When Ursula von der Leyen steps into closed-door meetings these days, it’s expected that controversial debates will arise. Today, however, her focus isn’t on her potential re-election as Commission President. Instead, she’s attending the fourth Strategic Dialogue on Agriculture plenary session, a platform she initiated.
This initiative is also tied to von der Leyen’s ambition for a second term. By the end of summer, the committee – comprising representatives from diverse interests – aims to present its final report.
This timing could align perfectly to provide a clear agricultural policy framework for a potential second von der Leyen administration. The benefit for von der Leyen is significant: she can claim to be implementing the articulated will of the farmers, outmaneuvering EPP leader Manfred Weber, who has championed the EPP as the farmers’ party. Simultaneously, the report’s non-binding nature, requiring support from a broad spectrum of participants, ensures it remains flexible enough not to constrain the new Commission’s future actions.
So, today’s developments promise to be both exciting and intriguing, much like today’s edition of Europe.Table.
Have a wonderful weekend!
Your Julia Dahm
Feature
Sanctions: Why Berlin is preventing a tougher package against Russia
The Permanent Representatives of the Member States to the EU agreed on the 14th sanctions package after all on Thursday, albeit without tightening the so-called “no-Russia clause”. This was to be extended to subsidiaries of EU companies in order to close known loopholes in the comprehensive sanctions regime against Russia. On instructions from Berlin, the German EU ambassador had to oppose the extension and was criticized by his European partners. Suddenly, it was Germany and not Hungary that caused the delay.
The fact is that Germany, with its export-oriented industry, would be particularly affected by an extension of the “no-Russia clause”. There were also questions from the German side regarding legal certainty for the companies affected and the feasibility of the clause. The damage to the European economy would possibly be greater than the benefits with regard to the loopholes in the sanctions regime, according to fears. The EU Commission should therefore first examine the consequences.
Fear of bureaucratic hurdles
Companies in the EU would have had to contractually oblige subsidiaries in third countries to preventthe re-export of certain goods to Russia. These include spare parts for the aviation industry or high-tech products that the Russian arms industry could use. The Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations warns that the application of the existing “no-Russia clause” already presents EU companies with major bureaucratic challenges that US competitors, for example, do not currently face.
There is a growing risk that small and medium-sized companies will shy away from the expense and scale back their foreign business out of fear of violating sanctions or in view of the effort involved in checking. As an export nation, the German economy would be particularly affected by an extension of the clause. Due to complex supply chains, it is difficult to check compliance with the rules in practice. One example is when the subsidiary of a German company in Brazil delivers products to a customer in Kazakhstan, who then ships the sanctioned goods to Russia.
China does not accept clause
According to reports, however, trade with China would be particularly affected: the problem here is particularly great, as Chinese partners do not accept a “no-Russia clause”. China prohibits its companies from accepting the clause because it sees it as an extension of EU sanctions to its own jurisdiction.
In fact, the EU Commission’s proposal was primarily aimed at closing loopholes that allowed goods to reach Russia from the EU via China. A year ago, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had already warned that European goods were being delivered directly to Russia via companies in China.
Even if the companies are registered there, they are companies that do not necessarily have their headquarters in China. The EU Commission had found evidence that “around eight companies” were supplying sanctioned goods from the EU to Russia via third countries. According to information from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Russia purchased high-precision tools produced in the West for Russian weapons manufacturers.
Sanctions against Russian transit business with LNG
In Brussels, the German position was further complicated by differences between the Chancellery and the Office for Foreign Affairs. The reservations regarding the impact on the German economy came from the Chancellery, while the Foreign Office warned of the damage to Germany’s image if it blocked the clause. However, the “no-Russia clause” is now not off the table. The Permanent Representatives have instructed the Commission to address the open questions regarding legal certainty and feasibility in third countries and to submit a report.
In addition to the steps against loopholes, the 14th package includes sanctions against Russia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) business for the first time. Not against imports into the EU, but against the Russian transit business: in the future, Russia will no longer be allowed to useEuropean ports such as Zeebrugge in Belgium to ship LNG to third countries. According to a spokesperson for the EU Commission, four to six billion cubic meters of Russian liquefied natural gas were forwarded to third countries via European ports last year. According to reports, this involves transactions worth several billion euros.
Measures also against Russia’s hybrid warfare
The comprehensive package also includes measures against a dozen tankers belonging to the so-called shadow fleets, which Russia uses to circumvent the oil pricecap. Export controls on chemical products, plastics and electronics that could be used in the arms industry are being tightened. According to diplomats, sanctions against instruments of Russia’s hybrid warfare, i.e. financial aid from Moscow for NGOs, propaganda platforms or political parties, will also be added.
The member states will probably still have to formally agree at the meeting of foreign ministers next Monday before the 14th sanctions package can enter into force following publication in the Official Journal. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen welcomed the punitive measures despite thelast-minute weakening: The powerful package will make Russia’s access to key technologies even more difficult. With Birgit Jennen
EU foreign policy
European policy
KMU
Russland
Interview
EIB climate action expert: ‘Too much money is going into the wrong things’
Nancy Saich, Senior Climate Change Expert at the European Investment Bank (EIB).
Ms. Saich, climate policy sees a battle for a new climate finance target. Developing and emerging countries want hundreds of billions of euros in annual aid. What do you think the new financial target should look like?
The EIB has observer status in these negotiations. It is not our place to formulate our own demands. Personally, I hope that there will be new payments into the loss and damage fund in the course of the year. And regarding the new financial target, it is important that we don’t just need a number, we also need quality. The target must be ambitious, and yet everyone must be able to agree on it. My impression is that the troika from the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan and Brazil is very active. There are positive signals, but we are not nearly as fast as we should be. Far too much money continues to flow into the wrong things, such as subsidizing fossil fuels. That has to stop.
The EIB also lends climate loans to countries outside the EU. Where does the money go? To wealthy emerging countries with strong business opportunities, or to particularly disadvantaged countries that might need it more urgently?
We are a bank and we grant loans. However, with it, we can hardly solve the problems of already over-indebted countries. Even particularly low-interest loans or instruments such as the currently hotly debated “debt-for-nature swaps” would not help these countries. I think the solution for them is more likely to be found in the proposals of the Bridgetown Agenda.
The EIB is financing the EU’s Green Deal. After the shift to the right in the elections, how secure is the EIB’s continued climate leadership role?
The new EIB President Nadia Calviño, who has been in office since January, has made it clear: Continuing our work as a climate bank is one of her top priorities. We are working on our climate roadmap for 2026 to 2030, and our communication needs to be much stronger: A greener future benefits everyone, not just the climate. It will bring new jobs, better homes, cleaner air and better health. Our goal is a just climate transition that leaves no one behind. And these are not just empty words.
‘Far too much money continues to flow into the wrong things. That has to stop’
You say that too much money continues to flow into the wrong things. The EIB is one of the world’s largest financiers of climate action and sustainability. What criteria do private companies or the public sector must meet in order to receive a climate loan from you?
As the EU’s climate bank, we finance the Green Deal. We have set out 2020 in our climate roadmap: By the end of 2020, all EIB financial activities must be in line with the Paris Agreement. 50 percent of our loans are to flow into climate and green projects from 2025. And from 2021 to 2030, we want to support the fair, green transformation of the economy with investments of one trillion euros. Of course, we have not yet implemented everything, but we are making good progress. More than half of EIB lending now goes towards climate finance.
Which activities does the EIB fund and which does it rule out?
Since 2021, we have only been funding new activities that, according to the EIB-Paris Alignment Framework, help our clients meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. We focus our climate loans on the energy sector, namely renewable energies, energy efficiency, grids and electricity storage. We also grant loans for the expansion of local public transport and building refurbishment, for example. Since 2020, we generally no longer grant loans for conventional energy generation from fossil sources – however, we do not withdraw existing loans, as we are contractually bound to agreed projects as a public financial institution. We systematically examine all projects that are submitted to us for possible climate risks. We help our clients understand the impact of climate change on their business and how to reduce their emissions. And we support banks in green lending, for example to small and medium-sized enterprises or smaller municipalities.
‘Everything must be done in line with the Paris Agreement’
Would the EIB fund new natural gas projects or fossil fuel power generation with CCS?
Our standards exclude any form of electricity generation that produces more greenhouse gases than 250 grams of CO2 equivalent per kilowatt-hour. This makes us stricter than the EU taxonomy, which sets the limit at 270 grams. The 250-gram limit means that even the most efficient form of conventional fossil power generation is excluded – so we do not finance combined-cycle gas turbines, for example. However, highly efficient combined heat and power plants that supply residential areas with electricity and heat can meet our criteria. We do not finance the extraction of coal, oil or gas, nor do we finance pipelines or other fossil fuel infrastructure.
Because our mandate also requires us to finance other objectives. We support small and medium-sized enterprises and promote innovation in the education and healthcare sectors, such as the development of vaccines. There is currently also a growing interest in defense and digitalization loans. Not everything we do promotes the green transformation of Europe – after all, we can’t stop funding schools or hospitals. But everything must be done in line with the Paris Agreement. This means, for instance, that any hospital we fund is aware of its climate risks and is adapting accordingly. The other multilateral development banks, with whom we have been working closely on climate finance issues since Paris, use a similar approach.
CCS
Climate financing
Climate protection
EIB
EIB
Finance
KMU
Translation missing.
EU-Monitoring
June 24-25, 2024 Council of the EU: Agriculture and Fisheries Topics: Approval of the conclusions on the future of agriculture in the EU, Current legislative proposals, Information from the Romanian delegation on the introduction of eligibility of expenditure for the purchase of breeding animals under the CAP Strategic Plans. Provisional agenda
June 24, 2024; 8:30 a.m. Council of the EU: Foreign Affairs Topics: Exchange of views on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East, the Western Balkans and Georgia.Provisional agenda
June 25, 2024 Accession conference with Ukraine Topics: EU leaders and the Ukrainian government meet for accession talks.Info
June 25, 2024 Accession conference with Moldova Topics: EU leaders and the government of Moldova meet for accession talks.Info
June 25, 2024; 9 a.m. Council of the EU: General Affairs Topics: Policy debate on the Directive on the transparency of interest representation on behalf of third countries, exchange of views in preparation for the European Council meeting at June 27/28, 2024 (conclusions), hearing on Union values in Hungary (reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) TEU).Provisional agenda
June 27-28, 2024 European Council Topics: Ukraine, security and defense, competitiveness, foreign relations, the next legislative period.Provisional agenda
Translation missing.
News
Romania concedes: Dutchman Rutte can become NATO Secretary General
The way has been cleared for the appointment of Mark Rutte as the next Secretary General of NATO after months of deadlock. On Thursday, Romania was the last alliance state to announce that it would drop its opposition to the outgoing Dutch head of government being appointed to the top post.
Romania’s President Klaus Iohannis withdrew his own candidacy, as the presidential chancellery announced in Bucharest on Thursday. At the same time, Romania now supports Rutte’s candidacy, it added. This decision was made by the country’s supreme defense council (CSAT), which Iohannis chairs.
Recently, Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey had already takenthis step. For a long time, these three countries, together with Romania, were the only NATO states that had blocked the appointment of 57-year-old Rutte as Jens Stoltenberg’s successor. dpa
Verteidigungspolitik
European Parliament: Strack-Zimmermann wants to head defense committee
The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) is to become a full committee, according to the group leaders. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP) has announced that she will then apply for the chairmanship of the Defense Committee. Moritz Körner will continue to lead the German delegation of FDP MPs in the Renew Group. It consists of five MEPs. mgr
EU Parliament
FDP
ITRE
Renew
Renew
Iratxe García wants to continue leading the S&D Group
The current group leader Iratxe García Pérez wants to continue to lead the S&D Group in the European Parliament in the new legislative period. The Spanish socialist declared her candidacy in a letter to MEPs on Thursday. So far, no opposing candidates are foreseeable, according to group circles.
The 49-year-old PSOE politician has led the second-largest parliamentary group since 2019. She is not without controversy internally, partly due to her close ties to Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. In the most recent European elections, the PSOE won 20 seats, making it the second-largest delegation in the group behind the Italian PD. According to reports, its representatives are claiming to take over the office of President of the Parliament halfway through the legislative term. However, the EPP has also formulated claims to fill Roberta Metsola’s post for the entire term of office.
In her letter, García proposes that the Group “identify a number of common key political objectives and non-negotiable red lines”, which should serve as a benchmark for a hearing with the President-elect of the Commission in July. Until the election of the new Commission President, the group should also develop a thorough version of the Commission’s future work program. The demands should be the prerequisite for the support of the entire College of the Commission. tho
Europawahlen 2024
Volt: Party members vote on party affiliation
The pan-European party Volt is calling on its members to vote by Sunday. They should decide which political group Volt should join in the European Parliament. The choice is between the Greens/EFA and Renew groups, with which Volt has negotiated. The five elected MEPs unanimously recommend joining the Greens/EFA group. According to their own statements, they are convinced that they can achieve more for their own voters and Europe in this group. However, they want to bow to the vote of the members should their decision be different.
In the last legislature, Volt was represented in the EU Parliament by only one MEP, Damian Boeselager from Germany. At the time, Boeselager had joined the Greens/EFA. This time, Volt is entering the EU Parliament with five MEPs, which makes the party more interesting for both the Greens/EFA and Renew. Two MEPs come from the Netherlands, three from Germany.
Fight against right-wing populism
Various criteria also played a role in the decision this time, said Boeselager. For example, how the parliamentary groups had behaved in the past, which values and programs they represented and which committees they had offered Volt. And, of course, it was a matter of which parliamentary group would be better able to fulfill its own election promises. The aim is to form his own parliamentary group as quickly as possible.
According to information from Table.Briefings, the five MEPs opted for the Greens, among other reasons, because the parliamentary group is more credible in the fight against right-wing populist forces. This is a central concern of the party. Renew, on the other hand, is strongly in favor of the rule of law vis-à-vis the member states. However, the group still accepts parties such as ANO, a populist Czech party, and the VVD, which enabled the election of a Wilders government in the Netherlands, within its own ranks. vis
Europawahlen 2024
What the EU Commission criticizes about German economic policy
Too little investment, too high a trade surplus – this is how the EU Commission’s verdict on Germany can be summarized. On Wednesday, as part of the European Semester, the European Commission not only presented the procedures it intends to initiate against member states with high deficits. The Commission also published a country report and country-specific recommendations for each member state. As the Commission identified a “macroeconomic imbalance” for Germany – as it did for Cyprus, Hungary, Sweden and the Netherlands – it also published a detailed report on Germany’s macroeconomic risks.
In particular, Germany’s trade surplus and the associated low level of investment are criticized by the Commission. Although Germany’s trade surplus is a sign of German competitiveness, it also makes the country’s economy very dependent on foreign demand. Germany’s current “anemic” economic growth is partly due to this dependency. Because Germany is saving too much in relation to the investments made, the economy is not being sufficiently supported by domestic demand.
Commission criticizes low private investment
According to the Commission, this also hurts the rest of the EU. A greater willingness to consume or higher investment activity in Germany would also boost the economy of the entire EU thanks to the interconnectedness of the single market. Many other EU countries are unable to boost their economies due to their high debt levels.
The Commission criticizes the fact that private investment activity in Germany is lower than before the coronavirus pandemic. Although public investment has increased slightly, it is “insufficient” in view of the investment needs, especially at municipal level, where net investment has been negative for two decades. “Public investment can improve private investment”, write the EU Commission’s economists in their report. However, the Commission also criticizes the fact that administrative hurdles stand in the way of private investment.
The Commission also criticizes a “complex and opaque tax system“. The high-income taxes would not provide sufficient incentives to work more. The Commission also believes that other incentives are not set optimally in Germany. For example, corporate taxation is among the highest in the EU, while environment-related taxes are below the EU average. jaa
Debt
Economic policy
Investments
Konjunktur
Missing EU climate targets: Why Germany might have to pay 16.2 billion euros
Without immediate measures, twelve EU countries are projected to miss their national climate targets under the ESR, according to a study by the transport and environmental organization Transport & Environment (T&E). T&E analyzed the draft national energy and climate plans to reach this conclusion.
The ESR allocates allowed emission amounts to each member state for sectors outside the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), including road transport, buildings, small industries, waste and agriculture. Countries that fail to meet their ESR targets must purchase excess certificates from other countries. According to T&E, Germany could owe up to 16.2 billion euros due to shortfalls in the transport sector.
CO2 price forecasted at over 120 euros per ton
Data from the German Environment Agency (UBA) indicates that Germany will emit 126 million tons of CO2 equivalents above its ESR allocation. T&E bases its calculations on a certificate price of 129 euros, as projected by Bloomberg for the ETS sectors in 2030. The UBA estimates a price of 125 euros per ton of CO2.
Higher prices are primarily due to the scarcity of certificates. Germany alone would consume about 70 percent of the excess certificates available from other EU countries, given the 126 million ton shortfall forecasted by T&E. T&E warns that without immediate action, there will be a significant shortage of credits, as multiple countries are expected to miss their targets.
Italy also significantly missing targets
Italy is expected to require an additional 120 million emission credits under the ESR, potentially costing Rome up to 15.5 billion euros. Together, Germany and Italy would need 246 million certificates. However, only 180 million excess certificates are likely to be available from other member states. This means that ten other countries failing to meet their ESR targets would have no means to comply, leading to high costs for taxpayers in Germany and Italy.
Sebastian Bock, managing director of T&E Germany, criticizes the German government’s amendment to the climate change law, which abolished sector-specific targets, calling it a “sleight of hand”. He states, “Volker Wissing faces a clear choice: either pay billions to our European neighbors for delayed climate action or finally take climate protection in the transport sector seriously.” luk
Climate & Environment
EU climate policy
EU-Klimapolitik
Transport policy
Study: Why the EU is not competitive in critical technologies
A recent study by the lobby association Digital Europe shows that Europe is lagging behind its competitors in seven out of eight critical technology areas.The study, “The EU’s Critical Tech Gap“, analyzes Europe’s position in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors. The EU is only ahead in the area of connectivity, but is struggling to develop the market.
Large technology companies such as Apple, Google and Microsoft as well as national trade associations are represented in the Digital Europe association. It criticizes the EU’s current strategy. Digital Europe is calling for more investment and a stronger focus on growth and partnerships. Europe is too focused on protecting itself from risks. This leads to additional burdens for European companies and weakens their position in the global supply chain.
The study shows significant investment deficits in critical technology areas, particularly in AI, quantum computing and space technologies. Although the EU is strong in research and development, it is unable to translate these skills into production and commercialization. As a result, the economic benefits of these innovations are not being fully realized in Europe.
Targeted funding for research, development and infrastructure
Complex regulations also hinder the growth of European companies, which often have to switch to markets where conditions are simpler. A critical shortage of skilled workers in key areas such as AI engineering and quantum computing is further limiting Europe’s competitiveness.
The study recommends several measures to catch up. These include: Simplifying regulation, promoting public-private partnerships, targeted funding for research and development, major investments in infrastructure as well as education and training. Tax incentives should also be created and global partnerships strengthened. vis
Big Tech
Tennet: blame game between The Hague and Berlin
The governments in Germany and the Netherlands are blaming each other for the failure of talks on the sale of the German business of electricity grid operator Tennet. “The Dutch government has given us a very short deadline for a decision by July 1. Only the owner of Tennet Holding can control the process”, said a spokesperson for the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs in Berlin on Thursday.
The government in The Hague contradicted this account. “The talks have been going on for a year and a half. The July 1 deadline was set by Germany because it is no longer possible to adjust the budget for 2025 after this date. It is therefore essentially a German deadline”, a spokesperson for Dutch Finance Minister Steven van Weyenberg told Table.Briefings. The date also has nothing to do with a new Dutch government taking office.
‘Have explicitly not named July 1’
The fact is that the consultations for the 2025 federal budget should be completed by July 3. In mid-May, Weyenberg informed the Dutch parliament about the status of the negotiations. “The German government will conclude the budget negotiations for 2025 around July 1, 2024. A convincing and market-driven price that is compatible with the German budget rules must be agreed by this date“, the Finance Minister wrote in the letter.
The BMWK argues that the Dutch side itself derived a date for the end of the negotiations. “We expressly did not specify July 1 as the deadline”, said the Habeck spokesperson. In an interview with Table.Briefings in May, Tennet COO Tim Meyerjürgens justified the federal government’s investment in the grid operators with the long-term capital requirements: “Germany has over €300 billion in investments ahead of it in the transmission grid sector alone.” ber
EU tariffs: Where Chinese manufacturers already feel the effects
A survey has found that 73 percent of Chinese EV manufacturers have experienced a drop in sales in the European market due to the EU investigation into state subsidies. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Brussels presented the survey on Wednesday in cooperation with the state-run China Economic Information Service. 67 percent of the companies stated that the EU investigation had affected their brand’s reputation. According to the Chamber of Commerce, the survey was conducted in May and April this year among more than 30 manufacturers and suppliers in the Chinese EV industry.
The survey found that the investigation had a negative impact on cooperation with European partners: 82 percent of respondents were less confident about future investments in Europe. Accordingly, 83 percent of the companies surveyed stated that European dealers and leasing companies were less optimistic about the prospects for cooperation. Around two-thirds (67 percent) of respondents said that the European market was still of crucial importance and that they wanted to build production facilities in Europe within the next five years.
In the report, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce criticizes the EU Commission’s actions and claims it has deliberately overestimated the market share of Chinese EVs in Europe. Last week, the Brussels authority announced extra tariffs of up to 38.1 percent on Chinese EVs. In response, Beijing announced an anti-dumping investigation into European pork earlier this week. Both sides repeatedly emphasized that they wanted to resolve the conflict through negotiations. ari
EU
Trade
European Works Councils: What the Council has agreed on
The Council has agreed its general approach on the European Works Council (EWC) Directive. An agreement had been expected, although the German Liberals had previously expressed concerns.
In January, the Commission presented its proposal for a revision of the existing directive. Among other things, the aim is to close existing gaps in the establishment ofEuropean Works Councils and to better involve EWC members in cross-border decisions. In addition, EWCs are to be guaranteed effective access to court proceedings so that they can enforce their rights.
European Works Councils can represent European employees in companies with more than 1,000 employees that are active in at least two countries of the EU or the European Economic Area.
Sufficient time to comment before decisions are made
In its negotiating position, the Council stipulates, among other things, that:
The obligation to strive for gender equality in EWCs should not affect the national rules for the election and appointment of employee representatives;
That EWCs should be given sufficient time to express their views before a decision is taken that could affect them. If an EWC does not submit its opinion within a certain period, companies must not be prevented from taking a decision;
That access to court proceedings should be simplified by covering the costs of legal representation and participation;
That the list of factors that can determine a possible sanction should be retained. These include, for example, the size and financial situation of the company.
Criticism came from the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations, which sees the decision as a step towards more bureaucracy. “The Council’s position on the Works Council Directive is harmful”, says BDA Managing Director Steffen Kampeter. “With the planned directive, decision-making processes will become increasingly bureaucratically burdened and delayed.” The existing regulation works and is therefore sufficient. sas/lei
Employee rights
Social policy
Must-Reads
Column
What’s cooking in Paris? How the Republicans are grinding away at the Rassemblement National
By Claire Stam
“Give me a little more time, I’m having trouble understanding what’s going on.” This is the most common answer you get in France at the moment when you ask for an analysis of the conservative situation in the country. From outside France, the situation seems even more nebulous. So here is an attempt to put the events of the past few days in order:
On June 11, Éric Ciotti, leader of the conservative party Les Républicains (LR), announced an alliance with the far-right party Rassemblement National (RN) for the parliamentary elections on French television. He emphasized the existence of three “blocs” facing each other: on the left, an “unnatural alliance with the Insoumis”, by which he means Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s far-left party La France Insoumise (LFI), a “Macronist bloc that has brought the country to where it is today, with more violence, more insecurity”, and “a bloc of the right, a national bloc”.
In his opinion, however, the Republicans alone are “too weak to oppose the two most dangerous blocs“. The conservatives would therefore need an alliance with the RN in order to be represented in the National Assembly. Ciotti is thus the first leader of the bourgeois right to propose an agreement with the extreme right. If it comes to fruition, it would be the first of its kind in France.
For the Republicans, it’s all about damage control
His announcement led to an outcry in French politics and in the ranks of the Republicans. The leading representatives of the French conservatives vehemently rejected the decision and spoke of “dishonor”, “betrayal” and “opportunism”. They immediately voted to strip him of his party presidency. Ciotti refused to accept this and went to court to challenge the decision – where he was vindicated.
The LR managers, who are against Ciotti, then announced that they would examine a “more legally sound” exclusion of their chairman. A decision on this is still pending. Against the backdrop of the legal dispute, almost 400 LR candidates (excluding RN) are now in the election campaign. For the party, which had 61 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly, it will be a matter of damage limitation.
Absolute majority for the RN
The dynamic on the RN side is the exact opposite: following RN leader Jordan Bardella’s overwhelming result in the European elections, the far-right party is aiming to reach the threshold of 289 elected MEPs in the new National Assembly, which corresponds to an absolute majority. In the current legislative period, there were 88 MEPs. The candidates running as part of an alliance between the Republicans and the RN would have 60 to 70 seats.
The following anecdote shows what this shift in the balance of power on the right of the political spectrum in France means: After making ambiguous statements, Jordan Bardella announced that the extremelyunpopular pension reform would be withdrawn if the RN won the election. “It is not said that the pension reform will be withdrawn,” said Ciotti on French television. Bardella’s response followed promptly: “It is the RN that is leading this coalition”, he told the newspaper “Le Parisien”. Obviously, the RN does not want to let its new ally dictate its line.
Little remains of the once proud party
It is therefore easy to see that in an alliance with the RN, the Republicanswould only be a satellite party following the positions of Marine Le Pen and Bardella. It would be another nail in the coffin of the conservatives: The inauguration of Emmanuel Macron in 2017, who is pursuing a liberal and pro-European course, had already shattered the balance of the Republicans. Some of them then joined the president’s alliance, while others switched to the Rassemblement National.
Conclusion: The French conservatives can no longer be liberal-European and nationalist-identitarian at the same time. The coexistence of these two lines no longer works. What remains is only a fraction of the once proud party of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.
When Ursula von der Leyen steps into closed-door meetings these days, it’s expected that controversial debates will arise. Today, however, her focus isn’t on her potential re-election as Commission President. Instead, she’s attending the fourth Strategic Dialogue on Agriculture plenary session, a platform she initiated.
This initiative is also tied to von der Leyen’s ambition for a second term. By the end of summer, the committee – comprising representatives from diverse interests – aims to present its final report.
This timing could align perfectly to provide a clear agricultural policy framework for a potential second von der Leyen administration. The benefit for von der Leyen is significant: she can claim to be implementing the articulated will of the farmers, outmaneuvering EPP leader Manfred Weber, who has championed the EPP as the farmers’ party. Simultaneously, the report’s non-binding nature, requiring support from a broad spectrum of participants, ensures it remains flexible enough not to constrain the new Commission’s future actions.
So, today’s developments promise to be both exciting and intriguing, much like today’s edition of Europe.Table.
Have a wonderful weekend!
Your Julia Dahm
Feature
Sanctions: Why Berlin is preventing a tougher package against Russia
The Permanent Representatives of the Member States to the EU agreed on the 14th sanctions package after all on Thursday, albeit without tightening the so-called “no-Russia clause”. This was to be extended to subsidiaries of EU companies in order to close known loopholes in the comprehensive sanctions regime against Russia. On instructions from Berlin, the German EU ambassador had to oppose the extension and was criticized by his European partners. Suddenly, it was Germany and not Hungary that caused the delay.
The fact is that Germany, with its export-oriented industry, would be particularly affected by an extension of the “no-Russia clause”. There were also questions from the German side regarding legal certainty for the companies affected and the feasibility of the clause. The damage to the European economy would possibly be greater than the benefits with regard to the loopholes in the sanctions regime, according to fears. The EU Commission should therefore first examine the consequences.
Fear of bureaucratic hurdles
Companies in the EU would have had to contractually oblige subsidiaries in third countries to preventthe re-export of certain goods to Russia. These include spare parts for the aviation industry or high-tech products that the Russian arms industry could use. The Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations warns that the application of the existing “no-Russia clause” already presents EU companies with major bureaucratic challenges that US competitors, for example, do not currently face.
There is a growing risk that small and medium-sized companies will shy away from the expense and scale back their foreign business out of fear of violating sanctions or in view of the effort involved in checking. As an export nation, the German economy would be particularly affected by an extension of the clause. Due to complex supply chains, it is difficult to check compliance with the rules in practice. One example is when the subsidiary of a German company in Brazil delivers products to a customer in Kazakhstan, who then ships the sanctioned goods to Russia.
China does not accept clause
According to reports, however, trade with China would be particularly affected: the problem here is particularly great, as Chinese partners do not accept a “no-Russia clause”. China prohibits its companies from accepting the clause because it sees it as an extension of EU sanctions to its own jurisdiction.
In fact, the EU Commission’s proposal was primarily aimed at closing loopholes that allowed goods to reach Russia from the EU via China. A year ago, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had already warned that European goods were being delivered directly to Russia via companies in China.
Even if the companies are registered there, they are companies that do not necessarily have their headquarters in China. The EU Commission had found evidence that “around eight companies” were supplying sanctioned goods from the EU to Russia via third countries. According to information from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Russia purchased high-precision tools produced in the West for Russian weapons manufacturers.
Sanctions against Russian transit business with LNG
In Brussels, the German position was further complicated by differences between the Chancellery and the Office for Foreign Affairs. The reservations regarding the impact on the German economy came from the Chancellery, while the Foreign Office warned of the damage to Germany’s image if it blocked the clause. However, the “no-Russia clause” is now not off the table. The Permanent Representatives have instructed the Commission to address the open questions regarding legal certainty and feasibility in third countries and to submit a report.
In addition to the steps against loopholes, the 14th package includes sanctions against Russia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) business for the first time. Not against imports into the EU, but against the Russian transit business: in the future, Russia will no longer be allowed to useEuropean ports such as Zeebrugge in Belgium to ship LNG to third countries. According to a spokesperson for the EU Commission, four to six billion cubic meters of Russian liquefied natural gas were forwarded to third countries via European ports last year. According to reports, this involves transactions worth several billion euros.
Measures also against Russia’s hybrid warfare
The comprehensive package also includes measures against a dozen tankers belonging to the so-called shadow fleets, which Russia uses to circumvent the oil pricecap. Export controls on chemical products, plastics and electronics that could be used in the arms industry are being tightened. According to diplomats, sanctions against instruments of Russia’s hybrid warfare, i.e. financial aid from Moscow for NGOs, propaganda platforms or political parties, will also be added.
The member states will probably still have to formally agree at the meeting of foreign ministers next Monday before the 14th sanctions package can enter into force following publication in the Official Journal. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen welcomed the punitive measures despite thelast-minute weakening: The powerful package will make Russia’s access to key technologies even more difficult. With Birgit Jennen
EU foreign policy
European policy
KMU
Russland
Interview
EIB climate action expert: ‘Too much money is going into the wrong things’
Nancy Saich, Senior Climate Change Expert at the European Investment Bank (EIB).
Ms. Saich, climate policy sees a battle for a new climate finance target. Developing and emerging countries want hundreds of billions of euros in annual aid. What do you think the new financial target should look like?
The EIB has observer status in these negotiations. It is not our place to formulate our own demands. Personally, I hope that there will be new payments into the loss and damage fund in the course of the year. And regarding the new financial target, it is important that we don’t just need a number, we also need quality. The target must be ambitious, and yet everyone must be able to agree on it. My impression is that the troika from the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan and Brazil is very active. There are positive signals, but we are not nearly as fast as we should be. Far too much money continues to flow into the wrong things, such as subsidizing fossil fuels. That has to stop.
The EIB also lends climate loans to countries outside the EU. Where does the money go? To wealthy emerging countries with strong business opportunities, or to particularly disadvantaged countries that might need it more urgently?
We are a bank and we grant loans. However, with it, we can hardly solve the problems of already over-indebted countries. Even particularly low-interest loans or instruments such as the currently hotly debated “debt-for-nature swaps” would not help these countries. I think the solution for them is more likely to be found in the proposals of the Bridgetown Agenda.
The EIB is financing the EU’s Green Deal. After the shift to the right in the elections, how secure is the EIB’s continued climate leadership role?
The new EIB President Nadia Calviño, who has been in office since January, has made it clear: Continuing our work as a climate bank is one of her top priorities. We are working on our climate roadmap for 2026 to 2030, and our communication needs to be much stronger: A greener future benefits everyone, not just the climate. It will bring new jobs, better homes, cleaner air and better health. Our goal is a just climate transition that leaves no one behind. And these are not just empty words.
‘Far too much money continues to flow into the wrong things. That has to stop’
You say that too much money continues to flow into the wrong things. The EIB is one of the world’s largest financiers of climate action and sustainability. What criteria do private companies or the public sector must meet in order to receive a climate loan from you?
As the EU’s climate bank, we finance the Green Deal. We have set out 2020 in our climate roadmap: By the end of 2020, all EIB financial activities must be in line with the Paris Agreement. 50 percent of our loans are to flow into climate and green projects from 2025. And from 2021 to 2030, we want to support the fair, green transformation of the economy with investments of one trillion euros. Of course, we have not yet implemented everything, but we are making good progress. More than half of EIB lending now goes towards climate finance.
Which activities does the EIB fund and which does it rule out?
Since 2021, we have only been funding new activities that, according to the EIB-Paris Alignment Framework, help our clients meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. We focus our climate loans on the energy sector, namely renewable energies, energy efficiency, grids and electricity storage. We also grant loans for the expansion of local public transport and building refurbishment, for example. Since 2020, we generally no longer grant loans for conventional energy generation from fossil sources – however, we do not withdraw existing loans, as we are contractually bound to agreed projects as a public financial institution. We systematically examine all projects that are submitted to us for possible climate risks. We help our clients understand the impact of climate change on their business and how to reduce their emissions. And we support banks in green lending, for example to small and medium-sized enterprises or smaller municipalities.
‘Everything must be done in line with the Paris Agreement’
Would the EIB fund new natural gas projects or fossil fuel power generation with CCS?
Our standards exclude any form of electricity generation that produces more greenhouse gases than 250 grams of CO2 equivalent per kilowatt-hour. This makes us stricter than the EU taxonomy, which sets the limit at 270 grams. The 250-gram limit means that even the most efficient form of conventional fossil power generation is excluded – so we do not finance combined-cycle gas turbines, for example. However, highly efficient combined heat and power plants that supply residential areas with electricity and heat can meet our criteria. We do not finance the extraction of coal, oil or gas, nor do we finance pipelines or other fossil fuel infrastructure.
Because our mandate also requires us to finance other objectives. We support small and medium-sized enterprises and promote innovation in the education and healthcare sectors, such as the development of vaccines. There is currently also a growing interest in defense and digitalization loans. Not everything we do promotes the green transformation of Europe – after all, we can’t stop funding schools or hospitals. But everything must be done in line with the Paris Agreement. This means, for instance, that any hospital we fund is aware of its climate risks and is adapting accordingly. The other multilateral development banks, with whom we have been working closely on climate finance issues since Paris, use a similar approach.
CCS
Climate financing
Climate protection
EIB
EIB
Finance
KMU
Translation missing.
EU-Monitoring
June 24-25, 2024 Council of the EU: Agriculture and Fisheries Topics: Approval of the conclusions on the future of agriculture in the EU, Current legislative proposals, Information from the Romanian delegation on the introduction of eligibility of expenditure for the purchase of breeding animals under the CAP Strategic Plans. Provisional agenda
June 24, 2024; 8:30 a.m. Council of the EU: Foreign Affairs Topics: Exchange of views on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East, the Western Balkans and Georgia.Provisional agenda
June 25, 2024 Accession conference with Ukraine Topics: EU leaders and the Ukrainian government meet for accession talks.Info
June 25, 2024 Accession conference with Moldova Topics: EU leaders and the government of Moldova meet for accession talks.Info
June 25, 2024; 9 a.m. Council of the EU: General Affairs Topics: Policy debate on the Directive on the transparency of interest representation on behalf of third countries, exchange of views in preparation for the European Council meeting at June 27/28, 2024 (conclusions), hearing on Union values in Hungary (reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) TEU).Provisional agenda
June 27-28, 2024 European Council Topics: Ukraine, security and defense, competitiveness, foreign relations, the next legislative period.Provisional agenda
Translation missing.
News
Romania concedes: Dutchman Rutte can become NATO Secretary General
The way has been cleared for the appointment of Mark Rutte as the next Secretary General of NATO after months of deadlock. On Thursday, Romania was the last alliance state to announce that it would drop its opposition to the outgoing Dutch head of government being appointed to the top post.
Romania’s President Klaus Iohannis withdrew his own candidacy, as the presidential chancellery announced in Bucharest on Thursday. At the same time, Romania now supports Rutte’s candidacy, it added. This decision was made by the country’s supreme defense council (CSAT), which Iohannis chairs.
Recently, Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey had already takenthis step. For a long time, these three countries, together with Romania, were the only NATO states that had blocked the appointment of 57-year-old Rutte as Jens Stoltenberg’s successor. dpa
Verteidigungspolitik
European Parliament: Strack-Zimmermann wants to head defense committee
The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) is to become a full committee, according to the group leaders. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP) has announced that she will then apply for the chairmanship of the Defense Committee. Moritz Körner will continue to lead the German delegation of FDP MPs in the Renew Group. It consists of five MEPs. mgr
EU Parliament
FDP
ITRE
Renew
Renew
Iratxe García wants to continue leading the S&D Group
The current group leader Iratxe García Pérez wants to continue to lead the S&D Group in the European Parliament in the new legislative period. The Spanish socialist declared her candidacy in a letter to MEPs on Thursday. So far, no opposing candidates are foreseeable, according to group circles.
The 49-year-old PSOE politician has led the second-largest parliamentary group since 2019. She is not without controversy internally, partly due to her close ties to Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. In the most recent European elections, the PSOE won 20 seats, making it the second-largest delegation in the group behind the Italian PD. According to reports, its representatives are claiming to take over the office of President of the Parliament halfway through the legislative term. However, the EPP has also formulated claims to fill Roberta Metsola’s post for the entire term of office.
In her letter, García proposes that the Group “identify a number of common key political objectives and non-negotiable red lines”, which should serve as a benchmark for a hearing with the President-elect of the Commission in July. Until the election of the new Commission President, the group should also develop a thorough version of the Commission’s future work program. The demands should be the prerequisite for the support of the entire College of the Commission. tho
Europawahlen 2024
Volt: Party members vote on party affiliation
The pan-European party Volt is calling on its members to vote by Sunday. They should decide which political group Volt should join in the European Parliament. The choice is between the Greens/EFA and Renew groups, with which Volt has negotiated. The five elected MEPs unanimously recommend joining the Greens/EFA group. According to their own statements, they are convinced that they can achieve more for their own voters and Europe in this group. However, they want to bow to the vote of the members should their decision be different.
In the last legislature, Volt was represented in the EU Parliament by only one MEP, Damian Boeselager from Germany. At the time, Boeselager had joined the Greens/EFA. This time, Volt is entering the EU Parliament with five MEPs, which makes the party more interesting for both the Greens/EFA and Renew. Two MEPs come from the Netherlands, three from Germany.
Fight against right-wing populism
Various criteria also played a role in the decision this time, said Boeselager. For example, how the parliamentary groups had behaved in the past, which values and programs they represented and which committees they had offered Volt. And, of course, it was a matter of which parliamentary group would be better able to fulfill its own election promises. The aim is to form his own parliamentary group as quickly as possible.
According to information from Table.Briefings, the five MEPs opted for the Greens, among other reasons, because the parliamentary group is more credible in the fight against right-wing populist forces. This is a central concern of the party. Renew, on the other hand, is strongly in favor of the rule of law vis-à-vis the member states. However, the group still accepts parties such as ANO, a populist Czech party, and the VVD, which enabled the election of a Wilders government in the Netherlands, within its own ranks. vis
Europawahlen 2024
What the EU Commission criticizes about German economic policy
Too little investment, too high a trade surplus – this is how the EU Commission’s verdict on Germany can be summarized. On Wednesday, as part of the European Semester, the European Commission not only presented the procedures it intends to initiate against member states with high deficits. The Commission also published a country report and country-specific recommendations for each member state. As the Commission identified a “macroeconomic imbalance” for Germany – as it did for Cyprus, Hungary, Sweden and the Netherlands – it also published a detailed report on Germany’s macroeconomic risks.
In particular, Germany’s trade surplus and the associated low level of investment are criticized by the Commission. Although Germany’s trade surplus is a sign of German competitiveness, it also makes the country’s economy very dependent on foreign demand. Germany’s current “anemic” economic growth is partly due to this dependency. Because Germany is saving too much in relation to the investments made, the economy is not being sufficiently supported by domestic demand.
Commission criticizes low private investment
According to the Commission, this also hurts the rest of the EU. A greater willingness to consume or higher investment activity in Germany would also boost the economy of the entire EU thanks to the interconnectedness of the single market. Many other EU countries are unable to boost their economies due to their high debt levels.
The Commission criticizes the fact that private investment activity in Germany is lower than before the coronavirus pandemic. Although public investment has increased slightly, it is “insufficient” in view of the investment needs, especially at municipal level, where net investment has been negative for two decades. “Public investment can improve private investment”, write the EU Commission’s economists in their report. However, the Commission also criticizes the fact that administrative hurdles stand in the way of private investment.
The Commission also criticizes a “complex and opaque tax system“. The high-income taxes would not provide sufficient incentives to work more. The Commission also believes that other incentives are not set optimally in Germany. For example, corporate taxation is among the highest in the EU, while environment-related taxes are below the EU average. jaa
Debt
Economic policy
Investments
Konjunktur
Missing EU climate targets: Why Germany might have to pay 16.2 billion euros
Without immediate measures, twelve EU countries are projected to miss their national climate targets under the ESR, according to a study by the transport and environmental organization Transport & Environment (T&E). T&E analyzed the draft national energy and climate plans to reach this conclusion.
The ESR allocates allowed emission amounts to each member state for sectors outside the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), including road transport, buildings, small industries, waste and agriculture. Countries that fail to meet their ESR targets must purchase excess certificates from other countries. According to T&E, Germany could owe up to 16.2 billion euros due to shortfalls in the transport sector.
CO2 price forecasted at over 120 euros per ton
Data from the German Environment Agency (UBA) indicates that Germany will emit 126 million tons of CO2 equivalents above its ESR allocation. T&E bases its calculations on a certificate price of 129 euros, as projected by Bloomberg for the ETS sectors in 2030. The UBA estimates a price of 125 euros per ton of CO2.
Higher prices are primarily due to the scarcity of certificates. Germany alone would consume about 70 percent of the excess certificates available from other EU countries, given the 126 million ton shortfall forecasted by T&E. T&E warns that without immediate action, there will be a significant shortage of credits, as multiple countries are expected to miss their targets.
Italy also significantly missing targets
Italy is expected to require an additional 120 million emission credits under the ESR, potentially costing Rome up to 15.5 billion euros. Together, Germany and Italy would need 246 million certificates. However, only 180 million excess certificates are likely to be available from other member states. This means that ten other countries failing to meet their ESR targets would have no means to comply, leading to high costs for taxpayers in Germany and Italy.
Sebastian Bock, managing director of T&E Germany, criticizes the German government’s amendment to the climate change law, which abolished sector-specific targets, calling it a “sleight of hand”. He states, “Volker Wissing faces a clear choice: either pay billions to our European neighbors for delayed climate action or finally take climate protection in the transport sector seriously.” luk
Climate & Environment
EU climate policy
EU-Klimapolitik
Transport policy
Study: Why the EU is not competitive in critical technologies
A recent study by the lobby association Digital Europe shows that Europe is lagging behind its competitors in seven out of eight critical technology areas.The study, “The EU’s Critical Tech Gap“, analyzes Europe’s position in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors. The EU is only ahead in the area of connectivity, but is struggling to develop the market.
Large technology companies such as Apple, Google and Microsoft as well as national trade associations are represented in the Digital Europe association. It criticizes the EU’s current strategy. Digital Europe is calling for more investment and a stronger focus on growth and partnerships. Europe is too focused on protecting itself from risks. This leads to additional burdens for European companies and weakens their position in the global supply chain.
The study shows significant investment deficits in critical technology areas, particularly in AI, quantum computing and space technologies. Although the EU is strong in research and development, it is unable to translate these skills into production and commercialization. As a result, the economic benefits of these innovations are not being fully realized in Europe.
Targeted funding for research, development and infrastructure
Complex regulations also hinder the growth of European companies, which often have to switch to markets where conditions are simpler. A critical shortage of skilled workers in key areas such as AI engineering and quantum computing is further limiting Europe’s competitiveness.
The study recommends several measures to catch up. These include: Simplifying regulation, promoting public-private partnerships, targeted funding for research and development, major investments in infrastructure as well as education and training. Tax incentives should also be created and global partnerships strengthened. vis
Big Tech
Tennet: blame game between The Hague and Berlin
The governments in Germany and the Netherlands are blaming each other for the failure of talks on the sale of the German business of electricity grid operator Tennet. “The Dutch government has given us a very short deadline for a decision by July 1. Only the owner of Tennet Holding can control the process”, said a spokesperson for the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs in Berlin on Thursday.
The government in The Hague contradicted this account. “The talks have been going on for a year and a half. The July 1 deadline was set by Germany because it is no longer possible to adjust the budget for 2025 after this date. It is therefore essentially a German deadline”, a spokesperson for Dutch Finance Minister Steven van Weyenberg told Table.Briefings. The date also has nothing to do with a new Dutch government taking office.
‘Have explicitly not named July 1’
The fact is that the consultations for the 2025 federal budget should be completed by July 3. In mid-May, Weyenberg informed the Dutch parliament about the status of the negotiations. “The German government will conclude the budget negotiations for 2025 around July 1, 2024. A convincing and market-driven price that is compatible with the German budget rules must be agreed by this date“, the Finance Minister wrote in the letter.
The BMWK argues that the Dutch side itself derived a date for the end of the negotiations. “We expressly did not specify July 1 as the deadline”, said the Habeck spokesperson. In an interview with Table.Briefings in May, Tennet COO Tim Meyerjürgens justified the federal government’s investment in the grid operators with the long-term capital requirements: “Germany has over €300 billion in investments ahead of it in the transmission grid sector alone.” ber
EU tariffs: Where Chinese manufacturers already feel the effects
A survey has found that 73 percent of Chinese EV manufacturers have experienced a drop in sales in the European market due to the EU investigation into state subsidies. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Brussels presented the survey on Wednesday in cooperation with the state-run China Economic Information Service. 67 percent of the companies stated that the EU investigation had affected their brand’s reputation. According to the Chamber of Commerce, the survey was conducted in May and April this year among more than 30 manufacturers and suppliers in the Chinese EV industry.
The survey found that the investigation had a negative impact on cooperation with European partners: 82 percent of respondents were less confident about future investments in Europe. Accordingly, 83 percent of the companies surveyed stated that European dealers and leasing companies were less optimistic about the prospects for cooperation. Around two-thirds (67 percent) of respondents said that the European market was still of crucial importance and that they wanted to build production facilities in Europe within the next five years.
In the report, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce criticizes the EU Commission’s actions and claims it has deliberately overestimated the market share of Chinese EVs in Europe. Last week, the Brussels authority announced extra tariffs of up to 38.1 percent on Chinese EVs. In response, Beijing announced an anti-dumping investigation into European pork earlier this week. Both sides repeatedly emphasized that they wanted to resolve the conflict through negotiations. ari
EU
Trade
European Works Councils: What the Council has agreed on
The Council has agreed its general approach on the European Works Council (EWC) Directive. An agreement had been expected, although the German Liberals had previously expressed concerns.
In January, the Commission presented its proposal for a revision of the existing directive. Among other things, the aim is to close existing gaps in the establishment ofEuropean Works Councils and to better involve EWC members in cross-border decisions. In addition, EWCs are to be guaranteed effective access to court proceedings so that they can enforce their rights.
European Works Councils can represent European employees in companies with more than 1,000 employees that are active in at least two countries of the EU or the European Economic Area.
Sufficient time to comment before decisions are made
In its negotiating position, the Council stipulates, among other things, that:
The obligation to strive for gender equality in EWCs should not affect the national rules for the election and appointment of employee representatives;
That EWCs should be given sufficient time to express their views before a decision is taken that could affect them. If an EWC does not submit its opinion within a certain period, companies must not be prevented from taking a decision;
That access to court proceedings should be simplified by covering the costs of legal representation and participation;
That the list of factors that can determine a possible sanction should be retained. These include, for example, the size and financial situation of the company.
Criticism came from the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations, which sees the decision as a step towards more bureaucracy. “The Council’s position on the Works Council Directive is harmful”, says BDA Managing Director Steffen Kampeter. “With the planned directive, decision-making processes will become increasingly bureaucratically burdened and delayed.” The existing regulation works and is therefore sufficient. sas/lei
Employee rights
Social policy
Must-Reads
Column
What’s cooking in Paris? How the Republicans are grinding away at the Rassemblement National
By Claire Stam
“Give me a little more time, I’m having trouble understanding what’s going on.” This is the most common answer you get in France at the moment when you ask for an analysis of the conservative situation in the country. From outside France, the situation seems even more nebulous. So here is an attempt to put the events of the past few days in order:
On June 11, Éric Ciotti, leader of the conservative party Les Républicains (LR), announced an alliance with the far-right party Rassemblement National (RN) for the parliamentary elections on French television. He emphasized the existence of three “blocs” facing each other: on the left, an “unnatural alliance with the Insoumis”, by which he means Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s far-left party La France Insoumise (LFI), a “Macronist bloc that has brought the country to where it is today, with more violence, more insecurity”, and “a bloc of the right, a national bloc”.
In his opinion, however, the Republicans alone are “too weak to oppose the two most dangerous blocs“. The conservatives would therefore need an alliance with the RN in order to be represented in the National Assembly. Ciotti is thus the first leader of the bourgeois right to propose an agreement with the extreme right. If it comes to fruition, it would be the first of its kind in France.
For the Republicans, it’s all about damage control
His announcement led to an outcry in French politics and in the ranks of the Republicans. The leading representatives of the French conservatives vehemently rejected the decision and spoke of “dishonor”, “betrayal” and “opportunism”. They immediately voted to strip him of his party presidency. Ciotti refused to accept this and went to court to challenge the decision – where he was vindicated.
The LR managers, who are against Ciotti, then announced that they would examine a “more legally sound” exclusion of their chairman. A decision on this is still pending. Against the backdrop of the legal dispute, almost 400 LR candidates (excluding RN) are now in the election campaign. For the party, which had 61 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly, it will be a matter of damage limitation.
Absolute majority for the RN
The dynamic on the RN side is the exact opposite: following RN leader Jordan Bardella’s overwhelming result in the European elections, the far-right party is aiming to reach the threshold of 289 elected MEPs in the new National Assembly, which corresponds to an absolute majority. In the current legislative period, there were 88 MEPs. The candidates running as part of an alliance between the Republicans and the RN would have 60 to 70 seats.
The following anecdote shows what this shift in the balance of power on the right of the political spectrum in France means: After making ambiguous statements, Jordan Bardella announced that the extremelyunpopular pension reform would be withdrawn if the RN won the election. “It is not said that the pension reform will be withdrawn,” said Ciotti on French television. Bardella’s response followed promptly: “It is the RN that is leading this coalition”, he told the newspaper “Le Parisien”. Obviously, the RN does not want to let its new ally dictate its line.
Little remains of the once proud party
It is therefore easy to see that in an alliance with the RN, the Republicanswould only be a satellite party following the positions of Marine Le Pen and Bardella. It would be another nail in the coffin of the conservatives: The inauguration of Emmanuel Macron in 2017, who is pursuing a liberal and pro-European course, had already shattered the balance of the Republicans. Some of them then joined the president’s alliance, while others switched to the Rassemblement National.
Conclusion: The French conservatives can no longer be liberal-European and nationalist-identitarian at the same time. The coexistence of these two lines no longer works. What remains is only a fraction of the once proud party of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.
