Europe’s solar industry has scored a stage victory. The industry has made it onto the agenda of today’s Energy Council. Over lunch, the ministers in Brussels want to discuss the state of the companies, many of which say they are on the verge of going out of business due to Chinese competition and falling module prices.
Just a few minutes away on the Grand Place, one of the most beautiful ensembles in Europe, Europe’s solar companies from the downstream stages of the value chain will gather in the afternoon for the SolarPower Summit. Most of the members of SolarPower Europe are more interested in the largest possible quantities of cheap modules and believe that closing off the market is the wrong approach. Some of the more China-critical European manufacturers organized in the rival association ESMC will probably not even visit the congress hotel on Monday and Tuesday.
However, one thing is uniting the different camps: the hope of a purchase program by the EU Commission for modules from the full warehouses. Let’s see if one or two ministers support the idea in the Council of Ministers today. Have a good start to the week.
The EU Commission’s economic security package combines trade and security for the first time. This has never been done before. But isn’t the EU already too late?
I would say it’s late, but still in time. Many countries are just waking up. It is quite clear that the global economy is increasingly being defined by security interests. Specifically, this means that the superpowers USA and China are increasingly focussing on who innovates, who produces, who trades with which strategic capacities. This is not just a matter of ‘Who makes more money?’ but a clear security concern. The list of strategic capacities has been very narrowly defined in recent years. We have talked about dual-use goods primarily for weapons production. The list of strategic goods is growing. China is very openly and broadly defining strategic industries in which they intend to lead. Such leadership positions are of national security interest to China.
So it’s simply about control?
Yes, especially over certain technologies and supply chains. Who controls and who has access to them? This is increasingly considered to be the core of national security. It is now about pharmaceutical goods and certain energy technologies. Other sectors are constantly being added. As Europe, we cannot stay out of this. The EU Commission is already focussing on this industrial and technological battle with economic security. Perhaps more than some member countries.
And what happened so far?
The EU Commission defined the strategy last June and has virtually forged ahead. The staff around Commission President Ursula von der Leyen seized the issue and defined it very transatlantically. The comprehensive strategy drawn up last year was very ambitious. But not much has happened since then. There was an update and white paper in January. Last year, the Commission was still talking about significant economic security risks and the fragmentation of global trade chains. In the update, however, the strategy is now very much centered on narrowly defined risks of some technologies and how these threaten to flow off.
Had you hoped for more than what has now been presented?
Yes, definitely. Unfortunately, we are vulnerable in many areas – often due to the reality that many of these areas fall under national competencies. When it comes to economic security, Europe is only as strong as its weakest link. This is currently the case with export controls, for example. The pressure on Europe to find a common position here is high. We are not really managing to question national competences here fundamentally. There is a lack of fundamental questions about how we actually work together in general as member states and the Commission on this issue. Various platforms are churned out ad hoc, where companies and member states then try to exchange ideas. However, there is no ambitious agenda to really create fundamentally new structures.
Was there pressure to deliver something because of the upcoming European elections?
I think the pressure was pretty high. Even in the cabinet itself from the outset. However, the member states and companies had also warned from the start that the time was too short. In any case, I think there was political pressure for the current Commission to deliver something before the election. On the other hand, they wanted to avoid throwing everything into the balance in this super election year.
What does it take to implement the strategy? To a large extent, it consists of proposals that do not necessarily have to be implemented.
There is a lack of money and, above all, a lack of European resources. On top of that, we pledge ourselves to de-risking at some point. That sounds very good and everyone can sign up for it. But it’s also extremely undefined at the moment. What exactly does it mean? There must be a clear purpose. Which risks have priority? To this end, we need an agenda for a comprehensive industrial and trade policy, especially concerning raw materials.
What about the Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to secure access to key raw materials such as copper or rare earths?
The Critical Raw Materials Act also has grand ambitions but no plan on how to achieve them. There are no clear EU instruments that could have an impact on this, for example, a fund at the European level. This also reflects the problem that the industrial policy instruments are all laid out at the national level – while the goals are actually all defined at European level. In my opinion, there is a clear need for European resources and strategic funds. Because without them, the EU Commission can only fiddle around with existing regulations, such as export controls or FDI screening. That is just not enough.
The once prominently discussed outbound investment screening will not happen for the time being. Can you explain why?
For starters, the outbound investment screening was a US agenda. Ursula von der Leyen defined her security strategy very transatlantically. She traveled to Washington for a meeting with Joe Biden and returned with a joint statement in which export controls, outbound investment screening and research security were central. But when it came to the issue of outbound, the Commission failed to clearly define in this short amount of time what Europe’s risk is. The outbound risks the Americans have defined may differ from ours.
What are the differences?
The main focus in Washington is on venture capital, which primarily transfers know-how to Chinese tech companies. We have different investment relationships with China, so we have to define our risk differently. And the second question is: How big is the risk really? And can our existing export control instruments not achieve the same thing in principle? These questions remain unanswered. The member states were highly skeptical about the whole thing anyway and put it on the back burner for the time being. But the matter is not over. I believe they also plan to wait and see how the Americans approach it, including after the US election.
Wouldn’t it have been better to wait and see instead of rushing it?
Yes, you could say that. We definitely need a clear risk definition and analysis. We need to prepare ourselves better and define our standards for risk investments. We are now taking a little more time and the January paper reflects this.
What impact do you expect this to have on European companies?
Naturally, companies always worry that restrictive measures such as export controls will spoil their business. But the actual threat is that we will fragment our export controls in Europe and that different standards will exist. Companies don’t want that either. One example are semiconductor machines from the Netherlands, which are now subject to different requirements than those of German suppliers. Or in the field of quantum technology, where new national export controls in Spain, Finland or France increase the risk of European fragmentation. Companies should certainly have an interest in this being regulated at the European level. Of course, there are still open questions about the balance between security, competitiveness and green transition – and the debate about solar panels and EVs from China, for example, is only just beginning.
How does China see all this?
China has not had the best experience of waging such trade conflicts and then escalating them politically. I think the sanctions on European MPs, for example, were really detrimental to China. They have had very negative consequences for China’s reputation.
What could we conclude from this?
Beijing is more likely to resort to tried and tested practices: Putting politically important and politically well-connected companies through the wringer. For example, French wine exporters or European car manufacturers in the People’s Republic. Or with its own targeted export controls, such as last year’s measures against gallium and germanium exports. But I don’t think China is currently interested in escalating things. We also have some breathing room because China needs us as an export market.
Tobias Gehrke is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in the Berlin office. He covers geoeconomics, focusing on economic security, European economic strategy, and great power competition in the global economy. Before joining ECFR, Gehrke was a research fellow with the Egmont Royal Institute in Brussels from 2017 to 2022, where he covered geoeconomics. He has also been a visiting fellow at the National University of Singapore, the University of Nottingham, and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. He holds a PhD in political science from Ghent University.
The European Socialist Party family (PES) adopted the manifesto for the European elections at its congress in Rome. The motto is “social, democratic, sustainable.” In the document, the social democrats are committing to the fight for equality, the rule of law and good jobs. The Socialists call for a “permanent EU investment capacity” and a more ambitious EU budget for the next mandate.
The Socialists want to take up the fight against the far right in their campaign. Nicolas Schmit from Luxembourg, Social Affairs Commissioner in the Leyen Commission, was chosen by the delegates as the lead candidate. Schmit, who pushed through the European Minimum Wage Directive, condemned the supposedly simple solutions used by right-wing populists to gain votes at the expense of the weakest.
Stefan Löfven, party leader of the PES and former Prime Minister of Sweden, criticized the competitors from the Christian Democratic party family EPP: “Normalizing the far right means jeopardizing everything we have built together.” In the votes on the Green Deal and agricultural issues in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats had made a pact with right-wing opponents of the EU.
This criticism is based not only on election rhetoric but also on concerns about the Socialists’ ability to shape the next European Parliament. The far-right groups could become so strong that arithmetically majorities would be possible without the Social Democrats.
The newly crowned lead candidate Nicolas Schmit received powerful support from four social democratic heads of government: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Portugal’s caretaker Prime Minister António Costa praised the qualities of the 70-year-old challenger to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
The Social Democrats are bravely sticking to their plan to pave Schmit’s way to the head of the Commission with a powerful election campaign. However, the polls currently predict a clear election victory for von der Leyen. In this case, the Social Democrats would demand a Vice-President of the Commission with an influential portfolio for Schmit.
Of course, party leader Löfven still has to convince Luxembourg’s Christian Democrat Prime Minister Luc Frieden that Schmit is the Grand Duchy’s candidate for the next Commission. Or perhaps Olaf Scholz will make the trip to Luxembourg for this mission: After all, the German traffic light coalition in the Council is likely to end up supporting the EPP candidate, Ursula von der Leyen (CDU). As a counter-deal between neighbors, Luxembourg should, according to Scholz’s possible appeal, speak out in favor of the Social Democrat.
If Ursula von der Leyen is given a second term as Commission President, the Social Democrats believe they have a chance of becoming the next President of the European Council. Two candidates are under discussion: António Costa and Mette Frederiksen. Costa was already considered the favorite last year. In November, however, his name was mentioned in connection with corruption investigations, whereupon he announced his resignation. A short time later, it was reported that the investigators had made a mistake and confused the Prime Minister with António Costa Silva, the Minister of Economy, who had almost the same name. Costa’s head of cabinet was arrested. At the moment, it looks as if nothing of the accusations will stick to the caretaker Prime Minister Costa in the end.
Frederiksen stands for a different kind of social democracy. She is tough on migration issues and stands for an austere fiscal policy. It was the Danish Social Democrats who, together with the Swedish Social Democrats, campaigned against the minimum wage directive. The other members of the party family are celebrating the minimum wage all the more as a great success for the Commissioner responsible. Named Nicolas Schmit.
When the package of top jobs is put together after the election, it is not only the affiliation to a party family that plays a role. It is also important that West and East, North and South are represented. If, for example, the liberal Kaja Kallas from the north-east were to become foreign affairs commissioner, Costa’s chances of succeeding Charles Michel as Council president would increase.
Until now, the Socialists and Christian Democrats have each held the office of President of the European Parliament for half a term. The Socialists expect that the incumbent Roberta Metsola from the EPP will want to continue directly. The ball would then be in the Socialists’ court for the second half of the mandate. Katarina Barley, currently one of 14 Vice-Presidents, and group leader Iratxe García Pérez are under discussion.
The politically most important job is the group chairmanship. Unlike the EPP, Greens and Renew, the Socialists have the unwritten law that the strongest delegation is entitled to the job. Spain, Italy, Germany or Romania could come out on top next time. However, there are already plans to break this unwritten law. Behind the scenes, people are exploring whether Raphaël Glucksmann from France or Mohammed Chahim from the Netherlands could be the front runner.
When asked about these rumors, Chahim gave a passionate speech of praise to Table.Media in defense of the incumbent. She was largely responsible for the cohesion in the parliamentary group and was able to lead without placing herself at the center. “I am only in this position because Iratxe gives me room,” Chahim said. ” I will not challenge her,” he promised. However, he also did not expect a crucial vote. Rather, he said, they would reach an agreement together and then proceed to the election.
Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) refuses to disclose 15 major donations from 2021. Of 17 donations and gifts with a volume of more than €20,000 that the organization received in 2021, it only named the donors for two items. In the case of 15 donations with a total volume of €1.5 million, DUH refuses to be transparent and does not provide any information on the donors. This emerges from the lobby register of the German Bundestag.
DUH’s refusal to disclose the donors contradicts the demands of the “Alliance for Lobby Transparency.” The Alliance, which also includes the Federation of German Consumer Organizations and Transparency International, explains: “The origin of financial resources should always be transparent. Exceptions are conceivable in individual cases for private individuals. However, they should not apply to organizations or companies.”
When asked by Table.Media, DUH acknowledged the facts. It explained: “Our donors can only be named if we have their authorization.” In its report for the Bundestag’s lobby register, DUH initially anonymized the 15 donors in question. From 2022, the donors were no longer allowed to be anonymized. When anonymization was no longer legally possible, DUH refused to provide further information on the donors.
It is therefore unclear whether the 15 donations for which DUH refuses to provide transparency may also have financed campaigns DUH had previously been actively canvassing. In 2016, DUH offered a gas industry association a campaign for fossil gas as a fuel in cars in return for donations of €2.1 million spread over three years.
DUH is one of the organizations covering a significant part of its expenses with donations. With an annual budget of €14.655 million for 2021, DUH, which enjoys non-profit status, received donations of €5.029 million. 17 donations were over €20,000 each and should have been disclosed according to the rules of the lobby register.
At €2.390 million, the 17 larger donations accounted for around half of the total donation volume. DUH only disclosed a donation of around €1 million from the German Postcode Lottery and a donation of around €100,000 from Stiftung Mercator GmbH.
The 15 donations, for which DUH does not provide details of the originators, amount to a total of around €1.5 million. Of these, donations from legal entities and institutions that were earmarked for a specific purpose account for a total of around €538,000. Legal entities can be associations, foundations, corporations or cooperatives.
Umwelthilfe only makes public subsidies fully transparent. In 2021, for example, it received grants from the Federal Ministry for the Environment amounting to almost €500,000. It also received around €1 million from the EU Commission. DUH received around €660,000 in EU funding for a project entitled: “Closing the gap between official manufacturer data and the actual fuel consumption of cars” and “Reducing ammonia and methane emissions from agriculture to improve air quality and climate protection.”
In 2021, the Commission has prepared Green Deal legislative proposals on carbon fleet limits and agriculture. Further grants in the six-figure range came from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, ministries in the state of Thuringia and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture in Brandenburg.
New rules for the lobby register of the Bundestag have been in force since March 1, 2024. The rules for disclosing donors in the case of donations have been relaxed. While donations of €20,000 or more were previously subject to disclosure, an individual donation only has to be disclosed if it accounts for more than ten percent of an organization’s total donation volume. This new regulation means that donation-driven organizations such as Umwelthilfe will have to provide even less information about the origin of their donations.
With regard to 2021, Umwelthilfe would only have had to disclose the donation from the German Postcode Lottery. The donation from the Mercator Foundation could have remained undisclosed. Under the previous legislation, donation-based organizations such as Umwelthilfe could refuse to disclose the names of donors. However, the structure of the donations was visible in the lobby register. Since the new legislation, the structure of donations is no longer transparent either.
Under the old legislation, a total of 1425 individual donations to around 70 donation-based organizations were subject to disclosure in 2021. With the new rules, only 23 individual donations would still have to be disclosed. 98 percent of all donations made to donation-based organizations in 2021 would no longer be mentioned in the Bundestag’s lobby register.
The “Alliance for Lobby Transparency,” which was founded in 2018 on the initiative of the German Chemical Industry Association and now includes seven other organizations such as the BDI, Family Entrepreneurs, Transparency International and the Federation of German Consumer Organizations, criticizes the increase in the threshold value for donations in the new regulation that will apply from March: “Large organizations with major donors are thus exempt from the disclosure obligation.”
Initially, the coalition wanted organizations to have to make donations and gifts exceeding €50,000 transparent. After many donation-based organizations protested against this, the coalition toned down the law. The organizations stated that natural persons in particular were often not interested in disclosure and that the willingness to donate would decrease if the coalition’s plans were implemented. Donations now only have to be published if they account for ten percent of the total donation volume.
The political change in Poland is raising expectations of a more ambitious Polish energy and climate policy. The new government’s active foreign policy does indeed offer the opportunity to intensify energy cooperation with neighboring countries, including Germany. Cooperation on green hydrogen, among other things, makes sense.
However, a rapid Polish energy transition is not a foregone conclusion. The government, in office since December, is committed to a more ambitious energy and climate policy than its predecessors. However, it was initially cautious about the recently adopted stricter European climate target. Paulina Hennig-Kloska, Minister for Climate and Environment, emphasized that Poland must not overstretch itself in terms of speed and that the transition must be economically just. The deputy minister from her department, Krzysztof Bolesta, sees a dual task for his government: while building a green alternative, the current system based on fossil fuels must also be preserved.
The Polish economy is still one of the most carbon-intensive in Europe; its heavy dependence on coal remains a central problem. The EU has granted the country an extension of the EU capacity market mechanism for coal-fired power plants until 2028, which allows for subsidization. But a further extension is unlikely. As in Germany, the process of gradually decommissioning coal-fired power plants could also lead to electricity shortages.
Financing the energy transition poses another major challenge for the country. According to an EY report published in 2023, the necessary investments will amount to €135 billion by 2030. Less than €27 billion can be covered by EU funds.
Although the previous government did not pursue an ambitious energy and climate policy, Poland made progress in some respects. Although there was no comprehensive decarbonization strategy, some initiatives to increase the energy efficiency of households, heat pumps, thermal insulation and small photovoltaic projects also accelerated the green transition. It is particularly noteworthy that the share of electricity generated from renewable energy sources almost tripled from 10 percent in 2015 to 27 percent in 2023.
The share of coal in the energy mix fell by seven percent within a year and still amounted to 63 percent in 2023. Both the amount of coal mined and the number of employees are in steady decline. In addition, some miners’ unions have declared their willingness to support the renewable energy sector. The population overwhelmingly supports an accelerated energy transition.
Most of the targets presented by the new government during the election campaign address key challenges, are in line with EU priorities and are achievable.
At a central level, the share of renewable energies in the national energy mix is to more than double to 68 percent by 2030, including the following measures:
Due to the large investment needs, cross-border cooperation could be an important complement to national efforts for an energy transition, especially with neighboring countries such as Germany. One promising area for cooperation on green projects would be hydrogen. Poland is already one of the largest hydrogen producers in the world but has so far mainly used fossil fuels.
The government is likely to announce new large-scale hydrogen projects in the update of the “Poland’s Energy Policy until 2040” strategy, an important energy and climate policy document. Germany, on the other hand, is ambitious in developing green hydrogen because it needs large quantities for the transformation of its industry. Both countries should look for synergies in cross-border hydrogen and energy storage projects.
There could also be opportunities for cooperation in securing the supply of fossil fuels. There are currently indications that a Polish company could take over the Russian shares in the refinery in Schwedt following a possible expropriation of Rosneft.
With its ambitious approaches, the government could facilitate new cooperation in the energy sector with neighboring countries. Ambitious cross-border cooperation would provide valuable impetus for the energy transition in Poland.
Szymon Kardaś is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations in Warsaw. He deals with European and Russian energy policy and co-edits the “Energy Sovereignty Index.“
Europe’s solar industry has scored a stage victory. The industry has made it onto the agenda of today’s Energy Council. Over lunch, the ministers in Brussels want to discuss the state of the companies, many of which say they are on the verge of going out of business due to Chinese competition and falling module prices.
Just a few minutes away on the Grand Place, one of the most beautiful ensembles in Europe, Europe’s solar companies from the downstream stages of the value chain will gather in the afternoon for the SolarPower Summit. Most of the members of SolarPower Europe are more interested in the largest possible quantities of cheap modules and believe that closing off the market is the wrong approach. Some of the more China-critical European manufacturers organized in the rival association ESMC will probably not even visit the congress hotel on Monday and Tuesday.
However, one thing is uniting the different camps: the hope of a purchase program by the EU Commission for modules from the full warehouses. Let’s see if one or two ministers support the idea in the Council of Ministers today. Have a good start to the week.
The EU Commission’s economic security package combines trade and security for the first time. This has never been done before. But isn’t the EU already too late?
I would say it’s late, but still in time. Many countries are just waking up. It is quite clear that the global economy is increasingly being defined by security interests. Specifically, this means that the superpowers USA and China are increasingly focussing on who innovates, who produces, who trades with which strategic capacities. This is not just a matter of ‘Who makes more money?’ but a clear security concern. The list of strategic capacities has been very narrowly defined in recent years. We have talked about dual-use goods primarily for weapons production. The list of strategic goods is growing. China is very openly and broadly defining strategic industries in which they intend to lead. Such leadership positions are of national security interest to China.
So it’s simply about control?
Yes, especially over certain technologies and supply chains. Who controls and who has access to them? This is increasingly considered to be the core of national security. It is now about pharmaceutical goods and certain energy technologies. Other sectors are constantly being added. As Europe, we cannot stay out of this. The EU Commission is already focussing on this industrial and technological battle with economic security. Perhaps more than some member countries.
And what happened so far?
The EU Commission defined the strategy last June and has virtually forged ahead. The staff around Commission President Ursula von der Leyen seized the issue and defined it very transatlantically. The comprehensive strategy drawn up last year was very ambitious. But not much has happened since then. There was an update and white paper in January. Last year, the Commission was still talking about significant economic security risks and the fragmentation of global trade chains. In the update, however, the strategy is now very much centered on narrowly defined risks of some technologies and how these threaten to flow off.
Had you hoped for more than what has now been presented?
Yes, definitely. Unfortunately, we are vulnerable in many areas – often due to the reality that many of these areas fall under national competencies. When it comes to economic security, Europe is only as strong as its weakest link. This is currently the case with export controls, for example. The pressure on Europe to find a common position here is high. We are not really managing to question national competences here fundamentally. There is a lack of fundamental questions about how we actually work together in general as member states and the Commission on this issue. Various platforms are churned out ad hoc, where companies and member states then try to exchange ideas. However, there is no ambitious agenda to really create fundamentally new structures.
Was there pressure to deliver something because of the upcoming European elections?
I think the pressure was pretty high. Even in the cabinet itself from the outset. However, the member states and companies had also warned from the start that the time was too short. In any case, I think there was political pressure for the current Commission to deliver something before the election. On the other hand, they wanted to avoid throwing everything into the balance in this super election year.
What does it take to implement the strategy? To a large extent, it consists of proposals that do not necessarily have to be implemented.
There is a lack of money and, above all, a lack of European resources. On top of that, we pledge ourselves to de-risking at some point. That sounds very good and everyone can sign up for it. But it’s also extremely undefined at the moment. What exactly does it mean? There must be a clear purpose. Which risks have priority? To this end, we need an agenda for a comprehensive industrial and trade policy, especially concerning raw materials.
What about the Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to secure access to key raw materials such as copper or rare earths?
The Critical Raw Materials Act also has grand ambitions but no plan on how to achieve them. There are no clear EU instruments that could have an impact on this, for example, a fund at the European level. This also reflects the problem that the industrial policy instruments are all laid out at the national level – while the goals are actually all defined at European level. In my opinion, there is a clear need for European resources and strategic funds. Because without them, the EU Commission can only fiddle around with existing regulations, such as export controls or FDI screening. That is just not enough.
The once prominently discussed outbound investment screening will not happen for the time being. Can you explain why?
For starters, the outbound investment screening was a US agenda. Ursula von der Leyen defined her security strategy very transatlantically. She traveled to Washington for a meeting with Joe Biden and returned with a joint statement in which export controls, outbound investment screening and research security were central. But when it came to the issue of outbound, the Commission failed to clearly define in this short amount of time what Europe’s risk is. The outbound risks the Americans have defined may differ from ours.
What are the differences?
The main focus in Washington is on venture capital, which primarily transfers know-how to Chinese tech companies. We have different investment relationships with China, so we have to define our risk differently. And the second question is: How big is the risk really? And can our existing export control instruments not achieve the same thing in principle? These questions remain unanswered. The member states were highly skeptical about the whole thing anyway and put it on the back burner for the time being. But the matter is not over. I believe they also plan to wait and see how the Americans approach it, including after the US election.
Wouldn’t it have been better to wait and see instead of rushing it?
Yes, you could say that. We definitely need a clear risk definition and analysis. We need to prepare ourselves better and define our standards for risk investments. We are now taking a little more time and the January paper reflects this.
What impact do you expect this to have on European companies?
Naturally, companies always worry that restrictive measures such as export controls will spoil their business. But the actual threat is that we will fragment our export controls in Europe and that different standards will exist. Companies don’t want that either. One example are semiconductor machines from the Netherlands, which are now subject to different requirements than those of German suppliers. Or in the field of quantum technology, where new national export controls in Spain, Finland or France increase the risk of European fragmentation. Companies should certainly have an interest in this being regulated at the European level. Of course, there are still open questions about the balance between security, competitiveness and green transition – and the debate about solar panels and EVs from China, for example, is only just beginning.
How does China see all this?
China has not had the best experience of waging such trade conflicts and then escalating them politically. I think the sanctions on European MPs, for example, were really detrimental to China. They have had very negative consequences for China’s reputation.
What could we conclude from this?
Beijing is more likely to resort to tried and tested practices: Putting politically important and politically well-connected companies through the wringer. For example, French wine exporters or European car manufacturers in the People’s Republic. Or with its own targeted export controls, such as last year’s measures against gallium and germanium exports. But I don’t think China is currently interested in escalating things. We also have some breathing room because China needs us as an export market.
Tobias Gehrke is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in the Berlin office. He covers geoeconomics, focusing on economic security, European economic strategy, and great power competition in the global economy. Before joining ECFR, Gehrke was a research fellow with the Egmont Royal Institute in Brussels from 2017 to 2022, where he covered geoeconomics. He has also been a visiting fellow at the National University of Singapore, the University of Nottingham, and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. He holds a PhD in political science from Ghent University.
The European Socialist Party family (PES) adopted the manifesto for the European elections at its congress in Rome. The motto is “social, democratic, sustainable.” In the document, the social democrats are committing to the fight for equality, the rule of law and good jobs. The Socialists call for a “permanent EU investment capacity” and a more ambitious EU budget for the next mandate.
The Socialists want to take up the fight against the far right in their campaign. Nicolas Schmit from Luxembourg, Social Affairs Commissioner in the Leyen Commission, was chosen by the delegates as the lead candidate. Schmit, who pushed through the European Minimum Wage Directive, condemned the supposedly simple solutions used by right-wing populists to gain votes at the expense of the weakest.
Stefan Löfven, party leader of the PES and former Prime Minister of Sweden, criticized the competitors from the Christian Democratic party family EPP: “Normalizing the far right means jeopardizing everything we have built together.” In the votes on the Green Deal and agricultural issues in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats had made a pact with right-wing opponents of the EU.
This criticism is based not only on election rhetoric but also on concerns about the Socialists’ ability to shape the next European Parliament. The far-right groups could become so strong that arithmetically majorities would be possible without the Social Democrats.
The newly crowned lead candidate Nicolas Schmit received powerful support from four social democratic heads of government: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Portugal’s caretaker Prime Minister António Costa praised the qualities of the 70-year-old challenger to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
The Social Democrats are bravely sticking to their plan to pave Schmit’s way to the head of the Commission with a powerful election campaign. However, the polls currently predict a clear election victory for von der Leyen. In this case, the Social Democrats would demand a Vice-President of the Commission with an influential portfolio for Schmit.
Of course, party leader Löfven still has to convince Luxembourg’s Christian Democrat Prime Minister Luc Frieden that Schmit is the Grand Duchy’s candidate for the next Commission. Or perhaps Olaf Scholz will make the trip to Luxembourg for this mission: After all, the German traffic light coalition in the Council is likely to end up supporting the EPP candidate, Ursula von der Leyen (CDU). As a counter-deal between neighbors, Luxembourg should, according to Scholz’s possible appeal, speak out in favor of the Social Democrat.
If Ursula von der Leyen is given a second term as Commission President, the Social Democrats believe they have a chance of becoming the next President of the European Council. Two candidates are under discussion: António Costa and Mette Frederiksen. Costa was already considered the favorite last year. In November, however, his name was mentioned in connection with corruption investigations, whereupon he announced his resignation. A short time later, it was reported that the investigators had made a mistake and confused the Prime Minister with António Costa Silva, the Minister of Economy, who had almost the same name. Costa’s head of cabinet was arrested. At the moment, it looks as if nothing of the accusations will stick to the caretaker Prime Minister Costa in the end.
Frederiksen stands for a different kind of social democracy. She is tough on migration issues and stands for an austere fiscal policy. It was the Danish Social Democrats who, together with the Swedish Social Democrats, campaigned against the minimum wage directive. The other members of the party family are celebrating the minimum wage all the more as a great success for the Commissioner responsible. Named Nicolas Schmit.
When the package of top jobs is put together after the election, it is not only the affiliation to a party family that plays a role. It is also important that West and East, North and South are represented. If, for example, the liberal Kaja Kallas from the north-east were to become foreign affairs commissioner, Costa’s chances of succeeding Charles Michel as Council president would increase.
Until now, the Socialists and Christian Democrats have each held the office of President of the European Parliament for half a term. The Socialists expect that the incumbent Roberta Metsola from the EPP will want to continue directly. The ball would then be in the Socialists’ court for the second half of the mandate. Katarina Barley, currently one of 14 Vice-Presidents, and group leader Iratxe García Pérez are under discussion.
The politically most important job is the group chairmanship. Unlike the EPP, Greens and Renew, the Socialists have the unwritten law that the strongest delegation is entitled to the job. Spain, Italy, Germany or Romania could come out on top next time. However, there are already plans to break this unwritten law. Behind the scenes, people are exploring whether Raphaël Glucksmann from France or Mohammed Chahim from the Netherlands could be the front runner.
When asked about these rumors, Chahim gave a passionate speech of praise to Table.Media in defense of the incumbent. She was largely responsible for the cohesion in the parliamentary group and was able to lead without placing herself at the center. “I am only in this position because Iratxe gives me room,” Chahim said. ” I will not challenge her,” he promised. However, he also did not expect a crucial vote. Rather, he said, they would reach an agreement together and then proceed to the election.
Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) refuses to disclose 15 major donations from 2021. Of 17 donations and gifts with a volume of more than €20,000 that the organization received in 2021, it only named the donors for two items. In the case of 15 donations with a total volume of €1.5 million, DUH refuses to be transparent and does not provide any information on the donors. This emerges from the lobby register of the German Bundestag.
DUH’s refusal to disclose the donors contradicts the demands of the “Alliance for Lobby Transparency.” The Alliance, which also includes the Federation of German Consumer Organizations and Transparency International, explains: “The origin of financial resources should always be transparent. Exceptions are conceivable in individual cases for private individuals. However, they should not apply to organizations or companies.”
When asked by Table.Media, DUH acknowledged the facts. It explained: “Our donors can only be named if we have their authorization.” In its report for the Bundestag’s lobby register, DUH initially anonymized the 15 donors in question. From 2022, the donors were no longer allowed to be anonymized. When anonymization was no longer legally possible, DUH refused to provide further information on the donors.
It is therefore unclear whether the 15 donations for which DUH refuses to provide transparency may also have financed campaigns DUH had previously been actively canvassing. In 2016, DUH offered a gas industry association a campaign for fossil gas as a fuel in cars in return for donations of €2.1 million spread over three years.
DUH is one of the organizations covering a significant part of its expenses with donations. With an annual budget of €14.655 million for 2021, DUH, which enjoys non-profit status, received donations of €5.029 million. 17 donations were over €20,000 each and should have been disclosed according to the rules of the lobby register.
At €2.390 million, the 17 larger donations accounted for around half of the total donation volume. DUH only disclosed a donation of around €1 million from the German Postcode Lottery and a donation of around €100,000 from Stiftung Mercator GmbH.
The 15 donations, for which DUH does not provide details of the originators, amount to a total of around €1.5 million. Of these, donations from legal entities and institutions that were earmarked for a specific purpose account for a total of around €538,000. Legal entities can be associations, foundations, corporations or cooperatives.
Umwelthilfe only makes public subsidies fully transparent. In 2021, for example, it received grants from the Federal Ministry for the Environment amounting to almost €500,000. It also received around €1 million from the EU Commission. DUH received around €660,000 in EU funding for a project entitled: “Closing the gap between official manufacturer data and the actual fuel consumption of cars” and “Reducing ammonia and methane emissions from agriculture to improve air quality and climate protection.”
In 2021, the Commission has prepared Green Deal legislative proposals on carbon fleet limits and agriculture. Further grants in the six-figure range came from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, ministries in the state of Thuringia and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture in Brandenburg.
New rules for the lobby register of the Bundestag have been in force since March 1, 2024. The rules for disclosing donors in the case of donations have been relaxed. While donations of €20,000 or more were previously subject to disclosure, an individual donation only has to be disclosed if it accounts for more than ten percent of an organization’s total donation volume. This new regulation means that donation-driven organizations such as Umwelthilfe will have to provide even less information about the origin of their donations.
With regard to 2021, Umwelthilfe would only have had to disclose the donation from the German Postcode Lottery. The donation from the Mercator Foundation could have remained undisclosed. Under the previous legislation, donation-based organizations such as Umwelthilfe could refuse to disclose the names of donors. However, the structure of the donations was visible in the lobby register. Since the new legislation, the structure of donations is no longer transparent either.
Under the old legislation, a total of 1425 individual donations to around 70 donation-based organizations were subject to disclosure in 2021. With the new rules, only 23 individual donations would still have to be disclosed. 98 percent of all donations made to donation-based organizations in 2021 would no longer be mentioned in the Bundestag’s lobby register.
The “Alliance for Lobby Transparency,” which was founded in 2018 on the initiative of the German Chemical Industry Association and now includes seven other organizations such as the BDI, Family Entrepreneurs, Transparency International and the Federation of German Consumer Organizations, criticizes the increase in the threshold value for donations in the new regulation that will apply from March: “Large organizations with major donors are thus exempt from the disclosure obligation.”
Initially, the coalition wanted organizations to have to make donations and gifts exceeding €50,000 transparent. After many donation-based organizations protested against this, the coalition toned down the law. The organizations stated that natural persons in particular were often not interested in disclosure and that the willingness to donate would decrease if the coalition’s plans were implemented. Donations now only have to be published if they account for ten percent of the total donation volume.
The political change in Poland is raising expectations of a more ambitious Polish energy and climate policy. The new government’s active foreign policy does indeed offer the opportunity to intensify energy cooperation with neighboring countries, including Germany. Cooperation on green hydrogen, among other things, makes sense.
However, a rapid Polish energy transition is not a foregone conclusion. The government, in office since December, is committed to a more ambitious energy and climate policy than its predecessors. However, it was initially cautious about the recently adopted stricter European climate target. Paulina Hennig-Kloska, Minister for Climate and Environment, emphasized that Poland must not overstretch itself in terms of speed and that the transition must be economically just. The deputy minister from her department, Krzysztof Bolesta, sees a dual task for his government: while building a green alternative, the current system based on fossil fuels must also be preserved.
The Polish economy is still one of the most carbon-intensive in Europe; its heavy dependence on coal remains a central problem. The EU has granted the country an extension of the EU capacity market mechanism for coal-fired power plants until 2028, which allows for subsidization. But a further extension is unlikely. As in Germany, the process of gradually decommissioning coal-fired power plants could also lead to electricity shortages.
Financing the energy transition poses another major challenge for the country. According to an EY report published in 2023, the necessary investments will amount to €135 billion by 2030. Less than €27 billion can be covered by EU funds.
Although the previous government did not pursue an ambitious energy and climate policy, Poland made progress in some respects. Although there was no comprehensive decarbonization strategy, some initiatives to increase the energy efficiency of households, heat pumps, thermal insulation and small photovoltaic projects also accelerated the green transition. It is particularly noteworthy that the share of electricity generated from renewable energy sources almost tripled from 10 percent in 2015 to 27 percent in 2023.
The share of coal in the energy mix fell by seven percent within a year and still amounted to 63 percent in 2023. Both the amount of coal mined and the number of employees are in steady decline. In addition, some miners’ unions have declared their willingness to support the renewable energy sector. The population overwhelmingly supports an accelerated energy transition.
Most of the targets presented by the new government during the election campaign address key challenges, are in line with EU priorities and are achievable.
At a central level, the share of renewable energies in the national energy mix is to more than double to 68 percent by 2030, including the following measures:
Due to the large investment needs, cross-border cooperation could be an important complement to national efforts for an energy transition, especially with neighboring countries such as Germany. One promising area for cooperation on green projects would be hydrogen. Poland is already one of the largest hydrogen producers in the world but has so far mainly used fossil fuels.
The government is likely to announce new large-scale hydrogen projects in the update of the “Poland’s Energy Policy until 2040” strategy, an important energy and climate policy document. Germany, on the other hand, is ambitious in developing green hydrogen because it needs large quantities for the transformation of its industry. Both countries should look for synergies in cross-border hydrogen and energy storage projects.
There could also be opportunities for cooperation in securing the supply of fossil fuels. There are currently indications that a Polish company could take over the Russian shares in the refinery in Schwedt following a possible expropriation of Rosneft.
With its ambitious approaches, the government could facilitate new cooperation in the energy sector with neighboring countries. Ambitious cross-border cooperation would provide valuable impetus for the energy transition in Poland.
Szymon Kardaś is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations in Warsaw. He deals with European and Russian energy policy and co-edits the “Energy Sovereignty Index.“
