with Salzgitter, the Commission did not approve the conversion under the IPCEI mechanism originally envisaged but under the more general Climate and Energy Aid Guidelines (KUEBLL). The Commission imposed several conditions, including that ThyssenKrupp shares the gained experience and repays any profits to the state.
“We will support further projects under the IPCEI hydrogen so that the production and transport of hydrogen is also made possible,” said German Economy Minister Robert Habeck (Greens). According to BMWK, a project by Stahl-Holding-Saar and one by ArcelorMittal in Bremen and Eisenhüttenstadt are also awaiting approval under state aid law. ber
Two weeks ago, the Food Safety Authority EFSA announced its risk assessment for glyphosate. Now it is certain: The vote on a 15-year extension of the controversial herbicide will take place in October.
The glyphosate extension will go through the so-called comitology procedure. In other words: The Commission presents a decision, and the relevant comitology committee of the Council votes on it. In this case, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health is responsible, or more precisely its subcommittee on phytopharmaceuticals. The Committee plans to present its decision on glyphosate at its next meeting on Sept. 15. After that, the Committee will meet again on October 12 and 13. Then, the Committee plans to vote on the extension.
A qualified majority will apply. In the event of a negative vote, the matter will be referred to the Appeals Committee. If this also decides against the Committee’s proposal, it must withdraw the proposal. If there is no qualified majority for or against the Commission’s proposal, it can implement its proposal. This happened with the decision to provisionally extend glyphosate in December 2022.
A few days ago, a first draft of the Commission’s proposal was leaked. In it, the Commission recommends the extension of glyphosate. According to it, the controversial herbicide could still be used until 2038.
The Parliament is considering raising its objections to the extension, according to the office of Pascal Canfin (Renew), Chairman of the Environment Committee. Such an objection, however, is mainly symbolic in the case of implementing acts.
The Commission’s quick action may come as a surprise. EFSA will not publish its conclusions on the glyphosate assessment until the end of July. The full report is not expected until October. Only after the Commission makes its decision. cw
French President Emmanuel Macron is reshuffling his government. However, the important departments of the economy, foreign and domestic policy, defense and justice are not affected, as the Élysée Palace announced in Paris on Thursday evening. Among others, the education and health ministers will be replaced. Secretary of State Marlène Schiappa is also leaving the government.
Already for weeks, a government reshuffle was in the room in France, there was also speculation about a change at the head of government. However, Macron had already said on Tuesday he was sticking with Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne.
Macron and the centrist government are weakened after months of fighting over the pension reform that was ultimately pushed through. The government, which has lacked an absolute majority in the National Assembly since the general election just over a year ago, failed to secure a reliable majority for its key project with votes from the opposition. This was compounded by the recent unrest following the death of a teenager during a police control. dpa
Spain is one of Europe’s renewable energy champions and certainly no friend of nuclear energy. The fight against global warming is also central to the current government. The Spanish Minister of Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Teresa Ribera, is considered one of the “best experts in international climate negotiations” in the EU. Her negotiating style: open, communicative and tough on the issue.
New majorities in Madrid could well have an impact on Spain’s priorities during its EU Council presidency. The program includes ecological transformation with answers to the climate crisis as a pillar of the Spanish program.
Spain’s term in the Council is the last full six months of the presidency before the European elections. Sometimes referred to as the “golden presidency,” this time is usually used to complete as many projects as possible or to allow them to be completed by the next presidency. This is all the more true for the Green Deal, the prestige program of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to make Europe climate neutral by 2050. Von der Leyen even spoke of “Europe’s man on the moon moment.” The rhetoric, similar to the level of ambition, is extremely high.
Belgium, which will take over the Council presidency on January 1, 2024, is likely to have only two to three months in practice to try to complete politically what has not been completed before. This is because the following weeks will be used for formal steps, such as translations and the final votes of the co-legislators.
Now Spain is going to the polls next Sunday. Most polls currently predict a victory for the conservatives on July 23. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the People’s Party (PP), has made the tax cut one of his key proposals (see also the analysis on Feijóo in today’s briefing).
The Spanish PP is also strongly opposed to the Nature Restoration Law. On the gas and hydrogen package, it may also be more receptive to the French position on nuclear energy, which the left opposes. In short: The PP represents pretty much the opposite of the current government on many issues.
In Brussels, the old hands of EU politics broadly agree that a right-wing election victory in Madrid would not deeply affect the Spanish presidency. Spain assumes this role as a country that must be fundamentally neutral. Above all, there would be no time in concrete terms to change an already fixed agenda, and the remaining work on most of the issues, which are very mature, is mainly technical.
However, “Apart from that, there is the informal part of the leadership, which is important. And if the negotiations are difficult, the presidency can propose a compromise or play with deadlines to favor a dossier or not,” says a European diplomatic source. “And above all, a conservative government in Spain would mean one more conservative voice in the EU Council, changing the political balance.”
Frans Timmermans is leaving Brussels. Even though there had been speculation about this for months, it was the news of the day in EU circles yesterday. The Commission Vice-President wants to do it again at the national level and become Prime Minister of the Netherlands. Regardless of whether he wins or loses the election, he will probably turn his back on the EU Commission as early as mid-August, when the red-green alliance officially selects its candidate. My colleague Till Hoppe and I have analyzed what Timmermans’ departure means for Brussels.
For the Green Deal, Timmermans’ planned move to The Hague is a great loss, as he was considered the doer and defender of the EU climate and environment package. And with the election in Spain, supporters may soon lose another pillar of support in the Council. Claire Stam writes in her column, how an election victory by Spain’s conservative People’s Party (PP) could affect the Green Deal.
Find out what Alberto Núñez Feijóo – the PP’s possible election winner – stands for in the piece by my colleague Isabel Cuesta Camacho.
Enjoy the read and have a relaxing weekend
“This morning I told the Labour and Green Left parties that I would love to be a candidate to lead them in the next elections,” Frans Timmermans said Thursday. This makes official what had been rumored since the end of last year and had become concrete since the resignation of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte two weeks ago. Timmermans is turning his back on Brussels and wants to succeed Rutte.
This is tantamount to Timmermans’ early end as the EU’s Green Deal chief and executive vice president of the Commission. Not effective immediately, however. Officially, the two alliance parties do not intend to nominate their top candidate until mid-August. So until then, the Green Deal commissioner can and will remain in Brussels.
A spokesman also clarified this on Thursday, saying that the candidacy was initially hypothetical and subject to an internal party process. A Commission spokesman also clarified this on Thursday: The candidacy is initially hypothetical and subject to an internal party process. Until that process is completed, it will not impact Timmermans’ availability as a member of the collegium and the continuation of his work as executive vice president for the Green Deal, the spokesman said.
Some regret Timmermans’ departure from Brussels. Green MEP Michael Bloss, for instance, commented that the EU Commission was losing the visionary builder of the Green Deal, whose achievements were historic. Dutch Social Democrat Mohammed Chahim said Timmermans was what the Netherlands needed: “Leadership and vision to make the Netherlands greener and more social.”
Others cannot wait for Timmermans to leave Brussels finally. “He will not be missed. We are counting on Dutch voters to treat him the way he deserves,” tweeted Italian Lega politician Matteo Salvini. Peter Liese, environmental spokesman for the EPP, told Politico that Timmermans’ departure is good for climate action. He said Timmermans’ provocative nature had complicated the matter with the Nature Restoration Law. Timmermans’ party colleague Dennis Radtke wrote: “There is probably no one who has done so much damage in Europe in recent years and who cared so little about jobs and social equality.”
The question of who will succeed Timmermans by the end of the legislature in the fall of 2024 is not a simple one. First of all, the Dutch government will propose a new commissioner and the outgoing cabinet will have to accept the proposal. However, this person will unlikely become a Commission vice-president or take over the Green Deal portfolio. It is up to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to decide who will be in charge of which portfolio.
There is speculation in EU circles that the Green Deal will be taken over either by Italian Commissioner for Economy, Paolo Gentiloni, or by Maroš Šefčovič, Vice President for Interinstitutional Relations. The latter was previously Energy Commissioner, which is why he is considered suitable for the post.
It also remains to be seen how significant the political weakness will be in the last year of the Von der Leyen Commission. Not only is Timmermans about to leave, but the Commission’s second Executive Vice President, Margrethe Vestager, also wants to leave Brussels to take over the management of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxembourg. There is a danger that the Commission will be a lame duck in several areas between now and the European elections in 2024.
Timmermans will undoubtedly leave a big gap in the Green Deal. However, the main legislative proposals of the Fit for 55 package have already been negotiated. At present, the dossiers on nature conservation and agriculture in particular, such as the Nature Restoration Law, the Industrial Emissions Directive, the Pesticides Regulation and the regulation of new genome editing, are still in the trilogue.
Timmermans also distinguished himself on nature conservation legislation and repeatedly intervened in the debate, especially at the political level, for example, when the Nature Restoration Law was at risk of failing in Parliament. However, Timmermans is not responsible for the farm-to-fork and biodiversity strategies, but the Commissioner for the Environment and Agriculture, Virginijus Sinkevičius. The loss of Timmermans would be politically significant, but in terms of content, it would be bearable for the EU Commission.
Alberto Núñez Feijóo has often beaten his political rivals at the ballot box. Four times he won the regional elections in Galicia with an absolute majority and was thus President of the northwestern region for 13 years, from 2009 to 2022. This time, Feijóo also wants to win with an absolute majority as the candidate of the Partido Popular (PP) in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Polls see him winning next Sunday’s elections with around 34 percent of the vote and up to 145 seats. For an absolute majority of 176 seats, however, he would need the far-right Vox party.
“I’m not going to say I will pact with Vox because I don’t want to pact with Vox,” Feijóo said this week in an interview with the newspaper La Voz de Galicia. Feijóo claims four red lines that separate him and his conservative Popular Party from Vox: “respect for the Constitution, the status of the autonomous regions, the problem of violence against women and the position on climate change. In short, the issues that make up my political biography.”
Nevertheless, Feijóo has given the PP regional councils the green light to work with Vox. The pacts between PP and Vox in regions such as Valencia and Extremadura raise the question of how Feijóo will proceed should he need Vox to form a government.
The 62-year-old has a conservative profile similar to that of former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (PP), who is also from Galicia: He wants a strong state, but preferably without tax increases. Thus, he promises to end the “economic populism” of Pedro Sánchez’s coalition government. This would include lowering income tax for those earning less than €40,000 gross per year and abolishing the special taxes that Sánchez had imposed on large fortunes, banks and energy companies. Feijóo also wants to win the political center back since this legislative period has polarized Spain toward the extremes of left and right.
Feijóo – the maternal surname by which he is known – was born on September 10, 1961, in the small village of Os Peares, Galicia. He is married to businesswoman Eva Cárdenas, with whom he has a six-year-old son. A good Galician, he maintains close ties with his homeland (apego ao terruño), an inner belonging to the geography and its people.
Three rivers cross in his home village. Due to the special location of the Ribeira Sacra, a wine-growing region, the village belongs to four municipalities, two provinces and two dioceses, so there are four mayors for the current population of about 60. “That’s why we built so many bridges here, to understand each other, to unite what the rivers had separated,” Feijóo says. At the age of eleven, he was sent to boarding school in the city of León. This was followed by studies at the Faculty of Law in Santiago de Compostela.
Originally, Feijóo did not want to be a politician but a judge, but when his father became unemployed, he applied for positions in the regional administration. He obtained various posts in the Galician Ministries of Housing and Health. From 1996 to 2000, he was President of the National Institute of Health (Insalud) and Secretary General in the Spanish Ministry of Health. From 2000 to 2003, he headed the Post Office. In 2006, he took over the leadership of the PP in Galicia. In April 2022, he became party leader at the national level.
So far, Feijóo has not been responsible for any major scandals. However, in 2013, a photo of him and drug trafficker Marcial Dorado was circulated. The photo from 1995 shows Feijóo on Dorado’s yacht, who was a tobacco smuggler at the time. This photo has now been brought out again in the election campaign to prevent Feijóo’s election victory.
July 24-25, 2023
Informal ministerial meeting on consumer issues, industry and internal market
Topics: New Consumer Agenda 2020-2025 (current situation and future perspectives), Next steps towards sustainable consumption, Open strategic autonomy as a cornerstone of the EU (an opportunity for industrial development and a new impetus for the internal market). Provisional agenda
July 25, 2023; 10 a.m.
Council of the EU: Agriculture and Fisheries
Topics: Exchange of views on the regulation on the sustainable use of plant protection products (study to complement the impact assessment), information from the Commission on the Fifth Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the African Union and the European Union (Rome, June 30, 2023), presentation by the Commission on the regulations on the production and marketing of plant and forest reproductive material. Provisional agenda
July 27-28, 2023
Informal Ministerial Meeting Health
Topics: Paving the way to the European Health Union, Improving mental health in the EU, Measures to build an open strategic autonomy for the EU in the field of medicines and medical devices. Provisional agenda
July 27-28, 2023
Informal ministerial meeting on competitiveness (research)
Topics: The role of science diplomacy, Presentation of the IFMIF DONES project, Second Strategic Plan for Horizon Europe (2025-27). Provisional agenda
The news overshadowed the meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels: Russia was not only blocking the extension of the grain agreement but bombing Odessa and the grain silos there for the third night in a row. Josep Borrell spoke on Thursday of a “barbaric attitude” by Moscow. New evidence for the EU foreign affairs envoy that Ukraine needs longer-term aid: “We need a stable instrument because Ukraine will need support not month by month, but a structural and continued support.”
Borrell presented a paper to the roundtable that envisages increasing the Peace Facility by €20 billion. €5 billion are to be mobilized in annual tranches from 2024 to 2027. This is to finance the expansion of the military training program for the Ukrainian armed forces. Previous plans envisaged training 30,000 soldiers in various EU states. The goal should soon be reached. However, the EU money will also be used to finance additional air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets, expected to be delivered to Ukraine early next year.
Ukraine needs security guarantees, and large-scale financial aid must be closely interlinked with support from NATO and the G7 countries, said Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. Ukraine’s right to self-defense must also be ensured with funding for military equipment, she said. An initial debate based on Borrell’s proposal was planned. For some ministers, however, the discussion came too soon, all the more so because Hungary has recently blocked significantly smaller increases in the Peace Facility.
Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg said the EU will continue to provide solidarity support to Ukraine, but to what extent and how it will be financed is not yet clear. The chief diplomat questioned whether the net contributors in the EU will free up new funds for this. He said this could also be done through normal reallocations at the mid-term review in the fall, as not all funds in the long-standing budget have been exhausted yet: “We will talk behind closed doors, reach an agreement and then go public.”
Another important item on the agenda was Turkey and a possible new dynamic after the re-election of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. At the meeting, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner and the EU Commission urged to seize the opportunity and approach Turkey with offers.
Ankara’s wish list includes not only a restart of accession negotiations but also the modernization of the Customs Union and the old demand for visa liberalization. The round of foreign ministers took a more skeptical view of Borrell’s push for Turkey. Baerbock stressed that the EU has clear processes for its accession procedures. She said the procedure with Turkey is frozen for a reason. She said there had been backward steps instead of progress in crucial chapters such as the rule of law. But it was important to remain in dialogue with each other, she said. Luxembourg’s Jean Asselborn expressed a similar view.
Sweden had promised to lobby the EU for Turkey’s European agenda as part of an agreement with a view to NATO membership. The discussions between Sweden and Turkey are of no concern to the EU, Schallenberg said: “I don’t see the need for any concession within the EU.” He added that the rationale for putting the accession negotiations on hold has not changed. With a view to visa liberalization, the EU had set 72 conditions and these had not been met. sti
Member States are only sporadically fulfilling their obligation to make the recipients of funds from the Reconstruction Fund (RRF) public. Only 14 out of 27 member states have published the largest recipients. Among the countries that have not published are:
Monika Hohlmeier (CSU), head of the Budgetary Control Committee, criticized this in a letter to Vice Commission President Valdis Dombrovskis and Finance Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni: “We expect to receive the lists of all member states as soon as possible.” The letter is available to Table.Media. The fund has €724 billion in grants and loans available to member states. States must publish a list of the 100 largest recipients every six months.
Hohlmeier also points out that two member states to which so far no funds can be disbursed are already publishing lists of recipients. “To our surprise, Poland and Hungary published lists even though they received neither funds from pre-financing nor a regular installment.” Because of the rule of law cases against Poland and Hungary, the disbursement of €23 billion in grants and €11 billion in loans to Warsaw and nearly €6 billion in grants to Budapest is blocked.
Poland published a list of recipients, Hungary already published two. “Can you explain to us how the listed recipients have already received the funds from the RRF?”, Hohlmeier asks the Commission. She said the Commission should make clear to Parliament what criteria Member States should use to compile lists of recipients.
In addition to the implementation of the Next Generation EU program, the Commission and member states are also struggling with increased financing costs. For example, interest rates on ten-year EU bonds have risen from 0.09 percent in June 2021 to 3.2 percent in May 2023, slightly more than German bunds, for example. When the program was launched, however, the Commission had expected only a “gradual rise in interest rates to 1.15 percent,” according to a letter from Budget Commissioner Johannes Hahn to Markus Ferber, the spokesman for the EPP in the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.
Hahn recently put the additional financial requirement for this at €18.9 billion during the revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework. Among the member states, however, there is resistance to paying for this additional burden. “The interest charges for the Covid Fund have literally exploded compared to the Commission’s forecasts – this is already becoming a problem for the EU’s ability to act,” says Ferber.
The CSU politician fears further interest rate hikes due to the strained financial situation in some member states. In April, rating agency Fitch downgraded France’s long-term debt from AA to AA- and subsequently also downgraded the credit rating of the European Financial Stabilization Facility (EFSF), the predecessor of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). “When a major EU member state like France is downgraded, this almost inevitably has consequences for the credit rating of EU bonds in the long term,” Ferber warns.
Hahn disagrees: In his letter, he assures “that France’s downgrade has no impact on its EU rating.” The liabilities are solidly backed by the EU budget and the EU’s resources, he says. The EFSF is “less robust” because of its lower capital base, he said. The Commission would not speculate on the impact of a hypothetical downgrade of EU bonds. mgr/tho
On Thursday, the Council gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate a Critical Minerals Agreement (CMA) with the US. The agreement aims to strengthen supply chains for critical raw materials and mitigate some of the negative impacts of the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) on the EU industry.
“The Critical Minerals Agreement will play a key role in diversifying international supply chains for critical minerals,” said Spanish Industry and Trade Minister Héctor Gómez Hernández. “It will also help strengthen our cooperation on the green transformation.” He said the agreement will grant the EU equivalent status to US FTA partners for purposes of the Clean Vehicle Credit under the IRA.
According to the negotiation guidelines, the CMA should:
In doing so, the agreement should be in line with World Trade Organization (WHO) rules and with the goals of the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the European Battery Alliance, he said.
Once the mandate has been adopted, the Commission can begin formal negotiations with the USA. Once these have been concluded, the agreement must be adopted by the Council and Parliament. leo
Diplomats of the German EU embassy appeal in a diplomatic correspondence to the German government to settle its dispute on the Euro 7 emission standard. Otherwise, they say, it will not be in a position to help determine the Council’s position on this important dossier for the auto industry. Following a meeting of Permanent Representatives (Coreper 1) on Wednesday, the German EU embassy pointed out to the German government that work on the dossier was now entering a decisive phase.
The general orientation is scheduled for the Competitiveness Council on Sept. 25, and Coreper 1 is to prepare the orientation on Sept. 13-15. Accordingly, only two weeks remained for final deliberations on the text after the summer break. The German EU embassy writes that German concerns should thus be conveyed as soon as possible, before the summer break and before a still-awaited compromise proposal from the Spanish Council presidency.
In the round table at Wednesday’s meeting, almost every member state had expressed its opinion on Euro 7, only Germany remained without a word for lack of instructions. To date, the environment and transport ministries have been unable to reach an agreement. The Spanish Council Presidency expressly regretted that Germany had not yet contributed to this dossier.
The state of negotiations between the member states was summarized by a representative of the Council Presidency at the meeting: Only the Commission’s proposals on tires, brakes and durability were undisputed. No majority for the Commission proposal was foreseeable with regard to the exhaust limits for passenger cars and vans.
As far as limit values and test conditions for heavy commercial vehicles are concerned, there are major differences between the various positions. Discussions at the working level on the deadlines for entry into force are still needed. mgr
On Thursday, the EU Commission gave state aid approval to what the BMWK says is Germany’s biggest decarbonization project to date. ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe is to receive €2 billion from the federal government and the state of North Rhine-Westphalia to convert a blast furnace line in Duisburg to direct reduction.
Of this, €550 million will go toward the construction of the direct reduction plant and two sponge iron melter units. The remaining sum of €1.45 billion is a “conditional payment” for the use of green hydrogen, which can already be paid out in advance, according to the BMWK. “The conditional payment mechanism will cover, during the first ten years of operation […], the additional costs of procuring and using renewable hydrogen instead of low-carbon hydrogen,” the Commission writes.
According to the company, commissioning is scheduled to start at the end of 2026 – initially still with natural gas, as a spokeswoman explained. From 2027, the first quantities of hydrogen would be used. “Depending on availability and economic viability,” it will be a mix of blue and green hydrogen, she said. From 2029, only hydrogen is to be used – 143,000 tons annually – and from 2037, only green hydrogen. The annual carbon savings are expected to be up to 3.5 million tons.
As with Salzgitter, the Commission did not approve the conversion under the IPCEI mechanism originally envisaged but under the more general Climate and Energy Aid Guidelines (KUEBLL). The Commission imposed several conditions, including that ThyssenKrupp shares the gained experience and repays any profits to the state.
“We will support further projects under the IPCEI hydrogen so that the production and transport of hydrogen is also made possible,” said German Economy Minister Robert Habeck (Greens). According to BMWK, a project by Stahl-Holding-Saar and one by ArcelorMittal in Bremen and Eisenhüttenstadt are also awaiting approval under state aid law. ber
Two weeks ago, the Food Safety Authority EFSA announced its risk assessment for glyphosate. Now it is certain: The vote on a 15-year extension of the controversial herbicide will take place in October.
The glyphosate extension will go through the so-called comitology procedure. In other words: The Commission presents a decision, and the relevant comitology committee of the Council votes on it. In this case, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health is responsible, or more precisely its subcommittee on phytopharmaceuticals. The Committee plans to present its decision on glyphosate at its next meeting on Sept. 15. After that, the Committee will meet again on October 12 and 13. Then, the Committee plans to vote on the extension.
A qualified majority will apply. In the event of a negative vote, the matter will be referred to the Appeals Committee. If this also decides against the Committee’s proposal, it must withdraw the proposal. If there is no qualified majority for or against the Commission’s proposal, it can implement its proposal. This happened with the decision to provisionally extend glyphosate in December 2022.
A few days ago, a first draft of the Commission’s proposal was leaked. In it, the Commission recommends the extension of glyphosate. According to it, the controversial herbicide could still be used until 2038.
The Parliament is considering raising its objections to the extension, according to the office of Pascal Canfin (Renew), Chairman of the Environment Committee. Such an objection, however, is mainly symbolic in the case of implementing acts.
The Commission’s quick action may come as a surprise. EFSA will not publish its conclusions on the glyphosate assessment until the end of July. The full report is not expected until October. Only after the Commission makes its decision. cw
French President Emmanuel Macron is reshuffling his government. However, the important departments of the economy, foreign and domestic policy, defense and justice are not affected, as the Élysée Palace announced in Paris on Thursday evening. Among others, the education and health ministers will be replaced. Secretary of State Marlène Schiappa is also leaving the government.
Already for weeks, a government reshuffle was in the room in France, there was also speculation about a change at the head of government. However, Macron had already said on Tuesday he was sticking with Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne.
Macron and the centrist government are weakened after months of fighting over the pension reform that was ultimately pushed through. The government, which has lacked an absolute majority in the National Assembly since the general election just over a year ago, failed to secure a reliable majority for its key project with votes from the opposition. This was compounded by the recent unrest following the death of a teenager during a police control. dpa
Spain is one of Europe’s renewable energy champions and certainly no friend of nuclear energy. The fight against global warming is also central to the current government. The Spanish Minister of Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Teresa Ribera, is considered one of the “best experts in international climate negotiations” in the EU. Her negotiating style: open, communicative and tough on the issue.
New majorities in Madrid could well have an impact on Spain’s priorities during its EU Council presidency. The program includes ecological transformation with answers to the climate crisis as a pillar of the Spanish program.
Spain’s term in the Council is the last full six months of the presidency before the European elections. Sometimes referred to as the “golden presidency,” this time is usually used to complete as many projects as possible or to allow them to be completed by the next presidency. This is all the more true for the Green Deal, the prestige program of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to make Europe climate neutral by 2050. Von der Leyen even spoke of “Europe’s man on the moon moment.” The rhetoric, similar to the level of ambition, is extremely high.
Belgium, which will take over the Council presidency on January 1, 2024, is likely to have only two to three months in practice to try to complete politically what has not been completed before. This is because the following weeks will be used for formal steps, such as translations and the final votes of the co-legislators.
Now Spain is going to the polls next Sunday. Most polls currently predict a victory for the conservatives on July 23. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the People’s Party (PP), has made the tax cut one of his key proposals (see also the analysis on Feijóo in today’s briefing).
The Spanish PP is also strongly opposed to the Nature Restoration Law. On the gas and hydrogen package, it may also be more receptive to the French position on nuclear energy, which the left opposes. In short: The PP represents pretty much the opposite of the current government on many issues.
In Brussels, the old hands of EU politics broadly agree that a right-wing election victory in Madrid would not deeply affect the Spanish presidency. Spain assumes this role as a country that must be fundamentally neutral. Above all, there would be no time in concrete terms to change an already fixed agenda, and the remaining work on most of the issues, which are very mature, is mainly technical.
However, “Apart from that, there is the informal part of the leadership, which is important. And if the negotiations are difficult, the presidency can propose a compromise or play with deadlines to favor a dossier or not,” says a European diplomatic source. “And above all, a conservative government in Spain would mean one more conservative voice in the EU Council, changing the political balance.”