The Digital Services Act is still being negotiated, but the timetable is tight; the “Basic Law for the Internet” is to come into force very soon. That’s when it’s time to start looking at setting up the regulatory authority that will be responsible for enforcing the DSA at the national level. But the question of who will take over the duties of the Digital Services Coordinator in Germany is far from settled, as Falk Steiner reports.
The new European emissions trading system for the buildings and road transport sectors could start as early as 2025 – one year earlier than envisaged by the Commission. This is what Peter Liese (EPP/CDU), rapporteur in the EU Parliament, proposes in his draft report. The paper is to be published tomorrow, Lukas Scheid evaluates it for you in advance.
Higher recycling quotas, the right to repair, the start of the agricultural turnaround, a climate adaptation law: in a general debate of the German Bundestag, Federal Environment Minister Steffi Lemke outlined the priorities for her future environmental policy. Timo Landenberger summarizes the most important aspects.
They play no role in the coalition agreement. But the new supervisory authorities envisaged by the Digital Services Act (DSA) will become perhaps the most powerful national institution for internet regulation. Even though the DSA has not yet been fully negotiated, its enforcement depends heavily on nation-states making it practically possible.
The basic construct of supervision by the “Digital Services Coordinators” in the DSA is multi-layered. On the one hand, the DSCs are responsible for enforcing the planned rules at the national level – and thus for a large proportion of the providers from Germany or with their European headquarters in Germany that are affected by the DSA. However, it is also to cooperate with the DSCs of other EU member states and, in the case of the very large online platforms (VLOPs), to assist the EU Commission.
National DSCs are expected to perform a variety of functions. This ranges from monitoring compliance with rules for switching services to admitting researchers to providers’ databases to designating and supervising so-called trusted flaggers, the reporters of illegal content on Internet platforms who are classified as particularly trustworthy.
They would also be given broad powers to investigate matters, including the right to request information, conduct interviews, impose fines and periodic penalty payments, or issue instructions to operators on what actions to implement or refrain from.
The Council’s position on the DSA states that the DSC is to be an independent authority: “Completely independent”, free from external influence and “neither directly nor indirectly solicit or to receive instructions from other authorities or private bodies”. This structure is usually known from data protection supervisory authorities.
It stems not least from the fact that, in view of Polish and Hungarian realities, some member states wanted to see the influence of national politics limited. However, the DSCs’ administrative acts are to be subject to judicial review and the usual accountability to parliament.
But who could fill this role? So far, the Federal Office of Justice has been responsible for enforcing the Network Enforcement Act in Germany. Significant parts of the NetzDG would be superseded by the DSA regulations under European law. At the same time, the DSA regulates the handling of media content in many places – but supervision in Germany lies with the federal states and their state media authorities.
In addition, the DSA also contains some components relevant to competition law – and the Federal Cartel Office has been monitoring these up to now. Previous responsibilities of the Federal Network Agency are also affected. However, the existing federal structures do not meet the requirements for the DSC as envisaged in the Commission proposal, Council, and parliamentary positions.
When asked, the young federal government is not yet ready to talk about what the German Digital Service Coordinator should look like. So far, it has not even been finally clarified which dossiers and units will be shifted between the Ministries of Economics and Climate Protection, Digital Affairs and Transport, Environment and Consumer Protection, and the Federal Ministry of Justice. However, responsibility for the Digital Services Act is to be located in Volker Wissing’s DP department. But this House has no subordinate authority that is considered a natural candidate.
Time is pressing: After all, France wants to conclude negotiations on the DSA during its Council presidency. After that, the “Basic Law for the Internet” should enter into force quickly. The Council is arguing for a subsequent 15-month implementation period and for the DSC to be operational three months later. 18 months is not a long time frame for creating the national legal basis and setting up a corresponding authority. The staff build-up alone is likely to take years.
Some time could be saved by having an existing national authority take on the role of DSC and coordinate with the other authorities. This would be a possible variant in line with the negotiating positions. As a one-stop shop for European coordination, the DSC should be the sole contact and coordinator within the member states. But which one?
“For reasons of efficiency, it would be obvious to locate the Digital Services Coordinator at a ministry or an existing federal authority,” says Oliver Süme, CEO of the Internet Industry Association Eco. “On the one hand, this would ensure that the necessary structures can be set up quickly, that existing technical expertise in the subject areas can be drawn upon, and that existing personnel and administrative resources can be used.” Süme urges that there must be a clear and uniform, coordinated approach to the DSA and its implementation within the federal government.
The IT association Bitkom sees an urgent need for action: “Above all, we would like to see this body cooperate well with the state media authorities and effectively engage in dialog with companies,” says Rebekka Weiß, Head of Trust and Security. The main task is coordination, and the DSC should primarily work toward EU-wide harmonization, says Weiß: “It is important that such a body is created promptly.”
The liberal digital policy association Load is also calling for a speedy concept. “We can only plead for the German government to quickly think about who should take on this role so that the European coordination among the coordinators can take place immediately after the DSA is passed,” says Load chairwoman Ann-Cathrin Riedel. The debate around Telegram has just shown once again that a common European approach would be necessary. The lack of law enforcement would otherwise implicitly strengthen those who advocated stronger surveillance.
From the point of view of the German Association for Voluntary Self-Regulation of Digital Media Service Providers, the suitability of different bodies needs to be examined but cannot be answered at present. So far, media regulation in Germany has mostly been a matter for the federal states. This would argue for placing the role with the state media authorities. “However, in the area of youth protection and in the case of illegal content, the federal government is also playing an increasingly important role,” the FSM announced in response to a query. Therefore, it would depend on the specific tasks.
The state media authorities seem to be somewhat more suitable candidates overall – after all, they already have to perform comparable tasks to some extent. However, their sovereignty basically ends at the borders of the federal states. Can the EU’s digital single market tolerate a national mapping of federal structures, as is already the case with data protection and audiovisual media, also in the case of the DSA? At any rate, this would not be desirable from any side.
The German side still has some time to sort itself out. But if the parliamentary position is finalized for the trilogue in the European Parliament next Thursday, this could not only result in even more responsibilities. It could also result in a shorter implementation period in the trilogue: Parliamentarians consider the 15-month transition period proposed by the Council is too long.
The new European emissions trading system for the buildings and road transport sectors (ETS 2) could start as early as 2025. This is what the EU Parliament’s rapporteur, Peter Liese (EPP/CDU), is proposing. The Commission had planned to include both sectors in CO2 pricing only in 2026.
In the draft report, which is to be published on Friday and is available to Europe.Table in a pre-release draft, Liese also introduces the possibility of a so-called opt-out. Accordingly, member states could decide individually whether to implement the ETS expansion as early as 2025 or postpone it until 2027. The condition for this would be that they can prove that they will achieve their national emission reduction targets for 2030 in both sectors.
The maritime sector is also to be included in the existing ETS earlier than planned by the Commission. The pilot phase of pricing ship emissions is to be shortened by one year, from 2023 to 2024, so that the sector would be fully integrated into the ETS from 2025. This would result in 57 million additional emissions allowances ending up on the market. Contrary to what environmentalists have called for, Liese does not plan a one-time reduction in allowances to compensate for the surplus of available allowances over demand.
The ETS is also intended to provide stronger incentives for the industry to decarbonize production processes. Companies that no longer use fossil fuels are to receive free certificates for another five years. This is intended to reward necessary innovations, such as the production of green hydrogen for steel production. At the same time, companies that do not take steps toward decarbonization are to receive fewer allowances via a bonus-malus system, while best performers are to receive bonuses on free allocations.
In the long term, free certificates are also to be abolished in Liese’s plans. However, not gradually, as envisaged by the Commission, with a simultaneous ramp-up of the CBAM. Liese wants free allowances that would be eliminated with the introduction of the CBAM to go into a reserve. They are to be auctioned if the CBAM worked effectively in that year. If not, they are to be awarded retroactively to affected industrial facilities. This is to allow manufacturers, importers, and distributors to adapt to the new regime and verify the effective implementation of the CBAM.
The rapporteur also wants to include municipal waste incineration plants in the ETS from 2028. While this won’t happen overnight, it is a must in the long term, Liese said. This would promote the recycling, reuse, and repair of products and at the same time contribute to the decarbonization of the economy, according to his draft report.
The CDU MEP calls on the Commission to present a corresponding impact assessment for the inclusion of waste incineration plants by the end of 2025. In addition, the Commission should prepare a legislative proposal to prevent waste from incinerators from being diverted to landfills and exported to third countries. luk
In a general debate in the Bundestag on the government’s environmental policy, Federal Environment Minister Steffi Lemke (Greens) reiterated her opposition to nuclear energy, calling it a high-risk technology, extremely expensive, and impossible without government guarantees. “Even the fairy tales of possible new reactor types do not change that,” the minister said in Wednesday evening’s plenary debate, adding with regard to the controversial EU taxonomy: “Nuclear power is not sustainable. That’s why there should be no attempt to save it with a sustainability label.”
Completing the nuclear phaseout is one of five key tasks in her “new chapter of environmental policy”.
The others are:
Russia is exacerbating the energy crisis in the EU, according to the head of the International Energy Agency (IEA). “In terms of European gas … we believe there are strong elements of the tightness in European gas markets due to Russia’s behavior,” Fatih Birol told reporters on Wednesday. “Today’s low Russian gas flows to Europe coincide with heightened geopolitical tensions over Ukraine,” he added.
Russia’s Gazprom cut its exports to Europe by 25 percent year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2021 despite high market prices and lower spot sales, while other exporters increased their exports, Birol said. Russia could increase its supplies to Europe by at least a third, as it has ample spare capacity. This is equivalent to 10 percent of the EU’s average monthly gas consumption, or one full LNG ship per day, he said. Moreover, Russia is delivering more to China than contractually agreed – unlike to Europe.
The unusually low levels in European gas storage facilities were largely due to Gazprom, Birol added: The company’s storage facilities were responsible for half of the deficit, although Gazprom’s facilities accounted for only ten percent of the total storage capacity in the EU. They are currently only 50 percent full, compared to 70 percent, which isn’t unusual in January. The unusually empty storage facilities have helped drive gas prices to new heights.
Birol advocated introducing minimum storage obligations for all commercial operators in the EU. Member states have been arguing for months about how the EU should react to the sharp rise in energy prices. A number of governments and experts say Moscow shares responsibility for the crisis. The German government, on the other hand, takes Russia’s side, pointing to the fulfilled supply contracts. Moscow has repeatedly made it clear that a rapid operating permit for Nord Stream 2 could defuse the situation.
On Wednesday, the Swedish government also announced its intention to compensate households particularly affected. Electricity prices in the country had skyrocketed in recent months, although less so than in other member states. Sweden generates most of its electricity from its own hydropower, nuclear reactors, and wind farms and does not rely on natural gas imports. According to Industry Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti, the Italian government is currently considering raising the tax rate for energy companies that have benefited from rising energy prices. rtr/tho
Budget payments could now potentially be blocked after Poland refused to pay a daily fine of €500,000. As Bloomberg reports, the EU is preparing to withhold corresponding payments.
The report cites a spokesman for the Commission, according to which the EU Commission has already sent three requests for payment to Warsaw as well as informing the country that a late fee will be due.
The European Court of Justice had imposed the fine on Poland in September against the background of the dispute over lignite mining in Turów. At the end of May, the ECJ had ordered a halt to coal mining in Turow, thus upholding a complaint by the Czech Republic.
According to the Prague authorities, the neighboring country extended the license for the open-pit mine until 2044 without the required environmental impact assessment. The operation has a negative impact on the groundwater level, which also affects the Czech Republic.
In the dispute over the PiS government’s judicial reforms in Warsaw, the ECJ has also ordered Poland to pay a penalty payment – in this case of €1 million a day. Currently, the EU is also withholding funds to Poland from the COVID reconstruction instrument. sas
The US is also threatening Russia with a shutdown of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline through the Baltic Sea in the event of aggression against Ukraine. US Democrats introduced a bill in Washington on Wednesday that would impose sanctions on Russian government officials and banks, as well as measures against Nord Stream 2, which is intended to bring more Russian gas to Western Europe.
The Presidential Oval Office-backed push says the pipeline is an “instrument of the negative influence of the Russian Federation.” In the event of an attack on Ukraine, “all possible and appropriate steps” should be taken to prevent it from going into operation. The background is the Russian troop buildup on Ukraine’s border and concern by Western governments and Ukraine about an attack.
“In our view, it is very difficult for gas to flow through the pipeline or for it to come online at all if Russia repeats its aggression against Ukraine,” US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman also said after a NATO-Russia Council meeting in Brussels.
It reiterated the US position that the pipeline undermines European energy and security interests. The German government has repeatedly rejected this. However, in the new traffic light coalition, the Greens are vocal critics of the pipeline. The USA is a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is also supplied to Europe.
In the SPD, on the other hand, there are more and more voices warning against a sanctions debate against the Baltic Sea gas pipeline. This would be “a wrong attitude and a wrong discussion,” said Katja Mast, parliamentary director of the SPD parliamentary group. No tougher sanctions are currently being prepared, she added. “Should there be a new debate on tougher sanctions against Russia, all things must be put on the table without reservation. That includes Nord Stream 2, but it also includes many other things,” but she also stressed. Besides, there is currently no gas flowing through the pipeline at all, Mast said. So a stop would have no immediate effect. “Narrowing the debate to Nord Stream 2 is the real problem.” rtr
The protection and conservation of biomes, especially tropical rainforests, is critical to achieve climate goals, especially in countries with abundant forest cover. Nevertheless, the latest monitoring data show significant deforestation in many of these areas, including the world’s most extensive.
In October 2021, Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research reported the highest level of forest loss in the Amazon recorded in that month since monitoring began five years ago. And the problem is not limited to the Amazon. The world’s second-largest tropical forest, the Congo River Basin, lost more than 15 million hectares, or 8% of its original covering, between 2001 and 2020.
Global goals to promote biodiversity, such as those agreed on at the recent United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), are critical to raise awareness about ecosystem loss and ensure accountability at the international level. But much of the actual conservation work necessarily must be carried out locally.
Enabling people in these biodiverse regions to coexist with their environment is essential to ensuring the survival of forest biomes. But earning a livelihood from forests is not a simple task. Activities like mining and logging are more lucrative – at least in the short term – than, say, forest management, sustainable farming, and ecotourism.
A recent survey of land-use dynamics in the Brazilian Amazon conducted over the course of two years offers some insights into how governments and non-governmental actors can promote forest conservation at the local level. For starters, understanding the needs and concerns of residents is critical. Civil-society organizations working in the Amazon, for example, learned that economic stability is a top concern for rural farmers. With this knowledge, NGOs introduced new agricultural practices based on the latest science. Doing so enabled activities such as cattle ranching and coffee production to coexist with recovering forests.
Other programs implanted during this period taught small rural farmers forest-management techniques and how to replant native species. Extension agents working with the NGOs provided technical assistance to the farmers and set up demonstration units to help residents understand the benefits of the new methods. Enthusiastic promotion of the techniques and evidence that they improved production were decisive factors in encouraging local farmers to adopt them and engage in sustainable forestry activities.
In addition to introducing forest-friendly farming practices, civil-society organizations in the Amazon work with small producer cooperatives to integrate remote communities into bigger markets. These networks allow farmers to earn money from the forests without harming them. But this infrastructure is fragile. According to data collected by Conexsus, the annual income sustainable cooperatives in the Brazilian Amazon generated for their members in 2019 was under half of Brazil’s minimum wage for that year. Such low returns make it difficult to attract farmers away from more profitable, but less sustainable activities.
To embrace sustainable forestry, residents of rural communities must view it as a reliable source of stable income. Government institutions could reduce economic uncertainty through legislation and incentives.
Unfortunately, recent policy changes actually limit the viability of sustainable forestry in Brazil. The gradual weakening of the national bodies responsible for controlling and monitoring land use is one of the main causes of the recent increase in deforestation in the Amazon Basin, and Brazil’s rural credit policy also does little to support environmentally sustainable economic initiatives.
In 2019 and 2020, only 3% of disbursements made by financial institutions in the Amazon region were directed toward sustainable activities; most of the rest went to industries known to be damaging the local ecosystem, such as soybean production and large-scale cattle ranching.
Community-led organizations are key to promoting sustainable forestry, but their ability to effect change is limited, owing to a lack of capital. Activities like teaching rural farmers more sustainable techniques, creating markets that encourage investment in forest products, and developing ways to integrate Amazon communities into value chains are time-consuming and expensive.
Forest preservation depends on several interconnected factors. Legislation to support conservation efforts and more funding for initiatives like those mentioned here will help promote work that is positive for the environment. But without structural changes at both the national and local level to enable rural residents to earn a living from sustainable forest activities, the destruction of Earth’s most important forest biomes will continue.
In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2022.
It’s a nice idea. So-called “peer parliaments” could increase the participation of citizens in European climate policy. This is urgently needed, as the Brussels bubble often seems far removed from the reality of people’s lives. “We will only defeat the climate crisis if everyone joins the fight,” says Executive Vice President Frans Timmermans, calling for the establishment of debating clubs among one’s friends.
In these Peer Parliaments, five to ten people from the same social circles, school class, or shared flat come together and debate key Green Deal issues. What would make us book fewer flights and take the train or bus instead? How can we make the energy transition fair for everyone? How can we eat more sustainably and waste less food? Under the name home parliaments, the citizens’ initiative Pulse of Europe already organizes comparable discussion rounds on EU topics.
The results of debates in peer parliaments can be submitted to the Commission. They will then – the Commission promises – be collected in a final report to be discussed with policymakers and stakeholders. As I said, sounds great. But it will only help if the proposals of the peer parliaments are actually visibly taken into account in the implementation of the Green Deal.
In any case, there are already public consultations on the Commission’s legislative proposals, in which citizens can express their opinions. The EU Future Conference is pursuing a similar goal. Whether the feedback will ultimately flow into the deliberations and negotiations is not exactly clear. And this could also happen with the peer parliaments. The risk would then be that the citizens would have even less confidence in the EU’s staged closeness to its citizens. Or – and this is probably the most likely scenario – they will not notice any of this anyway. Lukas Scheid
The Digital Services Act is still being negotiated, but the timetable is tight; the “Basic Law for the Internet” is to come into force very soon. That’s when it’s time to start looking at setting up the regulatory authority that will be responsible for enforcing the DSA at the national level. But the question of who will take over the duties of the Digital Services Coordinator in Germany is far from settled, as Falk Steiner reports.
The new European emissions trading system for the buildings and road transport sectors could start as early as 2025 – one year earlier than envisaged by the Commission. This is what Peter Liese (EPP/CDU), rapporteur in the EU Parliament, proposes in his draft report. The paper is to be published tomorrow, Lukas Scheid evaluates it for you in advance.
Higher recycling quotas, the right to repair, the start of the agricultural turnaround, a climate adaptation law: in a general debate of the German Bundestag, Federal Environment Minister Steffi Lemke outlined the priorities for her future environmental policy. Timo Landenberger summarizes the most important aspects.
They play no role in the coalition agreement. But the new supervisory authorities envisaged by the Digital Services Act (DSA) will become perhaps the most powerful national institution for internet regulation. Even though the DSA has not yet been fully negotiated, its enforcement depends heavily on nation-states making it practically possible.
The basic construct of supervision by the “Digital Services Coordinators” in the DSA is multi-layered. On the one hand, the DSCs are responsible for enforcing the planned rules at the national level – and thus for a large proportion of the providers from Germany or with their European headquarters in Germany that are affected by the DSA. However, it is also to cooperate with the DSCs of other EU member states and, in the case of the very large online platforms (VLOPs), to assist the EU Commission.
National DSCs are expected to perform a variety of functions. This ranges from monitoring compliance with rules for switching services to admitting researchers to providers’ databases to designating and supervising so-called trusted flaggers, the reporters of illegal content on Internet platforms who are classified as particularly trustworthy.
They would also be given broad powers to investigate matters, including the right to request information, conduct interviews, impose fines and periodic penalty payments, or issue instructions to operators on what actions to implement or refrain from.
The Council’s position on the DSA states that the DSC is to be an independent authority: “Completely independent”, free from external influence and “neither directly nor indirectly solicit or to receive instructions from other authorities or private bodies”. This structure is usually known from data protection supervisory authorities.
It stems not least from the fact that, in view of Polish and Hungarian realities, some member states wanted to see the influence of national politics limited. However, the DSCs’ administrative acts are to be subject to judicial review and the usual accountability to parliament.
But who could fill this role? So far, the Federal Office of Justice has been responsible for enforcing the Network Enforcement Act in Germany. Significant parts of the NetzDG would be superseded by the DSA regulations under European law. At the same time, the DSA regulates the handling of media content in many places – but supervision in Germany lies with the federal states and their state media authorities.
In addition, the DSA also contains some components relevant to competition law – and the Federal Cartel Office has been monitoring these up to now. Previous responsibilities of the Federal Network Agency are also affected. However, the existing federal structures do not meet the requirements for the DSC as envisaged in the Commission proposal, Council, and parliamentary positions.
When asked, the young federal government is not yet ready to talk about what the German Digital Service Coordinator should look like. So far, it has not even been finally clarified which dossiers and units will be shifted between the Ministries of Economics and Climate Protection, Digital Affairs and Transport, Environment and Consumer Protection, and the Federal Ministry of Justice. However, responsibility for the Digital Services Act is to be located in Volker Wissing’s DP department. But this House has no subordinate authority that is considered a natural candidate.
Time is pressing: After all, France wants to conclude negotiations on the DSA during its Council presidency. After that, the “Basic Law for the Internet” should enter into force quickly. The Council is arguing for a subsequent 15-month implementation period and for the DSC to be operational three months later. 18 months is not a long time frame for creating the national legal basis and setting up a corresponding authority. The staff build-up alone is likely to take years.
Some time could be saved by having an existing national authority take on the role of DSC and coordinate with the other authorities. This would be a possible variant in line with the negotiating positions. As a one-stop shop for European coordination, the DSC should be the sole contact and coordinator within the member states. But which one?
“For reasons of efficiency, it would be obvious to locate the Digital Services Coordinator at a ministry or an existing federal authority,” says Oliver Süme, CEO of the Internet Industry Association Eco. “On the one hand, this would ensure that the necessary structures can be set up quickly, that existing technical expertise in the subject areas can be drawn upon, and that existing personnel and administrative resources can be used.” Süme urges that there must be a clear and uniform, coordinated approach to the DSA and its implementation within the federal government.
The IT association Bitkom sees an urgent need for action: “Above all, we would like to see this body cooperate well with the state media authorities and effectively engage in dialog with companies,” says Rebekka Weiß, Head of Trust and Security. The main task is coordination, and the DSC should primarily work toward EU-wide harmonization, says Weiß: “It is important that such a body is created promptly.”
The liberal digital policy association Load is also calling for a speedy concept. “We can only plead for the German government to quickly think about who should take on this role so that the European coordination among the coordinators can take place immediately after the DSA is passed,” says Load chairwoman Ann-Cathrin Riedel. The debate around Telegram has just shown once again that a common European approach would be necessary. The lack of law enforcement would otherwise implicitly strengthen those who advocated stronger surveillance.
From the point of view of the German Association for Voluntary Self-Regulation of Digital Media Service Providers, the suitability of different bodies needs to be examined but cannot be answered at present. So far, media regulation in Germany has mostly been a matter for the federal states. This would argue for placing the role with the state media authorities. “However, in the area of youth protection and in the case of illegal content, the federal government is also playing an increasingly important role,” the FSM announced in response to a query. Therefore, it would depend on the specific tasks.
The state media authorities seem to be somewhat more suitable candidates overall – after all, they already have to perform comparable tasks to some extent. However, their sovereignty basically ends at the borders of the federal states. Can the EU’s digital single market tolerate a national mapping of federal structures, as is already the case with data protection and audiovisual media, also in the case of the DSA? At any rate, this would not be desirable from any side.
The German side still has some time to sort itself out. But if the parliamentary position is finalized for the trilogue in the European Parliament next Thursday, this could not only result in even more responsibilities. It could also result in a shorter implementation period in the trilogue: Parliamentarians consider the 15-month transition period proposed by the Council is too long.
The new European emissions trading system for the buildings and road transport sectors (ETS 2) could start as early as 2025. This is what the EU Parliament’s rapporteur, Peter Liese (EPP/CDU), is proposing. The Commission had planned to include both sectors in CO2 pricing only in 2026.
In the draft report, which is to be published on Friday and is available to Europe.Table in a pre-release draft, Liese also introduces the possibility of a so-called opt-out. Accordingly, member states could decide individually whether to implement the ETS expansion as early as 2025 or postpone it until 2027. The condition for this would be that they can prove that they will achieve their national emission reduction targets for 2030 in both sectors.
The maritime sector is also to be included in the existing ETS earlier than planned by the Commission. The pilot phase of pricing ship emissions is to be shortened by one year, from 2023 to 2024, so that the sector would be fully integrated into the ETS from 2025. This would result in 57 million additional emissions allowances ending up on the market. Contrary to what environmentalists have called for, Liese does not plan a one-time reduction in allowances to compensate for the surplus of available allowances over demand.
The ETS is also intended to provide stronger incentives for the industry to decarbonize production processes. Companies that no longer use fossil fuels are to receive free certificates for another five years. This is intended to reward necessary innovations, such as the production of green hydrogen for steel production. At the same time, companies that do not take steps toward decarbonization are to receive fewer allowances via a bonus-malus system, while best performers are to receive bonuses on free allocations.
In the long term, free certificates are also to be abolished in Liese’s plans. However, not gradually, as envisaged by the Commission, with a simultaneous ramp-up of the CBAM. Liese wants free allowances that would be eliminated with the introduction of the CBAM to go into a reserve. They are to be auctioned if the CBAM worked effectively in that year. If not, they are to be awarded retroactively to affected industrial facilities. This is to allow manufacturers, importers, and distributors to adapt to the new regime and verify the effective implementation of the CBAM.
The rapporteur also wants to include municipal waste incineration plants in the ETS from 2028. While this won’t happen overnight, it is a must in the long term, Liese said. This would promote the recycling, reuse, and repair of products and at the same time contribute to the decarbonization of the economy, according to his draft report.
The CDU MEP calls on the Commission to present a corresponding impact assessment for the inclusion of waste incineration plants by the end of 2025. In addition, the Commission should prepare a legislative proposal to prevent waste from incinerators from being diverted to landfills and exported to third countries. luk
In a general debate in the Bundestag on the government’s environmental policy, Federal Environment Minister Steffi Lemke (Greens) reiterated her opposition to nuclear energy, calling it a high-risk technology, extremely expensive, and impossible without government guarantees. “Even the fairy tales of possible new reactor types do not change that,” the minister said in Wednesday evening’s plenary debate, adding with regard to the controversial EU taxonomy: “Nuclear power is not sustainable. That’s why there should be no attempt to save it with a sustainability label.”
Completing the nuclear phaseout is one of five key tasks in her “new chapter of environmental policy”.
The others are:
Russia is exacerbating the energy crisis in the EU, according to the head of the International Energy Agency (IEA). “In terms of European gas … we believe there are strong elements of the tightness in European gas markets due to Russia’s behavior,” Fatih Birol told reporters on Wednesday. “Today’s low Russian gas flows to Europe coincide with heightened geopolitical tensions over Ukraine,” he added.
Russia’s Gazprom cut its exports to Europe by 25 percent year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2021 despite high market prices and lower spot sales, while other exporters increased their exports, Birol said. Russia could increase its supplies to Europe by at least a third, as it has ample spare capacity. This is equivalent to 10 percent of the EU’s average monthly gas consumption, or one full LNG ship per day, he said. Moreover, Russia is delivering more to China than contractually agreed – unlike to Europe.
The unusually low levels in European gas storage facilities were largely due to Gazprom, Birol added: The company’s storage facilities were responsible for half of the deficit, although Gazprom’s facilities accounted for only ten percent of the total storage capacity in the EU. They are currently only 50 percent full, compared to 70 percent, which isn’t unusual in January. The unusually empty storage facilities have helped drive gas prices to new heights.
Birol advocated introducing minimum storage obligations for all commercial operators in the EU. Member states have been arguing for months about how the EU should react to the sharp rise in energy prices. A number of governments and experts say Moscow shares responsibility for the crisis. The German government, on the other hand, takes Russia’s side, pointing to the fulfilled supply contracts. Moscow has repeatedly made it clear that a rapid operating permit for Nord Stream 2 could defuse the situation.
On Wednesday, the Swedish government also announced its intention to compensate households particularly affected. Electricity prices in the country had skyrocketed in recent months, although less so than in other member states. Sweden generates most of its electricity from its own hydropower, nuclear reactors, and wind farms and does not rely on natural gas imports. According to Industry Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti, the Italian government is currently considering raising the tax rate for energy companies that have benefited from rising energy prices. rtr/tho
Budget payments could now potentially be blocked after Poland refused to pay a daily fine of €500,000. As Bloomberg reports, the EU is preparing to withhold corresponding payments.
The report cites a spokesman for the Commission, according to which the EU Commission has already sent three requests for payment to Warsaw as well as informing the country that a late fee will be due.
The European Court of Justice had imposed the fine on Poland in September against the background of the dispute over lignite mining in Turów. At the end of May, the ECJ had ordered a halt to coal mining in Turow, thus upholding a complaint by the Czech Republic.
According to the Prague authorities, the neighboring country extended the license for the open-pit mine until 2044 without the required environmental impact assessment. The operation has a negative impact on the groundwater level, which also affects the Czech Republic.
In the dispute over the PiS government’s judicial reforms in Warsaw, the ECJ has also ordered Poland to pay a penalty payment – in this case of €1 million a day. Currently, the EU is also withholding funds to Poland from the COVID reconstruction instrument. sas
The US is also threatening Russia with a shutdown of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline through the Baltic Sea in the event of aggression against Ukraine. US Democrats introduced a bill in Washington on Wednesday that would impose sanctions on Russian government officials and banks, as well as measures against Nord Stream 2, which is intended to bring more Russian gas to Western Europe.
The Presidential Oval Office-backed push says the pipeline is an “instrument of the negative influence of the Russian Federation.” In the event of an attack on Ukraine, “all possible and appropriate steps” should be taken to prevent it from going into operation. The background is the Russian troop buildup on Ukraine’s border and concern by Western governments and Ukraine about an attack.
“In our view, it is very difficult for gas to flow through the pipeline or for it to come online at all if Russia repeats its aggression against Ukraine,” US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman also said after a NATO-Russia Council meeting in Brussels.
It reiterated the US position that the pipeline undermines European energy and security interests. The German government has repeatedly rejected this. However, in the new traffic light coalition, the Greens are vocal critics of the pipeline. The USA is a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is also supplied to Europe.
In the SPD, on the other hand, there are more and more voices warning against a sanctions debate against the Baltic Sea gas pipeline. This would be “a wrong attitude and a wrong discussion,” said Katja Mast, parliamentary director of the SPD parliamentary group. No tougher sanctions are currently being prepared, she added. “Should there be a new debate on tougher sanctions against Russia, all things must be put on the table without reservation. That includes Nord Stream 2, but it also includes many other things,” but she also stressed. Besides, there is currently no gas flowing through the pipeline at all, Mast said. So a stop would have no immediate effect. “Narrowing the debate to Nord Stream 2 is the real problem.” rtr
The protection and conservation of biomes, especially tropical rainforests, is critical to achieve climate goals, especially in countries with abundant forest cover. Nevertheless, the latest monitoring data show significant deforestation in many of these areas, including the world’s most extensive.
In October 2021, Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research reported the highest level of forest loss in the Amazon recorded in that month since monitoring began five years ago. And the problem is not limited to the Amazon. The world’s second-largest tropical forest, the Congo River Basin, lost more than 15 million hectares, or 8% of its original covering, between 2001 and 2020.
Global goals to promote biodiversity, such as those agreed on at the recent United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), are critical to raise awareness about ecosystem loss and ensure accountability at the international level. But much of the actual conservation work necessarily must be carried out locally.
Enabling people in these biodiverse regions to coexist with their environment is essential to ensuring the survival of forest biomes. But earning a livelihood from forests is not a simple task. Activities like mining and logging are more lucrative – at least in the short term – than, say, forest management, sustainable farming, and ecotourism.
A recent survey of land-use dynamics in the Brazilian Amazon conducted over the course of two years offers some insights into how governments and non-governmental actors can promote forest conservation at the local level. For starters, understanding the needs and concerns of residents is critical. Civil-society organizations working in the Amazon, for example, learned that economic stability is a top concern for rural farmers. With this knowledge, NGOs introduced new agricultural practices based on the latest science. Doing so enabled activities such as cattle ranching and coffee production to coexist with recovering forests.
Other programs implanted during this period taught small rural farmers forest-management techniques and how to replant native species. Extension agents working with the NGOs provided technical assistance to the farmers and set up demonstration units to help residents understand the benefits of the new methods. Enthusiastic promotion of the techniques and evidence that they improved production were decisive factors in encouraging local farmers to adopt them and engage in sustainable forestry activities.
In addition to introducing forest-friendly farming practices, civil-society organizations in the Amazon work with small producer cooperatives to integrate remote communities into bigger markets. These networks allow farmers to earn money from the forests without harming them. But this infrastructure is fragile. According to data collected by Conexsus, the annual income sustainable cooperatives in the Brazilian Amazon generated for their members in 2019 was under half of Brazil’s minimum wage for that year. Such low returns make it difficult to attract farmers away from more profitable, but less sustainable activities.
To embrace sustainable forestry, residents of rural communities must view it as a reliable source of stable income. Government institutions could reduce economic uncertainty through legislation and incentives.
Unfortunately, recent policy changes actually limit the viability of sustainable forestry in Brazil. The gradual weakening of the national bodies responsible for controlling and monitoring land use is one of the main causes of the recent increase in deforestation in the Amazon Basin, and Brazil’s rural credit policy also does little to support environmentally sustainable economic initiatives.
In 2019 and 2020, only 3% of disbursements made by financial institutions in the Amazon region were directed toward sustainable activities; most of the rest went to industries known to be damaging the local ecosystem, such as soybean production and large-scale cattle ranching.
Community-led organizations are key to promoting sustainable forestry, but their ability to effect change is limited, owing to a lack of capital. Activities like teaching rural farmers more sustainable techniques, creating markets that encourage investment in forest products, and developing ways to integrate Amazon communities into value chains are time-consuming and expensive.
Forest preservation depends on several interconnected factors. Legislation to support conservation efforts and more funding for initiatives like those mentioned here will help promote work that is positive for the environment. But without structural changes at both the national and local level to enable rural residents to earn a living from sustainable forest activities, the destruction of Earth’s most important forest biomes will continue.
In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2022.
It’s a nice idea. So-called “peer parliaments” could increase the participation of citizens in European climate policy. This is urgently needed, as the Brussels bubble often seems far removed from the reality of people’s lives. “We will only defeat the climate crisis if everyone joins the fight,” says Executive Vice President Frans Timmermans, calling for the establishment of debating clubs among one’s friends.
In these Peer Parliaments, five to ten people from the same social circles, school class, or shared flat come together and debate key Green Deal issues. What would make us book fewer flights and take the train or bus instead? How can we make the energy transition fair for everyone? How can we eat more sustainably and waste less food? Under the name home parliaments, the citizens’ initiative Pulse of Europe already organizes comparable discussion rounds on EU topics.
The results of debates in peer parliaments can be submitted to the Commission. They will then – the Commission promises – be collected in a final report to be discussed with policymakers and stakeholders. As I said, sounds great. But it will only help if the proposals of the peer parliaments are actually visibly taken into account in the implementation of the Green Deal.
In any case, there are already public consultations on the Commission’s legislative proposals, in which citizens can express their opinions. The EU Future Conference is pursuing a similar goal. Whether the feedback will ultimately flow into the deliberations and negotiations is not exactly clear. And this could also happen with the peer parliaments. The risk would then be that the citizens would have even less confidence in the EU’s staged closeness to its citizens. Or – and this is probably the most likely scenario – they will not notice any of this anyway. Lukas Scheid