This year has been a particularly eventful one in European politics: the European elections and a number of elections in the Member States have changed the balance of power in the EU. In December, the new Commission took up its work. Following Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, it will probably soon have the opportunity to prove its claim to leadership, not least in trade policy. Political leadership is urgently needed in the EU – also due to the weak governments in Berlin and Paris, which have been mainly preoccupied with themselves in recent months.
In our annual review, we look back at the most important developments of the past year that will remain important in 2025. One thing is clear: Europe must stand united, it must better protect democracy – and become more innovative.
What is also clear: this is the last regular edition of Europe.Table this year. We’ll be back after the Christmas break on January 2 with our Features and News on everything you need to know about Europe. In the meantime, you can keep up to date with our free newsletter 100 Headlines. Our podcast Table.Today will also appear between the years – our guests will include former Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Have a pleasant break and happy holidays. Have a good start to the next year!
… hardly get it in today’s Europe: political leadership has become a scarce commodity. Chancellor Olaf Scholz governs on demand and sometimes moves through the European Council like a bull in a china store. Emmanuel Macron has fallen victim to his own disruptive style (see below). As a result, the EU looks ill-equipped for a more dangerous world, in which the Loudspeaker-in-Chief Donald Trump will soon be taking the floor.
Others are trying to fill the vacuum, such as Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk on the Ukraine issue. With Ursula von der Leyen, António Costa, Kaja Kallas and Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte, a quartet with a claim to leadership is taking over in Brussels, which has (so far) worked well together. A CDU Chancellor Friedrich Merz would also create a real center of power consisting of Christian Democrats who dominate the Council, Commission and European Parliament. At the same time, however, the centrifugal forces of social polarization are tugging at the political center, increasingly narrowing the scope for action. tho
If European lack of leadership was the rule in 2024, trade policy was perhaps the exception that proves that rule. As the year drew to a close, the Commission took a firm grip on this EU competence. Against the express will of the German government, it introduced countervailing duties on subsidized Chinese electric cars and also pushed this decision through the EU Council.
Anyone who thought that this customs decision was a sign that the Commission had adopted a French interpretation of industrial and trade policy has been proved wrong in December. The Commission President concluded the negotiations for a trade agreement with Mercosur against the will of the entire French political spectrum. The two decisions help the Commission’s reputation with smaller member states. They see that even the big players can be outvoted.
The second half of 2025 will show whether the Commission, together with other supporters of the Mercosur agreement, can also get this decision through the Council. Trump will probably give the EU Commission the opportunity to prove its claim to leadership in trade policy before that. jaa
By now, no one doubts that elections can be won by making smart use of social media. By 2024 at the latest, it was obvious how dangerous a short video platform like TikTok can be for the integrity of democratic elections. Disinformation, fake news, hidden paid advertising, influence from abroad – the possibilities for manipulation are many and varied. They were probably all used in Romania, with the well-known outcome.
The worst thing about it is that outsiders usually know very little about how the algorithms work. However, it is obvious that they spread hate, lies and hate speech faster than facts. Researchers Timothy Graham and Mark Andrejevic have shown that Elon Musk has massively influenced the visibility of political content on his platform X, to name just one example. The Commission is trying to counter this and use the Digital Services Act to enforce in the digital space what has always been prohibited offline.
However, the DSA has only been fully applicable since February 17. This means that the policy is lagging far behind technical – and social – developments. The mechanisms of the DSA still have to settle in and the Commission must prove that it and its staff are up to the challenges. vis
The Draghi Report dominated the political discussion in Brussels for a long time. It was not very flattering. Europe lacks competitiveness, investment and innovative strength. Mario Draghi states that Europe needs €750 to €800 billion in additional investment every year in order to achieve its goals. This corresponds to 4.4 to 4.7 percent of the EU’s GDP in 2023.
Europe has many talented researchers and entrepreneurs. But it has difficulties in transferring innovations to commercialization. Complex and restrictive regulations hinder innovative companies at every stage of their development. This is reflected not least in the fact that the innovation process in the EU is slower and less efficient than in the US. And while Big Tech is responsible for the highest expenditure on research and development in the USA, in the EU it is still the automotive companies – although they are having increasing problems selling their cars.
Coordinating policy across the EU is still often bureaucratic and ineffective. In many places, national interests hinder a clear European solution. The General Data Protection Regulation is just one example of a regulation where well-intentioned does not equal well done. It should be clear to all member states that they alone can hardly achieve anything on the global market – a united EU, on the other hand, can. vis
While the European election campaign gave the impression that climate policy would only play a subordinate role in the new legislature, it celebrated its rebirth with von der Leyen’s election victory – albeit under a different name. The Green Deal 2.0 will be called the Clean Industrial Deal and should finally unite climate protection and industrial policy across party lines. The goal: climate neutrality by 2050 while maintaining internationally competitive companies and European value creation.
The EU Commission’s top climate official is therefore also the Commissioner for Competition. The Social Democrat Teresa Ribera is thus responsible for sustainable growth in the EU, while the Christian Democrats Wopke Hoekstra and Jessika Roswall are responsible for climate and environmental protection. A clever move by von der Leyen, who thus received the backing for her policy from a broad majority in Parliament. luk
The topic of grids culminated in many things that were important in European economic policy in 2024 – and will continue to shape at least the coming year: The internal market, competitiveness and energy prices. Shortly before Christmas, it became clear what was at stake: Sweden and Norway had threatened to interrupt electricity connections to other European countries or not to approve them at all. This was supposedly to protect their own markets from high energy prices.
However, Enrico Letta had already written in his internal market report that the EU could best minimize the costs of the energy transition under one crucial condition: “the strengthening of mutual trust between the member states. Every country must be able to trust that it can receive energy supplies from its neighbors at any time.”
However, the cost of the grid will itself become a decisive factor for energy prices. For example, passages from drafts were removed from the Council conclusions in May, according to which member states that are not directly connected to each other should also share the costs of expansion projects. Companies and consumers can look forward to what the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs will mean by the “smarter distribution” of grid fees that has already been called for. ber
The automotive industry has slipped into a deep crisis. It is a threefold burden: firstly, customers, especially in Germany, are buying disappointingly few cars with battery-electric drive systems. Manufacturers and suppliers alike are suffering as a result. Secondly, profits from the Chinese business are collapsing for German manufacturers because the wealthy Chinese are buying fewer combustion cars in the luxury segment and are not buying enough e-drives from BMW, Mercedes, Porsche and Audi. Thirdly, car sales are declining overall and there is massive overcapacity. A number of assembly plants in the EU would actually have to be closed in order to balance production and sales as well as the cost structure of the surviving factories and brands.
It is not clear whether and to what extent the EU will accommodate manufacturers in terms of regulation. Carbon fleet limits for 2025, 2030 and 2035, the end of combustion engines in 2035 and fines for failing to meet climate targets from 2025 are being discussed at the Strategic Automotive Dialogue, chaired by Ursula von der Leyen.
There is little chance that she will reverse the Green Deal and bring about a renaissance of the combustion engine. It is more likely that non-fossil fuels such as e-fuels will be recognized and manufacturers will be exempted or largely relieved of the tens of billions in fines. mgr
The European elections in June shifted the balance of power in the European Parliament in favor of Manfred Weber. In the previous mandate, there was still a majority to the left of the EPP. And Weber had to accept that the S&D, Liberals, Greens and Left pushed through decisions against the EPP. Things look different now: Without Weber’s EPP group, which has once again become the largest with 188 seats, majorities are now no longer possible.
Weber, who is not only the EPP group leader but also heads the Christian Democratic party family, has a choice: Either he forges compromises with the other two parties in the informal Von der Leyen coalition, i.e. the Socialists and Liberals. Or he can rely on votes to the right of the EPP, i.e. the ECR and the radical right-wing “Patriots” and “Sovereignists.”
So far, he has tended to vote with the ECR and the right on procedural issues. However, when it comes to repealing the ban on combustion engines or other environmental dossiers in the near future, he could once again count on votes from the right. In doing so, he would once again be accused by socialists, liberals and the Greens of making common cause with right-wing extremists.
EPP leader Weber has the backing of the Commission and the Member States. 14 out of 27 Commissioners come from the EPP party family. At the meetings of the heads of state and government, 14 leaders with an EPP background sit at the table. This should enable Weber to organize majorities in the Council for important decisions such as triloges. mgr
After the 2019 European elections, he prevented Manfred Weber from becoming Commission President, Emmanuel Macron was at the height of his power. Today, he seems politically paralyzed, a victim of his method of constant disruption. His spontaneous decision to call new elections in June was met with a shake of the head in Berlin and other capitals. The French president is now seen as aloof and erratic, accessible only to a small number of loyal supporters.
Macron took office in 2017 with the aim of monopolizing the political center. The moderate right and left were no match for his force; the Republicans and Socialists are now just a shadow of decades past. At the same time, however, Macron created space for the fringes, for Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon: those who were alienated by the increasingly autocratic president found an alternative at the extremes. A Le Pen presidency seems more likely today than when he took office. tho
After many years, the negotiations have now been concluded: The EU and Switzerland want to permanently consolidate their partnership. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Swiss President Viola Amherd sealed the political agreement in Bern on Friday. Both sides expressed their satisfaction. Von der Leyen spoke of a “historic agreement” and referred to the geopolitical environment of growing tensions. Against this backdrop, a stronger partnership was imperative. Amherd also spoke of a milestone “in the stabilization and further development” of the bilateral relationship.
Members of the European Parliament David McAllister, Andreas Schwab (both CDU) and Christophe Grudler (Renew) welcome the agreement: “This is a milestone in deepening the already close relationship between the European Union and Switzerland.” The package of measures and agreements creates a level playing field and security for citizens, companies and the research community.
In the negotiations, Switzerland has succeeded in consolidating and further expanding its tailor-made access to the EU internal market. Even after saying no to joining the EEA in 1992, Switzerland was able to secure privileged conditions from the EU with a thicket of over 120 agreements. For over ten years, however, this special bilateral approach has been in jeopardy, as the EU insisted on a new basis and refused further single market access agreements. This was also due to the fact that Switzerland had formally withdrawn its application to join the EU.
With the previous static agreements, the homogeneous application of EU internal market law in Switzerland was less and less guaranteed. In addition, there was no dispute resolution mechanism.
Both are now set to change with the negotiated package. Switzerland must now dynamically adopt the new EU law in the internal market agreements. An arbitration tribunal will also decide if the interpretation of the agreements is disputed. In cases involving the interpretation of purely EU law, the arbitration tribunal must also consult the ECJ.
Switzerland must adapt existing agreements to EU law, whereby the free movement of persons remains limited to employees and the period for secondments is limited to 90 days. However, Switzerland must now grant all working EU citizens the right of permanent residence after five years.
Cabotage will be possible under the new agreements on land and air transport. This means that the airline Swiss can also transport passengers within the EU and European rail companies can operate within Switzerland.
The package also includes an electricity agreement with which Switzerland secures access to the internal electricity market, which is becoming increasingly integrated. In return, Switzerland must allow households the freedom to choose their supplier and largely comply with EU state aid rules.
Most recently, an agreement was reached on the price for tailor-made access to the single market. In future, Switzerland will pay €375 million a year towards the EU’s cohesion policy, practically three times more than before. A major concern of the research community in Germany and Switzerland will also be met. From January, Swiss researchers will be provisionally allowed to participate in Horizon Europe calls for proposals and take part in projects.
When and whether the package can come into force is the big question. During the negotiations, the government refrained from publicly promoting an agreement with the EU. As a result, opponents of the deal now have the power of interpretation. Exponents of the right-wing nationalist SVP, after all the strongest party in Switzerland, speak of a “subjugation” or “colonial treaty.”
Resistance is also emerging from the left-wing spectrum. The trade unions fear that Swiss wage protection will be weakened. The Social Democrats have reservations about the further liberalization of the electricity market.
The proponents are likely to have a difficult time against the concentrated resistance from the right and left. The government could try to get the trade unions on board with domestic political concessions or compensation for wage protection. However, there are only real risks in terms of posted workers, with minimal significance for the Swiss labor market.
A referendum is likely to take place in 2026 at the earliest, but possibly not until 2028 after the next parliamentary elections. The package could then come into force around 2030. The EU Commission has retained two levers. Should the deal fall through in the vote, provisional access to EU research programs would come to an end again. The EU would also not update the important agreement on technical barriers to trade (MRA).
This year has been a particularly eventful one in European politics: the European elections and a number of elections in the Member States have changed the balance of power in the EU. In December, the new Commission took up its work. Following Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, it will probably soon have the opportunity to prove its claim to leadership, not least in trade policy. Political leadership is urgently needed in the EU – also due to the weak governments in Berlin and Paris, which have been mainly preoccupied with themselves in recent months.
In our annual review, we look back at the most important developments of the past year that will remain important in 2025. One thing is clear: Europe must stand united, it must better protect democracy – and become more innovative.
What is also clear: this is the last regular edition of Europe.Table this year. We’ll be back after the Christmas break on January 2 with our Features and News on everything you need to know about Europe. In the meantime, you can keep up to date with our free newsletter 100 Headlines. Our podcast Table.Today will also appear between the years – our guests will include former Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Have a pleasant break and happy holidays. Have a good start to the next year!
… hardly get it in today’s Europe: political leadership has become a scarce commodity. Chancellor Olaf Scholz governs on demand and sometimes moves through the European Council like a bull in a china store. Emmanuel Macron has fallen victim to his own disruptive style (see below). As a result, the EU looks ill-equipped for a more dangerous world, in which the Loudspeaker-in-Chief Donald Trump will soon be taking the floor.
Others are trying to fill the vacuum, such as Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk on the Ukraine issue. With Ursula von der Leyen, António Costa, Kaja Kallas and Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte, a quartet with a claim to leadership is taking over in Brussels, which has (so far) worked well together. A CDU Chancellor Friedrich Merz would also create a real center of power consisting of Christian Democrats who dominate the Council, Commission and European Parliament. At the same time, however, the centrifugal forces of social polarization are tugging at the political center, increasingly narrowing the scope for action. tho
If European lack of leadership was the rule in 2024, trade policy was perhaps the exception that proves that rule. As the year drew to a close, the Commission took a firm grip on this EU competence. Against the express will of the German government, it introduced countervailing duties on subsidized Chinese electric cars and also pushed this decision through the EU Council.
Anyone who thought that this customs decision was a sign that the Commission had adopted a French interpretation of industrial and trade policy has been proved wrong in December. The Commission President concluded the negotiations for a trade agreement with Mercosur against the will of the entire French political spectrum. The two decisions help the Commission’s reputation with smaller member states. They see that even the big players can be outvoted.
The second half of 2025 will show whether the Commission, together with other supporters of the Mercosur agreement, can also get this decision through the Council. Trump will probably give the EU Commission the opportunity to prove its claim to leadership in trade policy before that. jaa
By now, no one doubts that elections can be won by making smart use of social media. By 2024 at the latest, it was obvious how dangerous a short video platform like TikTok can be for the integrity of democratic elections. Disinformation, fake news, hidden paid advertising, influence from abroad – the possibilities for manipulation are many and varied. They were probably all used in Romania, with the well-known outcome.
The worst thing about it is that outsiders usually know very little about how the algorithms work. However, it is obvious that they spread hate, lies and hate speech faster than facts. Researchers Timothy Graham and Mark Andrejevic have shown that Elon Musk has massively influenced the visibility of political content on his platform X, to name just one example. The Commission is trying to counter this and use the Digital Services Act to enforce in the digital space what has always been prohibited offline.
However, the DSA has only been fully applicable since February 17. This means that the policy is lagging far behind technical – and social – developments. The mechanisms of the DSA still have to settle in and the Commission must prove that it and its staff are up to the challenges. vis
The Draghi Report dominated the political discussion in Brussels for a long time. It was not very flattering. Europe lacks competitiveness, investment and innovative strength. Mario Draghi states that Europe needs €750 to €800 billion in additional investment every year in order to achieve its goals. This corresponds to 4.4 to 4.7 percent of the EU’s GDP in 2023.
Europe has many talented researchers and entrepreneurs. But it has difficulties in transferring innovations to commercialization. Complex and restrictive regulations hinder innovative companies at every stage of their development. This is reflected not least in the fact that the innovation process in the EU is slower and less efficient than in the US. And while Big Tech is responsible for the highest expenditure on research and development in the USA, in the EU it is still the automotive companies – although they are having increasing problems selling their cars.
Coordinating policy across the EU is still often bureaucratic and ineffective. In many places, national interests hinder a clear European solution. The General Data Protection Regulation is just one example of a regulation where well-intentioned does not equal well done. It should be clear to all member states that they alone can hardly achieve anything on the global market – a united EU, on the other hand, can. vis
While the European election campaign gave the impression that climate policy would only play a subordinate role in the new legislature, it celebrated its rebirth with von der Leyen’s election victory – albeit under a different name. The Green Deal 2.0 will be called the Clean Industrial Deal and should finally unite climate protection and industrial policy across party lines. The goal: climate neutrality by 2050 while maintaining internationally competitive companies and European value creation.
The EU Commission’s top climate official is therefore also the Commissioner for Competition. The Social Democrat Teresa Ribera is thus responsible for sustainable growth in the EU, while the Christian Democrats Wopke Hoekstra and Jessika Roswall are responsible for climate and environmental protection. A clever move by von der Leyen, who thus received the backing for her policy from a broad majority in Parliament. luk
The topic of grids culminated in many things that were important in European economic policy in 2024 – and will continue to shape at least the coming year: The internal market, competitiveness and energy prices. Shortly before Christmas, it became clear what was at stake: Sweden and Norway had threatened to interrupt electricity connections to other European countries or not to approve them at all. This was supposedly to protect their own markets from high energy prices.
However, Enrico Letta had already written in his internal market report that the EU could best minimize the costs of the energy transition under one crucial condition: “the strengthening of mutual trust between the member states. Every country must be able to trust that it can receive energy supplies from its neighbors at any time.”
However, the cost of the grid will itself become a decisive factor for energy prices. For example, passages from drafts were removed from the Council conclusions in May, according to which member states that are not directly connected to each other should also share the costs of expansion projects. Companies and consumers can look forward to what the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs will mean by the “smarter distribution” of grid fees that has already been called for. ber
The automotive industry has slipped into a deep crisis. It is a threefold burden: firstly, customers, especially in Germany, are buying disappointingly few cars with battery-electric drive systems. Manufacturers and suppliers alike are suffering as a result. Secondly, profits from the Chinese business are collapsing for German manufacturers because the wealthy Chinese are buying fewer combustion cars in the luxury segment and are not buying enough e-drives from BMW, Mercedes, Porsche and Audi. Thirdly, car sales are declining overall and there is massive overcapacity. A number of assembly plants in the EU would actually have to be closed in order to balance production and sales as well as the cost structure of the surviving factories and brands.
It is not clear whether and to what extent the EU will accommodate manufacturers in terms of regulation. Carbon fleet limits for 2025, 2030 and 2035, the end of combustion engines in 2035 and fines for failing to meet climate targets from 2025 are being discussed at the Strategic Automotive Dialogue, chaired by Ursula von der Leyen.
There is little chance that she will reverse the Green Deal and bring about a renaissance of the combustion engine. It is more likely that non-fossil fuels such as e-fuels will be recognized and manufacturers will be exempted or largely relieved of the tens of billions in fines. mgr
The European elections in June shifted the balance of power in the European Parliament in favor of Manfred Weber. In the previous mandate, there was still a majority to the left of the EPP. And Weber had to accept that the S&D, Liberals, Greens and Left pushed through decisions against the EPP. Things look different now: Without Weber’s EPP group, which has once again become the largest with 188 seats, majorities are now no longer possible.
Weber, who is not only the EPP group leader but also heads the Christian Democratic party family, has a choice: Either he forges compromises with the other two parties in the informal Von der Leyen coalition, i.e. the Socialists and Liberals. Or he can rely on votes to the right of the EPP, i.e. the ECR and the radical right-wing “Patriots” and “Sovereignists.”
So far, he has tended to vote with the ECR and the right on procedural issues. However, when it comes to repealing the ban on combustion engines or other environmental dossiers in the near future, he could once again count on votes from the right. In doing so, he would once again be accused by socialists, liberals and the Greens of making common cause with right-wing extremists.
EPP leader Weber has the backing of the Commission and the Member States. 14 out of 27 Commissioners come from the EPP party family. At the meetings of the heads of state and government, 14 leaders with an EPP background sit at the table. This should enable Weber to organize majorities in the Council for important decisions such as triloges. mgr
After the 2019 European elections, he prevented Manfred Weber from becoming Commission President, Emmanuel Macron was at the height of his power. Today, he seems politically paralyzed, a victim of his method of constant disruption. His spontaneous decision to call new elections in June was met with a shake of the head in Berlin and other capitals. The French president is now seen as aloof and erratic, accessible only to a small number of loyal supporters.
Macron took office in 2017 with the aim of monopolizing the political center. The moderate right and left were no match for his force; the Republicans and Socialists are now just a shadow of decades past. At the same time, however, Macron created space for the fringes, for Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon: those who were alienated by the increasingly autocratic president found an alternative at the extremes. A Le Pen presidency seems more likely today than when he took office. tho
After many years, the negotiations have now been concluded: The EU and Switzerland want to permanently consolidate their partnership. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Swiss President Viola Amherd sealed the political agreement in Bern on Friday. Both sides expressed their satisfaction. Von der Leyen spoke of a “historic agreement” and referred to the geopolitical environment of growing tensions. Against this backdrop, a stronger partnership was imperative. Amherd also spoke of a milestone “in the stabilization and further development” of the bilateral relationship.
Members of the European Parliament David McAllister, Andreas Schwab (both CDU) and Christophe Grudler (Renew) welcome the agreement: “This is a milestone in deepening the already close relationship between the European Union and Switzerland.” The package of measures and agreements creates a level playing field and security for citizens, companies and the research community.
In the negotiations, Switzerland has succeeded in consolidating and further expanding its tailor-made access to the EU internal market. Even after saying no to joining the EEA in 1992, Switzerland was able to secure privileged conditions from the EU with a thicket of over 120 agreements. For over ten years, however, this special bilateral approach has been in jeopardy, as the EU insisted on a new basis and refused further single market access agreements. This was also due to the fact that Switzerland had formally withdrawn its application to join the EU.
With the previous static agreements, the homogeneous application of EU internal market law in Switzerland was less and less guaranteed. In addition, there was no dispute resolution mechanism.
Both are now set to change with the negotiated package. Switzerland must now dynamically adopt the new EU law in the internal market agreements. An arbitration tribunal will also decide if the interpretation of the agreements is disputed. In cases involving the interpretation of purely EU law, the arbitration tribunal must also consult the ECJ.
Switzerland must adapt existing agreements to EU law, whereby the free movement of persons remains limited to employees and the period for secondments is limited to 90 days. However, Switzerland must now grant all working EU citizens the right of permanent residence after five years.
Cabotage will be possible under the new agreements on land and air transport. This means that the airline Swiss can also transport passengers within the EU and European rail companies can operate within Switzerland.
The package also includes an electricity agreement with which Switzerland secures access to the internal electricity market, which is becoming increasingly integrated. In return, Switzerland must allow households the freedom to choose their supplier and largely comply with EU state aid rules.
Most recently, an agreement was reached on the price for tailor-made access to the single market. In future, Switzerland will pay €375 million a year towards the EU’s cohesion policy, practically three times more than before. A major concern of the research community in Germany and Switzerland will also be met. From January, Swiss researchers will be provisionally allowed to participate in Horizon Europe calls for proposals and take part in projects.
When and whether the package can come into force is the big question. During the negotiations, the government refrained from publicly promoting an agreement with the EU. As a result, opponents of the deal now have the power of interpretation. Exponents of the right-wing nationalist SVP, after all the strongest party in Switzerland, speak of a “subjugation” or “colonial treaty.”
Resistance is also emerging from the left-wing spectrum. The trade unions fear that Swiss wage protection will be weakened. The Social Democrats have reservations about the further liberalization of the electricity market.
The proponents are likely to have a difficult time against the concentrated resistance from the right and left. The government could try to get the trade unions on board with domestic political concessions or compensation for wage protection. However, there are only real risks in terms of posted workers, with minimal significance for the Swiss labor market.
A referendum is likely to take place in 2026 at the earliest, but possibly not until 2028 after the next parliamentary elections. The package could then come into force around 2030. The EU Commission has retained two levers. Should the deal fall through in the vote, provisional access to EU research programs would come to an end again. The EU would also not update the important agreement on technical barriers to trade (MRA).
