There is a term that students of political science in France must remember: republican monarchy (“monarchie républicaine”). This term has immortalized the French political scientist Maurice Duverger and refers to the expansion of presidential powers in the Fifth French Republic. For example, the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and holds the nuclear key. He can also remove his prime minister at the head of the government or, in the other case, keep him or her.
The latter happened on Monday: Emmanuel Macron “keeps” Élisabeth Borne as head of government. In France, the president is the head of state, representing the nation. The prime minister heads the executive branch. One can summarize this distinction with a quote from Jacques Chirac: “I decide, he executes.” This very French phrase would simply be indigestible to many on the other side of the Rhine.
So, Élisabeth Borne remains head of government. Why are we talking about this again this morning? Because she will present her new government “at the end of this week,” is the word from Paris without further details. It is the famous “remaniement,” the replacement of one government by another. Like “monarchie républicaine,” “remaniement” is an integral part of French politics. In Paris, many names and speculation are currently being bandied about, leaving some incumbent and prospective ministers in a thick fog.
After the ongoing waves of protest around the pension reform and the recent unrest, which have brought to light a strong social unease in the suburbs, the French president hopes to bring back “stability” with the reshuffle. He is deliberately remaining vague on how exactly and with which team he intends to achieve this. After all, the last few months have been so turbulent that Macron cannot rule anything out. “Political life in France will not simplify,” he says. This will certainly also be felt in Brussels.
Have a nice summerly reading!
Fiona Scott Morton’s appointment continues to make waves – but following the US economist’s withdrawal, criticism is now directed at Paris. In recent days, President Emmanuel Macron and several female ministers stirred up sentiment against the appointment of the Yale Professor as Chief Economist of the Directorate General for Competition. “It’s a shame that the French forced her out,” says a Brussels-based EU diplomat.
The French maneuver is also seen as “very strange” in Berlin government circles. State Secretary for Economic Affairs Sven Giegold regrets the US economist’s renunciation: “We should not judge people by their passport, but by their qualifications and their substantive positions,” he told Table.Media. Fiona Scott Morton had campaigned for a national digital supervisory authority in the US, which was certainly not in the interests of the large digital corporations.
After several of his ministers, Macron had personally expressed “doubts” on Tuesday about the Commission’s decision to appoint Scott Morton as Chief Economist in DG Comp. This contradicts the goal of Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” the President argued. Moreover, Scott Morton could not perform her duties effectively because she could not participate in proceedings against former principals. Scott Morton, for a time Chief Economist of the US Justice Department’s antitrust division under President Barack Obama, had later advised Amazon and Apple, among others.
In a letter to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, five Commissioners, including heavyweights Josep Borrell, Thierry Breton and Paolo Gentiloni, recently called for the personnel matter to be reassessed. Already at the end of the week, the leaders of several political groups in the European Parliament had spoken out in favor of withdrawing the decision.
Scott Morton responded to the reservations and informed Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in a letter that she would not take up the position of Chief Economist. She justified this with the “political controversy” over her appointment. However, she said, the Directorate-General for Competition needed the backing of the entire EU. The 56-year-old should have taken up the post on Sept. 1, when current Chief Economist Pierre Régibeau retires.
In other capitals, France, in particular, is seen as driving the campaign. According to reports, Internal Market Commissioner Breton had already stirred up opposition to the appointment of Scott Morton in the middle of last week, immediately after the College of Commissioners had decided on the personnel matter.
According to Berlin, such a campaign over a position that is not particularly significant is embarrassing at best and damaging at worst. After all, it would scare away highly qualified experts from the US and other countries. The message is that American academics are not welcome in European institutions, criticized Mark Hallerberg, Professor at Berlin’s Hertie School. For a US scientist in Europe, this is “disturbing.”
In the case of another member country, the selection of DG Comp’s chief economist is said to be the exclusive responsibility of the EU Commission. “Of course, any good executive will try to hire the best candidate for the job, regardless of where he comes from,” says a diplomat. Moreover, he says, it has been clear since the job posting was published in April that the search would not be limited to nationals of EU countries. That the criticism is voiced only now “shows that it is a political game, not a matter of substance.”
Andreas Schwab, a member of the European Parliament for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), considers the escalation of the past week to be “a big political mistake” – it will now hardly be possible to find a renowned economist for the position. For the enforcement of the new rules for large digital companies, it is not decisive who is the chief economist – after all, in this position, one can only give advice. Rather, the decisive factor is whether the relevant teams in the Directorate General are adequately staffed, according to the Parliament’s rapporteur for the Digital Markets Act.
However, CSU member Markus Ferber signaled understanding for Scott Morton’s withdrawal. There had been no doubts about her qualifications and her nationality had not played a role either. “But if a chief economist is not allowed to be consulted on topics that have to do with the Big 5 of the digital economy, then you don’t need the post,” Ferber said. He added that this was especially true in light of the fact that the exclusion was to be for two years and Scott Morton’s contract was to be for three years. In the hearing in the Economic Affairs Committee on Tuesday evening, Commissioner Vestager also said nothing that would have shed light on the matter, Ferber said.
Giegold sees a need for action given the personnel case: “We need clear rules at the EU level for dealing with conflicts of interest in transfers between the public service, parliaments and the private sector,” demands the former Green MEP. Particularly problematic, he said, are often transfers to the private sector “where former office holders gold-plate their insider knowledge.” The EU Commission has approved many problematic cases here because the rules and their application are too lax.
Giegold, on the other hand, believes it essential for authorities to be able to hire experts from outside: “Institutions depend on gaining external knowledge.” At the beginning of the year, Economics Minister Robert Habeck appointed Elga Bartsch, a former Blackrock economist, as Head of the Department for Economic Policy.
If it were up to Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton, network operators would have to ban Chinese technology suppliers such as Huawei or ZTE from their networks – especially from the strategically important fifth-generation mobile networks (5G). Repeatedly, the Commission has warned of the risks that certain mobile equipment suppliers posed to security in the Union. In 2020, it provided a 5G toolbox to member states, with measures to reduce the risks. And a month ago, Breton announced the Commission itself was no longer procuring connectivity services that relied on equipment from Huawei and ZTE. He called on member states to do the same.
So far, Germany has held back, but with the German government’s new China strategy, it is moving in Breton’s direction. The strategy aims for better protection of critical infrastructure against access by rival powers. To this end, it wants to introduce a so-called KRITIS umbrella law as quickly as possible. A key issue here is data networks, and here again the expansion of 5G mobile communications.
In this context, the wireless network newcomer 1&1 Mobilfunk brings itself into play with the strategy of building its network entirely without Huawei components right from the start. The planning of its own network began in 2019 when other providers were still unwaveringly relying on Huawei. “Even then, there was discussion about using Chinese manufacturers,” Michael Martin, CEO of 1&1 Mobilfunk, told Table.Media. “It became increasingly not opportune to sign contracts with Chinese vendors if you want to build a new network.”
Unlike established network operators Telekom, Vodafone, and Telefónica, 1&1 has an easier time avoiding Huawei components because their networks are already in place. However, this puts them under considerable pressure. A Huawei ban is looming on the government’s agenda. The planned “critical infrastructure” legislation could make this ban concrete.
1&1 has partnered with the Japanese company Rakuten to create a technology-agnostic, Huawei-free network across Germany. Rakuten is implementing the “Open RAN” concept, where “RAN” stands for Radio Access Network. Components from different manufacturers are designed to seamlessly cooperate in an Open RAN. A complete system, from the antenna to the server, can be procured from the free market. The only requirement is that the components follow the Open RAN standard and the software code is accessible. Rakuten maximizes the possibilities arising from this concept.
The software-driven company Rakuten is taking advantage of the opportunities this offers. Hardware suppliers include, for example, the Japanese providers NEC from Tokyo and Cisco from the USA.“We decided not to work with a large network equipment supplier that supplies everything, but to cooperate with experienced specialists who supply hardware and software as well as high-performance antennas that are a perfect fit,” says Martin. Rakuten’s experts help with this.
However, the other providers do not offer this level of openness. This also applies to Huawei, as the company confirmed upon request. The networks they offer are traditional Single RAN, which ties the customers to one provider. Huawei emphasizes that Single RAN is faster and more cost-effective.
The software of the Huawei platform fundamentally works only with Huawei hardware. On the positive side, everything is optimally aligned. Some experts even doubt whether the combination of cheaper everyday parts in Open RAN can achieve the same high performance and reliability as the solution from a single supplier.
Martin is, however, convinced that his Open RAN will work exactly as it should. “Rakuten has already shown in Japan that the technology performs very well.” The engineers at Rakuten had to identify and eliminate unexpected errors during their pioneering work with Open RAN. But these initial difficulties have been overcome, he said.
In Japan, Rakuten is considered an innovative company, and its network operates to the satisfaction of customers. Independent studies give Rakuten high marks, making it a standard-bearer for the Open RAN movement.
However, the example of 1&1’s new network should not distract from the difficulty that Telekom will face in replacing everything it has already installed by Huawei. The proportion of Huawei components in the networks of Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica is not known but is estimated to be close to 60 percent.
Replacing these parts will be time-consuming and expensive. Barclays Capital estimates the cost for German providers at 2.5 billion euros, with Telekom accounting for 1.1 billion euros of that total. There are rumors that Telekom might sue the government for damages if it is forced to convert.
So far, no government agency or security firm has proven the existence of unexpected backdoors or other malicious traps in Huawei’s networks. For a framework law for critical infrastructure, theoretical future security risks are the focus, not current concrete threats.
Interesting questions will arise here. Open-RAN components also come from China in many cases, even if they bear Western brand names. For example, in the servers of the company Supermicro, which offers Open-RAN systems, suspicious chips from the People’s Republic of China were found in the past. The Open-RAN Alliance includes many Chinese names that have connections to the Chinese security apparatus.
Open RAN is by no means a panacea. “It is not inherently safer than single vendor solutions,” says Tim Ruehlig, an expert in technology security at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). When building such a network, one must also consider the trustworthiness of each individual manufacturer.
Additionally, Open RAN is based on a high level of virtualization, i.e., software-based networks instead of physical lines. Virtualization has significant advantages but also increases complexity. Complexity is precisely what undermines cybersecurity. “In short, Open RAN has pros and cons.”
Cost savings, which mobile operators hoped for with Open RAN, seem to be achievable only where there are no major existing networks. Rakuten and 1&1 are exceptions in this regard. “For Telekom to switch to Open RAN now doesn’t make much sense. The cost savings are likely to be limited,” says Ruehlig. Especially since the security vulnerabilities “won’t be truly closed.”
Ruehlig believes that the current popularity of Open RAN is driven more by politics than technology. The US, in particular, is interested in promoting Open RAN because none of the leading network equipment suppliers are based there, but the big cloud providers like Amazon, Microsoft, and Google are. The virtual mobile network is based on the cloud. “The appeal of Open RAN for us Europeans is currently unclear to me,” says Ruehlig.
Open RAN could, nevertheless, break the era of a small number of major network equipment suppliers. So far, five providers dominate the market: Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei, ZTE and Samsung. Even with doubts about the efficiency of Open RAN, a German “critical infrastructure law” could swing the pendulum in this direction as a political decision.
The vote on the Nature Restoration Law was a dramatic moment in the European Parliament. This was not only due to the close result but also to the unusually sharp confrontation: While the Social Democratic S&D, Greens, Left and a majority of the liberal Renew Group supported the law, the Christian Democratic Conservative EPP aggressively campaigned against it and tried to stop it together with the two far-right groups EKR and ID. Although unsuccessful, some saw this campaign as a test balloon for a new EPP strategy ahead of the 2024 European elections – and possibly for the years thereafter.
How far the European Parliament will move to the right has long become the key question of this election. The end of the “European grand coalition” of EPP, S&D and RE has been proclaimed many times before without actually materializing. But there is no doubt that the political center is currently increasingly divided. What other constellations could have a majority in 2024? And what does the EPP actually gain from its opening to the right?
Looking at the party’s poll numbers alone, the EPP has so far not benefited from the growing polarization. In the base scenario of the European election seat projection, it currently has only 160 seats, two less than in the last projection at the end of May. With the S&D also losing slightly (136 seats/-1), the EPP is still in first place. In the dynamic scenario – which takes into account the possible accession of national parties that could win seats for the first time in the European elections – its lead is even slightly larger (167 to 137 seats). But that the EPP could reach many voters with its shift to the right is currently not apparent, at least in the polls.
However, the current crisis of the center-left camp becomes clear in the seat projection. Although the liberal RE group has gained slightly and would now have 94 seats (+2, dynamic scenario: 99 seats), it is weakening in its stronghold, France. The Greens reach 48 seats (-2, dynamic: 52), a decent figure compared to recent polls but far from their 2019 election result. The European Left, in turn, recently slipped in several large member states and stands at only 41 seats (-8, dynamic: 43) – its worst figure in years.
The right-wing camp, on the other hand, continues to grow: While the EKR group remains unchanged at 79 seats in the baseline scenario, the ID benefits from the current surge of the German AfD and now has 70 seats (+3). In the dynamic scenario – which takes into account, among other things, the possible accession of the French newcomer right-wing party Reconquête to the EKR and the Hungarian Fidesz to the ID – the EKR would even reach 89 seats, the ID 87. In addition, there would be 36 non-factional deputies (+3, dynamic: 31), about a third of whom belong to far-right parties.
If these poll results are confirmed in the European elections, the center-left alliance of S&D, RE, Greens and Left, which most recently advanced the Nature Restoration Law, would be far from a majority in the future. The EPP, ECR and ID could easily block decisions with the help of a few dissenters from other groups or nonattached deputies. A center-right alliance of EPP, ECR and RE could even achieve its own absolute majority, even if only by a narrow margin.
This will not be enough for a stable coalition, if only because the right-wing parties’ factional discipline is traditionally weak. In the future, most decisions in Parliament will probably also be made by a grand coalition of EPP, S&D and Renew. Nevertheless, the right’s gain will affect the balance of power in Parliament: Without a center-left alternative, the S&D is necessarily dependent on cooperation with the EPP to form majorities. The EPP, on the other hand, gains the option to cooperate with the right, at least selectively, and can use this to put pressure on S&D and Renew. This shifts the center of gravity in the European Parliament to the right – which will ultimately be reflected in concrete political decisions.
Since there are no pan-European election polls, the seat projection presented here is based on aggregated national polls and election results from all member states. In the baseline scenario, all national parties are each assigned to their current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of their European umbrella party); parties without a clear assignment are shown as “other.” The dynamic scenario assigns all “other” parties in each case to a parliamentary group that they could plausibly join, and also includes other possible changes in the parliamentary groups.
For more details on the data basis and methodology of the projection, as well as a more detailed breakdown of the results, see the blog The (European) Federalist.
There is a term that students of political science in France must remember: republican monarchy (“monarchie républicaine”). This term has immortalized the French political scientist Maurice Duverger and refers to the expansion of presidential powers in the Fifth French Republic. For example, the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and holds the nuclear key. He can also remove his prime minister at the head of the government or, in the other case, keep him or her.
The latter happened on Monday: Emmanuel Macron “keeps” Élisabeth Borne as head of government. In France, the president is the head of state, representing the nation. The prime minister heads the executive branch. One can summarize this distinction with a quote from Jacques Chirac: “I decide, he executes.” This very French phrase would simply be indigestible to many on the other side of the Rhine.
So, Élisabeth Borne remains head of government. Why are we talking about this again this morning? Because she will present her new government “at the end of this week,” is the word from Paris without further details. It is the famous “remaniement,” the replacement of one government by another. Like “monarchie républicaine,” “remaniement” is an integral part of French politics. In Paris, many names and speculation are currently being bandied about, leaving some incumbent and prospective ministers in a thick fog.
After the ongoing waves of protest around the pension reform and the recent unrest, which have brought to light a strong social unease in the suburbs, the French president hopes to bring back “stability” with the reshuffle. He is deliberately remaining vague on how exactly and with which team he intends to achieve this. After all, the last few months have been so turbulent that Macron cannot rule anything out. “Political life in France will not simplify,” he says. This will certainly also be felt in Brussels.
Have a nice summerly reading!
Fiona Scott Morton’s appointment continues to make waves – but following the US economist’s withdrawal, criticism is now directed at Paris. In recent days, President Emmanuel Macron and several female ministers stirred up sentiment against the appointment of the Yale Professor as Chief Economist of the Directorate General for Competition. “It’s a shame that the French forced her out,” says a Brussels-based EU diplomat.
The French maneuver is also seen as “very strange” in Berlin government circles. State Secretary for Economic Affairs Sven Giegold regrets the US economist’s renunciation: “We should not judge people by their passport, but by their qualifications and their substantive positions,” he told Table.Media. Fiona Scott Morton had campaigned for a national digital supervisory authority in the US, which was certainly not in the interests of the large digital corporations.
After several of his ministers, Macron had personally expressed “doubts” on Tuesday about the Commission’s decision to appoint Scott Morton as Chief Economist in DG Comp. This contradicts the goal of Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” the President argued. Moreover, Scott Morton could not perform her duties effectively because she could not participate in proceedings against former principals. Scott Morton, for a time Chief Economist of the US Justice Department’s antitrust division under President Barack Obama, had later advised Amazon and Apple, among others.
In a letter to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, five Commissioners, including heavyweights Josep Borrell, Thierry Breton and Paolo Gentiloni, recently called for the personnel matter to be reassessed. Already at the end of the week, the leaders of several political groups in the European Parliament had spoken out in favor of withdrawing the decision.
Scott Morton responded to the reservations and informed Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in a letter that she would not take up the position of Chief Economist. She justified this with the “political controversy” over her appointment. However, she said, the Directorate-General for Competition needed the backing of the entire EU. The 56-year-old should have taken up the post on Sept. 1, when current Chief Economist Pierre Régibeau retires.
In other capitals, France, in particular, is seen as driving the campaign. According to reports, Internal Market Commissioner Breton had already stirred up opposition to the appointment of Scott Morton in the middle of last week, immediately after the College of Commissioners had decided on the personnel matter.
According to Berlin, such a campaign over a position that is not particularly significant is embarrassing at best and damaging at worst. After all, it would scare away highly qualified experts from the US and other countries. The message is that American academics are not welcome in European institutions, criticized Mark Hallerberg, Professor at Berlin’s Hertie School. For a US scientist in Europe, this is “disturbing.”
In the case of another member country, the selection of DG Comp’s chief economist is said to be the exclusive responsibility of the EU Commission. “Of course, any good executive will try to hire the best candidate for the job, regardless of where he comes from,” says a diplomat. Moreover, he says, it has been clear since the job posting was published in April that the search would not be limited to nationals of EU countries. That the criticism is voiced only now “shows that it is a political game, not a matter of substance.”
Andreas Schwab, a member of the European Parliament for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), considers the escalation of the past week to be “a big political mistake” – it will now hardly be possible to find a renowned economist for the position. For the enforcement of the new rules for large digital companies, it is not decisive who is the chief economist – after all, in this position, one can only give advice. Rather, the decisive factor is whether the relevant teams in the Directorate General are adequately staffed, according to the Parliament’s rapporteur for the Digital Markets Act.
However, CSU member Markus Ferber signaled understanding for Scott Morton’s withdrawal. There had been no doubts about her qualifications and her nationality had not played a role either. “But if a chief economist is not allowed to be consulted on topics that have to do with the Big 5 of the digital economy, then you don’t need the post,” Ferber said. He added that this was especially true in light of the fact that the exclusion was to be for two years and Scott Morton’s contract was to be for three years. In the hearing in the Economic Affairs Committee on Tuesday evening, Commissioner Vestager also said nothing that would have shed light on the matter, Ferber said.
Giegold sees a need for action given the personnel case: “We need clear rules at the EU level for dealing with conflicts of interest in transfers between the public service, parliaments and the private sector,” demands the former Green MEP. Particularly problematic, he said, are often transfers to the private sector “where former office holders gold-plate their insider knowledge.” The EU Commission has approved many problematic cases here because the rules and their application are too lax.
Giegold, on the other hand, believes it essential for authorities to be able to hire experts from outside: “Institutions depend on gaining external knowledge.” At the beginning of the year, Economics Minister Robert Habeck appointed Elga Bartsch, a former Blackrock economist, as Head of the Department for Economic Policy.
If it were up to Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton, network operators would have to ban Chinese technology suppliers such as Huawei or ZTE from their networks – especially from the strategically important fifth-generation mobile networks (5G). Repeatedly, the Commission has warned of the risks that certain mobile equipment suppliers posed to security in the Union. In 2020, it provided a 5G toolbox to member states, with measures to reduce the risks. And a month ago, Breton announced the Commission itself was no longer procuring connectivity services that relied on equipment from Huawei and ZTE. He called on member states to do the same.
So far, Germany has held back, but with the German government’s new China strategy, it is moving in Breton’s direction. The strategy aims for better protection of critical infrastructure against access by rival powers. To this end, it wants to introduce a so-called KRITIS umbrella law as quickly as possible. A key issue here is data networks, and here again the expansion of 5G mobile communications.
In this context, the wireless network newcomer 1&1 Mobilfunk brings itself into play with the strategy of building its network entirely without Huawei components right from the start. The planning of its own network began in 2019 when other providers were still unwaveringly relying on Huawei. “Even then, there was discussion about using Chinese manufacturers,” Michael Martin, CEO of 1&1 Mobilfunk, told Table.Media. “It became increasingly not opportune to sign contracts with Chinese vendors if you want to build a new network.”
Unlike established network operators Telekom, Vodafone, and Telefónica, 1&1 has an easier time avoiding Huawei components because their networks are already in place. However, this puts them under considerable pressure. A Huawei ban is looming on the government’s agenda. The planned “critical infrastructure” legislation could make this ban concrete.
1&1 has partnered with the Japanese company Rakuten to create a technology-agnostic, Huawei-free network across Germany. Rakuten is implementing the “Open RAN” concept, where “RAN” stands for Radio Access Network. Components from different manufacturers are designed to seamlessly cooperate in an Open RAN. A complete system, from the antenna to the server, can be procured from the free market. The only requirement is that the components follow the Open RAN standard and the software code is accessible. Rakuten maximizes the possibilities arising from this concept.
The software-driven company Rakuten is taking advantage of the opportunities this offers. Hardware suppliers include, for example, the Japanese providers NEC from Tokyo and Cisco from the USA.“We decided not to work with a large network equipment supplier that supplies everything, but to cooperate with experienced specialists who supply hardware and software as well as high-performance antennas that are a perfect fit,” says Martin. Rakuten’s experts help with this.
However, the other providers do not offer this level of openness. This also applies to Huawei, as the company confirmed upon request. The networks they offer are traditional Single RAN, which ties the customers to one provider. Huawei emphasizes that Single RAN is faster and more cost-effective.
The software of the Huawei platform fundamentally works only with Huawei hardware. On the positive side, everything is optimally aligned. Some experts even doubt whether the combination of cheaper everyday parts in Open RAN can achieve the same high performance and reliability as the solution from a single supplier.
Martin is, however, convinced that his Open RAN will work exactly as it should. “Rakuten has already shown in Japan that the technology performs very well.” The engineers at Rakuten had to identify and eliminate unexpected errors during their pioneering work with Open RAN. But these initial difficulties have been overcome, he said.
In Japan, Rakuten is considered an innovative company, and its network operates to the satisfaction of customers. Independent studies give Rakuten high marks, making it a standard-bearer for the Open RAN movement.
However, the example of 1&1’s new network should not distract from the difficulty that Telekom will face in replacing everything it has already installed by Huawei. The proportion of Huawei components in the networks of Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica is not known but is estimated to be close to 60 percent.
Replacing these parts will be time-consuming and expensive. Barclays Capital estimates the cost for German providers at 2.5 billion euros, with Telekom accounting for 1.1 billion euros of that total. There are rumors that Telekom might sue the government for damages if it is forced to convert.
So far, no government agency or security firm has proven the existence of unexpected backdoors or other malicious traps in Huawei’s networks. For a framework law for critical infrastructure, theoretical future security risks are the focus, not current concrete threats.
Interesting questions will arise here. Open-RAN components also come from China in many cases, even if they bear Western brand names. For example, in the servers of the company Supermicro, which offers Open-RAN systems, suspicious chips from the People’s Republic of China were found in the past. The Open-RAN Alliance includes many Chinese names that have connections to the Chinese security apparatus.
Open RAN is by no means a panacea. “It is not inherently safer than single vendor solutions,” says Tim Ruehlig, an expert in technology security at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). When building such a network, one must also consider the trustworthiness of each individual manufacturer.
Additionally, Open RAN is based on a high level of virtualization, i.e., software-based networks instead of physical lines. Virtualization has significant advantages but also increases complexity. Complexity is precisely what undermines cybersecurity. “In short, Open RAN has pros and cons.”
Cost savings, which mobile operators hoped for with Open RAN, seem to be achievable only where there are no major existing networks. Rakuten and 1&1 are exceptions in this regard. “For Telekom to switch to Open RAN now doesn’t make much sense. The cost savings are likely to be limited,” says Ruehlig. Especially since the security vulnerabilities “won’t be truly closed.”
Ruehlig believes that the current popularity of Open RAN is driven more by politics than technology. The US, in particular, is interested in promoting Open RAN because none of the leading network equipment suppliers are based there, but the big cloud providers like Amazon, Microsoft, and Google are. The virtual mobile network is based on the cloud. “The appeal of Open RAN for us Europeans is currently unclear to me,” says Ruehlig.
Open RAN could, nevertheless, break the era of a small number of major network equipment suppliers. So far, five providers dominate the market: Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei, ZTE and Samsung. Even with doubts about the efficiency of Open RAN, a German “critical infrastructure law” could swing the pendulum in this direction as a political decision.
The vote on the Nature Restoration Law was a dramatic moment in the European Parliament. This was not only due to the close result but also to the unusually sharp confrontation: While the Social Democratic S&D, Greens, Left and a majority of the liberal Renew Group supported the law, the Christian Democratic Conservative EPP aggressively campaigned against it and tried to stop it together with the two far-right groups EKR and ID. Although unsuccessful, some saw this campaign as a test balloon for a new EPP strategy ahead of the 2024 European elections – and possibly for the years thereafter.
How far the European Parliament will move to the right has long become the key question of this election. The end of the “European grand coalition” of EPP, S&D and RE has been proclaimed many times before without actually materializing. But there is no doubt that the political center is currently increasingly divided. What other constellations could have a majority in 2024? And what does the EPP actually gain from its opening to the right?
Looking at the party’s poll numbers alone, the EPP has so far not benefited from the growing polarization. In the base scenario of the European election seat projection, it currently has only 160 seats, two less than in the last projection at the end of May. With the S&D also losing slightly (136 seats/-1), the EPP is still in first place. In the dynamic scenario – which takes into account the possible accession of national parties that could win seats for the first time in the European elections – its lead is even slightly larger (167 to 137 seats). But that the EPP could reach many voters with its shift to the right is currently not apparent, at least in the polls.
However, the current crisis of the center-left camp becomes clear in the seat projection. Although the liberal RE group has gained slightly and would now have 94 seats (+2, dynamic scenario: 99 seats), it is weakening in its stronghold, France. The Greens reach 48 seats (-2, dynamic: 52), a decent figure compared to recent polls but far from their 2019 election result. The European Left, in turn, recently slipped in several large member states and stands at only 41 seats (-8, dynamic: 43) – its worst figure in years.
The right-wing camp, on the other hand, continues to grow: While the EKR group remains unchanged at 79 seats in the baseline scenario, the ID benefits from the current surge of the German AfD and now has 70 seats (+3). In the dynamic scenario – which takes into account, among other things, the possible accession of the French newcomer right-wing party Reconquête to the EKR and the Hungarian Fidesz to the ID – the EKR would even reach 89 seats, the ID 87. In addition, there would be 36 non-factional deputies (+3, dynamic: 31), about a third of whom belong to far-right parties.
If these poll results are confirmed in the European elections, the center-left alliance of S&D, RE, Greens and Left, which most recently advanced the Nature Restoration Law, would be far from a majority in the future. The EPP, ECR and ID could easily block decisions with the help of a few dissenters from other groups or nonattached deputies. A center-right alliance of EPP, ECR and RE could even achieve its own absolute majority, even if only by a narrow margin.
This will not be enough for a stable coalition, if only because the right-wing parties’ factional discipline is traditionally weak. In the future, most decisions in Parliament will probably also be made by a grand coalition of EPP, S&D and Renew. Nevertheless, the right’s gain will affect the balance of power in Parliament: Without a center-left alternative, the S&D is necessarily dependent on cooperation with the EPP to form majorities. The EPP, on the other hand, gains the option to cooperate with the right, at least selectively, and can use this to put pressure on S&D and Renew. This shifts the center of gravity in the European Parliament to the right – which will ultimately be reflected in concrete political decisions.
Since there are no pan-European election polls, the seat projection presented here is based on aggregated national polls and election results from all member states. In the baseline scenario, all national parties are each assigned to their current parliamentary group (or to the parliamentary group of their European umbrella party); parties without a clear assignment are shown as “other.” The dynamic scenario assigns all “other” parties in each case to a parliamentary group that they could plausibly join, and also includes other possible changes in the parliamentary groups.
For more details on the data basis and methodology of the projection, as well as a more detailed breakdown of the results, see the blog The (European) Federalist.
